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ABSTRACT
Previous studies of the first direct elections to the Hong Kong Legislative 
Council (LegCo) in 1991 were largely focused on the effect of the Tiananmen 
Incident on voters’ choice, neglecting the domestic dimension of social conflict 
evolving within Hong Kong from the 1970s. Adopting the social cleavage approach, 
the present thesis argues that two electoral cleavages, centre-periphery and collective 
consumption, were important by 1991. It, therefore, explores the international, social 
and political contexts within which the 1991 LegCo direct elections took place in 
order to explain the political alignments and electoral cleavages during the period 
1982-1991.
First, the study examines the Sino-British attitudes towards political reforms 
in Hong Kong and the development of the centre-periphery cleavage in the 1980s as 
the two countries negotiated the transfer of sovereignty. Second, the expansion of the 
Hong Kong Government’s activities and its privatisation programmes are analyzed in 
order to describe the increasingly intimate relations between government and society 
and to show that, as a result, conflicts evolved over issues of collective consumption. 
Third, the emerging competition at the time of the 1991 elections is discussed with 
reference to political mobilisation and alignments during the previous decade. 
Fourth, the electoral market of 1991 is examined to explain voters’ choice. Finally, 
the election results are analyzed to demonstrate that two electoral cleavages, 
centre-periphery and collective consumption, played a significant role.
The data used in this study were collected from: official documents, such as 
the Hong Kong Government Gazette, the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the Basic 
Law, the Hong Kong Census and By-census reports, the annual reports of various 
government departments; opinion polls and one exit poll of the 1991 LegCo direct 
elections; personal interviews with leading political leaders; campaign materials and 
election debates on television; and newspaper cuttings.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Scope and Purpose
Political change in Hong Kong in the 1980s and 1990s has its uniqueness. 
First of all, it is clear that Hong Kong will never become an independent state after 
the "decolonisation" process. The Chinese Government, whether under the rule of 
the Kuomintang (KMT) or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has never failed to 
assert its sovereignty over Hong Kong and has claimed to be able to restore it when 
she thinks fit. Unlike other British colonies, therefore, the transfer of power is not 
from the colonial government to the native people but to another sovereign state— 
China. Thus, the normal Westminster decolonization process leading to the 
establishment of a parliamentary sovereign state would not happen in Hong Kong. 
The destiny of Hong Kong was finally fixed in 1984 when Britain agreed to return 
Hong Kong to China in 1997.
Second, there has been a lack of widespread nationalist movements in Hong 
Kong since the 1940s. Without the intense mobilisation in society witnessed in the 
independence movements of other decolonising colonies, Hong Kong has failed to 
have an integrated political force and a popular leadership to represent the people’s 
views and interests, and to provide a vision of change. On the one hand, the 
traditional and economic elites have been isolated from the masses for decades and 
it would be very difficult to enlist support from the masses because of differences in 
values and interests between them. On the other hand, the newly emerging middle- 
class political activists do have some social support, but they are rather loosely
11
organized and not equipped well with the "will and might" to challenge the political 
status quo.
Third, the "pre-emptive" political reforms in the 1980s initiated by Britain 
have unleashed the "frozen" political force.1 At the organisational level, group- 
building efforts attempted by the political activists were induced in the early 1980s 
by the expected devolution of power as stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
in 1984 and the Chinese promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" after 
1997. This gave an institutional push to defrost the "frozen" political forces and 
eventually created a political market through which various political groups compete 
among themselves for the devolved political goods. At the individual level, the mass 
public was suddenly exposed to the still-in-the-making political market and subject to 
frequent political mobilisation drives by the political activists. Their political 
horizons were, in one way or another, extended, because "politics" was no more a 
taboo in society. The demystification of politics had removed psychological hurdles 
and eventually made society prone to political mobilisation. Moreover, the 
enfranchised public was reminded to think politically by the periodic advent of 
elections. More important is that the reform from above created a situation where 
the political power devolved orderly to the local society. This development 
contradicted the wishes of the Chinese Government. Any reforms, without the 
blessing of the Chinese Government, would not be accepted because Beijing questions 
the motive behind the reform and wants as little change in political structure as 
possible in the transitional period. But the ball is not in the Chinese court. The 
British Government still has the legitimate right to initiate as well as carry out its own 
policy in the transitional period, although consultation with China is required as 
stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. Moreover, the situation was
lrThe word "frozen" is used to describe the rather static nature of the politics of 
Hong Kong before the 1980s. See Peter Harris, Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucratic 
Politics (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1978), p. 132.
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further complicated by the fact that the democrats2, whose political value and 
orientation differed from that of the Beijing Government, especially after the 
Tiananmen Incident in 1989, were supported by the majority of Hong Kong voters 
in the 1991 Legislative Council (LegCo) first-ever direct elections. Out of the 18 
directly elected seats of the LegCo, the democrats won 16. More important was the 
fact that none of the leftist candidates got elected.3 It is very strange to have such 
a complicated and subtle relationship among the colonial government, the colonized, 
and future sovereign state of the colonized.
Under such peculiar circumstances, how to comprehend the collective 
behaviour of the Hong Kong voters and the results of the 1991 LegCo direct elections 
are, thus, important topics to explore. Individuals do not live in isolation. They are 
social beings and, thus, cannot avoid interaction with the society. So, individual 
behaviour has its social and contextual dimensions. In other words, the electoral 
choice of voters, though made individually, has something to do with the specific 
social configurations and conditions which prevailed at the election time. With this 
understanding in mind, what this thesis plans to study is the identification of the 
social cleavage lines that help shape the voters’ choice and serve as the basis of 
mobilisation during the 1991 LegCo direct elections. It also attempts to explore the 
following related questions: what specific social conditions in the 1980s contributed 
to the salience of particular cleavage lines among the political elites? How these 
cleavage lines structured the development of political groups (parties) in the 1980s? 
Under what political conditions, do these political groups establish linkage and 
network with the electorate? How effective are the mobilisation efforts of these 
political groups? What implications do these cleavages have for the future political
2The democrats are those who support faster pace of democratisation and who 
advocate more welfare to the low-income groups and the poor. The democrats mostly 
come from the new middle-class of professionals, intellectuals, social workers, 
lawyers, and so on.
3Oriental Daily News, 17 September 1991, p. 3; Sing TaoJih Pao, 17 September 
1991, p. 23.
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change of Hong Kong in general, and the development of party system and electoral 
competition in particular?
The period 1981-91 is chosen for the present study for several reasons: only 
the reforms in the 1980s have changed the franchise system to allow mass 
participation; only the expansion of the franchise has transformed Hong Kong’s 
political ecology significantly and paved the way for the emergence of electoral 
politics; and only in the period under study do we witness the widespread political 
mobilisation that has never been seen in the history of Hong Kong.
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Literature Review
Given that universal suffrage in Hong Kong was only introduced at the district 
level in 1982 and at the central level in 1991, it is not surprising to find that there 
were not many academic electoral studies in the 1980s. As one study has suggested, 
there were altogether 67 voting behaviour surveys in the period 1970-91, and nearly 
half of them (N=32) were conducted in 1991.4 Furthermore, most of them were 
conducted by civic or community groups, or commissioned by the mass media. The 
objective of the former to conduct voting behaviour survey was to mobilise the mass 
public’s electoral awareness, while that of the latter was to attract readers’ or 
audiences’ attention by predicting the winners in the electoral "horse races". Thus, 
nearly all of these surveys are descriptive in nature rather than explanatory. As 
shown in the same study, only nine voting surveys (with reports) were conducted by 
academics.5 Nevertheless, over twenty articles on the 1991 elections were added to 
the stock of voting studies in Hong Kong in late 1992 and 1993.6
Among this literature, it appears that only one research paper seeks to analyze 
the electoral expression of social contradiction and its relations with electoral support. 
It was conducted by Leung Sai-wing and published in 1993 under the title "The
4Louie Kin-sheun and Wan Po-san, Voting Behaviour of the Hong Kong 
Electorate: A Review of the Past Studies, Paper submitted to Steering Group on Study 
of Voting Behaviour, Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education, Hong Kong, 
March 1992, p. 27, appendix 2. (Copy supplied by Louie Kin-sheun to me on 15 
June 1993.)
5Ibid., pp. 22-4.
6These included: Rowena Kwok, Loan Leung and Ian Scott, eds., Votes Without 
Power: The Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections 1991 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1992); Jermain T.M. Lam and Jane C. Y. Lee, The Political Culture 
of the Voters in Hong Kong: A Study of the Geographical Constituencies o f the 
Legislative Council in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: City Polytechnic of Hong Kong, 
1992a); Jermain T.M. Lam and Jane C.Y. Lee, "Allegiance, Apathy, or Alienation? 
The Political Culture of Professional Constituency Voters in Hong Kong," Issues & 
Studies 28,7(1992b):76-109; Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds., Hong Kong 
Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993).
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’China Factor’ in the 1991 Legislative Council Election: The June 4th Incident and 
Anti-Communist China Syndrome”.7 Leung argues that "it was the socialization of 
alienation through political events, with the June 4th Incident as the climax, during 
the transitional period of Hong Kong that resulted in the besieging of pro-China 
candidates by an anti-Communist China sentiment and in the landslide victory of the 
democratic camp in the 1991 [LegCo] direct election. "8 Furthermore, Leung also 
indicates that some Hong Kong people, especially the younger generation, have 
evolved an "anti-Communist China syndrome". The syndrome that he refers to is "an 
integrated set of political attitudes, with the distrust of the Chinese government as the 
centrifugal force, from which other related political attitudes, or even political 
actions, are derived. "9
The popular reason advanced to account for the landslide victory of the 
democrats, especially those of the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK) and the 
Meeting Point (MP), in the 1991 first-ever LegCo direct elections was the Tiananmen 
Incident complex or the "anti-Communist China syndrome" among the Hong Kong 
voters. It is true that the events in the Tiananmen Square in 1989 had reinforced the 
Hong Kong people’s long-term distrust of the Communist Chinese Government, and 
thus contributed to their support for the democrats’ candidates. But it might not be 
the sole factor in shaping the voters’ electoral choices. What is left untouched are 
the domestic political contradictions and their linkages with China. In the mid-1980s, 
two conflicts seem to occupy the domestic political scene. First, the political conflict 
between the Hong Kong Government, the conservatives10 and the leftists11 on the
7Leung Sai-wing, "The ’China Factor’ in the 1991 Legislative Council Election: 
The June 4th Incident and Anti-Communist China Syndrome," in Lau Siu-kai and 
Louie Kin-sheun, eds., Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University 
of Hong Kong, 1993), pp. 187-235.
'Ibid., p. 192.
9Ibid„ pp. 219-20.
10The conservatives are those who support the political status quo and want as
little political reform as possible, who also value the efficiency of the market and
16
one hand, and the democrats on the other, over the political reforms in the 
transitional period, as well as between the conservatives and the democrats over the 
future political model of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region (HKSAR). 
Second, the conflict between the Hong Kong Government and Hong Kong society 
over the privatisation scheme and related measures. The picture becomes more 
complicated because of China’s growing involvement in the domestic politics. It is 
a logical development as Hong Kong becomes part of China after 1997. The 
problems are: under what conditions do the two sides meet with each other, and what 
attitude does the Chinese Government adopt to frame the new political relationship 
and order between herself and Hong Kong.
oppose greater spending on welfare. The conservatives mostly come from the 
business sector, rural and local communities.
nThe term "leftists" is used, throughout this thesis, to denote those people or 
organisations that are affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or its 
related organisations, and also those who are the supporters of the CCP.
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Theoretical Framework
It is useful to clarify a number of terms and concepts, such as democratisation, 
political cleavage, political mobilisation, partisan alignment, and so on, which have 
been the subject of academic debate, so as to provide a theoretical framework for this 
study.
Democratisation and Elections
As advanced by Samuel P. Huntington, there are several conditions 
contributing to the democratisation of the non-democratic regimes. They are:12
a. declining legitimacy and the performance dilemma;
b. economic development and economic crises;
c. religious changes;
d. new policies of external actors; and
e. demonstration effects or snowballing.
Although the relative significance of the above-mentioned objective conditions
may vary, Huntington has included in his analysis a subjective dimension of
democratic transition, that is, the "will and skill" of political leaders throughout the
democratisation process. To borrow his words,
General factors create conditions favorable to democratization. They 
do not make democratization necessary, and they are at one remove 
[s/c] from the factors immediately responsible for democratization. A 
democratic regime is installed not by trends but by people. 
Democracies are created not by causes but by causers. Political 
leaders and publics have to act. . . . 13
12Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century (Norman & London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 45-106.
nIbid., p. 107.
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What is democratisation, then? Put simply, democratisation denotes the 
process of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. In the process of 
democratisation, Stein Rokkan has identified four sequential thresholds:
a. legitimation: the recognition of the right of petition, criticism against the 
regime, and the protection of the rights of assembly, expression, etc;
b. incorporation: the granting of equal right to choose representatives to the 
opposition and their potential supporters;
c. representation: the lowering of institutional barriers for the representation of 
the opposition; and
d. executive power: the opening of the executive organ to legislative pressure, 
or the direct influence of the legislature on executive decision-making.
The emergence of competitive mass politics depends on the crossing of the first two 
thresholds, while the institutional development of mass politics relies on the crossing 
of the last two thresholds. The lowering of one threshold would sooner or later 
generate pressure on the change of the other, but the transition to other higher 
thresholds would not be automatic.14
Furthermore, Rokkan has also suggested "four steps of change" in the process 
of electoral mobilisation:15
a. incorporation: the inclusion of the former disfranchised publics;
b. mobilisation: the mobilisation of the enfranchised in electoral contests;
c. activation: the encouragement of direct participation in public life; and
d. politicisation: the intrusion of national parties into local elections.
Although scholars and the public have different interpretations of the word 
"democracy" and the exact constitution of democratic rule, one thing that can be 
certain is the minimum institutional requirement that the top decision-makers should 
be elected periodically by means of an open, fair, popular and competitive election.
14For details and related political changes, see Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, 
Parties (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), pp. 79-96.
l5Ibid., p. 227.
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If we use this ideal criterion to measure Hong Kong’s political reforms implemented 
to date, we can only describe the moves so far as "liberalisation" rather than 
"democratisation” of the colonial structure; for liberalisation means "the partial 
opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing governmental leaders through 
freely competitive elections".16 In the context of Hong Kong, although only 18 
seats, out of 60 seats, are opened for direct election and the post of chief executive 
is still not determined by means of election, the 1991 LegCo direct elections can be 
regarded as a competitive one because the participants, whether candidates or voters, 
are free to enter or exit the election. The distribution of the remaining 42 members 
are as follow: 3 official appointed members, 18 non-official appointed members, and 
21 elected members through functional constituency.
Whatever it may be, liberalisation or democratisation, once the competitive 
elections and universal franchise have been put in place in a state, the institutional 
threshold of political participation will be lowered. The absorption of the newly 
mobilized persons into the "network of electoral institutions" may have a 
"deinstitutionalizing effect" on the existing political order. As a result, the "decay 
of institutionalized patterns of behavior" has given the original, excluded politicians 
an opportunity of jockeying for power through the newly instituted competitive 
electoral system.17 Subsequently, modem mass political parties would be formed 
to fight the electoral battle. Through the help of political parties, the public have 
been, in one way or another, incorporated into the national political process. Joseph 
LaPalombara and Myron Weiner have aptly described the situation:
16Huntington (1991), op. cit., p. 9.
17Adam Przeworski, "Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization 
the Source of Decay?" American Political Science Review 69 (1975):49-67.
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Where the suffrage is greatly restricted, local electoral committees are 
simply not needed; where it is expanded, the need to woo the masses 
is strongly felt. What was once a struggle limited to an aristocratic 
elite or small groups of notables now becomes a major drama in which 
large segments of the citizenry play an active role.18
The most controversial and critical issue during the transition seems to be ’’the 
production of contingent consent" on a set of election rules that the ensuing national 
elections will be based upon.19 All the concerned parties will try to shape the 
election rules to their favour, "for the party that wins the transition election plays a 
key role in the consolidation of democracy, often writing a new constitution, deciding 
the fate of the old guard, and rewriting the ’rules of the game’".20 Guillermo 
O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter highlight three critical dimensions in finding 
such consent of procedural democracy:21
a. eligibility of participants and threshold for representation;
b. electoral formula ("workable majorities" vs "accurate representation"); and
c. "the structure of offices for which national elections are held"
("parliamentarism" vs "presidentialism").
At a "founding election", it is said that the election outcome would be highly 
uncertain because of the inexperience of voters in choosing candidates, weak identity
18Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "The Origin and Development of 
Political Parties," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties 
and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 9.
19Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore & London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 59.
20"Transition election" is "the first national electoral contests which follow the 
restoration of political freedom". See Nancy Bermeo, "Redemocratization and 
Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and Portugal," Comparative Politics 19 
(1987):213.
210 ’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), op. cit., pp. 59-60.
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of voters with parties, unclear candidates’ image, and the unreliability of survey 
results.22
Nancy Bermeo, however, has proposed three structural factors that may have 
"the strongest effect" on the outcome of the "transition election":23
a. the patterns of regime transformation: revolution or reform;
b. the class configurations; and
c. the critical role of semiopposition.
The term "semiopposition" is used by Juan Linz to describe groups "that are not 
dominant or represented in the governing group but that are willing to participate in 
power without fundamentally challenging the regime" and thus, can be considered as 
"Being partly ’out’ [of] and partly ’in’ power".24
Concept of Political Cleavages
If the statement "politics arises from the existence of cleavages" is assumed 
to be true,25 then, social cleavages exist in every political community, no matter 
what the form of government or political system may be. The problem is by what 
means can we identify these cleavages. Probably, elections may provide the
22"Founding elections" means "for the first time after an authoritarian regime, 
elected positions of national significance are disputed under reasonably competitive 
conditions". See ibid., pp. 57 & 61.
23Nancy Bermeo, "Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of 
Spain and Portugal," Comparative Politics 19 (1987):213.
24Juan Linz, "Opposition in and under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of 
Spain," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., Regime and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1973), pp. 191-2.
^Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 21.
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appropriate occasion to detect them, as elections are said to serve as "a measure of 
social divisions” and "provide information on the extent to which society is organised 
and divided by such factors as religion, class and ethnicity”.26 This is particularly 
the case in "competitive” elections.
Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor have defined cleavages as:
the criteria which divide the members of a community or 
subcommunity into groups, and the relevant cleavages are those which 
divide members into groups with important political differences at 
specific times and places.27
Ronald Inglehart indicates that if a political community is divided into groups 
that particularly favour certain policies and parties for a period of time, political 
cleavages are said to be present. He described political cleavages as "relatively stable 
patterns of polarization" in a political system.28
As political conflicts are of different natures and forms in different societies, 
political cleavages will then be organized along different bases of social divisions. 
The following scholars have put forward various types of cleavages.
Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan suggest four critical cleavages:
a. subject-dominant culture (centre-periphery);
b. church-govemment (church-state);
c. primary-secondary economy (land-industry); and
d. workers-employers (worker-owner).
26Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, Elections and Voters (Hampshire: 
MacMillan, 1987), p. 173.
27Rae and Taylor (1970), op. cit., p. 1.
28Ronald Inglehart, "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western 
Societies," in Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, eds., 
Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 25.
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The first two and the last two cleavages are the direct products of national and 
industrial revolutions, respectively.29
Rae and Taylor have differentiated three types of cleavage:30
a. ascriptive (race or caste);
b. attitudinal ("opinion" cleavages as ideology or preference);
c. behavioral ("act" cleavage elicited through voting and organizational
membership).
Huntington suggests that three major cleavages will develop when society
moves from being industrial to postindustrial:31
a. group cleavage: that is divisions between declining and rising social forces;
between declining forces; and between rising social forces in terms of social 
status, economic position, and numerical strength.
b. institutional cleavage: that is party conflict, legislative-executive conflict,
state-national conflict, executive bureaucracy-mass media conflict.
c. ideological (political goals and values) cleavage: that is between modem and 
traditional groups; among modernizing groups of bourgeoisie, the military, 
and intellectuals over values of development, efficiency, and egalitarianism.
In the past decade, the literature on electoral cleavage is mainly divided over 
the discussion of production-based (class) and consumption-based (sectoral) cleavages. 
Before the late 1970s, class voting research had received wide acceptance in Western 
academic circles, especially in Britain. In the late 1970s, this trend was challenged 
by Patrick Dunleavy, who incorporated the concept of consumption cleavages in
29Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and 
Voter Alignment: An Introduction," in Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party 
System and Voter Alignments (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 14.
30Rae and Taylor (1970), op. cit.t p. 1.
31Samuel P. Huntington, "Postindustrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?" 
Comparative Politics 6 (1974): 163-191.
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explaining electoral behaviour.32 Dunleavy argues that with the expansion of state 
activities and state intervention into the consumption process, sectoral cleavages 
(collective vs individualized consumption) would emerge and crosscut the existing 
class cleavages. Hence, class voting may decline and give way to accommodate 
sectoral voting. The sectoral cleavage model is basically developed out of the thesis 
of collective consumption in urban politics advanced by Manuel Castells in 1972.33
Inglehart argues that the value-based polarization of materialist-postmaterialist 
issues has entered into the political arena.34 He suggests that when the 
postmaterialist issues, such as environmentalism, the women’s movement, the peace 
movement, the consumer advocacy movement, come to the centre of political debates, 
the materialist reaction of much of the working class would be stimulated to reassert 
the traditional materialist value of economic growth, security, and law and order. 
This may help to neutralize the class-based cleavage and eventually pave the way for 
electoral and partisan change. Parties of the Left will be divided over the 
postmaterialist issues and, thus, suffer a net flow of support to the Right. This 
perspective is also known as the "new politics thesis".35
32Patrick Dunleavy, "The Urban Basis of Political Alignment: Social Class, 
Domestic Property Ownership, and State Intervention in Consumption Processes," 
British Journal o f Political Science 9 (1979):409-443; Patrick Dunleavy, "The 
Political Implications of Sectoral Cleavages and the Growth of State Employment: 
Part 1, The Analysis of Production Cleavages," Political Studies 28 (1980):364-383; 
Patrick Dunleavy, "The Political Implications of Sectoral Cleavages and the Growth 
of State Employment: Part 2, Cleavage Structure and Political Alignment," Political 
Studies 28 (1980):527-549.
33Manuel Castells, City, Class and Power (Hampshire: MacMillan, 1978), chapter
2 .
34Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles 
Among Western Publics (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); Inglehart 
(1984), op. cit.
35Oddbjom Knutsen, "Political Cleavages and Political Alignment in Norway: The 
New Politics Thesis Reexamined," Scandinavian Political Studies 9 (1986):235-263.
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In a review article discussing cleavage models, Arend Lijphart has included 
foreign policy, regime support, participatory democracy, and ecological dimensions 
on the top of those types proposed by Lipset and Rokkan.36
Political Mobilisation, Political Party 
and Partisan Alignment
Although there are various types of cleavage, as mentioned above, only a few 
of them may find electoral expression and serve as the basis for partisan alignment 
(see Figure 1). The salience of particular cleavages may depend on the availability 
and nature of political cleavages presented at the time of introduction of universal 
franchise. Given that the election results would decide who or which party has the 
mandate to rule within a pre-defined period of time, and the legitimacy to allocate or 
distribute political goods and social resources, different political forces would align 
with those of similar values to form political groups or parties and mobilize people 
for electoral support. Thus, political parties would act as an agent to politicise the 
cleavages and to mobilize them for electoral support.
36Arend Lijphart, "The Cleavage Model and Electoral Geography: A Review," 
in R.J. Johnston, F.M. Shelley, and P.J. Taylor, eds., Developments in Electoral 
Geography (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 143-50.
26
Mobilisation, here, is conceptualised as:
a composite process involving several stages:
(a) the existence of values and goals requiring mobilization.
(b) action on the part of leaders, elites or institutions seeking to 
mobilize individuals and groups.
(c) the institutional and collective means of achieving this mobilization.
(d) the symbols and references by which values, goals and norms are 
communicated to, and understood as well as internalized by, the 
individuals involved in mobilization.
(e) the process by which mobilization takes place in terms of individual 
interaction, the creation and change of collectivities and structure, the 
crystallization of roles, the effect on subsystems and their boundaries.
(f) estimates of the numbers of people (or proportion of a population) 
mobilized and the degree of such mobilization for different sectors or 
strata of the population.37
In other words, political mobilisation "is to be considered as differential commitment 
and support for collectivities based on cleavages”.38
The seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan in Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments provided the theoretical linkage between cleavage structure, party systems, 
and voter alignment.39 They argued that the incorporation of rank-and-file voters 
into the electoral process as a result of the introduction of universal franchise in most 
European countries and the presence of social cleavages in the political community 
would help to shape the development of party systems. Political parties are said to 
be an "agent of conflict and instrument of integration". On the one hand, a political 
party is only a "part" of the political system; it needs to compete with others for 
power. Conflict, thus, is hard to prevent. On the other hand, when a party is 
engaged in the established political game, it certainly works to mobilize voters to 
support its own cause. As a result of such mobilisation, the former, loosely knitted 
local community would be integrated with the national political process.
37J.P. Nettl, Political Mobilization: A Sociological Analysis o f Methods and 
Concepts (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), p. 33.
™Ibid., p. 126.
39Lipset and Rokkan (1967), op. cit., pp. 1-64.
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Alan S. Zuckerman argues that the nature and extent of political cleavage 
depends on the interplay between party leadership and the "variable strength of the 
social bonds". The term "social bonds" is described as "tightly knit networks of 
interaction" in which "most individuals interact with others on many dimensions and 
exist within variably bound groups". Therefore, its meaning is different from Karl 
Marx’s concept of class. He also argues that only politicized networks of interaction 
would give rise to the persistent political divisions, and political divisions would be 
either widespread or persistent, and vice versa.40
Political parties make use of the media and the "tightly knit networks of 
interaction" to convey their respective value systems and policy positions to the 
public. In order to differentiate from other political parties, the traditional view of 
conducting election campaigns has been said to adopt a "direct confrontation" method 
and focuses on the party difference over a set of issues or policies. But Ian Budge 
and Dennis Farlie point out that parties actually tend to emphasise selectively their 
"own" issue or policy areas.41 That is what they call the "saliency theory" of party 
competition.
As a result, social or economic divisions that have found political (electoral) 
expression may serve as the basis of cleavage, cutting or cross-cutting the electorate 
into several slices. Party competition and electoral battles would, then, be fought 
along these lines of cleavage. Although Lipset and Rokkan have claimed that the 
Western party system has been frozen for nearly half-a-century, actually the shift of 
the cleavage line may cause the realignment of political forces.42 Parties that have 
responded adequately to the new shift and absorbed the new cleavages into their own
40Alan S. Zuckerman, "New Approaches to Political Cleavage: A Theoretical 
Introduction," Comparative Political Studies 15 (1982): 137-40.
41Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, "Party Competition: Selective Emphasis or Direct 
Confrontation? An Alternative View with Data," in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, 
eds., Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change (Beverly Hills: Sage, 
1983), pp. 269-72.
42Lipset and Rokkan (1967), op. cit.
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programmes will survive. Parties that have failed to adapt will witness a significant 
decline of electoral support and fade away eventually. Electoral volatility may then 
happen and pave the way for dealignment or realignment of political forces. The 
study of electoral volatility (change, dealignment, realignment) therefore has received 
much attention from students in the field.43
The ebb and flow of a particular social cleavage will cause a long-term change 
in the party system. As suggested above, the rise of postmaterialist values in Western 
Europe has crosscut the parties of the left. The line of reasoning is that when a party 
fails to respond to the emerging critical cleavages, the decline of electoral support 
may be expected, and those parties that can represent the new cleavage may witness 
a significant gain of vote.
But the same logic would not apply to the type of election that has taken place 
in a "non-competitive" system. Since the whole exercise of election is devised to 
legitimatize the pre-determined outcome, the electoral result would not really reflect 
the societal cleavages. There is no such thing as partisan alignment and party system
43Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral 
Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ian Budge, "Electoral Volatility: Issue Effects 
and Basic Change in 23 Post-War Democracies," Electoral Studies 1 (1982): 147-168; 
David Butler and Donald Strokes, Political Change in Britain: the Evolution of 
Electoral Choice, 2nd ed. (London: MacMillan, 1974); Herome M. Clubb, W.H. 
Flanigan, and N.H. Zingale, Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government 
in American History, Westview Encore ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1990); Ivor Crewe 
and D. Denver, eds., Electoral Change in Western Democracies (Beckenham: Croom 
Helm, 1985); Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Pail Allen Beck, eds., 
Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert H. Salisbury and Michael 
MacKuen, "On the Study of Party Realignment," Journal o f Politics 43 (1981):523- 
530; James L. Sundquist, Dynamics o f the Party System: Alignment and Realignment 
of Political Parties in the United States, rev. ed., (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1983).
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change in that kind of election. So, some scholars describe this as "state-controlled" 
elections.44
^Guy Hermet, "State-Controlled Elections: A Framework," in Guy Hermet, 
Richard Rose and Alain Rouquie, eds., Elections Without Choice (London: 
MacMillan, 1978), pp. 1-18; for elections in socialist states, see Robert K. Furtak, 
ed., Elections in Socialist States (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990a).
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Organisation of the Thesis
Following on from this introductory chapter (Chapter One), the remainder of 
the thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter Two: Historical Setting: The State and The Society
The political context under which the political reforms in the 1980s took place 
is examined. Topics included are: the nature of the Colonial state, the social 
compositions and their political orientations, the reasons for no serious challenge to 
colonialism, and the unusual decolonisation process in the early 1980s. By putting 
in this context, subsequent developments can be properly comprehended.
Chapter Three: The Rise of the Centre-Periphery Cleavage
This chapter charts the development of centre-periphery cleavage in the 1980s, 
in which the contradiction between the British-Hong Kong Government and the Hong 
Kong society was gradually transformed to that of the Chinese Government and Hong 
Kong society. The focal point is the pace and direction of liberalisation or 
democratisation in the transitional period. Attempts are also made to examine the 
efforts of all the concerned parties to mobilise support for their favoured political 
models before and after 1997.
Chapter Four: Government Expansion and Collective Consumption Cleavage
This chapter demonstrates the expanding activities of the Hong Kong 
Government and the formation of the collective consumption cleavage. The reason 
for privatisation since the mid-1980s is also examined and the example of public 
housing programmes is used to illustrate the trend of privatisation. The more the 
government intervenes in the society, the more the impact of the government policies 
upon the society; the more the government policies grow in scope and depth, the 
higher the proportion of people being drawn into the political process. As a result, 
any change in policy direction will meet with protest from the affected sector(s) and 
any move to privatize the collective consumption goods, such as public housing, 
hospital service, education, and so on, will cause shifts in electoral support.
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Chapter Five: The Development and Alignment of Political Forces
This chapter examines the various stages of development of political forces 
within Hong Kong and their alignments since the 1970s. The structural factors 
leading to the transformation of pressure groups into election-oriented political groups 
is also studied. Social origin of the political forces and their ideology as well as 
policy location are examined so as to ascertain the nature of the forces and the 
political (electoral) universe in which the electorate weigh each political force and cast 
their votes accordingly. By tracing the origins and the alignment of various political 
forces in the 1980s, a budding party system emerges.
Chapter Six: Political Mobilisation and Electoral Choices
This chapter focuses on the mobilisation efforts the relevant electoral 
participants had made in the 1991 LegCo direct elections, including both the Chinese 
and the British Governments. The reason for including this chapter is to provide the 
immediate context wherein the electors are exposed to the universe of the political 
market during an intense election campaign period. Through the media reports and 
features, individual voters may acquire the relevant information for deliberation. At 
the same time, we can identify the issues or policies that the candidates and parties 
want to stress and sell to the electorate.
Chapter Seven: Analysis of the 1991 LegCo Direct Elections Results
By the help of survey and aggregate data, this chapter explores the election 
results of the 1991 LegCo direct elections and tries to comprehend the result within 
the theoretical framework mentioned above. The former includes exit poll and survey 
of electoral behaviour. The latter comprises the 1991 Census and electoral return 
data.
Chapter Eight: Conclusion
This chapter argues the presence of two electoral cleavages, i.e. the centre- 
periphery and the collective consumption cleavages, in the 1991 LegCo direct 
elections, and examines various possible scenarios that may occur in the future 
electoral competition in Hong Kong.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL SETTING:
THE STATE AND THE SOCIETY
Hong Kong as a British Colony
The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong comprises three parts: the Island of 
Hong Kong, the Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories. Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon were ceded in perpetuity to Britain in 1842 and 1860, respectively. The 
New Territories were leased to Britain for a period of 99 years from 1898.
Like other British colonies, Hong Kong is headed by a powerful governor, 
who is formally appointed by the Queen (King) of the United Kingdom.45 The 
Governor is supported administratively by the Government Secretariat.46 Before the 
1980s, the highest level of the government bureaucracy was dominated by non- 
Chinese expatriates. As in other colonies, an appointed Executive Council and 
Legislative Council (ExCo and LegCo) have been set up to advise and assist him to 
rule the colony.47 Although the power is highly concentrated in the Governor’s
45For an introduction to Hong Kong’s political system, see Norman Miners, The 
Government and Politics o f Hong Kong, 5th ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University 
Press, 1991).
46The Government Secretariat was known as the Colonial Secretariat before 1976.
47For the development of the British colony’s legislature before the Second World 
War, see Martin Wight, The Development of the Legislative Council 1606-1945
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hands, he is kept under the supervision and co-ordination of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office.48 In fact, Britain has seldom intervened into the local
affairs, except for those matters related to security and foreign relations, since the
Second World War. This is especially the case after the granting of financial
autonomy in 1958. Mr John Walden, the former Director of Home Affairs who
retired in 1980, outlined the relations between the British and the Hong Kong
Governments as follows:
. . .  the British Government gave the Governor of Hong Kong and his 
small team of civil servants an almost unfettered hand in the way they 
governed Hong Kong. The Government, though colonial in origins, 
was in no sense a creature of the British Government. . . . Britain 
rarely tried to exert pressure upon the Hong Kong Government.49
In addition, the Governor himself has generally been a British civil servant 
without any vested interest in Hong Kong and has been subject to a fixed term of 
service. Because of such a peculiar relationship, the Hong Kong Government is 
operated actually by bureaucrats who are insulated from public pressure. 
Nevertheless, "the well-meaning traditional paternalism of British Colonial 
Governors" would be to care about the welfare of the colonial people.50
Under the pressure to have more overseas markets as a result of the 
tremendous enhancement of productive capacity brought about by industrialisation 
since the sixteenth century, the British traders, like their counterparts in other
(London: Faber & Faber, 1946). The LegCo has started to have elective elements 
since 1985.
48The Hong Kong Government was supervised by the Colonial Office until the re­
organisation in 1968. Since then, the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office have 
merged to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
49John Walden, Excellency, Your Gap is Growing! Six Talks on a Chinese 
Takeaway (Hong Kong: All Noble Co. Ltd., 1987), p. 89.
50John Walden, Excellency, Your Gap is Showing! Six Critiques on British 
Colonial Government in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Corporate Communications Ltd., 
1983), p. 9.
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European countries, had travelled to Asia for the sake of trade expansion. The 
colonisation of Hong Kong was, therefore, initiated by British traders and arose solely 
out of economic considerations. It seems quite normal that the ensuing colonial 
government has often come under the influence of those who have a vested interest 
in trading with China. Their influence can be well reflected in their nearly exclusive 
appointment to the LegCo and the ExCo.51 Furthermore, these traders maintained 
strong ties with Britain.52 The presence of these metropolitan capitalists dominated 
the input from society in the early period of colonial rule, probably up to the 
1920s.53
Accompanying the establishment of the Crown Colony was the flourishing of 
the entrepot trade and relevant economic development. By taking advantage of the 
economic boom, some indigenous businessmen promptly adapted to the newly 
emerged economic order and gradually built up their sphere of influence. In order 
to accommodate the emerging indigenous economic forces, the Hong Kong 
Government has resorted to co-opting the Chinese elite by appointing them to 
prestigious positions at various levels of government. This corporatist approach of 
politics is reflected in the appointment of them to the LegCo and the ExCo in 1880 
and 1926, respectively.54
51A full list of the appointed ExCo and LegCo members before 1941 can be found 
in G.B. Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong 1841-1962: A Constitutional 
History (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1964), pp. 250-3.
52G.B. Endacott, A Biographical Sketch-Book o f Early Hong Kong (Singapore: 
Eastern Universities Press, 1962), pp. 157-62.
53Chan Wai Kwan, The Making of Hong Kong Society: Three Studies of Class 
Formation in Early Hong Kong (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), chaps 2-4.
54For the background leading to the appointment of Chinese LegCo and ExCo 
members, see Endacott (1964), op. cit., pp. 89-96 & 135-49; also, T.C. Cheng, 
"Chinese Unofficial Members of the Legislative and Executive Councils in Hong 
Kong Up to 1941," Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 9 
(1969):7-30.
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The predominant position of the traders and big business representatives in the 
state structure has been maintained up to the present, though the pool of appointment 
was extended to the "new rich" and middle-class professionals in the mid-1970s. 
Some scholars have argued that the state power seems to be used to protect and 
enhance the privileges of the capitalist class.55 An often-quoted sentence reads: 
"Power in Hong Kong . . . resides in the Jockey Club, Jardine and Matheson, The 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and the Governor—in that order."56 H J. 
Lethbridge also argues that: "It is a Colony run today—though this is not a result of 
deliberate Government policy but faute de mieux—for a small group of Chinese and 
European businessmen, experts in the technique of making money."57 This line of 
reasoning is in line with the Marxist argument that the capitalist state is only "a 
committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie".58 That 
means the state does not have its own autonomy at all.
But we would argue that in order to maintain the capitalist mode of 
production, the state would have to act in contradiction to the will of some capitalists. 
In analyzing post-colonial societies in South Asia, Hamza Alavi has put forward his 
thesis of the "plurality of economically dominant classes" of metropolitan bourgeoisie, 
indigenous bourgeoisie and landed bourgeoisie that have regulated and controlled the 
military-bureaucratic oligarchies through "the needs and demands, the logic, of 
peripheral capitalism".59 That means that the bureaucratic state may have a leverage
55S.N.G. Davies, "One Brand of Politics Rekindled," Hong Kong Law Journal 
1 (1977):44-80.
56Richard Hughes, Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time: Hong Kong and Its Many 
Faces, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976), p. 23.
57H.J. Lethbridge, "Hong Kong Under Japanese Occupation: Changes in Social 
Structure," in I.C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi, eds., Hong Kong: A Society in 
Transition (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 127.
58Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1967), p. 82.
59Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," 
New Left Review 74 (1972):59-82; also, "Authoritarianism and Legitimation of State
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to balance the interests of the above-mentioned economic classes and has thus enjoyed 
"relative” autonomy as far as it proceeds according to the "structural imperative of 
capital". That means the state is able to enjoy autonomy, though it may be a 
"relative" one.60
Although the Hong Kong Government is rather free from mass (electoral) 
pressure, there are occasional conflicts with the businessmen over the question of 
taxation. On the one hand, Britain seems to be reluctant to take up all the financial 
cost of running the colony, but, on the other, the capitalists want to pay as little tax 
as possible and to maintain a "minimal" government. This kind of conflict often 
surfaced in the early colonial period.61 Although Hong Kong is a capitalist state, 
she seems to enjoy a certain degree of autonomy in the face of capitalists’ challenge. 
Several examples can be cited to illustrate this point.
First of all, despite the resistance from both the shipping companies and its
own officials, the state insisted on building the state-owned railway which connected
Hong Kong with Canton in the mid-1900s. The then Hong Kong Harbour Master
was quoted as saying the following in 1906:
It is a work which those who favour it appear to think will bring new 
prosperity to Hong Kong. But as the Colony depends entirely upon 
shipping for its existence I do not feel so hopeful, neither do I see its 
value or necessity.62
Even up to 1934, the shipping companies, which were dominated by European 
capitalists, still complained about the unfair competition of the state-owned railway.
Power in Pakistan," in Subrata Kumar Mitra, ed., The Post-Colonial State: Dialectics 
of Politics and Culture (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), 19-71.
^Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), especially chaps. 1 & 2.
61Endacott (1964), op. cit., chaps. 3 & 4.
62Cited by S.G. Davis, Hong Kong In Its Geographical Setting (London: Collins, 
1949), p. 131.
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Second, despite competition from a British firm, the Hong Kong state granted 
a contract of HK$5,000 million to a Japanese consortium for the construction of the 
Mass Transit Railway in 1973.63
Third, contrary to its economic philosophy of laissez-faire, the Government 
initiated a massive public housing scheme in the early 1970s. The state intervention 
into the collective consumption process has the effect of stabilizing workers’ wages 
and then maintained its cheap labour edge in the world market.64
Fourth, following a decade of social protest and movement as well as the 
flourishing of pressure groups, the state started to co-opt and accommodate the 
emerging new middle-class critics in the early 1980s by appointing them to various 
advisory committees and carrying out partial reform of its political structure. In the 
eyes of the metropolitan and indigenous capitalists, these emerging forces would do 
harm to the free economy, as they stand for the provision of "free lunch" and the 
establishment of some form of welfare state.
63Kuan Hsin-chi, "Political Stability and Change in Hong Kong," in Lin Tzong- 
biau, Ranee P.L. Lee and Udo-Emst Simonis, eds., Hong Kong: Economic, Social 
and Political Studies in Development (New York & Kent: M.E. Sharpe & Wm 
Dawson, 1979), p. 151.
^For the change of government policy in the early 1970s, see Alvin Rabushka, 
The Changing Face o f Hong Kong: New Departures in Public Policy (Washington, 
D.C. & Stanford: American Enterprise Institute & Hoover Institution, 1973); for the 
role of government in economic development, see Jonathan R. Schiffer, "State Policy 
and Economic Growth: A Note on the Hong Kong Model," International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research 15 (1991): 180-96.
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State Development in the Pre-1945 Period
In the century beginning from the establishment of the colonial state in 1841 
to the eve of the Japanese occupation in 1941, there was no substantial social demand 
on the Hong Kong Government, with the exception of the conflict between the earlier 
Governors and the business community over the problem of taxation. As a whole, 
the population living there by 1941 did not regard Hong Kong as their permanent 
domicile but rather as a temporary residence for the sake of economic betterment and 
emigration. Therefore, the society was of a transient nature in this period of time. 
Moreover, Hong Kong has served as a doorstep or supporting base for the British and 
later Chinese businessmen to advance their economic activities in mainland China. 
Acting as an entrepot, the function of the Hong Kong Government was largely 
confined to maintaining law and order, and the basic port and communication 
facilities.
Given the least degree of integration, the state relied on a narrow strata of 
socio-economic elites to communicate with the society which is largely composed of 
ethnic Chinese.65 The co-option of the prominent social and economic figures into 
the ExCo, the LegCo, the Sanitary Board (SB)66 and other advisory bodies served 
to enhance the efficiency of the Hong Kong Government. The Hong Kong 
Government started to appoint non-official members of LegCo and ExCo in 1850 and 
1896 respectively. Indirect election of LegCo non-official members was also 
instituted in 1884, though it was not a formal process.67 The General Chamber of 
Commerce and the non-official Justices of the Peace each elected one nominee whose 
name would be put through by the Governor to the Secretary of State in Britain for
65H.J. Lethbridge, Hong Kong: Stability and Change (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), chaps. 3-5.
^ h e  Sanitary Board was set up in 1883 and was, later, replaced by the Urban 
Council (UrbCo) in 1936.
67Miners (1991), op. cit., p. 129, nl.
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appointment.68 The SB also had its non-official and elected members in 1886 and 
1888 respectively. But the franchise of the SB was very restrictive and its function 
was largely confined to the maintenance of public health. In the New Territories, the 
Hong Kong Government first adopted the principle of indirect rule through village 
elders, but this was gradually replaced by a district administration system with 
District Officer as the administrative head there. The state has co-opted the local 
landed figures through the Heung Yee Kuk (Rural Consultation Committee) since 
1926. It has served as an informal senior advisory council and acted as the sole 
representative body for the indigenous residents there.
After the Japanese occupation in the period 1941-45, the British returned to 
Hong Kong and reinstalled the pre-war administrative structures there. But what was 
different from the pre-war period was the readiness of the British-Hong Kong 
Government to carry out political reform in the mid-1940s. Sir Mark Young, the 
then Hong Kong Governor, announced his intention to reform the colonial political 
structure in 1946, but the ensuing developments within and without Hong Kong 
contributed to the dropping of the plan. Chapter 4 will deal with this point in more 
detail.
68Endacott (1964), op. cit., pp. 102-3.
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A Chinese Society Under British Rule
The Hong Kong people, especially the Chinese, have long been described as 
politically apathetic. Living in a "borrowed time" and a "borrowed place",69 most 
of the Hong Kong Chinese are said to have emphasised material values, social 
stability, and short-term time horizons.70 In addition, they are submissive to 
authority and lack civic consciousness and a sense of belonging. The submissive 
attitude of the Chinese people was well described by Lin Yu-tang, a famous scholar, 
in 1938:
There is so much of this virtue (of patience) that it has almost become 
a vice. The Chinese people have put up with more tyranny, anarchy 
and misrule than any Western people have put up with, and seem to 
have regarded them as part of the laws of nature. In certain parts of 
Szechuan [Sichuan] the people have been taxed thirty years in advance 
without showing more energetic protest than a half-audible curse in the 
privacy of the household. Christian patience would seem like 
petulance compared to Chinese patience . . . We submit to tyranny and 
extortion as small fish swim into the mouth of a big fish.71
These orientations owe much to the cultural roots of Confucism and the 
tumultuous situation in China, particularly in Guangdong Province, from where most 
of the old Hong Kong Chinese originated. They came to the colony to avoid turmoil 
in China and seek a better living as well as economic opportunity. Most new-comers 
from China were labourers, less educated and not wealthy, except those who fled 
from Shanghai in 1949. The estimated population just before the Japanese occupation 
in 1941 was 1,600,000, but there was only 500,000 to 600,000 population when the
69These terms are borrowed from Richard Hughes’s book, Borrowed Time, 
Borrowed Place: Hong Kong and Its Many Faces, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1976).
70See Lau Siu-kai, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese 
University Press, 1982), pp. 68-72.
71Lin Yu-tang, My Country and My People (London, 1938), p. 44; quoted in N.J. 
Miners, "Hong Kong: A Case Study in Political Stability" Journal of Commonwealth 
and Comparative Politics 13 (1975):32.
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British returned to the colony in 1945. In the late 1940s, there was an influx of 
refugees because of the civil war in China and the estimated population rose to 
1,800,000.72 The population figure doubled by the mid-1960s and amounted to 
3,708,920 in 1966.73 They found Hong Kong to be a promised land, compared with 
the situation and their life in China. Although the colonial structure is far from 
perfect and just, it provided a stable environment that was badly needed. With this 
in mind, they did not bother to challenge the colonial system.
From the mid-1960s, the socio-economic condition has begun to change. The
post-war economic boom has failed to narrow the gap between the wealthy and the
poor. As Ronald Hsia and Laurence Chau indicated:
Despite the progress made in the 1960’s, the distribution of household 
income in Hong Kong remained highly unequal in 1971. The top 
quintile of households received 51 per cent of the total income, the 
lowest quintile got less than 6 per cent, and the next lowest had only 
10 per cent. At a low level of overall income, these figures imply a 
fairly widespread poverty. On a per capita basis, our calculations 
show that 138,000 persons had a monthly income of less than $50, and 
another 766,000 had to make do with less than $100. By any 
standard, these are very poor people indeed.74
Furthermore, the working hours were long, usually ten to twelve hours a day and
seven days a week in the 1950s and 1960s. As Edward Szczepanik wrote in 1958:
. . . Sunday[s] are very seldom observed, and as a result, work in the 
Colony goes on almost without interruption the whole year round, 
often without machines stopping even at night.75
72Hong Kong Government, Hong Kong Annual Report 1954 (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1955), p. 16.
73Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 1993 
Edition (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1993), p. 11, Table 2.1.
74Ronald Hsia and Laurence Chau, Industrialisation, Employment and Income 
Distribution: A Case Study of Hong Kong (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 185.
75Edward Szczepanik, The Economic Growth of Hong Kong (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1958), p. 73.
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Although their average wages increased 73% in the period 1958-65,76 it was
unlikely to ease their distress caused by the wide gap between one’s aspiration and
the hard reality.77 The people’s upward mobility through education was also very
limited. Only 3,900 university places were available in 1966 and about 1.7% of the
population aged over 5 in the 1960s received university education.78 In addition, it
was reported that:
In 1967, 980,000 pupils were enrolled in schools, but more than 
150,000 children of primary school age were unable to attend school 
and only 39% of 10-14 year olds [sic] and 13% of 15-19 year olds 
[sic] were enjoying secondary education.79
Though the term "sweated labour" is rather an emotional expression, it seems
to reflect the feeling of the Hong Kong workers, especially the young workers. In
addition, most of them lived in a very congested environment. As described by an
official report in 1963:
The people in these [post-war] buildings may well present a more 
serious health hazard, and bring up their children mentally, socially, 
and physically more handicapped of stunted than if they had been in 
controlled or even uncontrolled squatter shacks on the hillsides."80
16Kowloon Disturbances 1966, Report of Commission o f Inquiry (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1967), pp. 5-6.
77I.C. Jarvie, "A Postscript on Riots and the Future of Hong Kong" in I.C. 
Jarvie, ed., Hong Kong: A Society in Transition (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1969), p. 365; for a brief description of the life of the workers, see Joe England and 
John Rear, Chinese Labour Under British Rule: A Critical Study o f Labour and Law 
in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1975), chap. 4.
78See Hong Kong Social & Economic Trend 1964-1974 (Hong Kong: Census and 
Statistics Department, 1975), pp. 58 & 61. The population of 1966 is 3,708,920. This 
figure can be found in Hong Kong 1986 By-Census, Main Report Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: 
Census and Statistics Department, 1987), p. 16.
79William Heaton, "Maoist Revolutionary Strategy and Modem Colonialism: The 
Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong" Asian Survey 10 (1970):844.
^Quoted in L.F. Goodstadt, "Urban Housing in Hong Kong, 1945-63" in Jarvie 
(1969), ed., op. cit., p. 281.
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Although the Hong Kong Government had tried its best to provide more 
resettlement squatter huts, the pace was far behind the demand as there was an 
enormous influx of refugees from China. According to the estimation of Edvard 
Hambro in 1954, there were about 385,000 refugees (17.1 % of the whole population) 
in Hong Kong.81 But only 54,559 persons were resettled in cottage resettlement 
areas and multi-storey resettlement estates by the government in the same year.82 
Furthermore, according to the 1961 Census report, one-fifth of the urban population 
lived in housing built of temporary material or in accommodation not designed for 
domestic use.83
Under such "a grey industrial world", anomic violence was bom. The "social 
disequilibrium" of Hong Kong, thus, appeared to provide "a logical choice" to start 
a revolution.84 As Sir David Trench, the then Governor of Hong Kong, commented 
in 1967: " . . .  trouble can flare up over any minor matter—a football match or 
anything else—and it would be foolish to pretend otherwise."85 The fare increase of 
the Star Ferry Company in 1966 and the labour strikes of 1967, thus, triggered off 
a series of protests and riots.86 Nevertheless, the "China factor" also contributed 
to the intensification of the conflict. Being inspired by the Cultural Revolution in
81Edvard Hambro, The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong (Leyden: 
A.W. Sijthoff, 1955), p. 162.
“ Commissioner for Resettlement, Annual Departmental Report 1972-73 (Hong 
Kong: Government Printer, 1973), p. 30.
“ Quoted in Goodstadt (1969), op. cit., p. 280.
“ Heaton (1970), op. cit., pp. 840-847.
“ Quoted in Ibid, p. 840.
“ For the government account of the 1966 and 1967 riots, see Kowloon 
Disturbances 1966, Report o f Commission of Inquiry ', and Hong Kong 1967 (Hong 
Kong: Government Printer, 1968), chap. 1. For the communist view of the 1967 
event, see The May Upheaval in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Committee of 
Hongkong-Kowloon Chinese Compatriots of All Circles for the Stmggle Against 
Persecution by the British Authorities in Hong Kong, 1967).
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China at that time and the resulting left-lean policy towards Hong Kong, the local 
leftists (communists) played a leadership role in the 1967 riots.
After the two riots, the colonial government began to take steps to cool down 
the tension, namely by the passing of several labour legislations, the reorganization 
of the Labour Department, the setting up of the Labour Advisory Board and so on.87 
Besides, the colonial government has come to recognise the fact that there was a large 
communication gap between the government and the governed. Thus, a series of 
administrative reforms were carried out, namely the implementation of the City 
District Officer Scheme, the proposal of setting up an ombudsman, and the 
reorganization and reform of the Civil Service.88
In the 1970s, the Hong Kong Government expanded its activities in social 
services. The "Ten-Year Housing Programme" and the nine years of compulsory 
education have signified this tendency.89 Accompanying these changes were the 
emergence of social conflicts and the changing perception toward politics. After 
surveying the nature of social conflicts for the period 1975-1986, one study revealed 
that:
^England and Rear (1975), op. cit., pp. 5-9.
88For details, see Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis o f Legitimacy in Hong 
Kong (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), pp. 106-170; also, Brian Hook, 
"The Government of Hong Kong: Change Within Tradition" China Quarterly 95 
(1983):491-511. For the political implication of the City District Officer Scheme, see 
Ambrose King Yeo-chi, "Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: 
Emphasis on the Grass Roots Level" Asian Survey 15 (1975):422-439.
89For various aspects of change in government policies in the 1970s and early 
1980s, see Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ed., Hong Kong in Transition (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1986).
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The observable pattern of social conflicts in Hong Kong during the 
period 1975 to 1986 has definitely pointed to an increasing trend of 
social conflicts which have extended to issues relating to quality of life 
and civil and political rights. More social conflicts are resorted to for 
the articulation of sectoral and local interests, with the demands 
increasingly aiming at long-term institutional changes and non-material 
rights. . . . Besides, participants are getting more and better organized. 
The presence of more permanent groups of one form or another is 
becoming a significant feature of social conflicts.90
Another study also recorded a change in attitude towards politics:
While still maintaining a largely anti-political or apolitical 
predisposition, the Hong Kong Chinese are somehow able, in their 
values, to lessen subscription to the ideas of political omnipotence, 
political omniscience and political omnipresence. . . .
The sense of political powerlessness is still the most potent factor in 
perpetuating political lethargy among the Hong Kong Chinese, but they 
have become more aware of the multitude of means available to get 
access to the government, particularly those influence tactics that 
contain some amount of unconventionality and confrontation. . . .91
These slightly attitudinal and behavioral changes may probably reflect the 
emergence of a new generation composed of mostly the local-born Hong Kong 
people. According to the 1986 By-census figure, nearly 60% (approximately 
3,203,165) of the population was bom in Hong Kong.92 Their life style as well as 
value systems had developed to a point that is not hard to detect, and is easily 
differentiated from their mainland compatriots.93
90Anthony Cheung Bing-leung and Louie Kin-sheun, Social Conflicts in Hong 
Kong, 1975-1986: Trend and Implications (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia- 
Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991), p. 53.
91Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, The Ethos o f the Hong Kong Chinese (Hong 
Kong: Chinese University Press, 1988), pp. 115-6.
92Hong Kong 1986 By-Census, Main Report Vol. 2, p. 18.
93Hugh D.R. Baker, "Life in the Cities: The Emergence of Hong Kong Man" 
China Quarterly 95 (1983):469-479.
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Colonialism Without Serious Challenge
During the past one and a half century of colonial rule, Hong Kong has passed 
through the high tide of nationalism elsewhere without any significant challenge from 
within. It is also surprising to learn that there has been nearly no significant massive 
national or anti-colonial movement, except the great labour strikes in the 1920s. It 
seems to many people that this is impossible. But the fact is that it has not only 
survived but also provided an extended period of stability and prosperity at times 
when China repeatedly falls into political chaos and social turmoil, especially after 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Why is this so? 
The answers are probably found in the peculiar domestic condition of Hong Kong and 
its delicate relations with China.
First of all, the colonial power has set up its state structure over a ’’barren 
rock", where only about 2,000 people were said to live before 1841 and nearly all of 
them were engaged in some form of farming and fishing.94 Their life might well 
be described as "a primitive, arcadian existence devoid of any ambition beyond their 
daily wants’’.95 Furthermore, Hong Kong was located at the periphery of the Qing 
imperial state. To borrow Michael Mann’s concept of state power, Qing China by 
and large maintained the despotic power rather than infrastructural power there.96
^For the social history of early Hong Kong society, see Chan Wai Kwan, The 
Making of Hong Kong Society: Three Studies of Class Formation in Early Hong 
Kong (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Tsai Jung-fang, Hong Kong in Chinese 
History: Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842-1913 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993); Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London: 
Harper Collins, 1993); for a Chinese view, see Chan Kai-cheung, "History," in Choi 
Po-king and Ho Lok-sang, eds., The Other Hong Kong Report 1993 (Hong Kong: 
Chinese University Press, 1993), pp. 455-483.
95R.C. Hurley, Picturesque Hong Kong and Dependencies (Hong Kong: 
Commercial Press, 1925), p. 21.
^Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms 
and Result," Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 25 (1984): 185-213.
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Second, accompanying the coming of the colonial government was the 
institutionalization of the capitalist order and development. The idea of acquiring a 
small piece of land at the mouth of the Pearl River was out of consideration of 
facilitating trade with China. Naturally, Hong Kong society was shaped to provide 
the necessary infrastructure in fulfilling this function, such as the development of the 
transportation facilities, a corresponding legal system, and the spreading of the value 
of the rule of law. On the other hand, material incentives and the betterment 
generated in the process of capitalist development have compensated for the loss of 
statehood which has not been well developed and perceived among the indigenous 
Chinese population at that moment. There is a widespread Chinese old saying that 
has well reflected the Chinese attitude toward the government: "Whoever becomes 
the emperor (ruler), we all have to pay rates (in kind)". Furthermore, Hong Kong 
has enjoyed a rapid economic growth rate since the late 1950s. For the period 1961- 
1981, the Gross Domestic Product grew at the average rate of about 9.9% annually 
in real terms, and at 7.4% per capita.97
Third, most of Hong Kong’s population came to reside there well after the set 
up of the colonial government.98 That means they are voluntarily subjected to alien 
rule. Why do they do so? To a large extent, it is the tumultuous situation in China 
that helps to explain it. When there is social unrest or political instability in China, 
there will be a influx of people from Canton or nearby provinces into the British 
colony. Once social order in China has been restored, they move back to their 
homeland. This was often the case before the establishment of the PRC in 1949. 
The influx of people (refugees) therefore was served as a barometer of the stableness 
of domestic order in China. Furthermore, the capitalist society of Hong Kong has 
provided the economic opportunity for people originating from the dislocated rural 
region of China. Given this transient nature, it is difficult for them to develop their 
identity with Hong Kong. Nor do they seek any social or political reform to the
^Miners (1991), op. cit. , p. 34.
98John P. Bums, "Immigration from China and the Future of Hong Kong," Asian 
Survey 27 (1987):661-82.
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colonial structure. They only regard Hong Kong as their temporary abode just for 
the sake of security and economy.
Fourth, the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the 
subsequent restless political campaigns as well as social dislocation and economic 
stagnation have driven those who live in the colony with a higher standard of living 
to have little chance to have any romance of nationalism. Furthermore, Hong Kong 
has been used as an economic and political shelter for those who escaped from the 
political turmoil in China. This is especially the case after 1949. Although subjected 
to an alien rule, the Hong Kong Chinese are quite instrumental and pragmatic toward 
the colonial government. Any national movement aimed at driving out the colonial 
state will eventually be integrated with its communist mother state. In the face of this 
dilemma, an old Chinese saying seems aptly applicable: "Among the evils, choose the 
least one". Under such circumstances, it is easier for the local-born Hong Kong 
Chinese to develop a separate Hong Kong identity."
Fifth, the co-option of the local Chinese elite has contributed to the stability 
of Hong Kong. Through the synarchical rule, prominent Chinese residents have, in 
one way or another, been absorbed into the administrative system and have become 
a part of the colonial establishment. Through such a device, a certain level of elite 
integration has been achieved.100 Furthermore, the Hong Kong Government quite 
promptly adjusted to the changing environment of Hong Kong once she found the 
system inadequate or government policy unacceptable to the governed. The timely 
introduction of the City District Office Scheme in 1968 just after the riots of the pro- 
China leftists is an example at hand.
Sixth, the China factor. Although the Nationalists and the Communists 
renounced the three "unequal" treaties signed by the Qing government and vowed to 
restore the sovereignty of Hong Kong at any time, they have adopted a cautious and
"see Baker (1983), op. cit., pp. 469-79.
100see King (1975), op. cit. , pp. 422-39.
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pragmatic approach to solving the issue. As long as the colonial status quo continues
to make a contribution to China, Hong Kong would remain as it was. Mr Zhou
Enlai, the former Premier of the People’s Republic of China, was quoted as
describing the special role of Hong Kong as "a weather station, an observation point,
a meeting place, and a suitable place for things which must be launched and
radiated”.101 Moreover, the basic policy of the Beijing Government toward Hong
Kong since 1949 has been: "Make long-term plans, utilise to the full". This is also
known as the "eight-word guiding policy" within the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP). According to Huang Wenfang, Deputy General Secretary of the Hong Kong
Branch of the New China News Agency (NCNA) before his retirement in August
1992, the meaning of the "eight-word guiding policy" is:
"Make long-term plans" refers to the fact that Hong Kong will not be 
taken back in the near future. Of course, since the central government 
decided in 1981 to take back Hong Kong after 1997 this part now 
requires a different kind of explanation.
"Utilise to the full" refers to making use of all Hong Kong’s beneficial 
conditions to serve China, in particular its economic construction.102
101Quoted in Huang Wenfang’s memoirs (extracts), Eastern Express (Hong Kong) 
6 July 1994:6. Huang Wenfang was the Deputy General Secretary and Head of the 
Taiwan Affairs Department of the Hong Kong Branch of the New China News 
Agency (NCNA) before his retirement in August 1992. He is very familiar with 
Beijing’s Hong Kong policy as he was one of the two Chinese Communist Party 
members assigned to work on Hong Kong affairs in the late 1940s.
102Huang Wenfang’s memoirs (extracts), Eastern Express (Hong Kong) 6 July 
1994:6.
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Unusual Decolonisation in the Early 1980s
Regarding the constitutional future of her remaining colonies (dependent
territories), Britain made clear its guiding principles in 1968 that:
. . . Britain will always adhere closely to the cardinal principle to 
which we have adhered in the past—that the wishes of the people 
concerned must be the main guide to action—it is not and never has 
been our desire or intention either to delay independence for those 
dependencies who want it or to force it upon those who do not.103
As will be detailed in Chapter 3, the continuous British rule of Hong Kong has 
been hinged on the will of the Chinese Government. Any political reforms leading 
to the drastic change of Hong Kong political structure seemed to invite Chinese 
intervention. This has long been regarded as one of the reasons not to carry out 
constitutional reforms since the late 1940s. As the former Governor, David Trench, 
wrote in 1971: "China has made it pretty clear that she would not be happy with a 
Hong Kong moving towards a representative system" and Hong Kong "has to be 
either firmly under an old-style colonial government or lose her identity".104 But, 
in the midst of the surge of the 1997 issue, the establishment of elected District 
Boards by the Hong Kong Government at the district level in 1982 signified a revision 
of the former cautious policy. Some political observers regarded the move as a 
preparatory stage for the ensuing decolonisation process, but others saw it as a logical 
step to take as the original local administration system had proved to be 
ineffective.105 Whatever the reason(s) behind the local reform in 1982, it was not
103Quoted in George Drower, Britain’s Dependent Territories: A Fistful of Islands 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992), p. xiv.
104David Trench, Hong Kong and Its Position in the Southeast Asia Region 
(Hawaii: East-West Center, University of Hawaii, 1971), p. 5; quoted in Lo Shiu- 
hing, "Democratization in Hong Kong: Reasons, Phases, and Limits," Issues & 
Studies 26 (May 1990): 102.
105JeremiahK.H. Wong, "Separatism and Convergence: Pattern of Administrative 
Adaption in the New Territories," in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed., Hong Kong in the 
1980s (Hong Kong: Summerson, 1982b), pp. 13-21; C.B. Leung, "Community 
Participation: from Kai Fong Association, Mutual Aid Committee to District Board,"
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be followed by the usual path of decolonisation through transferring power to an 
independent state, where parliamentary government is operated through periodic 
elections and universal franchise.106 It is because neither the Chinese Government 
would allow Hong Kong to gain independence, nor do the majority of people in Hong 
Kong want it.
As mentioned before, one of the components of Hong Kong—the New 
Territories—is bound by a lease treaty which stipulated that the New Territories will 
be restored to China’s sovereignty in 1997. Although Britain had asserted the validity 
of the various treaties when the question of Hong Kong’s future was first raised in 
early 1980s, she would definitely know that without the New Territories it would be 
very hard for Hong Kong to survive, because the New Territories cover over 90% 
of the land mass of Hong Kong, has nearly 42 percent of the population living there, 
and has most of the industrial sites located there.
The chance to go independent diminishes when the view and policy of the 
Chinese Government is added to the above objective constraints. As mentioned 
before, the position of the Chinese Government, whether it is the Nationalist or the 
Communist, has been very clear that Hong Kong is a part of China ceded/leased to 
Britain under various "unequal treaties" signed by the Qing Dynasty in the nineteenth 
century. Indeed, the People’s Republic of China wasted no time in declaring her 
policy toward Hong Kong once she was admitted to the United Nations in 1972:
in Cheng, ed. (1982b), ibid., pp. 152-70.
106For the transfer of power and decolonisation process, see Charles Jeffries, 
Transfer o f Power: Problems of the Passage to Self-Government (London: Pall Mall 
Press, 1960); J.M. Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1967), chapter 5; D.G. Austin, "The Transfer of Power: Why and How," 
in W.H. Morris-Jones and Georges Fischer, eds., Decolonisation and After: The 
British and French Experience (London: Frank Cass, 1980), pp. 3-34; John Darwin, 
Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World 
(Hampshire: MacMillan, 1988); Norman Miners (1988), op. cit.
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The questions of Hong Kong and Macau belong to the category of 
questions resulting from the series of unequal treaties which the 
imperialists imposed on China. Hong Kong and Macau are part of 
Chinese territory occupied by the British and Portuguese authorities. 
The settlement of the questions of Hong Kong and Macau is entirely 
within China’s sovereign right and do [sic] not at all fall under the 
ordinary category of colonial territories. Consequently they should not 
be included in the list of colonial territories covered by the declaration 
on the granting of independence to colonial countries and people. 
With regard to the questions of Hong Kong and Macau, the Chinese 
[Government has consistently held that they should be settled in a 
appropriate way when conditions are ripe . . . ,107
As mentioned above, anticipation of the Chinese objection to political reforms 
had prevented the British-Hong Kong Government from carrying out political reforms 
since the late 1940s. But the situation was changed in the mid-1980s after the signing 
of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 and the Chinese promise of "Hong Kong 
people governing Hong Kong" after 1997. Given the incompatibility between a "high 
degree of autonomy" after 1997 and the colonial political structure, it become 
necessary to reform the colonial structure so as to prepare Hong Kong to exercise 
autonomy after 1997. It is believed that the reforms proposed in the 1984 White 
Paper on the development of representative government appeared to have the blessing 
of the Chinese Government at first. But later China withdrew its support, as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the political reforms did provide a push to 
politicize part of the population. In the three-tier legislature elections in 1991, the 
respective number of direct elected seats (universal suffrage) of the District Boards, 
Urban Council, Regional Council, and Legislative Council are 274 (out of 441), 15 
(out of 40), 12 (out of 36), and 18 (out of 60); the total number of direct elected seats 
is 319 and the total number of candidates is 587.108 Supposing that each candidate,
107Quoted in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, Hong Kong In Search of Future (Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 54.
108The District Boards’ figures are supplied by the City and New Territories 
Administration in 22 July 1993; the Urban and Regional Councils’, and the 
Legislative Council’s figures are compiled from the electoral data supplied by the 
Registration and Electoral Office, Constitutional Affairs Branch, Hong Kong 
Government Secretariat in early 1992.
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on average, had been assisted by a hundred campaign workers, there would have been 
an involvement of fifty-nine thousand people. Furthermore, the number of registered 
voters grew tremendously from about 40,000 in 1979 to about 1,910,000 (about 50% 
of the eligible electors) in 1991. The turnout of the 1991 Legco direct election was 
about 750,000 (nearly 40% of the registered voters).109 As a result, through the 
partial opening-up of the three-tier legislature and the electioneering process, more 
and more people got involved in politics.
Meanwhile, the social fabric or composition of Hong Kong is quite different 
from other British colonies when they were embarking on the road of decolonisation. 
As reported in the Hong Kong 1991 population census, there are all together 2.8 
million working population. Among them, twenty-three per cent are managers, 
administrators, and professionals. Nearly two-thirds of the working population served 
in the tertiary sector.110 Over 11% of the population aged 15 or above 
(N=4,370,365) had received some sort of tertiary education (degree and non-degree 
courses), and another 31% had finished their upper secondary or matriculation 
education.111 Given the above figures, it seems that no other decolonising colony 
has had a matching quality and quantity.
Decolonisation is not merely the transfer of political sovereignty to a new 
state; it involves also a social and economic restructuring process.112 As a result,
109The figure of the registered voters may not be accurate as the electoral roll has 
never updated since 1982. One must be cautious in interpreting the figure as there 
was a large scale internal population movement throughout the 80’s as well as an 
average of fifty thousand emigration (approximate sixty thousand people emigrated 
in 1990) since 1983. See Hong Kong 1986 By-Census, Graphic Guide (Hong Kong: 
Census and Statistics Department, 1987), p. 22; and Hong Kong Annual Report, 
various years (Hong Kong: Government Printer).
110See Hong Kong 1991 Population Census: Basic Table for District Board 
Districts (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1992), p. 34.
mSee Hong Kong Annual Digest o f Statistics, 1992 ed. (Hong Kong: Government 
Printer), p. 199, Table 15.1.
112Darwin (1988), op. cit., pp. 5-17.
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each of the social forces will try hard to shape it to their own advantage. But the 
hard fact is that not all the participants carried equal weight in deciding the final 
product. In addition, the reform has different meanings to different social classes. 
Their respective attitude towards the reform in or before 1984 were as follows.
First of all, the businessmen do not want any change in the way of governing. 
In general, they view the reform with scepticism. Some of them argued that the 
existing British administration113 and non-intervention policy have contributed to the 
stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. So, why bother to change it. Nonetheless, 
the business circle is not a homogenous entity. We can roughly differentiate it into 
the following sub-groups: the European "hongs" and metropolitan capitalists, the 
indigenous Chinese capitalists (including both the traditional and the New Rich), as 
well as the small and medium size firm-owners. The first sub-group may probably 
be more willing to tolerate reform; the second sub-group seems to be reluctant to 
accommodate reform; and the last sub-group may be hard to assess because of its 
number, diversity and being rather inactive in politics. Given that these sub-groups 
have a close economic relationship and interest with China and the fact that their 
privileges are well assured in the existing and future political structure,114 their 
attitude toward political reform may tend to be conservative. That means no reform 
if possible; if not, favour "gradual" and "orderly" change.115
113Nearly half (49.3%, N=463) of the directorate posts were occupied by 
expatriates in 1986. And nearly three-quarters of all expatriates were employed in the 
following six departments: Police (1,098), Engineering (344), Government Secretariat 
(191), Building (163), Legal (155), and Judiciary (111). See John P. Bums, 
"Succession Planning and Localization," in Ian Scott and J. P. Bums, eds., The Hong 
Kong Civil Service and Its Future (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 
96.
114For an account of the intimate relations of the British colonial government and 
the capitalists, see Chan (1991), The Making of Hong Kong Society, chaps. 2-4.
115For the views of the business circle, see Lydia Dunn, "Hong Kong after the 
Sino-British Declaration" International Affairs 61 (1985): 197-204.
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The middle class has grown out of the rapid social and economic development 
since the 1970s and comprised mainly managers, technocrats, accountants, social 
workers, doctors, lawyers, professors, and administrators. The size of this class 
doubled more than twice from 141,860 (7.7% of the working population) in 1976 to 
315,945 (11.9% of the working population) in 1986.116 Accompanying the growth 
of the size is the rise of their political awareness. Some of them want some kind of 
political reform because the pre-reformed political structure has limited their chance 
of participation, and the policies that the colonial government adopted favour the 
business class at the expense of their own interest (taxation is an example at hand). 
Some of them also think that their contribution to society has barely matched their 
political influence. As a result, several interest groups were established in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, such as the Hong Kong Observer (HKO), the Hong Kong 
Affairs Society (HKAS), and the Meeting Point (MP). On the whole, they seem to 
favour reform but in a gradual and non-violent way. This newly emerging middle 
class has played a significant role in the campaign for democracy since the mid- 
1980s.
The general public and the working class still remain politically apathetic. For 
them, the notion of democracy is so remote that it will make no immediate difference 
to their life. They work as hard as their predecessors so as to earn a living. 
Although some of them are quite attentive to public affairs, they are not keen to 
articulate their interests or participate politically. So, they get used to being the 
passive actor in the political arena. In addition, the trade unions are loosely 
organized and have limited bargaining power.117 Nevertheless, they will easily be 
mobilized if their interest and living is at stake. The vigorous protest against 
government’s policy of importing foreign labour is a recent example. Through the 
active role of the social workers, the "grass roots" are likely to become more
116Alvin Y. So and Ludmilla Kwitko, "The New Middle Class and the Democratic 
Movement in Hong Kong," Journal o f Contemporary Asia 20 (1990):384; also Hong 
Kong 1986 By-Census, Main Report, Vol. 1, pp. 32 & 38.
117England and Rear (1975), op. cit., chaps. 5 and 13.
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organized than before.118 Moreover, 34 social workers and social work 
administrators were elected members of the District Boards, Urban Council and 
Regional Council in 1988.119 In general, social workers have tended to support the 
underprivileged class and the poor as the former regard the poverty and misfortune 
of the latter as a structural issue, not an individual one. Thus, social workers often 
resort to direct action to pressure the government to adopt a more interventionist 
policy or a policy with redistributive effect so as to redress the social injustice and 
inequality resulting from the market failure.120
How far the decolonisation process can go will depend on the outcome of the 
negotiation between China and Britain, with the Hong Kong people playing a 
secondary role in the process. The Sino-British negotiation and the subsequent Basic 
Law drafting processes could be regarded as competition among China, Britain, and 
the Hong Kong people to shape the political order of Hong Kong both before and 
after 1997. We now turn to the efforts of all concerned parties and the rise of the 
centre-periphery cleavage in that context.
118C.K. Wong, "The Advocacy Role of Social Work in a Changing Political 
Environment: Its Dilemmas and Challenges in Hong Kong, ” Community Development 
Journal 25 (1990):399-404; Joe Leung, "Community Development in Hong Kong: 
Contributions Toward Democratization," Community Development Journal 21 
(1986):3-10.
119Mok Bong-ho, "Influence Through Political Power: The Emergence of Social 
Workers as Politicians in the Recent Political Reform in Hong Kong" International 
Social Work 31 (1988):251.
120Wong Chack-kie, Social Work and Social Change: A Profile o f the Activist 
Social Workers in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993), pp. 17-27.
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CHAPTER III
THE RISE OF THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE
The destiny of Hong Kong in the early 1980s was at the crossroads. The 
emergence of the 1997 issue had raised the question of whether this tiny Hong Kong 
would remain a British Colony or not after 1997. After more than two years of 
negotiation, Britain agreed to hand all of Hong Kong back to China in 1997. The 
Sino-British Joint Declaration signified the resolution of conflicting claims to 
sovereignty over Hong Kong, but not the assurance of close cooperation in the 
transitional period. The question of who has the final say in the lengthy transitional 
period of 12 years, from the effective date of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 
May 1985 to the actual transfer of power in July 1997, has proved to be an explosive 
one. The first controversial issue that emerged after the signing of the Joint 
Declaration was the pace and the extent of the democratic reforms in the transitional 
period.
The British "pre-emptive" political reforms in the mid-1980s had first created 
a political "seller" market, and then a "buyer" market in which the demand for 
democratic reforms has kept growing, especially after the Tiananmen Incident in 
1989. From the outset, the Chinese Government has doubted the motives behind the 
reform and seemingly regards it as a British "conspiracy" to obstruct the smooth 
restoration of sovereignty. Understandably, Beijing wants as little political reforms 
as possible in the transitional period. Adding to this was the growing support for 
democratic reforms within Hong Kong society after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989.
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The different attitudes of China, Britain, and segments of the Hong Kong 
people toward democratisation have been reflected in their respective attitudes and 
supports of the pace of democratic reform before 1997 and the different political 
models after 1997. Hence, three contradictions have been present: between the 
Chinese and British Governments, between the Chinese Government and Hong Kong 
people, and between the British Government and Hong Kong people. The interplay 
of these contradictions would have a significant impact on the subsequent formation 
of electoral cleavage. Through the political mobilisation in the past decade, the 
various political forces have established a linkage with their potential supporters. As 
a result, their difference would spill over to the electorate and would then contribute 
to the emergence of cleavage lines.
Given the decisive role played by China in shaping both the pre- and post- 
1997 political order, the contradiction between Beijing and Hong Kong would become 
paramount and thus contribute to the development of centre-periphery electoral 
cleavage over the proper relationship between the "centre” Beijing Government and 
the "periphery" Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) after 1997, i.e. 
dependency or autonomy. For those who support the Beijing Government’s stance 
towards and ideas about the HKSAR’s pace of democratisation and degree of 
autonomy, we can describe them as "pro-centre grouping". For those who support 
the faster pace of democratisation and a higher degree of autonomy regardless of the 
Beijing Government’s view, we can describe them as "pro-periphery grouping". 
Needless to say, the usage of the term "centre" and "periphery" only denote the 
superior-subordinate political relationship between China and Hong Kong, and does 
not apply to their economic relationship. Neither these two terms carry the same 
meaning as those used in the dependency theory. We now turn to the detailed 
examination of the evolution and emergence of the centre-periphery cleavage.
This chapter aims at examining the rise of the centre-periphery cleavage 
resulting from the dynamic shift of the contradictions between the British 
Government, the Chinese Government, and the Hong Kong people in the context of 
the reversion of sovereignty and the political reforms of the 1980s. First of all, we
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examine the conflicts and compromises of China and Britain in settling the question 
of Hong Kong, and the responses from the Hong Kong people towards the Sino- 
British Joint Declaration. Second, the rivalry of various political forces over the pace 
of democratic reforms in the political reforms debates since the mid-1980s. Their 
respective stances and considerations will also be explored. Third, the clash of the 
democrats with the Chinese Government and the conservatives in the Basic Law 
drafting process will be used to demonstrate the rise of the centre-periphery cleavage. 
The successive mobilisation efforts of the concerned parties will also be studied.
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The Settlement of the 1997 Issue
The uncertainty that loomed over the future of Hong Kong since the late 1970s 
had not been new to Hong Kong. Whether the Nationalist or the Communist 
Government was in power, the three treaties that helped create the Crown Colony of 
Hong Kong had been regarded as "unequal" and thus, had to be nullified "when the 
time is ripe".121 Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 2, over 90% of the Hong 
Kong territory is subject to a 99 years lease which will expire in June 1997. It was 
not so surprising that Hong Kong had been described by one observer as a "borrowed 
place" where people lived on a "borrowed time".122
The time had come to conclude a clear and formal settlement of the peculiar 
status of Hong Kong when the expiry date of the lease of the New Territories was 
approaching. Because of the fact that the Hong Kong Government does not have 
legal power to grant land leases in the New Territories beyond July 1997, most of the 
economic activities would be disrupted if no new arrangement with the PRC was 
acquired well before 1997. The anxiety of the business community in Hong Kong 
had prompted the Hong Kong Government to act. Under such circumstance, Sir 
Murray MacLehose, the then Hong Kong Governor, travelled to Beijing in 1979 to 
discuss the matter with China’s then Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping. When he returned 
to the Colony, the Governor told the public that Mr Deng had asked the Hong Kong 
investors "to put their hearts at ease". But Sir Murray had failed to convey the 
message at that time that China would reclaim the sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997.
Later -in May of the same year, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Song 
Zhiguang reiterated the official position that "Hong Kong is part of China" and "when
121For the China’s Hong Kong policy, see Chan Lau Kit Ching, "The Hong Kong 
Question During the Pacific War," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 
2(1973):56-77; Peter Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty 1898-1997(Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1980); Kevin P. Lane, Sovereignty and the Status Quo: The 
Historical Roots o f China’s Hong Kong Policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1990).
122Richard Hughes, Hong Kong: Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1968, lsted .; London: Deutsch, 1976, 2nd ed.)
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the lease expires, an appropriate attitude would be adopted in settling the 
question".123 In contrast to the vague attitude of the Chinese Government, the 
British and Hong Kong Governments wanted to have an early settlement of the status 
of Hong Kong by pressing for formal talks between Beijing and London.
Regarding the talks, a Chinese official was quoted as saying: "It has been the
Socialist policy to allow Hong Kong to stay as it is. We did not ask for the talks.
Britain did."124 Regardless of the question of which side wanted the talks, the visit
of the British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, to Beijing in 1982 had paved
the way for subsequent formal negotiation between Beijing and London over the
future of Hong Kong.125 Although China and Britain had different views on the
validity and legality of the three treaties concerned, a joint statement was released on
24 September 1982 when Mrs Thatcher concluded her Beijing trip:
Today, the two leaders of the two countries held far-reaching talks in 
a friendly atmosphere on the future of Hong Kong. Both leaders made 
clear their respective positions on the subject.
They agreed to enter into talks through diplomatic channels following 
the visit with the common aim of maintaining the stability and 
prosperity of Hong Kong.
123Quoted in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed., Hong Kong In Search o f a Future (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 246.
124Quoted in Paul Wilkinson, "Hong Kong: a One-Way Ticket to an Unknown 
Destination," Government and Opposition 18 (1983):447-8.
125For an account of the Sino-British negotiation process, see Robert Cottrell, The 
End of Hong Kong: The Secret Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat (London: John Murray,
1993). Also, Ian Scott, Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), Chap. 5; T.L. Tsim, "1997: Peking’s 
Strategy for Hong Kong" World Today 40 (1984):37-45; Cheng (1984), op. cit., 
chaps. 1 & 2; Dennis Duncanson, "The Anglo-Chinese Negotiations" in Jurgen 
Domes and Shaw Yu-Ming, eds., Hong Kong: A Chinese and International Concern 
(Boulder: Westview, 1988), pp. 26-41.
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The Setting of the Sino-British Negotiation
The setting of the negotiations was to have an overwhelming effect on the 
strength and bargaining strategy of the negotiators. For the British Government, the 
whole setting did not favour her. First of all, the uncertain situation had made the 
governing of Hong Kong more difficult, as any unfavourable developments would 
promptly have an adverse effect on the incumbent British-Hong Kong Government. 
The immediate concern of the British-Hong Kong Government was the continuing 
effective governing and sound economic development of Hong Kong. Any 
development that may jeopardise the above concerns would be avoided by the British- 
Hong Kong Government. The British Government was being tied down by "the 
realization that Deng Xiaoping was absolutely serious in his declared determination 
to allow Hong Kong to be ruined if necessary in order to regain full Chinese 
sovereignty. "126
Second, the institutional setting also did not favour Britain. China denied any 
representative from Hong Kong the right to join the Sino-British negotiation, as 
Beijing stressed that the negotiation is between two sovereign states and the whole 
process should be kept confidential. In addition, Beijing regards the Hong Kong 
Chinese as her nationals and thus, the Chinese Government claims that she represents 
her compatriots in Hong Kong. Under this circumstance, the question is: who does 
the British Government represent?
Third, from the geographical considerations, Britain had no way to defend 
Hong Kong in both military and economic terms. Hong Kong is totally different 
from the Falklands, where no such question of expiration of lease existed and, more 
importantly, military defence was viable. In addition, the international climate was 
against the continuance of colonialism. Moreover, the decision-makers in London 
were very clear that the British interest and importance, both economic and strategic,
126Michael Yahuda, "Hong Kong’s Future: Sino-British Negotiations, Perceptions, 
Organization and Political Culture," International Affairs 69 (1993):252.
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vested in Hong Kong was relatively declining when compared to the 1960s or before. 
The breakup of the British Empire, the detente of East-West relations as well as the 
open door policy of China contributed to the lessening of the importance of Hong 
Kong.
Fourth, Britain’s claim of the validity and legality of the three nineteenth 
century treaties that formed the basis of Britain’s rule over Hong Kong put London 
in a weak and hard position to defend. If the claim were accepted by China, would 
the whole of the New Territories be logically handed back to China on the expiry of 
a 99-year lease? Given that the New Territories cover over 90% of the land territory 
of Hong Kong, the survival of the remaining tiny area seems not viable.
As a result, the British negotiators were fighting not only an uphill battle but
also a no-win one because Britain would not agree to rule Hong Kong after 1997.
The second best option for London to take was to try to fight for a better terms for
the reversion of sovereignty. Because of the reliance on Beijing to produce an
acceptable mutual agreement, London adopted a cooperative approach towards the
negotiation. Sir Percy Cradock, the architect of Britain’s China policy from late
1970s to early 1990s, had defended the policy in 1994 that:
Cooperation does not mean automatic acquiescence in China’s views.
Tough negotiation has always been necessary and has always been 
practised. But it does mean recognising that unilateral action and 
confrontation with China are more damaging to Hong kong in its 
special circumstances than a negotiated settlement and are therefore 
inconsistent with our responsibility to do our best for the territory.
The long-term welfare of Hong Kong must be the sole criterion.127
Conversely, Beijing seems to have a free hand in dealing with London over 
the sovereignty of Hong Kong. Taking advantage of not being responsible for direct 
ruling and the low cost of any immediate economic crisis at the time of negotiation, 
China exploited the situation skilfully. On the one hand, Beijing knew that timing
127Percy Cradock, "China, Britain and Hong Kong: Policy in a Cul-de-sac," 
World Today 50 (1994b):92.
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was in her favour. The time pressure on the British Government would be 
tremendous as the negotiation hinged on an extended period of time. Besides, China 
had threatened to announce unilaterally the plan to recover the sovereignty of Hong 
Kong if agreement could not be reached by September 1984.
On the other hand, Beijing tried to remove the fear of the Hong Kong people 
by appealing to nationalism, and by promising "Hong Kong people governing Hong 
Kong" and "no change for fifty years after 1997". The idea of "one country, two 
systems” was put forward by China as a guideline for the subsequent reunification of 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.128 Under the "one country, two systems" concept, 
Hong Kong will retain her own capitalist system for 50 years after 1997. Hong Kong 
is also promised a high degree of autonomy, except in defence and foreign 
relations.129 Moreover, only Hong Kong people will qualify to rule Hong 
Kong.130 Such arrangement seems to aim at wooing the Hong Kong people to 
accept the hard fact of the transfer of sovereignty, and at maintaining the stability and 
prosperity of Hong Kong during the transitional period and beyond.
128See Byron S.Y. Weng, "The Hong Kong Model of ’One Country, Two 
Systems’: Promises and Problems," Asian Affairs 14 (1987-88): 193-209.
129See Article 3 and Annex I of the Joint Declaration o f the Government of the 
People’s Republic o f China and the Government o f the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland on the Question of Hong Kong (thereafter the Joint 
Declaration); and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
the People’s Republic of China (thereafter the Basic Law).
130The Hong Kong people are being defined as "people who have lived in Hong 
Kong for seven years, accept Hong Kong as part of China and accept that China is 
the only legitimate Chinese government." Quoted in Lane (1990), op. cit., p. 94; also 
understood as "patriotic compatriots" whom "China would not require all to favour 
China’s socialist system but who must love the motherland as well as Hong Kong". 
Quoted in Duncanson (1988), op. cit., p. 34.
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The Sino-British Negotiations, 1982-84
Diplomatic talks had started after the visit of Mrs Thatcher in September 1982. 
But no significant advance was made as Britain had insisted that the negotiation 
should be based on the legality of the treaties concerned. That means London was 
only ready to discuss the lease issue of the New Territories but not the Hong Kong 
issue as a whole. For Britain, Hong Kong island and Kowloon Peninsula (south of 
Boundary Street) was ceded to her in perpetuity and is a part of Britain. 
Furthermore, Britain argued that only the continuous "presence" of the British could 
contribute to a more stable and prosperous Hong Kong. The view of the British 
Government more or less reflected the ideas of the Hong Kong business community.
Understandably, China had persistently asserted her claim of sovereignty over
Hong Kong by stating that the "unequal treaties" had no binding force and advocating
the return of Hong Kong as a whole in 1997. In reacting to Mrs Thatcher’s claim
of "Britain’s moral responsibility and duty to the people of Hong Kong" in September
1982, the New China News Agency (NCNA) made clear the Chinese position in an
article entitled "Our Solemn Stand on the Question of Hong Kong" maintaining that:
Hong Kong is part of China. The treaties concerning Hong Kong 
signed in the past between the British government and the Qing 
dynasty were unequal treaties which the Chinese have never accepted.
It is the sacred duty of the Chinese government and the Chinese people 
to recover sovereignty over Hong Kong. This has all along been the 
just stand of our people on this issue.
The British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, however, once 
again emphasized on 27 September 1982 in Hong Kong that the Sino- 
British treaties concerning Hong Kong signed in the previous century 
were still ’valid’ and so were still ’binding’. This is something which 
the Chinese will never accept.
It must be pointed out that the aforementioned treaties are unequal 
treaties imposed on China in the wake of the nineteenth-century British 
imperialistic policy which manifested itself in the invasion of China by 
the use of ’gun-boat diplomacy’. Those treaties are ironclad proof of 
the plundering of Chinese soil by British imperialism, and have, since 
their existence, been considered by the Chinese as illegal and invalid.
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Mrs Thatcher also brought up the point of Britain’s ’moral obligation’ 
to the Hong Kong people. It is our belief that the Hong Kong issue is 
part and parcel of the People’s Republic of China with its one billion 
people (including the Chinese living in Hong Kong), and, as such, falls 
within the confines of China’s national sovereignty and interests. Only 
the People’s Republic of China, being the country with sovereignty 
over Hong Kong, is entitled to say that it has obligations to Hong 
Kong.131
This loud and clear stance had brought home the message that China would not make 
any concession on Hong Kong’s sovereignty. It was regarded by Beijing’s leaders 
as a subject of principle allowing no compromise.
As mentioned in the previous section, the setting and timing of the negotiation 
had prevented Mrs Thatcher from acting boldly. Although Mrs Thatcher’s initial 
claim of the validity of the treaties was quite forceful during her meeting with Deng 
Xiaoping in September 1982, no high-profile position had been taken, nor was a 
strong-worded statement delivered, by the British Government after that. The first 
few months of the negotiation could be described as standstill and fruitless as both 
sides showed no sign of compromise.
The breakthrough came in March 1983 when Britain softened her position over 
the sovereignty of Hong Kong. Any longer delay in the arrival of a mutually 
acceptable agreement would be detrimental to the social stability and economic 
prosperity of Hong Kong. Britain was also tied down by the fact that the British- 
Hong Kong Government is responsible for the continuation of effective governing of 
Hong Kong. Mrs Thatcher confessed in her memoirs that she wrote a letter to Mr 
Zhao Ziyang, then Prime Minister of the PRC, stating that:
131Quoted in Cheng, ed. (1984), op. cit., pp. 55-6.
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Provided that agreement could be reached between the British and 
Chinese Government on administrative arrangements for Hong Kong 
which would guarantee the future prosperity and stability of Hong 
Kong, and would be acceptable to the British Parliament and to the 
people of Hong Kong as well as to the Chinese Government, I would 
be prepared to recommend to Parliament that sovereignty over the 
whole of Hong Kong should revert to China.132 (italics origin)
As a result, Britain and China entered a new phase of negotiation of
substantial matters in July 1983. In the early rounds of negotiation in this phase,
Britain tried to convince Beijing by playing up the "economic" cards and stressed that
some form of British administrative presence in the post-1997 Hong Kong would be
vital to the stability and prosperity in both the transitional period up to 1997 and
beyond.133 In response to a question whether Britain "hope to keep a British
presence" in Hong Kong, Mrs Thatcher said:
Well, these kind of things are exactly what we’re now negotiating 
about. And obviously we think that the British link is very, very 
important indeed, because it is partly responsible for the kind of 
success we’ve had in Hongkong.134
Britain changed its tone and tried to separate "jurisdiction" from 
"sovereignty". That means Britain gave up its sovereign claim to China but 
maintained the right to administer Hong Kong. This idea was also not accepted by 
China. These new efforts made by the British Government had not only failed to 
convert Beijing, but also sparked off the so-called "megaphone diplomacy” 
characterized by a series of criticism from the local leftist newspapers and unions. 
From Beijing’s point of view, sovereignty and administration were indivisible. These
132Quoted in Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: Harper 
Collins, 1993), p. 489; see also Cheng (1984), ed., op. cit., p. 30; H.K. Lamb, A 
Date with Fate (Hong Kong: Lincoln Green, [1985]), p. 20.
133Scott (1989), Political Change and the Crisis o f Legitimacy in Hong Kong, p. 
179-80.
134Quoted in Cheng (1984), ed., op. cit., p. 44.
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rising differences had given a blow to the economy of Hong Kong. The Hong Kong 
dollar had been driven to the record low of $9.55 against the US dollar in late 
September 1983. In order to rescue the fall of the Hong Kong dollar, the currency 
board system has been restored by pegging the Hong Kong dollar with that of the 
United States at an exchange rate of HK$7.8 for a US dollar.
Facing the tremendous pressure from the financial crisis and subsequent social
instability, London had made a further concession before the fifth round of
negotiations held on 19 October 1983.135 Mrs Thatcher conveyed to Beijing that
"we envisaged no link of authority or accountability between Britain and Hong Kong
after 1997."136 Subsequently, the destiny of Hong Kong was almost fixed when Sir
Geoffrey Howe, then British Foreign Secretary, made it plain and public after his
Beijing trip on 19 April 1984 that:
The terms of an agreement between the British and Chinese 
Governments still have to be worked out, but it is right for me to tell 
you now that it would not be realistic to think of an agreement that 
provides for continued British administration in Hong Kong after 
1997.137
After twenty rounds of negotiation, the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the 
Question of Hong Kong was finally initiated in September 1984. In the Joint 
Declaration, Britain formally returned Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China with effect 
from 1 July 1997. In return, China had promised to set up a special administrative 
region in Hong Kong with "high degree of autonomy" (except for foreign and defence 
affairs) and no change of life style for 50 years after 1997. In the transitional period, 
"the Government of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration 
of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity 
and social stability; and that the Government of the People’s Republic of China will
135Tsim (1984), op. cit., p. 37.
136Thatcher (1993), op. cit., p. 490.
137Cited by Unofficial Members of Executive and Legislative Councils Office 
(UMELCO), Annual Report 1984 (Hong Kong: UMELCO, 1985), p. 6.
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give its cooperation in this connection" and a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group will
be set up to "ensure a smooth transfer of government in 1997". In section I of Annex
I, the future HKSAR political system will be:
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be directly under 
the authority of the Central People’s Government of the People’s 
Republic of China and shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Except 
for foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the 
Central People’s Government, the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region shall be vested with executive, legislative and independent 
judicial power, including that of final adjudication. . . .
The government and legislature of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region shall be composed of local inhabitants. The 
chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall 
be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be 
appointed by the Central People’s Government. Principal officials 
(equivalent to Secretaries) shall be nominated by the chief executive of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and appointed by the 
Central People’s Government. The legislature of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by elections. The 
executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to 
the legislature.
In evaluating the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Mrs Thatcher highlighted
"three main advantages":
First, they [the Joint Declaration] constituted what would be 
unequivocally binding international agreement. Second, they were 
sufficiently clear and detailed about what would happen in Hong Kong 
after 1997 to command the confidence of the people of Hong Kong.
Third, there was a provision that the terms of the proposed Anglo- 
Chinese Agreement would be stipulated in the Basic Law to be passed 
by Chinese People’s Congress: this would in effect be the constitution 
of Hong Kong after 1997.138
Although the terms of the Joint Declaration would be adopted in the Basic 
Law, the successful conversion would largely rely on the goodwill as well as the
138Thatcher (1993), op. cit., p. 492.
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same comprehension of the letter and spirit of the Declaration. Subsequent 
developments proved neither.
Institutional Barriers of Representation
The negotiations were structured as if it was only a matter of two concerned 
sovereign states. On the insistence of Chinese Government, the British Government 
agreed to keep the negotiations in strict confidence and on a bilateral basis.139 
Direct participation from the Hong Kong people was, thus, prevented. The lack of 
direct participation could be remedied if there was a sound representation system in 
place before the negotiation started. Unfortunately, no such kind of mechanism was 
available. Because of such structural constraints, the opinion of Hong Kong would 
only be relied on the negotiators from both Governments to represent and take care.
On the British side, the Governor of Hong Kong acted as a member of the 
British delegation. Voices from within Hong Kong had to rely on the Executive 
Council (ExCo), which had been granted an advisory status from the second phase 
of the negotiation in July 1983. In a statement issued by the British Prime Minister’s 
Office following the visit of all the ExCo members to London on 1 July 1983, Britain 
"reaffirmed their commitment to Hong Kong and their aim of seeking arrangement 
which would be acceptable to Parliament, to China and to the people of Hong Kong" 
and also "emphasised the importance which they attach to the advice of the Executive 
Council which would continue to be sought throughout the course of the talks".140 
But the Hong Kong mass public could hardly regard the ExCo members as 
representative of their interests because the latter were nominees of the Governor and
139David Bonavia, Hong Kong 1997 (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 
1985), pp. 102-104; quoted in Yahuda (1993), op. cit., p. 257.
140Cited by UMELCO, Annual Report 1984, p. 3.
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so insulated from the society.141 The closed colonial political structure, more or 
less, contributed to the wide spread of such kind of feelings.
On the Chinese side, Hong Kong deputies to the National People’s Congress, 
representatives to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the Hong 
Kong branch of the New China News Agency (NCNA) and local leftist organizations 
had constituted the major channels of reflecting public opinion in Hong Kong. It 
seemed to many Hong Kong people that the above-mentioned channels were far from 
adequate and had been regarded as not as neutral as they claimed to be. Without the 
necessary and widespread legitimacy in the eyes of the Hong Kong people in general, 
the representation and effectiveness of these channels were seriously called into 
question.
Furthermore, Beijing had rejected the "three-legged stool" concept totally. 
The concept was first used in 1971 to describe a tripod of consent among China, 
Britain and Hong Kong people in maintaining the stability of Hong Kong, and later 
borrowed to denote the three legs of China, Britain and Hong Kong in supporting the 
stool of Hong Kong’s future after 1997.142 The conflict was stirred up when the 
then Hong Kong Governor, Sir Edward Youde143, was asked who represents the 
people of Hong Kong in the Sino-British negotiations when he returned to Hong Kong 
from London on 7 July 1983. He said: "I represent. I am the Governor of Hong 
Kong . . . Indeed I represent the people of Hong Kong; who else would I 
represent?"144
141Yahuda (1993), op. cit., p. 256, nl5.
142See the interview of Mr Denis C. Bray, the then Secretary for Home Affairs, 
Hong Kong Government, in The Nineties Monthly 180 (January 1985):26; Cheng 
(1984), ed. op. cit., pp. 219, 231-2; H.K. Lamb (1985), op. cit., p. 29-33; Peter 
Harris, "Hong Kong Confronts 1997: An Assessment of the Sino-British Agreement," 
Pacific Affairs 59 (1986):48, nlO.
143Sir Edward Youde passed away in office during a trip to Beijing in late 1986.
144Quoted in H.K. Lamb (1985), op. cit., p. 29; see also Lane (1990), op. cit., 
p. 97.
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Beijing reacted the next day by stressing that the Hong Kong Governor was 
a member of the British delegation. Moreover, the Director of the Government 
Information Service, Mr Peter Tsao, was denied a visa for accompanying the 
Governor to the Beijing talks. The Chinese stance had been understood to be that 
only the Chinese Government has the right to act on behalf of the Hong Kong people.
Later on, Beijing had also challenged the status of the Unofficial members of 
both the ExCo and the LegCo as representatives of Hong Kong people. When 
receiving Sir S, Y. Chung, Miss Lydia Dunn and Mr Q.W. Lee, who visited Beijing 
at China’s invitation, on 23 June 1984, Mr Deng Xiaoping discredited them 
deliberately by stating that they were there in their private capacities. Mr Deng was 
quoted as saying: "The Sino-British negotiations will not be subject to external 
interference" and "As for the so-called ’three-legged stool’ situation, we only 
recognise two legs. There is no third leg". After the meeting, Miss Dunn was said 
to be surprised "at Deng’s initial reference to our individual capacity."145
Given the prevention from participation in the negotiations and the lack of a 
effective representation mechanism, the Hong Kong mass public seem to have little 
faith in the resulting Sino-British Agreement.
The Shifting of Aspiration
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Hong Kong people had held a quite 
optimistic view toward the future of Hong Kong. They believed that China would 
let Hong Kong remain as it was because of the fact that the Government of the PRC 
had tolerated the Colony for the past several decades, especially in the years of the 
Cultural Revolution, as well as because of the importance of Hong Kong in
145Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 5 July 1984.
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accomplishing her goals of "Four Modernisations". Therefore, they were of an 
opinion, though somewhat subjective, that the status quo would be maintained after 
1997. According to a survey released in March 1982, over three-fourths of the 
respondents indicated that the probable outcome of the future of Hong Kong after 
1997 would be either to maintain the status quo or to become trust territories.146
As mentioned before, Beijing would not accept any form of British presence 
after 1997 and this stance was straightforward and not negotiable. The hope to 
maintain the status quo was dashed as Beijing put across the above message 
vigorously and firmly during the initial phase of negotiations. In order not to 
disappoint and frustrate her compatriots in Hong Kong, Beijing put forward the plan 
of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" (gangren zhigang14,1).
This strategic move by the Beijing leaders had quite succeeded in shaping the
preferences of Hong Kong people, as well as offering a hope, at least at the moment,
of Hong Kong people governing themselves. In response to the question of what the
meaning of Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong was in an interview with
Newsweek on 23 January 1984, the then Deputy Director of the Hong Kong branch
of the NCNA, Mr Li Chu-wen said:
The demand for democracy on the part of Hong Kong’s people is fully 
justified and should win the sympathy of all those with democratic 
aspirations -- including the Chinese. If Hong Kong prefers direct 
elections to determine its officials, then it should strive for that, and 
it will have the support of the Chinese people.
In early 1984, members of the LegCo had adjusted their attitudes toward the 
Sino-British negotiations from the one of waiting passively for the outcome to the one
146Quoted in Cheng (1984), ed., op. cit., p. 85.
147The term "gangren zhigang" is believed to be coined by the then Director of 
the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of China’s State Council, Mr Liao Cheng- 
zhi, in January 1983 when receiving a visiting group of Hong Kong New Territories 
village leaders. Before that day, the concept was widely floated in Hong Kong, but 
the exact wording had not been fixed.
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of being more active in asserting their right to discuss the matter before London and
Beijing have arrived at any agreement. This was largely in response to London’s
decision to withdraw from Hong Kong in 1997.148 Under such a condition, Mr
R.H. Lobo, Senior Member of the LegCo, introduced a motion to debate the issue
in public on 14 March 1984. The motion reads as follows:
This council deems it essential that any proposals for the future of 
Hong Kong should be debated in this council before any final 
agreement is reached.
During the debate, LegCo members seemed dissatisfied with the way the Hong 
Kong people were being treated by both Britain and China. For example, Mr Alex 
Wu used the term "arranged marriage" to denote the treatment Hong Kong people had 
received; Dr Ho Kam-fai refuted those who regarded the "Lobo motion" as the re- 
emergence of the "three-legged stool" concept; Mr Stephen Cheong shared the view 
of Dr Ho and added that the LegCo members were not fighting to have a final say 
in the negotiations; and Miss Maria Tam argued that the LegCo has the legal status 
to debate the future of Hong Kong.149
When Sir Geoffrey Howe, then Foreign Secretary, had made it clear on 20 
April 1984 that Britain would retreat from Hong Kong in 1997, the unofficial 
members of the ExCo and the LegCo issued a position paper arguing that the 
acceptability of the would-be Sino-British Agreement depended on its:
148Sze Ma Yee, "The Negotiation of Hong Kong Future with All Glories Goes to 
Deng Xiaoping," Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly 91 (1984):37-39. (in 
Chinese)
149Quoted in UMELCO Annual Report 1984, pp. 4-5.
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(i) containing full details of the proposed administrative, legal, social 
and economic systems applicable after 1997;
(ii) providing adequate and workable assurances that the terms of the 
Agreement will be honoured;
(iii) stating that the provisions of the Basic Law will incorporate the 
provisions of the Agreement;
(iv) guaranteeing that the rights of British nationals will be 
safeguarded.150
Furthermore, Sir S.Y. Chung, Miss Lydia Dunn and Mr Q.W. Lee visited 
Beijing at China’s invitation and met with Mr Deng Xiaoping and Mr Ji Pengfei on 
23 June 1984. In the meeting, they made three recommendations to maintain stability 
and prosperity of Hong Kong both before and after 1997:
(i) . . . the Agreement:
—must be very detailed; it must provide clear and precise definitions 
of all aspects of Hong Kong’s existing systems;
—must be mutually binding as between the two signing countries of 
China and Britain;
—must contain a provision stipulating that the Basic Law of the Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong will be based on the terms in the 
Agreement. . . .
(ii) In order to enhance confidence, we believe that the Basic Law 
should be drafted in Hong Kong. It should be included in the 
Constitution of China after the approval by the Standing Committee of 
the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC). . . .
(iii) . . .  If the Chinese leaders understand the anxiety of the people of 
Hong Kong and would agree to the establishment of an insulating 
mechanism, like a dam, between Hong Kong and China, confidence 
in Hong Kong would be greatly increased. We, therefore, propose the 
establishment of a Committee consisting of Chinese people of 
international standing and reputation. This Committee will be 
appointed by the Government of China. Their responsibility would be 
to monitor or advise the drafting, and implementation of, and 
subsequent amendments, if any, to die Basic Law.151
150Ibid., p. 56.
mIbid., pp. 57-8.
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The strong wording in the above quotation did not bring much fruit. As 
mentioned before, Mr Deng Xiaoping opted to play down their capacities and denied 
that there was any confidence crisis in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, a strong distrust 
of Chinese Government could be detected from the lines. And this probably reflected 
the state of mind of many Hong Kong people, at least at that moment.
In addition, after the initialling of the Joint Declaration on 26 September 1984,
Hong Kong people were invited to submit to the Assessment Office their views on it.
One submission from an individual seemed to reflect the powerlessness and actual
feeling of the Hong Kong people:
I belong to the middle income group who do not have the means to 
emigrate to other countries and because I was bom and educated in 
Hong Kong I would wish to stay in Hong Kong. For the purpose of 
your statistics you can classify me as one of those who would accept 
the draft agreement but I hope you will also take into account that I 
only accept it with much reluctance and with many reservations about 
the feasibility of its implementation. My heart is not truly at ease and 
I have no full confidence in our future. The whole thing has not been 
a very fair play to us because we have not had any say and there is no 
other alternative than not to have an agreement at all.152
From the above we could see some of the Hong Kong people adjusted to 
accept whatever arrangements reached by Britain and China on their behalf. 
Retreating from their high hopes of maintaining the status quo under British mle, they 
now came down to the earth by accepting, though somewhat reluctantly, the reality 
that Hong Kong had to return to China in July 1997. The remaining thing they could 
do was to press for an agreement that promised to keep the existing systems 
unchanged and then have it codified in the Basic Law, which is the mini-constitution 
of Hong Kong after 1997.
152Assessment Office, Arrangements for Testing the Acceptability in Hong Kong 
of the Draft Agreement on the Future of the Territory. Report of the Independent 
Monitoring Team (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984), p. 19.
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Their hope and faith for the future of Hong Kong relied on whether the 
promise of "high degree of autonomy" and "Hong Kong people governing Hong 
Kong" under the roof of "one country, two systems" would be actually put into 
practice. Gone was the possibility of having any form of British presence after 1997; 
thus, the question of how to perfect and realize the concept of "Hong Kong people 
governing Hong Kong" became paramount.
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The Rivalry Over the Democratisation
of Hong Kong
The idea of developing "representative government" in Hong Kong was a 
recent one. Only after the issue of 1997 had been raised in the early 1980s, did the 
British Government make public its intention to have some sort of political reform in 
Hong Kong. To a certain extent, the late arrival of decolonization was due to the 
complicated political situation of Hong Kong.153 Unlike other British colonies, 
Hong Kong was unlikely to become an independent state. The Chinese Government, 
whether the Communists or the Nationalists, had never given up its sovereign claim 
over Hong Kong. Any constitutional reform must take into account the reaction of 
the Chinese Government.
The long-overdue reform of the "Victorian" colonial structure seemed to get 
China’s blessings as stated in the Joint Declaration. Up to the conclusion of the Joint 
Declaration, there was no elected element, be it direct or indirect, in the Legislative 
Council. But the Joint Declaration stipulates that the chief executive "shall be 
selected by election or through consultations held locally" and the legislature "shall 
be constituted by elections". Although there would be reform on the political 
structure, two outstanding questions remain: when to introduce such reforms, and 
who has the final say on the pace and direction of the reform. These two questions 
seem to be separated from each other at the first glance, but they are indeed highly 
related. If Britain and China had arrived at a consensus on the extent of the reform, 
the question of timing becomes less problematic. If not, the timing becomes critical 
as China would prefer no or limited change during the transitional period. 
Furthermore, the consensus between Beijing and London on the extent of the political 
reforms would be vital for building up a basis for Hong Kong’s autonomy that would 
endure after 1997.
153For the normal process of decolonisation, see Norman Miners, "The Normal 
Pattern of Decolonisation of British Dependent Territories" in Peter Wesley-Smith 
and Albert H.Y. Chen, eds., The Basic Law and Hong Kong's Future (Hong Kong: 
Butterworths, 1988), pp. 44-54.
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Britain seemed to think that she would be responsible for preparing the reform 
during the transitional period given that the proposed reform was in line with the 
Joint Declaration. Britain also thought that her sovereignty over Hong Kong would 
last until 1997, though China would be consulted in the implementation of the Joint 
Declaration. Furthermore, "the British and Hong Kong Governments appear to have 
interpreted the Chinese acceptance of central elective institutions for the S.A.R. 
[Special Administrative Region] from 1997 as also acquiescence in their progressive 
introduction in the interim period to lay the groundwork for full internal autonomy 
after the reversion of sovereignty."154 (italics origin)
China appeared not to share the same view as Britain. As the following 
sections will reveal, Beijing wanted to get hold of the pace of reform by stressing that 
the reform would better converge with the Basic Law which is still under drafting. 
China could not accept the pre-determination of the Basic Law by the political 
reforms initiated by the British Government. Furthermore, China seemed to regard 
the right of being consulted by Britain in the implementation of the Joint Declaration 
during the transitional period as having the right of approval or the veto power.
The divergent views had not only spelt out the difficulty of smooth transition, 
but also mobilized the local political forces to join in the rivalry. The attempts and 
bargains made by all these actors (political forces) in shaping the emerging political 
structure and order have provided the Hong Kong public with an understanding of 
their political value and stance. This process of development would shape the attitude 
and behaviour of the public and was bound to have impact on the voters’ choice in 
the ensuing elections.
154Peter Slinn, "The Hong Kong Settlement: A Preliminary Assessment," 
International Relations 9 (1987): 11.
Different Attitudes Towards Political Reforms
As mentioned before, the item of political reforms had been put on the 
political agenda by the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. There was no problem 
of carrying out reform but the pace and the extent of democratisation did stir up 
debate and mobilisation among the concerned parties. There were several forces 
working to shape the political reforms before 1997 and the post-1997 political 
structure. At the state level, there were only two actors: Britain and China. At the 
societal level, the following could be identified: the metropolitan capitalists, the 
indigenous capitalists, the rural gentry, and the new middle class.155 The alignment 
and realignment of the above-mentioned forces will probably help shape and explain 
the emergent social formation and political order in the transitional and post-1997 
period. All of them would like to see Hong Kong remain stable and prosper but they 
have their own ideas and ways to achieve it. Their interests and calculation are so 
divergent that conflict and contradiction seem inevitable.
First of all, China made clear that Hong Kong would be governed by Hong 
Kong people and enjoy a high degree of autonomy under the "imaginative" idea of 
"one country, two systems" after the restoration of Hong Kong sovereignty in 1997. 
Although the terms "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" and "high degree of 
autonomy" had often been talked about within Hong Kong society in and before 1985, 
no operational meaning and relevant procedures of implementation were offered by 
China at the time. This state of affairs could be attributed to the premature nature 
of the relevant concepts which were originally aimed at wooing the Taipei 
Government for reunification. As the situation came to requiring clarification in mid- 
1980s onwards, Beijing had added qualifications to her promise. Furthermore, 
Beijing showed that she would like to see as little change as possible before 1997. 
The adoption of such conservative approach by the Chinese Government seemingly 
came from Beijing’s "suspicion" over the British sincerity at carrying out the pre­
155Kuan Hsin-chi, "Power Dependence and Democratic Transition: The Case of 
Hong Kong," China Quarterly 128 (1991):774-93.
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emptive political reforms in 1985 and the resulting so-called danger of restoring
power to the Hong Kong people by such reforms before 1997. Furthermore, a long
list of reasons were also advanced to explain China’s resistance to democratisation:
(1) the fear that Britain will use it as an excuse to shirk its 
responsibility of administering Hong Kong until 1997, (2)
democratisation will release political forces of such magnitudes that 
continued rule of the Hong Kong [Government will be difficult or 
impossible, (3) the injection of elements of uncertainty which would 
wreck the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong before China is in a 
position to take over, (4) the possibility that power will be transferred 
to political groups which are pro-Britain, hostile to China or 
predisposed to place the interests of Hong Kong before those of China,
(5) China being compelled to openly organize politically in order to 
participate in the competition for the transferred power, thus bringing 
about detrimental consequences for Hong Kong, (6) democratization 
will disrupt the capitalist system of Hong Kong by scaring away local 
and foreign capital and by forcing the government to adopt excessive 
welfare measures and restrictive economic regulations, (7) the 
possibility of turning mass elections into occasions for the people of 
Hong Kong to periodically pass judgments on the popularity of China, 
and (8) the fear that the ’democratic forces’ in Hong Kong will 
eventually become subversive of political tranquility in China by sheer 
demonstration effects and by their purposive promotion of Westem- 
style ’democracy’ in China.156
Because of being "Not sure of Britain’s intentions and unable to completely 
prevent some forms of power transfer from taking place, China for strategic reasons 
and out of an instinctual predisposition not to leave power to chance, feels compelled 
to compete in any power-grasping game."157 Under such a perception, China would 
try to resist any constitutional change that will let Hong Kong out of her control and 
would like to maintain the executive-led government and related structures after 1997. 
This intention was well reflected in the content of the Basic Law. By concentrating
156Lau Siu-kai, Decolonization Without Independence: The Unfinished Political 
Reforms o f the Hong Kong Government (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, Institute of Social Studies, 1987), p. 6.
l51Ibid, p. 10.
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nearly all the power in the hands of the executive head, China would easily control 
the use of state power in post-1997 Hong Kong.
For Britain, the best outcome of the negotiation with China was the 
continuation of the British rule after 1997. As shown in previous sections, Britain 
had failed to achieve that goal and subsequently agreed to hand back Hong Kong to 
China in 1997. The remaining questions for the British Government to resolve just 
before the conclusion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in late 1984 were how to 
ensure institutionally the continuation of existing freedom and living style after 1997, 
and how to convince the British Parliament to approve the said Joint Declaration.158
As a result, the British Government had swiftly issued Green and White papers 
in 1984 aiming at the establishment of representative government before 1997. After 
that, the British concern was whether she could maintain an effective rule over Hong 
Kong in the transitional period. The unusual 12-year long transitional period has 
brought out the question as to which government has the ultimate say in that period. 
The intervention of China in the transitional period aroused British suspicion of the 
extent of the autonomy the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR) Government will have. The intensive and prolonged controversy over the 
constitutional reforms and the building of Chek Lap Kok airport have been the typical 
examples. Democratisation therefore became one of the necessary steps to take, so 
as to maintain her effective and legitimate rule as well as to counter the expanding 
Chinese intervention in Hong Kong affairs.
The metropolitan capitalists, the indigenous capitalists and the rural gentry 
seemed to try to avoid any involvement in the Sino-British dispute. Although their 
common interests in maintaining the capitalist system in Hong Kong is the same, they 
have conflict over their respective role and influence in the present colonial state as 
well as in the future HKSAR state. Accompanying the restoration of Hong Kong to
158John Walden, Excellency, Your Gap is Growing: Six Talks on a Chinese 
Takeaway (Hong Kong: All Noble Co. Ltd., 1987), p. 73.
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China is the rise of economic nationalism. The influence of the metropolitan 
capitalists seemed to be contained and may give way to the indigenous capitalists and 
the rural gentry as 1997 approaches. Furthermore, due to their extensive investment 
in China as well as the diminishing power of the British-Hong Kong Government, the 
indigenous capitalists, the rural gentry and some British businessmen would tend to 
support China if conflict existed between China and Britain. Nevertheless, the 
metropolitan capitalists are not without counteracting power. The very success and 
further development of Hong Kong as well as the economic reform in China hinge 
on the present and on the supply of adequate financial capital by the metropolitan 
capitalists, and the latter’s strategic position in the world capitalist system.
The new middle class had long been deprived of representation in the colonial 
state, at least up to the early 1980s. Through the writing of critics in the newspapers 
and the organisation of protest, the activists in this class have started to challenge the 
colonial state since the 1970s.159 They were not satisfied with the colonial political 
order and wanted to see some sort of democratic reform.160 They were therefore 
given the label of ’’democratic faction". The reunion with China and the maintenance 
of a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong after reunion were their political 
principles in the 1980s, but the latter one seems to have gained more emphasis after 
the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. Although rising to the status of semi-opposition 
through electoral competition, their vulnerability lies in their limited (though growing) 
mobilisation capacity and the lack of cohesive leadership.161 More important than
159For the role of the new middle class in the Hong Kong urban movements, see 
Alvin Y. So and Ludmilla Kwitko, "The Transformation of Urban Movements in 
Hong Kong, 1970-90," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 24 (1992): 32-43; for a 
collection of critics written by one of the active pressure groups, the Hong Kong 
Observers, see their publication Pressure Point (Hong Kong: Summerson Eastern, 
1981); for the attitude of the Hong Kong Government and her treatment towards the 
pressure groups in the late 1970s, see Duncan Campbell, "A Secret Plan for 
Dictatorship," New Statesman 2598 (1980):8-9 & 12.
160Joseph Y.S. Cheng, "The Democracy Movement in Hong Kong," International 
Affairs 65 (1989):443-62.
161Lau Siu-kai, "Institutions Without Leaders: The Hong Kong Chinese View of 
Political Leadership," Pacific Affairs 63 (1990): 191-209.
85
that is whether they have the will to remove the institutional barriers set by the 
present and future sovereign states.162 So far, it is the one that can manage to have 
a plurality of electoral support. Meanwhile, a pro-Beijing faction does exist in this 
class. They have a close relationship with the Chinese authorities and their organs 
in Hong Kong. For them, nationalism is more important than the principle of 
autonomy.
Unlike in other British colonies, the public in Hong Kong seemed to have 
played a minor and passive role in the politics of decolonisation. Insulated from 
politics under the colonial rule, discouraged from participation by its future sovereign 
state, and lacking leadership and organisation, their influence would be peripheral. 
Their voice could only be heard spontaneously in protest movements and hopefully 
in elections. This segment of population comprises largely the refugees from China 
after 1949 and their offspring. Their political orientation toward Communist China 
is quite negative and their trust in her is very limited.163 Regarding the political 
reform, they tended to be crosscut by the national sentiment and the principle of a 
high degree of autonomy.
Given the closed and concentrated nature of the Hong Kong Government 
which has developed since 1841 and is likely to remain in place after 1997, the 
successful jockeying for influence or power of particular social forces lies in their 
coincidence of interest with the sovereign state. In the meantime, the state may 
probably be constrained by its paramount aim of capitalist development and therefore 
may occasionally accommodate demands that seem to have effect on the stability and 
prosperity of the Hong Kong capitalist society.
162Gideon Doron and Moshe Maor, "Barriers to Entry into a Political System," 
Journal o f Theoretical Politics 3 (1991): 175-88; also, Randall G. Holcombe, 
"Barriers to Entry and Political Competition," Journal o f Theoretical Politics 3 
(1991):231-40.
163Huang Wenfang, "My Forty-Two Years of Life and Works in the New China 
News Agency’s Hong Kong Branch" (series and in Chinese) Eastweek 90 (13 July
1994): 160-164.
86
The Political Reforms from Above
While the Sino-British negotiations were still in progress in July 1984, the 
Hong Kong Government put forward a Green Paper entitled "The Further 
Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong". One of the aims stated 
in the Paper is:
. . .  to develop progressively a system of government the authority for 
which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong, which is able to represent 
authoritatively the views of the people of Hong Kong, and which is 
more directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong; . . .164
Following the District Administration Reforms launched in 1980-1 which led to the 
establishment of the consultative District Boards system, the Paper proposed to 
reform the "central organs of the Government" of the LegCo, the ExCo, the 
Governor and their relationships with each other.
The move seemed to indicate Britain’s decision to further reform the political 
structure in Hong Kong, though in a very cautious and manageable way. This can 
be detected from the Green Paper’s praise of the existing "consensus politics" and the 
somewhat less favourable comments on the introduction of direct election. In 
highlighting the unique feature of Hong Kong’s political system, the Green Paper put 
it in this way:
The most distinct feature of the present system of government in Hong 
Kong is that it operates on the basis of consultation and consensus. It 
is not a system based on parties, factions and adversarial politics but 
one of broad agreements which seeks to take a pragmatic approach to 
the problems of the day. . . . The very real advantages of this system, 
which have enabled Hong Kong to enjoy sustained periods of economic 
growth and internal stability, must not be forgotten, or lightly thrown 
aside, in developing plans for the introduction of more representative 
institutions in Hong Kong.165
164 Green Paper: The Further Development o f Representative Government in Hong 
Kong (July 1984), p. 4.
l65Ibid., p. 8.
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Regarding direct election, the Green Paper described it as not a "universally 
successful as a means of ensuring stable representative government" and it "would run 
the risk of a swift introduction of adversarial politics, and would introduce an element 
of instability at a crucial time". On the contrary, the adoption of indirect election, 
especially in the form of functional constituencies, seemed to have the consideration 
that "full weight should be given to representation of the economic and professional 
sectors of Hong Kong society which are essential to future confidence and 
prosperity".166
The then Governor, Sir Edward Youde, had also hinted that the views from
Beijing had also been taken into consideration when framing the proposal. In
introducing the Green Paper to the LegCo in July 1984, he stated:
In drawing up our proposals we have had regard to the special 
circumstance of Hongkong and the need to maintain our good 
relationship with our mainland neighbour. We have also done our 
utmost in framing these proposals to ensure that there need be no 
conflict with the principle of continuity between the systems in force 
both before and after 1997.167
As shown in Table 3.1, the LegCo proposed to have 12 (25%, N =48) and 24 
(48%, N=50) indirectly elected members (half from the electoral college and half 
from functional constituencies) in 1985 and 1988, respectively. In 1991, the number 
would be raised to 28 (56%) under option 1 and 40 (80%) under option 2. Though 
there was no proposed change in the ExCo in 1985, the Green Paper had proposed 
that 4 (25%) and 8 (57%) members would be elected from among the LegCo’s 
unofficial members. Because of the above changes in the LegCo and the ExCo, the 
Governor would cease to be the President of the LegCo and his power in the ExCo 
would be reviewed in due course. Furthermore, the Green Paper also indicated that:
mIbid., p. 9.
167The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong, Address 
by the Governor Sir Edward Youde, GCMG, MBE, to the Legislative Council on 18 
July 1984, p. 5.
88
The future method of selecting candidates for appointment as Governor 
will also need to be considered. One possible development would be 
for the Governor himself, in his capacity as Chief Executive, to be 
Selected, once the process described in this Paper is complete, through 
an elective process, for example, through election by a college 
composed of all Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative 
Councils after a period of consultation among them.168
The question here is whether the release of the 1984 Green Paper preceded the 
Chinese agreement in the Joint Declaration that the future HKSAR legislature should 
be constituted by elections. The answer was not, as revealed later by Sir Geoffrey 
Howe.169 Although showing her disapproval in private briefing, China at last did 
agree to include the clause in the Joint Declaration.170 This pre-emptive move to 
reform had aroused the suspicion of China which was later found to be detrimental 
to the close cooperation of both countries during the transition period, (for details, 
see the following section)
One possible explanation for the pre-emptive move by Britain was the British 
calculation of pressurising China to adopt the relevant clauses in the Joint 
Declaration. If adopted, it seemed to smooth the way for the subsequent approval of 
the Joint Declaration by the British Parliament and the Hong Kong people. In 
addition, the move also served as the constitutional basis for the succeeding 
democratic reform as well as "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong".
m Green Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong 
Kong (July 1984), p. 20.
169Sir Geoffrey Howe revealed this before the Foreign Affairs Committee, see 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Volume II, Minutes of Evidence, p. 24; cited by Norman 
Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong, 5th ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), pp. 25 & 30, n20.
170Miners (1991), ibid., p. 25; FEER, 29 November 1984.
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In fact, the release of the Green Paper has been viewed as a logical move to
prepare for the subsequent "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong". Sir S.Y.
Chung, then senior member of the ExCo, had stated that:
If there is no problem in the [on-going Sino-British] negotiation,
British rule will end on 30 June 1997. China has said to let Hong 
Kong people govern Hong Kong after regaining sovereignty. At 
present, Hong Kong is a colony and the Governor—the highest 
administrator—is appointed [by Britain]. The ordinary people in Hong 
Kong do wish that the [future] administrator would not be appointed 
by Beijing, but be elected by the Hong Kong people. Thus, there is 
no reason for Hong Kong to follow the colonial system in the future. 
Instead, Hong Kong should follow [to develop] a democratic system.
We do not want the Hong Kong Government to continue the existing 
colonial government until 1996 and then suddenly carry out election.
As a result, [we] should use the remaining 13 years to transform 
[Hong Kong] into a representative government. . . .m
In the LegCo’s motion debate on the Green Paper, Mr Alex Wu also said: "It 
is especially sensible for the Green Paper to adopt a gradual approach to achieve the 
objective of ’Hong Kong people to rule Hong Kong’". Mr Yeung Po-kwan said on 
the same occasion that: "as there are only 13 years to go before Hong Kong is faced 
with the reality of ’Hong Kong being ruled by Hong Kong people’ in 1997, the 
introduction of reforms into the government system has become an urgent task which 
admits of no delay."172
Although there was a common understanding of the need to reform the central 
level of government by introducing elected members to the LegCo first and then to 
the ExCo, the political community was divided over the way the elected members 
would be recruited. Those who supported the Green Paper’s option of indirect 
election were mainly ExCo and LegCo members. They argued for a cautious start 
of political reform so as to maintain stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Mr Chan 
Kam-chuen, a Legco member, even hinted that the introduction of direct election
m The Nineties Monthly 175 (August 1984):58; original in Chinese, my own 
translation.
mHong Kong Hansard, 2 August 1984:1354 & 1405.
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would probably favour the well-organised leftist trade unions. He further reminded
those who supported direct election that:
They should be aware of the Chinese saying ( f t  iff -5* *>“^ 4  ^ 4 )  
i.e. the mantis preying a cicada is unaware of the oriole behind it. If 
they count the number of votes they estimate they would get and 
compare the figure with what the unions would get, they would 
discover that it will take a lot of hardwork to canvass for the votes of 
the disorganised silent majority, bearing in mind that the unions are 
well organised and may use the votes they can canvass as their 
powerful political weapons.173
The advocates of direct election were UrbCo members, activists of pressure 
groups, trade unions and grassroots organizations. They united together to form the 
Joint Conference on the Green Paper on Further Development of Representative 
Government. The Joint Conference argued that direct election to the LegCo was the 
key issue of the present political reform and a step to "return governmental authority 
to the people" as there would be "a democratic and highly autonomous system of self­
administration" in 1997. They therefore demanded that there should be no less than 
one-fifth of directly elected LegCo members by 1988.174
The subsequent White Paper, released in late November 1984, opted for a 
speedy pace of introducing indirectly elected members to the LegCo. Twenty-four 
(43%) would be returned by indirect election in 1985. Though the Green Paper had 
not included any option of direct election to the LegCo, the White Paper indicated 
that the LegCo would have directly elected members in 1988. It seemed worthy to 
quote here:
mIbid., pp. 1373-4.
mSouth China Morning Post (SCMP), 17 September 1984.
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. . . With few exceptions the bulk of public response from all sources 
suggested a cautious approach with a gradual start by introducing a 
very small number of directly elected members in 1988 and building 
up to a significant number of directly elected members by 1997. . . .
In summary, there was strong public support for the idea of direct 
elections but little support for such elections in the immediate 
future.175
With respect to the ExCo and the Governor, no timetable was provided to 
implement the Green Paper’s proposals. Though a ministerial system had been raised 
before and during the consultation period, the White Paper stated that the issue would 
be addressed at a later stage because it "raises important constitutional question". 
Regarding the position of the Governor, the White Paper indicated that: "Any 
proposals for change in the position and role of the Governor will need to take into 
account the provisions of the Joint Declaration and these important issues will be 
considered at a later stage."176 Nevertheless, the White Paper had proposed to 
review the Governor’s position as President of the LegCo in 1987. As a whole, it 
is strange to note that the far-reaching reforms outlined in the Green Paper had only 
been given a start but no definite schedule beyond 1985 in the subsequent White 
Paper.
China’s Pressure to Converge
The optimists in Hong Kong seemed to believe that the coincidence of the 
timing of the release of the 1984 Green and White Papers, and the initialling of the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration in late 1984 indicated that London and Beijing had 
already arrived at certain consensus on political reforms and arrangements during the
m White Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong 
Kong (November 1984), p. 8.
mIbid., p. 11.
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transitional period. This false hope was eventually shattered by the high profile the 
Beijing leaders adopted in the ensuing years of transition.
The rather self-restrained gestures by Beijing leaders in late 1984 up to mid-
1985 witnessed an about-turn in late 1985, from the one that emphasized British
responsibility to administer Hong Kong up to 1997 to the one that actively spoke out
about what Beijing would like or not like to see in the transitional period. As
indicated in a previous section, the British pre-emptive move to reform has entailed
China’s suspicion about the motive behind it. Hence, the director of the NCNA’s
Hong Kong Branch, Mr Xu Jiatun, gave a warning in a press conference on 21
November 1985 that he "did not want to see major changes in the twelve years [to
come], transforming the fundamental system in Hong Kong, and then no more
changes in the following fifty years." He further remarked that if Hong Kong wanted
to maintain stability and prosperity, it would be better for her to follow the text of the
Joint Declaration. He warned that:
Now we cannot help noticing a tendency of doing things deviating 
from the Joint Declaration. If there are unexpected changes, I think 
one should pay attention to question of this kind.177
It was believed that Mr Xu wanted to express Beijing’s disapproval of the 
British attempt to introduce further political reforms in Hong Kong as well as to 
intimidate political activists who were lobbying for a faster pace of democratization. 
At that moment, the issue of direct election to the LegCo and the installation of a 
ministerial system were hotly debated in Hong Kong. Beijing seemed to worry that 
the pre-emptive political reforms would dictate the drafting of the Basic Law, which 
was to be promulgated in 1990, and thus lessen its command on the political changes 
in Hong Kong in the transitional period. Moreover, Beijing also regarded the move 
as a prelude to "transfer power to the Hong Kong people" rather than to China.178
177Quoted in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, "Hong Kong: the Pressure to Converge," 
International Affairs 63 (1987):278.
178Xu Jiatun, Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
United Daily News, 1993), pp. 168-173. (in Chinese)
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The sceptical attitude of Beijing toward the political reforms in Hong Kong was 
further reinforced by the existence of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865.179 The 
Act stated that if a colonial legislature developed to have one-half of its members 
elected by the inhabitants of the colony, the said legislature would become a 
"representative legislature" which has the "full power to make laws respecting the 
constitution, powers, and procedure of such legislature".
Beijing alleged that London, in doing so, would transfer the power to local
pro-British political forces. Instead, Beijing stressed that London was bound to
restore sovereignty to the PRC’s Government, not the people of Hong Kong. Thus,
any political reforms in the transitional period should have the approval of the
Chinese Government and must converge with the Basic Law.180 Mr Ji Pengfei, then
Director of the State Council’s HKMAO, revealed at the end of his visit to Hong
Kong on 21 December 1985 that only small changes could be made in the transitional
period and all proposed big changes must be discussed by China and Britain as the
future HKSAR political system involved not just Hong Kong people but also China
and its relations to Britain.181 He was also quoted as saying:
The question of Hong Kong’s political system after 1997 will be 
decided by the Basic Law. Reforms of Hong Kong’s political system 
in the transitional period have to take into consideration convergence 
with the Basic Law.182
In fact, he had already put through his message as early as 19 October 1985 
when he received a visiting Hong Kong delegation of architects. On that occasion, 
he expressed Beijing’s reservations at the fast pace of political reforms in Hong Kong
179Sun Wai-see, The Collection of Political Essays o f Sun Wai-see (Hong Kong: 
Ming Pao Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 102-12. (in Chinese)
mFEER, 12 December 1985.
mFEER, 2 January 1986.
mLiaowang, 30 November 1985; quoted in Cheng (1987), "Hong Kong: the 
Pressure to Converge", p. 278.
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and reportedly said the political system for the HKSAR would be decided by the 
Basic Law, the drafting of which had just started and which would be promulgated 
in 1990.183 Furthermore, Beijing officials seemed to stop using the phrase "gangren 
zhigang" (Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong) any more as Mr Lu Ping, then 
Secretary-General of the HKMAO, had openly regarded the phrase as 
"unscientific”.184
The above Chinese assertions stirred up the question of who was responsible 
for the Hong Kong administration in the transitional period. As mentioned before, 
Article 4 of the Joint Declaration stated that "the Government of the United Kingdom 
will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong" during the transitional 
period and China "will give its cooperation in this connection". In refuting his 
deputy, Alan Scott, who reportedly said in a seminar on 3 October 1985 that the 
Hong Kong Government will consult Beijing before taking any further political 
reforms, the then Chief Secretary, Sir David Akers-Jones, had stated clearly that: 
"The Chinese Government has made it clear it is our responsibility to run Hongkong 
in the next 12 years. Therefore we don’t have to consult them." He further said 
political reforms would not be a subject for discussion in the Joint Liaison Group 
(JLG), an organ set up to help effective implementation of the Joint Declaration.185
But shortly after Mr Xu’s warning, London reportedly conceded to Beijing by 
promising to discuss the future political reforms in the second meeting of the 
JLG.186 On 30 December 1985, Sir David Akers-Jones revealed that the Hong 
Kong Government would exchange views with Beijing before publishing any 
proposals for political reforms in 1987 review.187 Furthermore, the then British
mFEER, 31 October 1985.
mFEER, 13 February 1986.
ltsFEER, 17 October 1985.
mFEER, 2 January 1986.
WFEER, 16 January 1986.
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Foreign Minister with special responsibility for Hong Kong, Mr Timothy Renton,
after his visit to China on 24 January 1986, indicated his agreement with Beijing that
political changes must "converge" with the Basic Law. Mr Renton further elaborated
his idea of convergence:
We are creating a set of railway lines that lead up to 1997. The 
Chinese will be creating a set of railway lines that lead on from 1997.
The need is to see that those two railway lines meet together at a 
crossing point.
In contrast to his former statement that London would not interfere with constitutional 
reforms in Hong Kong, he emphasised that Britain has overall responsibility for the 
administration of Hong Kong during the transitional period.188 Apparently, London 
had opted to co-operate with Beijing by informing the latter before of any political 
reform plan in the future.
Being faced with China’s constant stress on the convergence of political 
reform in Hong Kong with the Basic Law (mini-constitution of Hong Kong after 
1997), on the return of sovereignty and administration to China but not the Hong 
Kong people, and on the maintenance of the status quo at the time of the conclusion 
of the Joint Declaration but not that of 1997, as well as with the constraints imposed 
by the responsibility of maintaining stability and prosperity as well as effective 
governing of Hong Kong, the British Government seemed to lose enthusiasm for 
carrying out her "unfinished" political reform at that moment.189
The Conflicting Ideas on the Pace of Democratization
The pressure to converge with the Basic Law being drafted called into question 
Britain’s impartiality in reviewing the developments in representative government in
mFEER, 6 February 1986.
189Lau (1987), Decolonization without Independence, pp. 33-40.
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1987 and in implementing relevant reforms in Hong Kong. Although the public in 
Hong Kong had widely debated the relationships between the executive and the 
legislature, the 1987 Green Paper, released on 27 May 1987, opted neither to discuss 
it, nor to examine the overall role of the Governor at the moment. The 1987 Green 
Paper seemed to confine the review to the less controversial topics: the role and 
composition of the District Boards and the relationship of the Urban Council and 
urban District Boards, the size and committee structure of the Urban Council, the 
composition of the Legislative Council, the position of the Governor as President of 
the LegCo, and the issues concerning technical aspects of elections.
Nevertheless, the Hong Kong Government had pledged to remain in a "neutral 
and open-minded position" in the review process and urged the public to offer their 
views on the matter. Mr David Ford, then Chief Secretary, had also told the LegCo 
when tabling the Green Paper that: "All of them are genuine options. There are no 
preconceived ideas on the part of the Government. There is no pre-determined 
outcome." In order to achieve this aim in the four-month long consultation period, 
a Survey Office had been set up to "collect, collate and report on the public response 
to the Green Paper". Though the Government had tried to play down the most 
controversial issue of direct election, by stressing that the review was not completely 
concerned with that particular issue but the whole political landscape of Hong Kong, 
the issue of the day was still whether to introduce direct election to the LegCo in 
1988.
Before the release of the 1987 Green Paper, Chinese officials had, in one way 
or another, made known their views on the political reform in general and the issue 
of direct election in particular. In February 1987, an unidentified Chinese official 
reportedly indicated that China was against the introduction of direct election in 1988, 
but would consider allowing it in 1991. The official also charged that the intention 
of the pro-direct-election group was to resist Communist China by promoting
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democracy in Hong Kong.190 In an address to the Basic Law drafters in April
1987, Mr Deng Xiaoping said:
I don’t believe that introducing direct election now will be good to 
Hong Kong. The first criterion of Hong Kong people governing Hong 
Kong is to elect those Hong Kong people who love China and Hong 
Kong. Does the one-person one-vote [method] elect such kind of 
people? It is not sure. . . . Introducing direct election in a gradual way 
[of doing it] is preferred.191
In an interview with the Liaowang (Overseas) published on 22 June, Mr Li 
Hou, then Deputy Director of the HKMAO and the Secretary-General of the Drafting 
Committee for the Basic Law (DCBL), was quoted as saying (but later denied) that 
direct election in 1988 "will naturally fail to converge with the Basic Law" and 
"would not be in accordance with the spirit of the Sino-British Joint Declaration".192 
Later in July, Mr Ke Zaishuo, Head of the Chinese side of the Joint Liaison Group, 
made clear that "we (China) have no significant view against direct election".193 
Probably, Beijing had adjusted its position from the question of "if" to "when". 
Subsequently, NCNA’s officials had reportedly promoted a "political swap plan" of 
having direct election in 1991 instead of 1988.194
The pro-direct-election activists and pressure group leaders (hereafter the 
democrats) criticised the Hong Kong Government of not living up to its 1984 promise 
of furthering the developments in representative government. Dr L.K. Ding, a long­
time democratic campaigner and the then chairman of the Christian Industrial
m SCMP, 6 February 1987.
191Cheung Kit-fung, Yeung Kin-hing, Lo Wing-hung and Chan Lu-tze, No Change 
for Fifty Years? The Tug o f War among China, Britain and Hong Kong over the 
Basic Law (Hong Kong: Long-chiu, 1991), p. 109-10; original in Chinese, my own
translation.
m SCMP, 19 and 24 June 1987.
m SCMP, 11 July 1987.
mHong Kong Standard (HKS), 18 September 1987.
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Committee, said: "The 1987 Green Paper reflects the sober mood of these times 
while the 1984 Green and White Papers reflected the euphoria of those times." He 
further blamed the Green Paper of "souring of a dream that grew out of the Joint 
Declaration". Mr Thomas Tam, the Chairman of the Hong Kong Policy Review, also 
criticised the Government for escaping "from its responsibility in overseeing the 
development of a representative government in Hong Kong after China has indicated 
very clearly its strong objection to direct election".195
On the contrary, the opponents of direct election (hereafter the 
conservatives196) in 1988 stressed the paramount importance of stability and 
prosperity, and any political reforms should be sure to have convergence with the 
Basic Law. Mr Vincent Lo, Convener of the Business and Professional Group of the 
Consultative Committee for the Basic Law (CCBL), said: "Changes in 1988, if any, 
should only involve the fine-tuning of the existing system and direct election for 1988 
would be a premature move as this [sic] will be a new development which may 
impinge on the Basic Law."197 Mr Tsang Yok-sing of the leftist Hong Kong 
Federation of Education had reportedly regarded direct election as a drastic 
constitutional change that would adversely affect the prosperity and stability of Hong 
Kong and thus was contrary to the Joint Declaration.198 Furthermore, chairman of 
a constituted union of the leftist Federation of Trade Unions argued that "One-man 
one-vote will not be the aim of democracy, but harmony among Hongkong’s people 
and the promotion of an environment that attracts investments and which is conducive
l95SCMP, 28 May 1987.
196The term "conservative" is denoted those who favour as little changes in the
status quo as possible. The various proposals put forward during the drafting of the 
Basic Law is summarized in Miron Mushkat’s article, "The Political Economy of 
Constitutional Change in Hong Kong," Asian Economies 75 (Dec. 1990):33-53.
™SCMPt 28 May 1987.
l9SHKS, 15 June 1987.
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to stability and prosperity" and added that "To the workers, a meal is better than a 
vote".199
The LegCo members were also divided over the issue of direct election. In 
the motion debate on the Green Paper on 15 and 16 July 1987, 18 LegCo members 
supported the introduction of direct election in 1988 and a similar number were 
against it. A similar pattern of opinion was also found in the Regional Council and 
the District Boards. In the case of the Urban Council, a majority of the speakers in 
the debate supported direct election in 1988.200 On the other hand, most of the 
independent opinion polls had shown that respondents were more inclined to support 
direct election in 1988 than the opponents, ranging from two to one to three to one 
in favour of it.201
The proponents and opponents were deeply engaged in the "war of public 
opinion". Each side wanted to have an edge over the other in the hope of tipping the 
balance in their favour in the Survey Office’s opinion collection process. The 
democrats under the umbrella organisation, the Joint Committee on the Promotion of 
Democratic Government, launched signature campaigns in supporting their cause. 
The broadcast during the campaign reads: "There is only 10 years to go before 1997, 
the future of Hongkong depends on our participation. If we have partial direct 
elections to the Legislative Council next year, we can participate more in central 
policy-making and will be in a better position to safeguard our livelihood in 
Hongkong."202 This appeal to protect people’s rights and interests managed to 
collect more than 210,000 signatures. In addition, the Joint Committee also placed 
a political advertisement on 4 September 1987, in which 145 pressure groups, trade
199SCMP, 22 June 1987.
200Survey Office, Public Response to Green Paper: The 1987 Review of 
Developments in Representative Government. Report o f the Survey Office: Part 1—
Report (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1987), p. 53.
m SCMPy 30 September 1987.
m SCMP, 7 September 1987.
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unions, and grassroots organisations as well as 864 individuals had shown their 
support.
On the anti-direct-election side, the leftists made use of their organisation 
networks in advancing their cause. The Bank of China and its 12 sister banks 
reportedly told their 10,000 employees to sign a petition to oppose direct election in 
1988.203 The Federation of Trade Unions urged their 170,000 members to sign an 
anti-direct-election position letter which would be directed to the Survey Office later 
on. In expressing their opposition to direct election in 1988, eighty-four business 
organisations and nearly 400 socio-economic elites advertised their stance in several 
local newspapers on 28 and 30 September, respectively.
The report of the Survey Office released in early November sparked off
another wave of criticism towards the Government about its mis-handling of public
opinion. The bone of contention between the Government and the democrats was
focused on the design and result of the Government-commissioned survey, and the
classification of the pre-printed submissions and the signature campaigns. Contrary
to all media-sponsored surveys, the Survey Office’s survey had found that more
respondents were against 1988 direct elections. Furthermore, the wording and
ordering of option (4) in a question concerning direct election was called into
question. It reads:
If changes are desirable in 1988, it will be possible to make one or 
more of the following changes, e.g. increase slightly the number of 
Official Members, reduce the number of Appointed Members, increase 
the number of indirectly elected Members or have directly elected 
Members.
This clumsy and hard-to-understand option received criticism not only from the 
democrats but also from academics and private polling companies.
In addition, the Survey Office treated the pre-printed submissions as individual 
submissions but not the signature campaigns. Among the 95,835 individual
203SCMP, 7 September 1987.
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submissions, 60,706 were against 1988 direct election, of which 50,175 were in pre­
printed forms. But only 1,313 out of 35,129 submissions for 1988 direct elections 
were in pre-printed forms.204 On the other hand, the signature campaigns, which 
were overwhelmingly in favour of 1988 direct elections, had collected over 220,000 
names of individuals and organisations. But only one signature campaign, which 
contained 295 names, was against 1988 direct election.205 On the whole, the views 
expressed at the Establishment and organisation levels were slightly more inclined to 
object to the introduction of direct elections in 1988, but there was a quite clear 
majority supporting 1988 direct elections at the individual level if the pre-printed 
forms and signature campaigns were treated equally.
As a result, the democrats accused the Government of playing around with the 
figures so as to bow to Beijing pressure on direct elections. This accusation called 
into question the integrity and credibility of the Government. In rebuffing the above 
allegation, Sir David Ford, the then Chief Secretary, warned that: "Those who 
continue to make them in the misguided belief that they are dealing with a lame duck 
will learn that they have a tiger by the tail — and not a paper tiger either."206 
Despite Sir David’s warning, the Joint Committee on the Promotion of Democratic 
Government dispatched delegations to London and Beijing to petition against alleged 
Government manipulation of public opinion in the Survey Office report. In an open 
letter addressed to Mrs Margaret Thatcher, then British Prime Minister, Mr Martin 
Lee, leader of the London delegation, wrote that:
m HKS, 15 November 1987.
205Survey Office (1987), op. cit., p. 57.
206Hong Kong Hansard, 11 November 1987; SCMP, 12 November 1987.
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We submit that a decision not to hold direct election next year would 
be wholly unacceptable to the majority of the people of Hongkong. 
For the introduction of direct elections is no longer just a question of 
timing. To most people in Hongkong, it has become an indicator as 
to whether the British administration is credible and responsible to the 
people.
We submit that time is of the utmost importance and time is not on our 
side. If we were to lose precious years just to please the Chinese 
Government, there is simply not enough time left to evolve 
progressively an effective democratic government before 1997.207
Despite the last-minute effort of lobbying London and Beijing, the hope of the 
democrats was formally shattered by the release of the White Paper in February 1988. 
According to the White Paper, only ten directly elected LegCo seats would be 
introduced in 1991 to replace those presently filled by the electoral college of the 
District Boards. The fate of 1988 direct elections had already been sealed, but the 
political forces aimed at reforming the colonial structure shifted their attention to the 
drafting of the Basic Law and triggered off another round of intense competition 
among various political groups.
207SCMP, 16 December 1987.
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The Centre-Peripherv Cleavage in the Making
With the British rule over Hong Kong not being extended beyond 1997, and 
the Chinese promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" and "high degree 
of autonomy" for 50 years after 1997, there was a need to re-frame the constitutional 
and political system so as to reflect the corresponding change in Hong Kong’s 
political status. Under such circumstances, the drafting of the Basic Law of the 
HKSAR was called into play. Because of its paramount importance in regulating the 
relationships between China and Hong Kong as well as the political life within the 
future HKSAR, the drafting of the Basic Law would inevitably be a political game 
in which various political forces would participate to shape the outcome in their 
favour.
For the democrats and their supporters, they had campaigned for democratic 
reforms since the mid-1970s, well before the surge of the 1997 issue. They regarded 
the Chinese promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" in the early 1980s 
as a timely push to advance their cause. Thus, they viewed the establishment of 
representative government as a logical development of such promise. Furthermore, 
it also helped to safeguard their freedom and living style after 1997 and worked as 
an effective mechanism to ward off unnecessary intervention from China. Regarding 
the future political model, they advocated a popular and responsive political structure 
where the executive should be placed under the control of either the legislature or the 
electorate. In other words, they would like to have a legislature-centred political 
system.
For the conservatives, although they understood the importance of an open 
government and the rule of law, their intimate economic relationships with China had 
dictated their attitude towards the campaigns for setting up representative government. 
Once the Beijing Government expressed its disapproval of major political reforms in 
the transitional period in late 1985, the conservatives had to follow suit. Moreover, 
their privileged and nearly exclusive access to the Establishment would be threatened 
if political reforms implemented. It was also logical for them to side with the
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Chinese Government to counter the advance of the democrats by limiting the scope 
of democratic reforms, if not totally opposed. A fragmented legislature and a 
executive-centred political system were thus their ideal model to be fought for in the 
Basic Law drafting process. In other words, they tried to maintain some form of 
colonial system or elite rule after 1997.
For the British and Hong Kong Governments, they always found themselves 
crosscut by the Chinese and the conservatives’ pressure for limited, if not definitely 
no, reform, and the democrats’ demand of full democracy. Governing in such a 
turbulent environment, like Hong Kong in the late 1980s, would not be an easy job. 
Furthermore, the British-Hong Kong Government also suffered from the diminishing 
support from the socio-economic elites, the lack of will to govern from the departing 
' senior bureaucrats and the rising welfare demands from the mass public. How to 
maintain the effective governing in the face of growing intervention from China in 
the transitional period would be the major question waiting to be resolved. To 
accommodate and cooperate with China in local affairs, and to open-up partially the 
political structure through popular elections would be two possible ways to restore the 
declining legitimacy. But given the incompatibility of these two measures, it was 
very difficult to maintain the right balance. Nevertheless, Britain seemed to adopt a 
co-operative attitude towards the transition of power, at least before the appointment 
of Mr Christopher Patten as Governor in 1992. Sir Percy Cradock wrote in his 
memoirs that "the policy of co-operation with China for the benefit of Hong Kong, 
if not the only conceivable policy, is the only one that will allow Britain to leave the 
stage knowing that it was done its best to fulfil its responsibilities to the six million 
people in its charge."208 Regarding the future political model, the British 
Government tried hard to convert the principles that it had stipulated in the Sino- 
British Joint Declaration into the operational details of implementation, i.e. a political 
system where the executive v 5>
to the elected legislature.
208Percy Cradock, Experiences of China (London: John Murray, 1994a), p. 258.
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Needless to say, China would be the host of the game with overwhelming 
power and influence in the drafting process. Acting as a referee or as an arbiter was 
all up to China’s decision. With China acting as a referee, the political controversy 
over Hong Kong’s electoral reforms might be confined to being a local issue and 
Beijing might then have a free hand to balance the conflicts between the democrats 
and the conservatives. But Beijing seemed to opt for the role of arbiter and to 
support the conservatives as reflected in the Basic Law drafting process. Thus, 
Beijing intervened in the local political contradictions of the democrats and the 
conservatives. There were two institutional barriers used to limit the influence of the 
democrats in the future HKSAR political system. One was to restrict the directly- 
elected seats of the legislature to a minority in terms of both number and influence. 
That meant to institute a fractionised and fragmented legislature. The other was to 
insulate the executive and its agencies from effective checks by the legislature and the 
mass public. That meant to maintain the executive-centred political system. These 
basic calculations of Beijing and the conservatives had worked to frustrate the 
democrats’ efforts and reinforced the contradictions between them. After intense 
mobilisation efforts made by the concerned parties during the Basic Law drafting 
process and the subsequent polarisation of political forces, the centre-periphery 
electoral cleavage emerged and played a significant role in the ensuing 1991 direct 
elections.
The Politics of Appointment
The drafting of the Basic Law would probably be the most pressing task in the 
transitional period. In his recent published memoirs, Mr Xu Jiatun noted that there 
were two kinds of opinion within China as to whether Hong Kong people should be 
invited to join the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law (DCBL). Mr Xu was of 
the opinion that in order to have the widest support from the Hong Kong people, the
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DCBL should include a certain number of Hong Kong drafters.209 Chinese leaders 
seemed to accept what Mr Xu had suggested. When Beijing released the appointment 
list of the DCBL in June 1985, 23 (out of 59) members were from Hong Kong. The 
numerical strength of the Chinese drafters reflects the ultimate decision power rested 
with the Chinese side.210 Any piece of legislation would, then, need the approval 
of the Chinese drafters and in fact, they held the vetting power in their own hands.
Although Beijing pledged to take care of as many sectors of interest as 
possible, the appointed Hong Kong drafters were mainly recruited from the upper and 
middle-upper strata of businessmen and professionals. Only two members were from 
the trade unions: Mr Tam Yiuchung from the leftist Federation of Trade Unions and 
Mr Szeto Wah from the Professional Teachers’ Unions (PTU). In response to 
comment that the grassroots were under-represented in the DCBL, Mr Xu made clear 
that in deciding who should be appointed to the DCBL, Hong Kong’s historical 
background and reality had to be considered, and the guiding principle was to 
maintain Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity.211 That means those who had 
occupied the strategic locations in Hong Kong society would be the prior targets to 
be wooed. But Mr Xu later in his memoirs admitted that he was originally planning 
to use the mainland drafters to counter-balance the businessmen’s influence in the 
DCBL, but he found it unneo^avij at the end of the day.212
As revealed by several sources, Britain had participated informally in the 
whole drafting process of the Basic Law through diplomatic channels and the Hong
209Xu (1993), op. cit., pp. 155-6.
210For the process of setting up the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) and 
Consultation Committee (BLCC), see Scott (1989), op. cit., pp. 298-305; Cheng 
(1987), "Hong Kong: the Pressure to Converge", pp. 275-6; Lane (1990), op. cit., 
pp. 119-26; Emily Lau, "The Early History of the Drafting Process" in Wesley-Smith 
and Chen (1988), op. cit., pp. 90-104.
211Cheung, et al. (1991), op. cit., p. 38.
212Xu (1993), op. cit., p. 156.
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Kong Basic Law drafters.213 Mr Xu claimed that the degree of British involvement 
in the drafting of the Basic Law was very deep, having examined every paragraph and 
even particular wording of the Basic Law.214 Sir Percy Cradock had also indicated 
the involvement of Hong Kong Government and the ExCo in the drafting process.215
-bo j>ersuadU_
In addition, Beijing had also invited, but failec^some pro-Hong Kong Establishment 
and pro-Taiwan figures to join the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law 
(CCBL).
Besides, two instances had worked to undermine the confidence of Hong Kong 
people toward the independence and operation of the CCBL which aimed to consult 
and collect public views on the Basic Law drafts. The first one concerned the sudden 
withdrawal of the leftist trade unions’ support for Mr Lau Chin-shek, Director of the 
Independent Christian Industrial Committee (CIC), to be one of the seven nominees 
representing labour in the CCBL. Mr Lau was said to be militant in fighting for 
labour interest and thus had invited the dislike of the businessmen.216 Mr Xu 
admitted in his memoirs that it was he who put pressure on the leftist Federation of 
Trade Unions not to support Mr Lau.217
The second one concerned the election of office bearers of the CCBL. The 
said election was held immediately after the election of the CCBL Standing 
Committee’s members. Sir Yue-kong Pao, a DCBL Vice-chairman, swiftly proposed 
seven names to fill the said posts. The seven were regarded as duly elected as
213Paul Fifoot, "China’s Basic Law for Hong Kong," International Relations 10 
(1991):301, n3; Xu (1993), op. cit., p. 154-5; Cradock (1994a), op. cit., p. 233.
214Xu (1993), op. cit., p. 155.
215Cradock (1994a), op. cit., p. 233.
2l6Pai Shing, 107 (1 November 1985):49-51; Emily Lau, "The Early History of 
the Drafting Process," in Peter Wesley-Smith and Albert H. Y. Chen, eds., The Basic 
Law and Hong Kong's Future (Hong Kong: Butterworths, 1988); Cheung et al.
(1991), op. cit., pp. 47-53.
217Xu (1993), op. cit., pp. 162-163.
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nobody in the meeting had shown their objection at that time. Later, critics 
challenged the appropriateness of Sir Y.K. to propose the candidates. The 
constitution of the CCBL had stipulated that the said posts "shall be elected from 
among members of the Standing Committee". That means Sir Y.K. had no such 
right. An NCNA official defended the result by saying that consultation was the 
same as "election from among members". Nevertheless, public pressure brought a 
new round of election but with the same result.218 Though this was just a matter 
of procedure, harm had already been done to the image of and the people’s faith 
toward the drafting process.
Threshold of Representation and Barriers of Entry
Accompanying the establishment of the DCBL and the CCBL was the Sino- 
British row over the further developments in representative government and the 
emergence of different interpretations of the Joint Declaration as more and more 
Beijing leaders put through their own version in the media, especially on the future 
political system. Their opinion seemed to set the pammeter for the drafters.
In elaborating the "accountability" of the executive to the legislative, Mr Mao 
Junnian, an NCNA official and a member of both the DCBL and the CCBL, 
reportedly said the present executive was already accountable to the legislature, in the 
sense that the LegCo had the right to question government policies and to vet 
government finance.219 In February 1986, Mr Lu Ping indicated that the word 
"accountable" could mean "clarify, explain and consult" and did not imply that the 
HKSAR legislature would become the power centre. He further elaborated his idea
m Pai Shing, 110 (16 December 1985):6-8 & 58; Emily Lau (1988), op. cit.; 
Cheung et al. (1991), op. cit., pp. 47-53.
m FEER, 12 December 1985.
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later that the HKSAR executive and legislative should check and balance each other, 
and the latter should not be superior to the former or vice versa.220
Mr Li Hou, then Deputy Director of the HKMAO and the Secretary-General 
of the DCBL, made further clarification in June that the executive should make 
periodic reports to, answer questions from, submit budgets to, and be impeached by, 
the legislature, but the two should be of equal status.221 Furthermore, Mr Deng 
Xiaoping told the DCBL drafters on 16 April 1987 that he did not support either the 
installation of a check-and-balance mechanism among the three powers of 
government, or the immediate introduction of direct elections.222
As mentioned before, the attitude of these Chinese leaders towards the political 
reforms in Hong Kong, in one way or another, coincided with those of the 
conservative leaders of the Hong Kong business community. The rather sudden and 
progressive introduction of universal suffrage and direct elections had given a shock 
to those political figures recruited by the appointment systems. Their privilege and 
status would then be threatened. Consequently, they tended to oppose liberalization 
or democratization. Because of such propensity, it is not surprising to find the 
frequent mutual support between the Chinese and the conservative Hong Kong 
drafters during the drafting process.
For the emerging democrats, the unreformed colonial system did not provide 
a fair opportunity for them to compete for political power. Thus, they tended to 
support a quicker pace of democratization and tried to mobilize support from the 
underprivileged. The critical questions for their development before and after 1997 
are: how far can they remove the institutional barrier of entry and how high the 
threshold of representation will be. Given the drafting exercise as an institution-
220FEER, 20 February 1986.
22lFEER, 26 June 1986.
222Xu (1993), op. cit., p. 152.
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building process, the democrats would try hard to remove the institutional barrier of 
entry and to lower the threshold of representation.
Immediately after the establishment of the DCBL and the CCBL, the political 
elites in Hong Kong had actively participated in the discussion on the future political 
model of the HKSAR. At one time, the Secretariat of the CCBL had noted that 41 
models had already been proposed. These models were later being sorted into 5 
alternatives for selecting the Chief Executive (CE) and 4 alternatives for constituting 
the Legislature in the Draft Basic Law (for solicitation of opinions) released in April
1988. The differences among these alternatives were largely on the methods of 
nominating and electing the Chief Executive, and on the proportion of directly elected 
seats in the Legislature.223
Among the proposed models, the keen competition was between the Group of 
190 and the Group of 89. The "190 proposal" was put forward by the democrats. 
It suggested that the candidates for the CE should be nominated by the legislature and 
selected by territory-wide direct election on a one-person-one-vote basis; and the 
legislature should be made-up of no less than 50% directly elected members, no more 
than 25% members returned through electoral college, and no more than 25% 
members returned through functional bodies. Under this model, the legislature, with 
directly elected members as a majority, would have an edge over the CE as the 
former have the right to nominate the CE’s candidates. As a variant of this 
legislature-led political system, the legislature would become the political centre of 
gravity. The low threshold of representation would allow more participation from the 
wider society and lessen the chance of manipulation.
223Secretariat of the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law (CCBL), Reference 
papers for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic o f China (Draft), (Hong Kong: Secretariat of the CCBL of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 1989a), 
pp. 89-101.
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In contrast, the "89 proposal" drew its support largely from the conservative 
business community and professionals. It proposed that three candidates for the CE 
position should be nominated by a 20-member nomination committee of the 600- 
member electoral college and elected by a vote of the same electoral college; the 
legislature should be composed of 50% members returned through functional bodies, 
25% members through direct election and the remaining 25% through the electoral 
college. Comparatively speaking, the institutional barrier of choosing the CE and the 
threshold of representation were quite high. By using the electoral college, the 
eligible participants would be largely confined to the narrow strata of socio-economic 
elites and the bulk of the mass public would be screened out. The influence from the 
mass society would also be prevented from playing a role because of its sheer size 
and proportion (one-fourth of the total). Given the predominance of the socio­
economic elites in the selection of the CE and in the legislature, and the coincidence 
of their interests, the legislature and the CE would then work hand-in-glove and thus 
contribute to an executive-led political system. The public would be prevented from 
effective participation.
Time was running short, as there had to be a DCBL-recommended draft 
political model incorporated into the draft Basic Law which would then be submitted 
to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) for approval as 
a piece of proposed legislation in early 1989. The political activists in Hong Kong 
had spared no effort in seeking such compromise but failed at the end of the day. 
Under such circumstances, Mr Louis Cha, the co-convenor of the Subgroup on 
Political Structure of the DCBL, proposed the so-called "Mainstream Model" at the 
Subgroup meeting in Guangzhou on 19 November 1988. The revised form of the 
"Mainstream Model" passed and the subgroup meeting recommended: the CE shall 
be first elected by the electoral college and then a referendum shall be held during the 
third term of the CE to decide whether the CE shall be directly elected from the next 
term onwards; the proportion of the directly elected seats in the HKSAR Legislature 
for the first four terms are 27%, 38.5%, 50% and 50%, respectively, and then a 
referendum shall be held during the fourth term of the legislature to decide whether 
all its members shall be returned by direct election from the next term onwards.
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According to this model, the earliest possible year for direct elections to the 
CE (five year term) and all the members of the legislature (four year term, except the 
first two year term) would be 2013 and 2012, respectively. Regarding the timing of 
introducing a full-fledged directly elected CE and legislature, this model might be 
considered as the most conservative of all the models proposed.
The "Mainstream Model" aroused a widespread outcry in Hong Kong. The 
democrats organised a series of protests, ranging from a marathon hunger strike to 
a mass rally in which the section on the HKSAR’s political structure of the draft 
Basic Law was burned. A group of undergraduates also burned the Ming Pao Daily 
News's editorials outside the Ming Pao Building to protest against Mr Cha’s taking 
advantage of his owner of the newspaper to defend his political model. Although 
showing their dismay and frustration, their efforts were abortive because of the lack 
of institutional control of the Basic Law drafters. The effect was to prevent a true 
reflection of societal preferences in the drafting process. Coinciding with this was 
the inflexibility of China’s Hong Kong policy and its apparent identification with the 
conservative businessmen’s interests. The stage was set for the polarisation of 
political forces both within and without Hong Kong. The democrats were fighting 
a no-win battle with the "unholy" alliance of the Beijing Government and the 
conservatives.
In the midst of protests, criticism and call for revision, the "mainstream 
model" was finally adopted by the eighth session of the DCBL in January 1989. 
Furthermore, Mr Cha Chi-mln, an influential but conservative businessman, had 
successfully sought a two-third majority backing in attaching four conditions to the 
introduction of a referendum in the session. Therefore, the referendum "shall only 
be held with the endorsement of the majority of members of the Legislature Council, 
the consent of the Chief Executive and the approval of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress. The result of the referendum shall only be valid and
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effective with the affirmative vote of more than 30 per cent of the eligible 
voters.1,224
The effect of the adoption of the most conservative "Cha-Cha formula" was 
the nearly endless delay in the implementation of full democracy. The four hurdles 
of getting a referendum to take place could not be regarded as a real progression path 
at all. Even if the crossing of the first three hurdles were secured, the threshold of 
the last hurdle was so high as to be unattainable. It was the matter of the adoption 
of the eligible voters as the basis to calculate the affirmative vote. The effect was 
that the higher the registration rate and the turnout rate in the referendum, the lower 
the threshold would be, or vice versa. For example, if there were 10,000 eligible 
votes, then the minimum vote of getting pass the threshold was 3,000+1 (more than 
30% of the eligible voters); if 6,000 (60%) eligible voters got registered and 3,600 
voters cast their votes (60%), then the referendum will only be passed if about 83.4% 
of voters were in favour of it.
The "Cha-Cha formula" might be regarded as another blow to the democrats 
after the 1987 political review. To those who hoped for the more democratic and 
open government that was promised, though vaguely, in the Joint Declaration, their 
hearts were really not at ease. Although Chinese officials had repeatedly said that 
there would be a chance to revise the conservative "Cha-Cha" political model, harm 
had already been done to the confidence and trust of the general public and the pro­
democrat supporters. As one academic wrote, "by winning a blatantly unfair and 
political costly battle in the first round of the Basic Law drafting process over the 
trampled aspiration of the local democratic elements, the PRC unintentionally, but
224Quoted in ibid. , p. 100; for the evolution of and comparison between the 
"mainstream" model and other models, see Secretariat of the Consultative Committee 
for the Basic Law (CCBL), Drafting of the Basic Law and the "Mainstream Political 
Model (Hong Kong: Secretariat of the CCBL of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, 1988).
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irrevocably, lost the hearts and minds of the great majority of the Hong Kong 
people".225
Demand for Democracy from Below:
The Tiananmen Effect
The "tug of war" between conservatives and democrats did not end with the 
inclusion of the "Cha-Cha" formula in the draft Basic Law. At first, the Hong Kong 
people at large and the political activists in particular seemed to have lost their 
momentum in further discussing the Basic Law in the second round of the 
consultation process. But the democratic movement in Beijing and the subsequent 
tragedy in the Tiananmen Square in June 1989 brushed the political low pressure 
aside and sparked off another round of political rows over the HKSAR political 
structure.
The political situation was transformed. The "apolitical" Hong Kong people 
changed overnight by actively participating in mass rallies to show their support and 
hope for a democratic China and Hong Kong. It was reported that one million people 
participated in one mass rally, which was a record-breaking event in the political 
history of Hong Kong. Leaders of the democrats, now under the umbrella 
organisation of Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement 
in China led by two LegCo members and DCBL’s drafters, Mr Martin Lee and Mr 
Szeto Wah, were deeply involved in the movement. The whole society was scared 
by the event and demanded a speeding up in the pace of democratic reform. Not only
225Ming K. Chan, ^ Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong 
Kong Basic Law, 1985-90," in Ming K. Chan and David J. Clark, eds., The Hong 
Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for "Stability and Prosperity" under Chinese Sovereignty? 
(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), p. 16.
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the democrats but also the conservatives and Establishment politicians joined hands 
to work for it.
The ExCo and the LegCo unofficial members, in May 1989, had put forward 
the "OMELCO Consensus Model", which recommended that the legislature shall have 
33.3%, 50%, 66.6% and 100% directly elected seats in 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003, 
respectively; and the CE shall be directly elected no later than 2003.226 The Joint 
Committee for Promotion of Democratic Government, the flagship of the democrats, 
also revised the "190 Proposal" and suggested that half of the LegCo seats should be 
returned by direct election in 1991 and then all in 1995; the CE to be directly elected 
in 1997.227
The reaction of the Beijing Government was tough. By labelling Hong Kong
as a "subversive" base aiming to topple the Communist Chinese Government with the
aid of global anti-Chinese and anti-communist forces, Beijing’s leaders had reinforced
their negative image towards the democrats and thus, tightened its Hong Kong policy.
As Sir Percy Cradock observed:
[The] Tiananmen [Incident] revived all Beijing’s neuroses about British 
duplicity and the external threats to the socialist system. . . .  It became 
a more obvious Chinese goal to extend a dominant influence over the 
territory as rapidly as possible, whatever the undertakings that British 
rule would continue undisturbed until 1997. . . . Democracy in Hong 
Kong . . . became a neuralgic issue.228
2260ffice of Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (OMELCO), 
Comments on the Basic Law (Draft), (Hong Kong: OMELCO, 1989), p. 23.
227Secretariat of the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law (CCBL), The 
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region o f the People's Republic 
of China (Draft): Consultative Report, Vol. 2 ., (Hong Kong: Secretariat of the CCBL 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China,
1989b), pp. 123-4.
228Cradock (1994a), op. cit., p. 223.
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As mentioned above, the business community was more vulnerable and prone 
to Beijing’s pressure. The conservative business figures also took advantage of 
Beijing’s tough policy to counter the advance of the democratic forces in the future 
political system. Because of such considerations, the conservative New Hong Kong 
Alliance (NHKA), led by former ExCo and LegCo member Mr T.S. Lo, proposed 
a controversial "Bicameral Model" or "One-Council Two-Chamber Model" in which 
there should be a Functional Chamber comprising mainly indirectly returned members 
of functional constituencies, and a District Chamber comprising at least 50% directly 
elected members and the remaining members returned by district organisations. Both 
chambers would have equal legislative powers and equal number of members. In 
regard to the selection of the CE, the first two terms would be elected by an election 
committee and the third term by direct election.229 In the name of ensuring the 
equal participation of all walks of life, the "Bicameral Model" in fact had sought to 
limit the proportion of directly elected seats in the HKSAR legislature. But the actual 
effect was to decrease the chance of a consolidated democratic force in the legislature 
by limiting their strength and influence in one of the chambers. With the apparent 
blessing of China, Mr Lo and the NHKA leaders sold the model vigorously.
The release of the "Bicameral Model" was regarded as a move to counter­
balance the "OMELCO Consensus Model" which was considered by China as a 
British plot to exploit and lead public opinion in Hong Kong in Britain’s own 
interests. Though criticised by many political leaders and media comments, the 
"Bicameral Model" managed to generate support from some political figures, like 
ExCo and LegCo member Miss Maria Tam, LegCo members Mr Peter Wong Hong- 
yuen and Mr James Tien Pei-chun230, and the leftist Federation of Trade 
Unions.231
229Ibid.t pp. 124-7.
m HKS, 1 September 1989.
m HKS and SCMP, 29 October 1989.
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Meanwhile, the moderates had also taken an initiative to bring the 
conservatives and the democrats to a compromise.232 With the common objective 
of defeating the "Bicameral Model", the concerned parties decided to enter into 
negotiation in the hope of seeking a compromise political model in early October
1989. After nearly a month of bargaining, they came out with a "New Compromise 
Model" or "4-4-2 Model" which recommended that the first legislature (1997) should 
be made up of: 40% from direct election, 40% from functional constituency election, 
and 20% from election through an election committee. The second legislature (2001) 
would have 60% directly elected seats and 40% functional constituency seats; the 
composition of the third legislature (2005) and whether all the members shall be 
elected through direct election would be reviewed and decided by the second 
legislature. Regarding the selection of the CE, the Model suggested that the CE for 
the first two terms would be elected by an election committee comprising 50% 
members selected from functional constituencies and the remainder from the Urban 
Council, the Regional Council and the District Boards; the third CE to be elected by 
direct election.233
Although there was some dissent among the moderates and the democrats, the 
"New Compromise Model" could be regarded as a great success in producing a 
common demand on the HKSAR political structure after a four-year-long rivalry and 
"war of words". The consensus shown by the three camps of moderates, 
conservatives, and democrats seemed to receive a cool reception by the Chinese 
officials. These officials had reportedly regarded the compromise exercise as a 
British plot to manipulate the future political system, and seemed to favour the
232The moderates are comprised of the following political groups: the Tritolaire
Academy, the University Graduates’ Association of Hong Kong, the Association for 
Democracy of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Chinese Civil Servants’ Association, the 
Progressive Society of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong People’s Association and the New 
Hong Kong Society. The conservatives is represented by the Business and 
Professional Group of CCBL led by Mr Vincent Lo. The democrats is represented 
by the Joint Committee for Promotion of Democratic Government led by Mr Martin 
Lee and Mr Szeto Wah.
233Secretariat of the CCBL (1989b), op. cit., pp. 139-41.
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"Bicameral Model" because "business interests would be protected".234 In response 
to the question of whether the DCBL would accept the "New Compromise Model", 
Mr Xu Jiatun declined to give a straight answer, but stated that "Any models will 
have to take the long-term interest of the territory into account. If there’s no 
stability, can there be prosperity and advancement?"235 It was understood that 
China would not accept the "New Compromise Model" because Beijing has often 
regarded the swift introduction of direct election as detrimental to the stability and 
prosperity of Hong Kong.
Among the models floated at the time, the "Bicameral Model", the "OMELCO 
Consensus Model", and the "New Compromise Model" were the most discussed 
within Hong Kong, and the latter two models seemed to have had more support than 
the first. In anticipation of Beijing’s likely rejection of the "OMELCO Consensus 
Model" and the "New Compromise Model", some members of the Group of 89, like 
Dr Philip Kwok and Mr Hu Fa-kuang, proposed the "Assorted Model" in mid- 
November 1989. This model tried to integrate the "Bicameral Model" with the "New 
Compromise Model" by proposing to install a "separate vote counting" mechanism 
under which a simple majority of both groups of members from the functional 
constituencies, and of members from direct election and the election committee should 
be sought for the passage of those motions and bills, or amendments to government 
bills introduced by individual legislative members. The model also proposed that the 
first three legislatures should have 65 members; 25 from the functional constituency, 
25 from direct election, and the remaining 15 from the election committee. It seemed 
that separate vote counting would have the effect of keeping the directly elected 
members at bay.
Although a handful of models had been floated, even fewer had a hearing at 
the meeting of the DCBL’s Subgroup on Political Structure. At its last meeting held 
on 20 January 1990 in Guangzhou, the Subgroup adopted a rather conservative "New
234HKS, 20 September 1989.
235SCMP, 29 September 1989.
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Mainstream Model” which was proposed by a mainland drafter and recommended that 
the first legislature should have 30 seats (50%) from functional constituencies, 18 
seats (30%) from direct election and 12 seats (20%) from the election committee; and 
separate vote counting be installed.
Immediately after the passage of the said model in the meeting, four Hong 
Kong drafters, namely Dr Raymond Wu, Miss Maria Tam, Mr Wong Po-yan and Mr 
Cha Chi-man, called a press conference to express their discontent at the passage of 
the "New Mainstream Model". They claimed that no Hong Kong drafters had given 
their consent and only one Hong Kong drafter had supported separate vote counting. 
This gave an impression that all Hong Kong drafters had fought against the slow pace 
of introducing direct election. Dr Raymond Wu also claimed that the rather high­
handed manner on the Chinese side in putting through the "New Mainstream Model" 
made the Hong Kong drafters act rubber stamps. But later it was reportedly disclosed 
that Hong Kong drafters had tabled three models at the meeting, of which two models 
suggested the same number of directly elected seats as the "New Mainstream Model" 
and the remaining one proposed even fewer directly elected seats in the second and 
third legislature than the "New Mainstream Model". Instead, their opposition seemed 
to target separate vote counting, which was a variant form of the "Bicameral Model" 
proposed by the New Hong Kong Alliance.236
As mentioned before, Britain agreed to be involved in the drafting of the Basic 
Law because this could help to smooth the transfer of power and to ensure the faithful 
implementation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Given such arrangements, both 
Governments had to sort out the electoral arrangements for the 1991 and 1995 
elections and the "through train" method of transferring power in 1997. Beijing and 
London engaged in behind-the-scene-bargaining in early 1990. According to the 
seven diplomatic documents disclosed by both London and Beijing on 28 October 
1992, the two Governments discussed and exchanged views on the proportion of 
directly elected seats, the composition of the electoral committee, the introduction of
236Cheung et al. (1991), op. cit. , p. 190.
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separate vote counting, the restriction of foreign nationals serving in the legislature 
and so on.237 In regard to the number of directly elected seats, London had asked 
for 24 (40%) in 1995 by preparing to limit it to 18 in 1991. But Beijing had insisted 
that there would be 20 (30%) directly elected seats in 1997 (1995), 24 (40%) in 1999 
and 30 (50%) in 2003. London had agreed subsequently to Beijing’s counter­
proposal. In explaining his judgement on the deal, Sir Percy Cradock wrote:
. . . more democracy was not, as increasingly claimed, an infallible 
protection against Chinese pressure if Chinese were bent on that 
course. To be of real worth, our arrangements had to stick after 1997; 
that required Chinese acquiescence. . . .  I saw little chance of 
extracting agreement for 20 directly elected seats in 1991 from Beijing 
in its ugly mood at the time. . . ,238
The ninth plenary session of the DCBL held in mid-February 1990 had sealed 
the fate of the nearly five-year-long row over the political structure of the HKSAR. 
The "New Mainstream Model" passed at the subgroup meeting in January was 
adopted with the following amendments: there were to be 20, instead of 18, directly 
elected seats in 1997; separate vote counting would be applied only to those bills, 
motions, and amendments to government bills introduced by individual legislative 
members; and the limit of foreign nationals in the HKSAR legislature was set at 20%, 
instead of 15%, of its total.
237These diplomatic documents were released in the midst of intense conflict 
between London and Beijing over the political reform proposals initiated by the new
Governor Chris Patten in his first annual address to the LegCo.
238Cradock (1994a), op. cit., p. 228.
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The Price to Pay
The Chinese promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" under the 
roof of "one country, two systems" had fascinated most of the Hong Kong people in 
the early 1980s. For some Hong Kong people, the pledge seemed to be a safeguard 
against Communist rule after 1997. For others, it offered an opportunity to develop 
democracy.
But subsequent developments have disappointed Hong Kong people, especially 
during the drafting of and consultation on the Basic Law--the future mini-constitution 
of the HKSAR. China seemed to have no faith in the political reforms that had been 
"engineered" by the British-Hong Kong Government, fearing knock-on effects in 
China. This attitude may well be reflected by her conservative attitude towards the 
pace of democratic reform in the transitional period and the political structure of the 
future HKSAR. On the one hand, China, supported by the conservatives, tries to 
contain the budding democratic forces by limiting the number of political posts 
returned by universal franchise. Out of 60 members of the HKSAR legislature, only 
20 in 1997, 24 in 1999 and 30 in 2007 will be elected by geographical constituency, 
the rest will be returned by functional constituency. On the other hand, China 
followed more or less the colonial structure of concentrating power in the HKSAR 
executive, which is hardly checked by the legislature. Moreover, through the use of 
the electoral college, China would probably exert a tremendous influence on choosing 
the HKSAR executive head. The basic Law stipulates the process of selecting the 
chief executive as follows: nominations will only be made among the members of the 
Election Committee that is selected mainly from the businessmen, professionals, and 
local political figures; upon nomination, only those members on the Committee have 
the right to vote; finally, the appointment of the executive head will be confirmed 
only by the Chinese Government.
The clash of the democrats and their potential supporters with the Chinese 
Government was further intensified as the first two took a different view on the nature 
of the democratic movement in China in 1989. After regaining her control of the
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capital, the Chinese Government openly criticised those who supported the democratic 
movement; it also regarded Hong Kong as a subversive base working to undermine 
communist rule in China. Given such negative feelings towards both the 
representative government and the democrats in Hong Kong, China will try in every 
way to shape the political reform in her favour and to contain the growing influence 
of the democrats.
From China’s point of view, Hong Kong had better developed her economic 
potential, but not "bourgeois" democracy. If Hong Kong becomes a democratic 
polity, China will not only find it harder to control the development of Hong Kong, 
but also feel the pressure of change from within China.
The decision-makers in Beijing, thus, come under cross-pressures of economic 
prosperity, autonomous government and possible models of unification on the one 
hand, and loss of control over Hong Kong as well as threat of domestic "peaceful 
evolution" on the other. In such a situation, China opts to play safe by establishing 
a political structure that may allow the conservative businessmen and local figures to 
counter-balance the emerging democratic forces.
For the democrats and their potential supporters, the mis-handling of the 
Tiananmen Incident and the adoption of the not-so-popular political model in the 
Basic Law by the Chinese Government seemed to serve as a basis of political 
mobilization. Coupled with the widespread distrust of the Communist Chinese 
Government among the Hong Kong people, the centre-periphery cleavage would then 
find mass electoral support and may be transformed to become part of the electoral 
cleavage system, where the periphery (the democrats) has emphasised local autonomy 
while the centre (the conservatives and the leftists) stressed compromise with the 
central Chinese Government and nationalist feeling.
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Table 3.1
Comparison of 1984 Green and White Papers
A) LegCo's Composition:
Green Paper: 
1984 1985 1988 1991 
(1) (2)
White Paper: 
change in 
1985
Electoral
College* 0 6 12 14 20 12
Functional
Constituen­
cies
0 6 12 14 20 12
Appointed
Members 29 23 16 12 0 22
Official
Members 18 13 10 10 10 10
TOTAL 47 48 50 50 50 56
* It is composed of Urban Council, (new) Regional Council 
and District Board members.
B) ExCo's Composition
Green Paper White Paper
1984 1988 1991
Elected
by LegCo 0 4 8 No
Change
Appointed m
Members 12 8 2 1985
and
Ex-officio no
Members 4 4 4 timetable
for
implementation
TOTAL 16 16 14
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CHAPTER IV
GOVERNMENT EXPANSION AND THE COLLECTIVE 
CONSUMPTION CLEAVAGE
This chapter will discuss and analyze the trend of government expansion and 
development in Hong Kong since 1945, the rise of privatisation politics, and the 
emergence of the collective consumption cleavage, focusing on the development of 
both the state and the society itself as well as their dynamic relationship in the period 
1945-91. First of all, the phases of the development of the colonial administration 
and its relations with the society of Hong Kong in the period under study will be 
traced and examined. Second, contrary to the generally accepted view of "positive 
non-interventionism", the expansion of the Hong Kong Government, in terms of both 
structural and functional aspects will be probed empirically. Third, the reasons for 
and impact of privatisation of the social service programmes on the govemment- 
society relations as a whole and on electoral politics in particular will be investigated.
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Development of the Hong Kong Government
Hong Kong has retained its colonial status for over 150 years. In general, its 
governmental structure experienced no significant transformation, nevertheless the 
Hong Kong Government adapted to the ever-changing foreign and domestic 
environments by adjusting its relationships with the society of Hong Kong and its 
neighbouring country, China. As will be discussed in the following sections, the 
China factor has been the most influential one in shaping the political development 
of Hong Kong. For illustrative purposes, three phases could be identified to examine 
this process of adjustment.
The First Phase, 1945-67
The period from 1945 to 1967 could be classified as the first phase of 
development. In this period, the nature and the composition of the society underwent 
significant changes. What made this period different from the pre-1945 period, as 
examined in Chapter 2, was the growing significance of the external factors: the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and the coming of the 
Cold War in the late 1940s. Several impacts could then be identified. First of all, 
the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Mainland China had made Hong 
Kong into a "refugee society". Second, some of them came from Shanghai with their 
capitals, skills and machineries which had proved to be indispensable for the later 
industrial development of Hong Kong. Third, the imposition of the United Nations’ 
embargo against the PRC after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 forced Hong 
Kong to replace its declining entrepot trade with industrial development, especially 
in manufacturing industry. Taking advantage of the abundance of cheap labour and 
the world market situation, Hong Kong has succeeded in its export-led economic 
growth. Fourth, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the late 1940s 
and the possible spill-over of the Chinese civil war into Hong Kong had contributed
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partly to the dropping of Governor Sir Mark Young’s proposal for post-war 
democratic reforms.
The worsening of living standards and social order caused by the influx of 
refugees had alerted the Hong Kong Government to take active measures to alleviate 
the growing social problems. How to house the ever-growing refugee population was 
the most pressing problem remaining to be solved in the early 1950s. The Hong 
Kong Government allowed the refugees to build their temporary huts elsewhere in 
the first instance. But a fire in Shek Kip Mei in December 1953 forced the 
Government to engage in providing housing in resettlement estates. As shown in 
Table 4.1, the population of the multi-storey resettlement estates went rapidly up, 
from around 8,000 in 1954 to nearly 1.2 million in 1973. There were several reasons 
advanced to account for government intervention in housing,239 but one of the 
reasons would be that the political status of Hong Kong became clear in the mid- 
1950s as the PRC, the then newly established regime in China, had made no plan to 
take over Hong Kong in the near future. As a result, the British-Hong Kong 
Government could continue her governing over Hong Kong and thus could afford to 
undertake long-term planning. This massive resettlement scheme proved to be 
decisive for the subsequent social stability and economic development of Hong Kong.
These societal changes had coincided with an adjustment in the Hong Kong 
Government, though a minor and not a structural one. Originally, pushed by the 
British Labour Government and echoing the international climate of decolonisation, 
the Hong Kong Government attempted to reform its own government structure by 
proposing to set up an elected municipal council. The idea was put forward by the 
then Governor, Sir Mark Young, in 1946 (the Young Plan) and the Municipal 
Council Ordinance 1949 was also gazetted on 3 June 1949. But subsequent 
developments within and without the society seemed to work against the plan. First 
of all, the continued British rule over Hong Kong was called into question by the
239M. Castells, L. Goh and R. Y-W. Kwok, The Shek Kip Mei Syndrome: 
Economic Development and Public Housing in Hong Kong and Singapore (London: 
Pion, 1990), p. 18.
127
founding of the PRC in 1949. The uncertainty was whether the new Chinese 
Government would allow the colonial status of Hong Kong as it was. Second, the 
influx of large numbers of refugees from China had made Hong Kong into a "refugee 
society" where the lack of citizenship and sense of belonging among the refugees 
would prove to be detrimental to the successful operation of representative 
government. Third, the arrival of the Cold War in Asia in the early 1950s and the 
ensuing United Nations’ embargo against China had re-ordered the priority of 
Government concerns from political reforms to those of security and economic issues. 
Fourth, the possible spill-over of the struggle between the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) into Hong Kong electoral politics would 
undermine the security of Hong Kong. Last but not least, the resistance of the 
unofficial LegCo members to the Young Plan and the unenthusiastic attitude of Sir 
Mark’s successor, Sir Alexander Grantham, meant the reform plan lacked institutional 
support. Because of such developments, the plan was shelved at the end of the 
day 240 xhe Urban Council did reintroduce its elected members in 1952 (two out 
of total 13), but the elections carried little significance and consequence because of 
the Council’s limited jurisdictions.
Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Government expanded its activities for the sake 
of people’s welfare, social stability and economic development. As mentioned above, 
the Hong Kong Government took a more active role after the political status of Hong 
Kong became clear in the mid-1950s. Amid the rapid economic growth, the 
Government seemed to accelerate its capacities to facilitate further economic 
development and at the same time to handle the contradictions that had been aroused 
by the rapid economic and social changes. The expansion of government activities
240For details, see Steven Tsang Yiu-sang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, 
China, and Attempts at Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1945-1952 (Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 1988).
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can be viewed as an expanding network of organization in which more and more 
people as well as resources were being included and involved in these activities.241
The process of government expansion can be traced back to the late 1940s. 
Judging from the record of the official reports and papers released since then, a 
pattern of government expansion could be unearthed. But it should be pointed out 
here that the official reports or papers are used to show the concern of the 
Government in that particular area and period of time, and may not imply that the 
corresponding Government efforts or commitments would then be followed. From 
the late 1940s up to 1968, the Government engaged in creating right infrastructure 
for economic development by initiating some sort of planning and regulation. 
Starting from the postwar overall planning and reorganization of the administration 
in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Hong Kong Government began to solve the 
pressing problems of housing and education.242 Public works on infrastructure had 
also been planned, like the expansion of the Kai Tak Airport and the construction plan
241Bo Strath and Rolf Torstendahl, "State Theory and State Development: State 
as Network Structure in Change in Modem European History," in Rolf Torstendahl, 
ed., State Theory and State History (London: Sage, 1992), pp. 12-37.
242Patrick Abercrombie, Hong Kong: Preliminary Planning Report (n.p., [1948]); 
N.G. Fisher, A Report on Government Expenditure on Education in Hong Kong 1950 
(Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1951); Hong Kong Government, Report o f the 
Hong Kong Salaries Commission (Singapore: Government Printer, 1949); Hong Kong 
Government, High Education in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 
1952); Hong Kong Government, Report on Technical Education and Vocational 
Training (Hong Kong: n.p., 1953); Hong Kong Government, Rent Control (Hong 
Kong: Government Printer, 1953); Hong Kong Government, Final Report of the 
Special Committee on Housing 1956-1958 (Hong Kong: n.p., 1958); Hong Kong 
Government, Statement on Government's Policy on the Re-organization of the 
Structure o f Primary and Secondary Education (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 
1963); Hong Kong Government, Report of the Fulton Commission 1963 (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1963); Hong Kong Government, Report o f the Working Paper 
on Government Policies and Practices with Regard to Squatters, Resettlement and 
Government Low Cost Housing (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1963); Hong Kong 
Government, Report o f the Finance o f Home Ownership Committee (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1964); Hong Kong Government, Review o f Policies for Squatter 
Control, Resettlement and Government Low-Cost Housing (Hong Kong: Government 
Printer, 1964); Hong Kong Government, Education Policy (Hong Kong: Government 
Printer, 1965).
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for a cross-harbour tunnel.243 Moreover, the Government provided a more active 
role in economic development by coordinating a federation of industries and 
despatching trade missions overseas.244 In the early 1960s, the Government 
expanded its activities in the economic sphere by carrying out an export credit 
insurance scheme and planning to set up a central export development council.245 
Meanwhile, efforts were also devoted to reforming the banking system and measures
243Hong Kong Government, Papers on Development o f Kai Tak Airport (Hong 
Kong: Government Printer, 1954); Hong Kong Government, Report o f the Inter- 
Departmental Working Party on the Proposed Cross-Harbour Tunnel (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1956).
244Hong Kong Government, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Proposed 
Federation of Industries (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1958); Hong Kong 
Government, Report of the Hong Kong Trade Mission to Australia (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1961); Hong Kong Government, Report o f Working Party on the 
European Common Market (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1963); Hong Kong 
Government, Report o f the Hong Kong Trade Mission to the Middle East, 27th Dec. 
1962—22nd Jan. 1963 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1963); Hong Kong 
Government, Report o f Hong Kong Government Trade Mission to the Common Market 
Countries, October 1963 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1964); Hong Kong 
Government, Report o f the Trade Mission to the East Africa (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1965); Hong Kong Government, Hong Kong Trade Mission to 
Cyprus (Hong Kong: Government Printer, [1966]); Commerce and Industry 
Department, Report o f the Hong Kong Commercial Mission to Caribbean Countries, 
Nov.-Dee. 1958 (Hong Kong: n.p., 1958); Commerce and Industry Department, 
Report o f the Hong Kong Commercial Mission to West Africa, Jan.-Feb. 1960 (Hong 
Kong: n.p., 1960).
245Hong Kong Government, Report of Working Party on Export Credit Insurance 
(Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1963); Hong Kong Government, Report o f the 
Working Committee on Export Promotion Organization (Hong Kong: Government 
Printer, 1965); R.A. Freeman, Report on an Export Credits Insurance Scheme for 
Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1964).
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adopted to increase her productivity.246 The Government also expanded its scope 
of social and medical services.247
The Government’s regulative capacities over the society has also extended as 
more corruption, drug addicts and criminal offences were reported.248 Its activities 
seemed to cover more than before, but its penetration and integration capacity 
into/with the society have still lagged behind the pace of economic and social 
development. The failure to alleviate the widespread social frustration caused by 
corruption and relative deprivation had irritated the public and had paved the way for 
developing social unrest.249
246H. J. Tomkins, Report on the Hong Kong Banking System and Recommendations 
for the Replacement o f the Banking Ordinance 1948 (Hong Kong: Government 
Printer, 1962); Hong Kong Government, Report o f the Working Committee on 
Productivity (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1964).
247Hong Kong Government, Development of Medical Services in Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong: Government Printer, [1963]); Hong Kong Government, Aims and Policy 
for Social Welfare in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1964); Hong 
Kong Government, Report o f Advisory Committee on Clinics (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1966); Hong Kong Government, A Report by the Inter- 
Departmental Working Party to Consider Aspects of Social Security (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1967); Council of Social Services, Working Together: A Survey 
of the Work o f Voluntary and Government Social Organizations in Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong: Government Printer, 1958); K.L. Gill, 'Recreation for Young People’: A 
Survey (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1966).
248Hong Kong Government, The Problem of Narcotic Drugs in Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong: n.p., 1959); Hong Kong Government, Reports o f the Standing Committee and 
the Advisory Committee on Corruption, 1960-61 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 
[1961]); Hong Kong Government, The Report of the Advisory Committee on Gambling 
Policy (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1965); Hong Kong Government, Report of 
the Governor in Council o f the Working Party set up to Advise on the Adequacy o f the 
Law in Relation to Crimes of Violence Committed by Young Persons (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1965).
249For the corruption in Hong Kong, see Ranee P.L. Lee, ed., Corruption and Its 
Control in Hong Kong: Situations Up to the Late Seventies (Hong Kong: Chinese 
University Press, 1981); H.J. Lethbridge, Hard Graft in Hong Kong: Scandal, 
Corruption and the ICAC (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1985); Peter Harris, 
Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucracy and Politics (Hong Kong: MacMillan, 1988), 
chap. 6.
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After the dropping of the Young Plan, the Hong Kong Government underwent 
some minor adjustment in this phase, for example, the granting of financial autonomy 
by Britain in 1958 and the increase of LegCo’s non-official members from 8 to 13 in 
1964.250 The pre-war political institutions and the socio-economic composition of 
members largely remained unchanged. The non-official seats in the ExCo and the 
LegCo were so often occupied by the "Princely Hong", the wealthy families, and the 
like. Although a working party was set up in April 1966 to "explore and advise on 
practicable alternatives for the development of an effective and convenient system of 
local administration in Hong Kong", its proposals were not adopted at the time.251
Communication with society still relied on the narrow strata of social elites
whose reach and understanding of the grass-roots is arguably minimal. For the
Chinese community, the Hong Kong Government relied on the traditional Chinese
organisations, like the Tung Wah (voluntary organisation comprised solely of
prominent Chinese elites), the Po Leung Kuk (the Society for the Protection of
Women and Girls) and the Kaifongs (neighbourhood organisations), to enlist support
and thus, enhance its efficiency of governing. But this system was later proved to be
not effective in channelling contacts between the Government and society, especially
at a time of rapid social and economic transformation. Although there was demand
for political reform in the colony, the response from the then Minister of State for
Colonial Affairs, Lord Perth, was that:
Her Majesty’s Government consider it undesirable that there should be 
any radical or major change in the present constitutional position in 
Hong Kong. . . . This does not, however, preclude the possibility of 
minor modifications, within the framework of existing principles, in 
the composition of the Legislative Council or the Urban Council.252
250It was the first time for the LegCo to have its non-official members in a 
majority (if the Governor was excluded).
251 Hong Kong Government, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Future Scope
and Operation o f the Urban Council (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1966).
252SCMP, 30 October 1960; quoted in Endacott (1964), op. cit., p. 200.
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It was a fact that there was seldom strong demand for political reform in terms 
of both scope and intensity, but it does not follow that the population was fully 
satisfied with what was going on in the society. The widespread corruption in the 
Government, especially in the Police Forces, the economic exploitation which was 
bound to happen in the process of capitalist development, the unbearably congested 
living environment and the sense of relative deprivation were some of the reasons 
which contributed to social frustration and resentment, especially among the low- 
income groups. Although this state of affairs would be tolerated by many ex-refugees 
who fled the communist rule in China, the local-born Hong Kong people were finding 
it more difficult to accept it as normal.
Given that the population was largely apolitical and without effective 
organisation, its grievances needed to be reflected by the social elites whose critical 
position in the government structure was so vital in channelling communications 
between the Government and society. Unfortunately, they were mostly insulated from 
the public. Because of such an institutional barrier, the discontent seemed to be 
redressed only by extra-constitutional means, as when the Star Ferries proposed a 5 
cents (Hong Kong Currency) fare increase in 1965. After hot public debate on the 
issue, riots broke out in April 1966. The 1966 riot came quickly to an end, but the 
ensuing 1967 riot disrupted the societal order totally. Although the latter was 
inspired by the Cultural Revolution in mainland China and led by the local leftists, 
domestic problems had a role to play in these two riots. The time had come to make 
some reform or adjustment in both the structure and policy of the Hong Kong 
Government.
The Second Phase, 1968-81
The Hong Kong Government, having learned from the two riots in the 1960s, 
had taken actions to improve the situation by carrying out local administrative reforms
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as well as embarking on intervention in both the production and the collective 
consumption processes. A study to reform the local administration had already been 
carried out before the outbreak of the riots in 1966 and 1967.253 But the touch-and- 
go situation at that time made it hard to hold back any longer. After the two riots, 
a City District Office Scheme (CDO) was swiftly implemented and an office was 
established in each of the administrative districts in 1968.254 The principal aim of 
this scheme was, to quote the directive to City District Officers in 1968, "to provide 
the public with a local manifestation of the Government in your person."255 
Afterward, several local institutions were also established. The City District 
Committees and Area Committees were set up in 1972, and the District Management 
Committee (consisting only of representatives from various Government departments) 
in Kwun Tong in the early 1970s. Mutual Aid Committees which developed at the 
block level were also established in 1973, and gradually replaced the role played by 
the traditional Kaifong associations.256 With the development and growth of new 
towns in the New Territories, there was an urgency to set up a new local 
administration. As a result, the District Advisory Boards were set up in 1977 and the 
Town Management Committee was also established in the New Territories in the late 
1970s.
Furthermore, after the release of the McKinsey Report in 1973, the 
reorganization of the central administration was launched to enhance its efficiency and
253Hong Kong Government, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Future Scope 
and Operation of the Urban Council (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1966); Hong 
Kong Government, Report of the Working Party on Local Administration (Hong 
Kong: Government Press, 1967).
^Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, The City District Officer Scheme (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1969).
755Ibid, cover page.
256Aline K. Wong, The Kaifong Associations and the Society of Hong Kong 
(Taipei: Orient Cultural Service, 1972).
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effectiveness in policy planning.257 The Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) was established in 1974 in order to fight against the widespread 
corruption within and without the Government. Moreover, adjustments in the LegCo 
were noted: the elimination of the informal practice of appointing two elected 
nominees from the Justices of the Peace and the General Chamber of Commerce in 
1974, the introduction of a de facto non-official majority in the LegCo in 1976, and 
the reorganization of the Office of the Unofficial Members of the Executive and 
Legislative Council (UMELCO) in 1970 so as to deal with public complaints more 
effectively instead of establishing the publicly-advocated Ombudsman office.258
At the same time, the Hong Kong Government began to put more emphasis 
on labour legislation in order to regulate the tense relationships between employers 
and employees. Attempts were also made to improve the living quality of the mass 
public. With the appointment of the new Governor, Sir Murray MacLehose, in 1971, 
Hong Kong had entered the so-called "MacLehose era" that was characterised by 
massive government intervention in the collective consumption process of housing, 
education, and health care. The promise was to provide adequate low-rent public 
housing, nearly free medical care, free nine-year education, and so on.259 Thus,
257Hong Kong Government, The Machinery of Government: A New Framework for 
Expanding Services (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1973).
258Renamed as the Office of the Members of the Executive and Legislative 
Councils (OMELCO) in 1986; Miners (1991), op. cit.t pp. 129, nl & 151-2; Tsang, 
(1989), op. cit., p. 70.
^ F o r  MacLehose’s policy statement, see his annual speech to the LegCo on 
October 18th 1972; for more information, see the following: Hong Kong 
Government, Social Welfare in Hong Kong: The Way Ahead (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1973); Hong Kong Government, The Five Year Plan for Social 
Welfare Development in Hong Kong, 1973-78 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 
1973); Hong Kong Government, The Further Development o f Medical and Health 
Services in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1974); Hong Kong 
Government, Secondary Education in Hong Kong over the Next Decade (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1974); Hong Kong Government, Integrating the Disabled into 
the Community: A United Effort (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1977); Hong Kong 
Government, A Programme of Social Security Development in Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong: Government Printer, 1977); Hong Kong Government, Services for the Elderly 
(Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1977); Hong Kong Government, Development of
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the government expansion in the provision of social service programmes had the 
effect of integrating the public with the government policy.
The significant economic growth and the massive provision of social services 
had contributed to the improvement of living standards. Nevertheless, several social 
movements took place in this phase. They were the Movement for Defending 
Sankaku, the Campaign for Demanding Chinese as an Official Language, the Golden 
Jubilee Affairs, and so on.260 The activists in these movements mostly came from 
university students, social workers and teaching sectors. Other young professionals 
also began to criticize the colonial structure and some of its policies.261 
Furthermore, the number of social conflicts in the mid- and late 1970s was rising as 
the Government increased its regulative activities in the society, especially in the land 
resumption process.262
As the government expanded its activities in terms of both scope and intensity, 
the demand from the newly emerging professionals to participate in the governing 
process was also growing. The elected members of the then only partially-elected 
Urban Council put forward their proposals for reforming the UrbCo and the
Personal Social Work among Young People in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government 
Printer, 1977); Hong Kong Government, The Development o f Senior Secondary and 
Tertiary Education (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1978); Hong Kong 
Government, Social Welfare into the 1980’s (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1979); 
Hong Kong Government, Primary Education and Pre-Primary Services: White Paper 
(Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1981).
260For more details, see Hong Kong Federation of Students, ed., A Review of the 
Student Movements in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Wide Angle, 1983). (in Chinese).
261Hong Kong Observers, Pressure Points (Hong Kong: Summerson Eastern 
Publishers, 1981).
262Anthony Cheung Bing-leung and Louie Kin-sheun, Social Conflicts in Hong 
Kong, 1975-1986: Trend and Implication (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia- 
Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991).
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representation system in 1969 and 1979.263 The Government responded to the
former demand only by adjusting minimally the balance of the elected and appointed
members (abolishment of the 6 ex-officio seats), and by granting the council’s
financial autonomy in 1973.264 But the nature and the scope of power remained
unchanged. The latter demand had to wait until the mid-1980s for its partial adoption
by the Hong Kong Government. The demands by the elected members of the UrbCo
in 1979 were to phase out the appointed members in the UrbCo, to introduce
universal franchise, to extend UrbCo’s jurisdiction and to replace LegCo’s appointed
members with elected ones, or institute a fully elected municipal council. They ended
their petition with the following lines:
Unless the Urban Council is reformed, and that urgently, this only 
public body with elected representatives of some of the people will 
die a natural death. The bureaucracy will then take over, policies 
will be passed and put into effect without opposition of any kind, and 
the stage will be set for the next round of disturbances caused by 
frustration. The people are being blatantly exploited by Government 
business-policy-makers and big business and monopoly concerns of 
private origin. No Community can continue indefinitely if it ignores 
the interests of the silent majority of its citizens.265
In regard to constitutional reform, the British-Hong Kong Government seemed 
to be constrained by the Chinese attitude towards the status of Hong Kong. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, China regarded Hong Kong as part of China. This was 
reflected in her prompt declaration, when admitted to the United Nations in 1972, that 
Hong Kong and Macau are not colonies but part of China, and her request to have 
them removed from the list of colonies. That means no self-determination would be 
possible and that was understood to limit the potential for democratic reforms.
263Urban Council, Report o f the Reform of Local Government (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1969); B.A. Bemacchi, et al., The Hong Kong Urban Council: 
The Case o f the Elected Member (n.p., 1979).
264Colonial Secretariat, White Paper: The Urban Council (Hong Kong:
Government Printer, 1971).
265Bemacchi, et al. (1979), op. cit., p. 12; bold in origin.
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The Third Phase, 1982-91
This phase was quite different from the previous one in the sense of the 
growing direct influence of the PRC in the domestic development of Hong Kong. 
When the then Governor MacLehose visited Beijing in 1979, he was told by Mr Deng 
Xiaoping that China would resume the sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997, when the 
lease of the New Territories expired. The emergence of the 1997 question forced the 
British Government to enter negotiations with the PRC over the future of Hong Kong. 
Subsequently, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was agreed in 1984, and the drafting 
of the Basic Law (the mini-constitution of Hong Kong after 1997), which was 
promulgated in 1990, began in 1985. Both documents set the parameters and basic 
principles of the political and social life in both the transitional period and for the 50 
years after 1997.
The coming to the stage of China constrained the will and policy options of 
the Hong Kong Government in the transitional period. On the one hand, the British- 
Hong Kong Government has the legitimate right to exercise its own rule by judging 
what measures needed to be adopted in maintaining the "stability and prosperity" of 
Hong Kong. On the other hand, the British-Hong Kong Government had to work 
closely with China to sort out the detailed plan of power transfer. Given the 
sensitivity and complexity of the matter, it was not difficult to imagine that the right 
balance was hard, if not impossible, to hold.
The Hong Kong Government continued its unfinished political reforms in the 
1980s by publishing a series of Green and White Papers concerning the development 
of district administration and representative government.266 The establishment of
266These are: Green Paper: A Pattern o f District Administration in Hong Kong 
(June 1980); White Paper: District Administration in Hong Kong (January 1981); 
Green Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong 
(July 1984); White Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in 
Hong Kong (November 1984); Green Paper: The 1987 Review o f Developments in 
Representative Government (May 1987); White Paper: The Development of 
Representative Government: The Way Forward (February 1988).
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the partially elected District Boards (1982) and Regional Council (1986), while the 
injection of indirectly and directly elected members into the LegCo in 1985 and 1991 
enlarged the scope for political participation. As indicated in Chapter 3, this 
development was unwelcome to Beijing and the conservative business community in 
Hong Kong. On the one hand, the introduction of elections in the LegCo received 
opposition and criticism from Beijing. Beijing seemed to believe that the British and 
Hong Kong Governments had engaged in a conspiracy of transferring power to pro- 
British Hong Kong people, rather than to China. The retention of some forms of 
political influence after 1997 through the institution of representative government was 
said to be the British motivation behind the conspiracy. On the other hand, the 
conservative business community did not like greater democracy because it 
undermined their privileged access to the government structure, and would lead to 
high taxes resulting from the pressure of the directly elected elements for greater 
spending on social welfare. Moreover, their intimate economic ties and interests with 
China also dictated their attitudes towards political reform.
Two events in this period had proved to be detrimental to the confidence of 
Hong Kong people, the anti-nuclear movement in 1986 and the suppression of the 
democratic movement in China in 1989. The former issue arose with China’s 
decision to build a nuclear plant in Day a Bay, which is only fifty kilometres away 
from Hong Kong, provoking fierce opposition from the Hong Kong public.267 Even 
though one million people signed petitions objecting to the nuclear plant project, 
China nevertheless proceeded with the project. The other was the Tiananmen 
Incident of 1989. The suppression of the democratic movement in China had given 
a serious shock to the Hong Kong people. It was reported that about one million 
Hong Kong people had taken to the streets to show their dismay and disapproval of 
what the Beijing Government had done in the Tiananmen Incident. Their confidence 
in the imaginative "one country, two systems" formula and their faith in the promise 
of "high degree of autonomy" were shattered. Furthermore, the non-responsive
267For details, see Herbert S. Yee and Wong Yiu-chung, "Hong Kong: The 
Politics of the Daya Bay Nuclear Plant Debate," International Affairs 63 (1987):617- 
630.
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attitude towards Hong Kong’s public demands in the former event and the high­
handed suppression of the popular democratic movement in the latter had, in one way 
or another, deepened the tensions in the already strained Sino-Hong Kong relations 
and the polarisation of the political forces within Hong Kong. The details of the 
alignment of Hong Kong political forces will be examined in Chapter 5.
At this juncture, different political groups within Hong Kong had reached a 
consensus on speedy democratic reform. The original 10 direct elected seats in 
LegCo in 1991 were expanded to 18. This was contradictory to the Chinese 
arrangement that was stipulated in the then draft Basic Law. For Beijing, the claim 
of conspiracy appeared to be further substantiated by the following moves of the 
Hong Kong Government: the introduction of the Bill of Rights, the British Nationality 
Selection Scheme, and the announcement of the new port and airport building 
programme. For the British and Hong Kong Governments, these measures were 
aimed at restoring the confidence of the Hong Kong people and the business 
community after the Tiananmen incident. The "brain drain" issue well reflected the 
loss of confidence among the Hong Kong people and it was estimated by the 
Government that 62,000 people emigrated overseas in 1990.268 The mistrust 
between China and Britain seemed to have reached a point of no return.
After decades of socio-economic development in Hong Kong, a significant 
demographical transformation in both composition and quality was evident. The 
local-born population in Hong Kong had steadily increased over the years. The 
respective figures of local bom population for 1961 and 1991 were 47.7% and 
59.8%.269 The education qualifications of the population were also improving to 
a large extent. The percentage of population aged 15 or above and finished upper-
268Ronald Skeldon, "Emigration, Immigration and Fertility Decline: Demographic 
Integration or Disintegration?" in Sung Yun-wing and Lee Ming-kwan, eds., The 
Other Hong Kong Report 1991 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1991), p. 235.
269Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Statistics 1947-1967 (Hong 
Kong: Government Printer, 1969), p. 22; Census and Statistics Department, Hong 
Kong 1991 Population Census: Basic Table for District Board Districts (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1992a), p. 34.
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secondary education, and degree education were 15.4% and 2.6% in 1971, and 
26.8% and 5.9% in 1991, respectively.270 The professionals and administrative 
workers were growing rapidly, from 7.7% in 1976 to 23.1% in 1991.271 The GDP 
per capita had grown from less than HK$3,779 in 1966 to over HK$111,721 in 1991 
in current market prices.272
Since the mid-1980s, the Hong Kong Government has tried to privatize some 
of its social services programmes like housing. The timing of privatization coincided 
with the structural transformation of the Hong Kong economy, from a ^  to a 
l ]oc^ lX Furthermore, there was a trend by Hong Kong manufacturing
industry to relocate its production lines to the Pearl River delta where abundant cheap 
labour could be hired to increase their products’ competitiveness in the world market. 
The decision of the Hong Kong Government to import foreign labour also frustrated 
the already suffering workers. The above changes hit the workers quite seriously, 
because most of them were living in public housing estates and were lacking the 
necessary quality to find jobs in the growing tertiary sectors. These developments 
mobilized the grassroots for participation and thus set the stage for the rise of local 
activists in the embryonic electoral politics. The electoral dynamic of the 1991 
LegCo direct election will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Now, we turn to the 
empirical examination of the expansion of the Hong Kong Government.
270Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Annual Digest o f Statistics, 1992 
Edition (Hong Kong: Government Printer 1992b), p. 199, table 15.1.
271Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong 1986 By-Census, Main Report 
Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1987), p. 38, Table 34; Census and 
Statistics Department (1992a), op. cit., p. 34.
272Census and Statistics Department, Estimates of Gross Domestic Product 1966 
to 1993 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1994), p. 10.
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Empirical Analysis of Government Expansion
In examining the role of the state in France, Britain, West Germany, Canada
and the United States, Anthony King found that the latter was "strikingly different"
from the rest in providing public services.273 He contended that:
the pattern of American policy is what it is, not because America is 
dominated by an elite (though it may be); not because the demands 
made on government are different from those made on governments in 
other countries; not because American interest groups have greater 
resources than those in other countries; not because American 
institutions are more resistant to change than those in other countries 
(though they probably are); but rather because Americans believe 
things that other people do not believe and make assumptions that 
other people do not make. More precisely, elites, demands, interest 
groups and institutions constitute neither necessary nor sufficient 
conditions of the American policy pattern; ideas, we contend, 
constitute both a necessary condition and a sufficient one.274
The American idea that King referred to was "the State plays a more limited
role in America than elsewhere because Americans, more than other people, want it
to play a limited role". (italic in origin) He further summarized the American beliefs
and assumptions about government as follows:
free enterprise is more efficient than government; government should 
concentrate on encouraging private initiative and free competition; 
government is wasteful; governments should not provide people with 
things they can provide for themselves; too much government 
endangers liberty; and so on.275
What the Americans thought about the appropriate role of government might 
probably be the same as in Hong Kong. One would not fail to find the readiness of
273Anthony King, "Ideas, Institutions and the Policies of Governments: A 
Comparative Analysis, Parts I and II, III," British Journal o f Political Science 3
(1973): 291-313, 409-423.
214Ibid., p. 423.
215Ibid. p. 418.
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the Hong Kong mass public to accept the official ideology of "laissez faire" and later 
"positive non-interventionism".276 It was true that the Hong Kong Government 
restrained itself to a minimal role in most aspects of economic activities. Her basic 
role was to maintain a system that could ensure and facilitate fair economic exchange 
and transactions. But these official ideologies had gone, in one way or another, when 
Hong Kong had entered the "take-off" stage of economic development in the 1960s. 
There were plenty of theories advanced to account for the state expansion.277 
Modem state-building and the corresponding capitalist economic development seemed 
to contribute to the expansion process of the government. In this period of
276The phrase "positive non-interventionism" was coined by Sir Philip Haddon- 
Cave, the former Financial Secretary from 1971 to 1981. For his view, see Philip 
Haddon-Cave, "The Making of Some Aspects of Public Policy in Hong Kong," in 
David Lethbridge, ed., The Business Environment in Hong Kong, 2nd ed. (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. xiii-xx.
277Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in 
Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation o f National State in Western Europe (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 3-83; David R. Cameron, "The Expansion 
of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," American Political Science Review 
72 (1978): 1243-61; Patrick D. Larkey, Chandler Stolp and Mark Winer, "Theorizing 
About the Growth of Government: A Research Assessment," Journal of Public Policy 
1 (1981): 157-220; Peter Flora and Jens Alber, "Modernization, Democratization, 
and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe," in Peter Flora and 
Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe and 
America (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Books, 1981), pp. 37-80; Franz 
Lehner and Ulrich Widmaier, "Market Failure and Growth of Government: A 
Sociological Explanation," in Charles Lewis Taylor, ed., Why Government Grow 
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), pp. 240-60; B. Guy Peter and Marin O. Heisler, 
"Thinking About Public Sector Growth: conceptual, Operational, Theoretical, and 
Policy Considerations," in Charles Lewis Taylor, ed., Why Government Grow 
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), pp. 177-97; Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter B. Evans, 
"The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an Analysis of the Conditions 
Underlying Effective Intervention," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and 
Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), pp. 44-77; John A. Hall, "State and Economic Development: 
Reflections on Adam Smith," in John A. Hall, ed., States in History (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), pp. 154-76; Su-Hoon Lee, State-Building in the Contemporary 
Third World (Boulder: Westview, 1988); Robert Hanneman and J. Rogers 
Hollingsworth, "Refocusing the Debate on the Role of the State in Capitalist 
Societies," in Rolf Torstendahl, ed., State Theory and State History (London: Sage, 
1992), pp. 38-61.
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expansion, the government involved itself deeply in constructing a system that would 
facilitate economic development. Later on, the government intervened in the 
consumption side of the production process by introducing massive social services 
programmes so as to deflate the social conflicts that had been aroused in the capital 
accumulation process. Furthermore, for late developing countries like Hong Kong, 
the demand for government intervention in the economic sphere has an additional 
feature: to have "independent" rather than "dependent" economic development. 
Following this line of thinking, the sections below will describe and discuss the 
process and the consequences of government expansion in Hong Kong, in terms of 
both structural and functional aspects, since the 1950s.
The Structural Expansion of the Hong Kong Government
The structural expansion of the Hong Kong Government could be detected 
from the growing number of Government organs since the 1950s. Starting from the 
central level was the growth of both the Secretaries in the Government (Colonial) 
Secretariat and implementation departments (see Table 4.2). The number of 
-Secretaries in the Secretariat grew from 10 in 1969 to 15 in 1974 after the 
reorganisation in that year, then expanded to 21 in 1990. The growth of the 
Secretaries could be seen as the increased regulating capacity of the Hong Kong 
Government. The growth rate of departments between 1969 and 1980 did not match 
that of the Secretaries, but there was more than 30% increase in number in the 1980- 
1990 period.
Given the nature of the Hong Kong Government and the stress on government 
by consultation, the representation system did not change much up till the early 
1980s. The higher the council was located in the power hierarchy, the less the 
change in its nature and composition (see Table 4.3). Although the non-official 
members in the ExCo outnumbered the official members after 1966, recruitment still
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relied solely on appointment by the Governor. Constitutionally speaking, it is at the 
governor’s pleasure to recommend whoever he wishes to appoint. People from 
wealthy families, big business firms and the like were so often appointed up till the 
late 1970s.
The LegCo non-official majority appeared in 1964 (exclusive of the Governor) 
and in 1976 (inclusive of the Governor). The LegCo seemed more ready for 
adjustment than the ExCo. Simply put, the location of the LegCo in the power 
hierarchy is less important than that of the ExCo because the latter is part of the 
executive. As a result, the institutional barrier in the LegCo to reform was smaller 
than that of the ExCo. Unlike the ExCo, the number of LegCo official and non­
official members grew from 15 (exclusive of the Governor) in 1947 to 60 in 1991, 
and the non-official members alone grew from 7 in 1947 to 57 in 1991. Moreover, 
the method and the pool of recruitment were similar to those of the ExCo. 
Constitutional change had been introduced to the LegCo when twenty-four members 
were opened to elections on the basis of the functional constituency and electoral 
college in 1985, and the number increased to twenty-six in 1988. The directly-elected 
seats of the LegCo were only instituted in 1991. Originally, the Government had 
indicated in the 1984 White Paper that there might be direct elections in the LegCo 
in 1988. But the 1988 White Paper concluded that although the introduction of direct 
election into the LegCo "would be a logical and desirable" step, the timing would be 
more suitable in 1991 rather than 1988, "given that opinions in the community on this 
issue are so clearly divided." (p.9) The decision had understandably invited vigorous 
protest from the democrats. Details of this development will be taken up in Chapter 
5.
Before the introduction of some forms of election in the LegCo in 1985, the 
Urban Council (UrbCo) had had its direct elected members before the Second World 
War. But its limited jurisdictions—mostly confined to public health, recreational and 
cultural affairs—had rendered the UrbCo’s election insignificant. The UrbCo held its 
first post-war election in 1952 with two directly elected members and since then the 
number has risen steadily from 4 in 1953, 8 in 1956, 10 in 1965, 12 in 1973, and
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finally 15 in 1983 (see Table 4.4). This increase was counter-balanced by the 
corresponding increase in the number of appointed members in the Council. The 
1973 reform resulted in the withdrawal of the official members, and the seats in the 
council were equally assigned between the appointed and elected members, each side 
having twelve seats (fifteen in 1983). And only in 1989 would there be a chance to 
have a non-appointed majority when ten representatives from the District Boards were 
being introduced. The UrbCo’s elected members had continually sought reform of 
the political system since the 1950s, especially those of the Reform Club’s members. 
When the pressure for reform had built up to a certain level, the Hong Kong 
Government responded to it by marginally adjusting the number of elected seats and 
the function of the Council. For example, starting from the mid-1960s, there was 
consistent push to have a Great Hong Kong City Council with wider franchise and 
powers than the then UrbCo. Two reports had been published in 1966 and 1969.278 
The Government made some concessions to the demand in 1971 by granting the 
UrbCo financial autonomy and the right to levy rates.279 Some minor functions 
were added, but its powers and its relationship with the central Government remained 
unchanged as a whole.
The Regional Council (RegCo) was set up in 1985 when the new towns in the 
New Territories flourished. Its functions and powers are similar to those of the 
UrbCo and mainly confined to public health, recreational and cultural affairs. The 
administration of the New Territories was different from that of the urban area 
because of the different legal basis of British rule between the ceded territory of Hong 
Kong Island and Kowloon, and the leased New Territories. After the lease of the 
New Territories to Britain in 1898 for 99 years, the Hong Kong Government adopted
278Hong Kong Government, Report of the Ad Hoc committee on the Future Scope 
and Operation of the Urban Council (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1966); Urban 
Council, Report o f the Reform of Local Government (Hong Kong: Government 
Printer, 1969).
279Colonial Secretariat, White Paper: The Urban Council (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1971).
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an almost non-interventionist policy towards the newly leased territory.280 By 
setting up minimal government institutions there, the Government relied very heavily 
on the village elders in running the rural area. But the situation changed rapidly as 
the Government started to develop the New Territories in the 1960s. The then 
District Officer’s jurisdiction was gradually shared with those central Government 
departments involved in development. The Heung Yee Kuk had played a significant 
role in communicating with the Government and the native residents. But given the 
Heung Yee Kuk as a statutory representative body for the native residents, the new 
immigrants from the urban area had little chance to participate if they wished to do 
so. The emerging new communities in the New Territories thus highlighted the need 
to reform the local administration system there. As a result, a local administration 
reform was initiated and implemented: the creation of the District Boards (DBs) in 
1982 and the RegCo in 1985. Since then, the three-tier legislature has evolved, but 
the destination was not clear as there was scarcely any consensus among Britain, 
China and the local political forces on the timing as well as the procedure to arrive 
at the widely accepted goal of democratisation. In 1991, the RegCo were made up 
of 12 appointed and 12 directly elected members, 9 representatives from the DBs, and 
3 ex-officio members from the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the Heung Yee Kuk 
(see Table 4.4). Regarding the District Boards, there were nineteen (eighteen before 
1985) DBs and 441 DB members in 1991. The percentage of directly elected 
members increased from 27% (132 out of 490) in 1982 to 62% (274 out of 441) in 
1991 (see Table 4.5).
In contrast to the development of representative government or local 
administration, the growth in consultation networks was spectacular. From thirty-one 
in 1947, the number of advisory bodies and committees increased to 277 in 1991, 
nearly nine times those of 1947 (see Table 4.6). But there were variations in the 
growth rate among different types of advisory body. From 1970 to 1980, the annual 
growth rate for "the statutory bodies", "the permanent non-statutory bodies with 
official and non-official members", "the permanent non-statutory bodies with official
280Endacott (1964), op. cit. , pp. 126-34.
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members only", were 4.1%, 7.5%, and 1.1%, respectively. In the period 1980-88, 
the growth rates for the first two kinds of bodies declined, especially for the non- 
statutory ones with official and non-official members. In contrast, the non-statutory 
ones with official members only, increased. The respective figures were 3%, 2.5%, 
and 5.8%. But the trend was just the opposite during the period 1988-91. The first 
two kinds of bodies (the statutory bodies, and the permanent non-statutory bodies with 
official and non-official members) increased significantly and had a 5.2% and 4.9% 
growth rate, respectively. The official non-statutory bodies experienced minus 0.9% 
growth rate. The details of these ups and downs in the growth rate are beyond the 
scope of this study, but one point that should be stressed is that the Government had 
reinforced its incorporation (absorption) capacity in the late 1980s.
The Hong Kong Government regarded this consultation system as an effective 
one, and it was believed by many others that it could avoid the "unnecessary” debates 
and confrontations found in Western democracy. The members of all these bodies 
were nominally appointed by the Governor. In fact, some boards’ and committees’ 
members were first elected among the concerned parties and then recommended to 
the Governor for appointment. Some were ex-officio members because of their 
positions in relevant activities. Through this particular channel, the Hong Kong 
Government would co-opt most, if not all, of the socio-economic elites into its 
consultation networks. The Government granted them the social status as well as the 
power of influence in anticipation of their support in the governing process. In 
return, the social elites were willing to cooperate as long as the Government could 
provide what they wanted. As a result, the efficiency of the Hong Kong Government 
would then be enhanced. The growth of this network had facilitated the penetration 
of the government into society and the integration of the social elites with the 
government. But once again, like other political appointments, the less organised and 
under-privileged sectors in the society were so often left out in the membership. 
More important was the fact that many government policies, whether welcomed or 
not by the public, were based on the recommendation of the advisory bodies 
concerned. In fact, this could enhance the transparency of the Government as well
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as enable it to avoid taking direct responsibility in certain controversial and sensitive 
policy areas.
Let us take the Transport Advisory Committee as an example, when the 
application for a fare increase by the franchised transportation company is first 
considered by the Committee and then recommendation made to the Transportation 
Branch of the Government Secretariats and later the ExCo for adoption. If the 
recommendation and its subsequent adoption go against the opinion of the public, the 
Committee’s members might more or less lose their credibility, and their roles might 
be doubted by the public. The Government can, therefore, avoid direct conflict with 
the mass public. Moreover, the issue of conflict of interests has long been the focal 
point of public discussion because many committee members are coming from the 
business sector. Thus, the neutrality of the committee’s recommendation might be 
questioned by the public. Miss Maria Tam’s scandal is a case in hand (details in 
Chapter 5).
The Functional Expansion of the Colonial State
Accompanying the growth of the government structure was the expansion of 
the number of public employees. The study of public employment has often faced 
the problem of availability of data. This was also the case in Hong Kong. 
Conceptually, there is a different coverage to the following two terms: "public 
employees" and "civil servants". The former were those who were directly or 
indirectly employed by the government, but the latter only involved those who were 
directly hired by the government. That means the employees in the voluntary or 
quasi-official organisations which received government funding or subvention were 
regarded as public employees. Ideally, the data on public employees, rather than that 
of the civil servants, are more suitable to measure the size and the growth rate of the 
public sector. This was especially true in Hong Kong as some of the social services
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were delivered by non-governmental agencies with annual financial support from the 
Government, e.g. member agencies of the Council of Social Service. Others were 
former Government but now privatised programmes which had been granted capital 
investment by the Government, e.g. the Housing Authority. Still others were those 
which were funded by the Government but had their own personnel policy, e.g. the 
Tourist Association.281 But so often, there was a lack of the accurate figures for 
that kind of public employee other than that of the civil servants. Nevertheless, the 
number of civil servants might be regarded as the fundamental one that could shed 
some light on the growth of the government employment.
As shown in Table 4.7, the strength of the civil servants grew from about
53,000 in 1963 to a little more than 190,000 in 1991. A gain of more than 3.5 times 
the figure of 1963. Once again, the growth rate varied in different periods. The 
average annual growth rates for the period 1963-73 and 1973-84 were 7.0% and 
8.1 % respectively. But the trend of growth did not continue thereafter and dropped 
significantly to 1.7% in the period 1984-91. Moreover, the growth rates among 
different function areas were not the same. In the period 1963-73, there were four 
function areas with two-digit annual growth rate. The order of annual growth rates 
were: social welfare (22.0%), policy planning (19.1%), extractive agencies (15.7%) 
and housing (11.1%). In the period 1973-84, policy planning and extractive agencies 
continued to enjoy a two-digit growth rate. The respective percentages were 12.5% 
and 11.6%. The disciplinary forces also acquired a two-digit growth rate of 13.2%. 
Only policy planning had a record of over 5% growth in the period of 1984-91. The 
above personnel statistics appeared to demonstrate the relative greater expansion in 
the function areas of policy planning, extractive, and law enforcement, at least in the 
period of 1963-84. The relative low growth rate experienced in the 1984-91 period 
was probably due to the fact that the Hong Kong Government came across financial 
constraint caused by the public work projects and social investments on the one hand,
281Norman Miners, The Government and Politics o f Hong Kong, 5th ed. (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 101-106.
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and the unstable government revenue imposed by the uncertainty of the future of the 
Territory on the other.
In general, the growth of revenue and the growth of expenditure of Hong 
Kong in the post-war period was remarkable but with variation. First of all, the 
growth of revenue and the growth of expenditure in 1992, in current market price 
(constant prices not available in the said annual report), was more than 1235 and 1091 
times the figures of 1947 respectively (see Table 4.8). For the whole period of 1947- 
92, the average annual growth rate of revenue and expenditure was 18.6% and 17.8% 
respectively; but there was a wide variation in terms of comparison yearly and 
periodically. The respective ranges of revenue and expenditure growth were -2.2% 
(1984) and 100.1% (1948) for the former, and -2.2% (1968) and 70.1% (1981) for 
the latter.
The revenue growth rates for the periods of 1947-67, 1967-73, 1973-84 and 
1984-92 were 18.7%, 20.5%, 23.6% and 16.1% respectively. Meanwhile, the 
respective expenditure growth rates were 17.3%, 16.9%, 26.3% and 13.8%. There 
were only a few occasions of minus growth rate of revenue and expenditure: 3 for the 
former (in 1954, 1983 and 1984) and 4 for the latter (in 1954, 1968, 1976 and 1984). 
The Hong Kong Government adhered to a conservative fiscal policy of balanced 
budgeting and thus accumulated an enormous surplus of HK$57,280.6 million 
(equivalent to GBP4,773.4 million, if GBP1 = HK$12) up to 1992 (in current market 
price).282 Only on seven occasions (1947, 1960, 1966, 1975, 1983, 1984 and 1991) 
had there resulted a negative balance at the end of the financial years.
The Government’s extracting capacity improved steadily over the post-war 
period. As shown in Table 4.9, the percentage of the actual revenue in term of the 
gross domestic product was on the rise, from 11.9% in the period 1967-73 to 13.1%
282For the role and policy of successive Financial Secretaries in the post-war 
period, see Lo Cheng Sik-sze, Public Budgeting in Hong Kong: An Incremental 
Decision-Making Approach (Hong Kong: Writers’ & Publishers’ Cooperative, 1990), 
pp. 66-79.
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in the period 1984-92. This meant that the growth of revenue was faster than that of 
the GDP, and more and more resources were extracted from the society and placed 
at the disposal of the Government. This aggregated growth rate did not necessarily 
imply that the same would go to individual revenue sources. Some components of 
revenue would contribute more than others to the course of development, or vice 
versa. Furthermore, different growth rates among revenue sources indicated that one 
or more sectors in the society had been drilled more than the rest. As shown in 
Table 4.10, the land revenue (excluding property tax and estate duty) contributed 
more than 23% on average during the period 1947-92, with the range from 7.1% in 
1988 to 48.4% in 1981. The period 1973-84 recorded an average contribution of 
28.7%, but the ensuing period 1984-91 decreased more than half of that in 1973-84 
and took up only 13.7% of the total actual revenue.
Why was this so? The rapid decline in the yield from land sales seemed to
be one of the most promising reasons (see column 2 in Table 4.10). The share of
land sales reached its peak in the early 1980s (37% in 1981 and 29.4% in 1982) and
then fell rapidly from the mid-1980s, with an average share of 0.5% in the period
1988-91. The sudden and swift fall of land sale shares since the early 1980s might
be attributed partly to the political uncertainty in the early 1980s and partly to the
sharing of the land sale revenue with the Chinese Government since the coming into
force of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in May 1985. Annex III of the Joint
Declaration laid down the details of land leases arrangements during the transitional
period of 1984-1997. Article 6 of the Annex III stipulated that:
From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, 
premium income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government from 
land transaction shall, after deduction of the average cost of land 
production, be shared equally between the British Hong Kong 
Government and the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
Government. All the income obtained by the British Hong Kong 
Government, including the amount of the above mentioned deduction, 
shall be put into the Capital Works Reserve Fund for the financing of 
land development and public works in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region Government’s share of the premium 
income shall be deposited in banks incorporated in Hong Kong and 
shall not be drawn on except for the financing of land development and 
public works in Hong Kong . . . .
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The revenue from land sale for the period 1985-1992, which was credited into 
the Capital Works Reserve Fund (Works Account), amounted to HK$465,028.7 
million and represented a drain of average 6.7% of the actual revenue in the said 
period (see Table 4.11). This was very likely to have a financial consequence on the 
Government fiscal system.283 Although the Hong Kong Government could still be 
the one to decide how to spend its own share, the programmes which were financed 
should be of a public works nature. That meant the Hong Kong Government lost the 
flexibility of using this sum of money to finance other general expenses and thus had 
to tighten its budget and expenditure or cut back some social commitments.
In ensuring the availability of the necessary funding for other expenditures, 
the revenue from other taxing sources had to yield more. As shown in Table 4.9, the 
share of internal revenue climbed significantly from 32.7% in the period 1950-73 to 
54.9% in 1984-88 and 61.6% in 1988-91. Among the items within the heading of 
internal revenue, as shown in Table 4.12, the share of salaries tax grew at a rapid 
rate. The salaries tax contributed only 9.5% in average in 1958-73, and steadily rose 
to 15.6% in 1973-84, and finally reached 23.8% in 1984-91. Comparatively, the 
share of stamp duty, and property tax and estate duty became smaller. The share of 
stamp duty decreased more than 5% in average from 1958-73 to 1984-91, and the 
share of property tax and estate duty was down 8.5% in the respective periods. The 
contribution from profits tax grew from 44.9% in 1958-73 to 49% in 1973-84, but 
eventually dropped to 45.8% in 1984-91.
As shown in Table 4.13, the net of salaries tax had extended widely with a 
significant growth of total taxpayers from little more than 255,500 in 1982 to
1,070,000 in 1991. That meant, on average, more than 90,000 persons were being 
drawn into the net yearly in the said period. Furthermore, a differential growth
283Before 1982, revenue from land sales haJ' been set aside for fiscal reserves. 
But the then Financial Secretary Sir John Bremridge, successor of Sir Philip Haddon- 
Cave, used it for expenditure. See Y.W. Sung, "Fiscal and Economic
Policies in Hong Kong," in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed., Hong Kong in Transition (Hong 
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 130.
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between the standard rate taxpayers and the single taxpayers, in terms of both number 
and share of final tax contribution, was noted. The standard rate taxpayers increased 
from 18,600 in 1982 to nearly 33,800 in 1987, and then expanded to over 100,000 
in 1991, but the respective share of final tax had first declined from 54.2% to 45.5% 
and then went up to 55%. The respective figures for the single taxpayers was 
147,700, 447,300 and 517,500, and the share of final tax was 12.7%, 19.5% and 
18.1%. Sub-dividing the period into two, the difference between the standard rate 
taxpayers and the single taxpayers was more apparent. The former expanded from 
average yearly growth of 3,000 in 1982-87 to nearly 16,600 in 1987-91, but the latter 
descended from nearly 60,000 to over 17,500 respectively.
As a whole, the growing number of standard rate taxpayers seemingly imply 
that more and more individuals and families (mostly middle or lower-middle income 
groups) that were not liable to pay the standard tax rate before had to pay more tax 
then, especially in the period of 1987-91. Though one would argue that the 
expanding population of taxpayers was the result of the real growth of income, the 
fact remained that personal and related tax allowances were not growing at the same 
pace as the income and inflation rate. As shown in Table 4.14, Column G, only on 
three occasions (1981/2, 1982/3, and 1983/4) did the amounts of personal allowances 
(without additional allowance) catch up with the inflation rate.
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Government Contraction and the Collective Consumption Cleavage
Accompanying the growing extractive capacity of the Hong Kong Government 
was its expansive and exclusive role in providing most of the social and economic 
services. The growing government expenditure on social services programmes 
carried with it the redistributive effect. For example, the provision of free nine-year 
education could reduce parents’ financial burden and thus increase the share of bring- 
home money. The same logic would also apply to other fields of government 
provisions. For example, the public works projects of the transportation system could 
facilitate the internal movement of goods and services, and thus lowered the cost of 
economic activities. James O’Connor differentiated the former type of government 
provisions as social consumption, the latter as social investment.284 Manuel Castells 
termed the former as collective consumption.285 Patrick Dunleavy highlighted the 
difference between the collective and individualized forms of consumption in the 
following three "politically significant ways":
(a) Collective consumption in advanced capitalist societies is typically 
concerned with services provided by the state apparatus, . . .
(b) . . . individuals’ location in these consumption processes is no 
longer directly determined by market forces. . . .
(c) Collective consumption processes create an inter-subjective basis 
for the development of political action. . . .286
Following the above framework, this section will only deal with the collective 
consumption aspect of the expenditure as it was believed to be the fundamental factor 
in politicizing the grassroots since the mid-1980s in the context of Hong Kong.
284James O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis o f the State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1973), pp. 5-10.
285Manuel Castells, City, Class and Power (Hampshire: MacMillan, 1978), chap.
2 .
286Patrick Dunleavy, "The Urban Basis of Political Alignment: Social Class, 
Domestic Property Ownership, and State Intervention in Consumption Processes," 
British Journal o f Political Science 9 (1979):418.
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The spending capacity of the post-war Hong Kong Government witnessed a steady 
growth and at a rate faster than that of the GDP. We can see from Table 4.15 that 
there was an average of nearly 2% growth from 1967-73 to 1973-84 and 1984-92. 
Only in 1970, 1971, 1972, 1977 and 1989 did the ratio between actual expenditure 
and the GDP fall a little below 10%. The steady growth of the government 
expenditure appeared to be related to the expanding role of government in the 
collective consumption processes. As shown in Table 4.16, the aggregated social 
services expenditures were 41.5% in 1973-84, 44.5% in 1984-88 and 45.7% in 1988- 
92, with a overall average of 43.1% in the period of 1973-92. Only on 3 occasions 
(1973, 1974 and 1982) did the figure fall below 40% of the total actual expenditure. 
The components of the social services expenditure had all more or less experienced 
some sorts of growth, with higher growth rates in social welfare and housing.
Nearly 45% of the total social services expenditure took the form of 
subvention to the statutory or appropriate social institutions to deliver the social 
provisions concerned. As shown in Table 4.17, about one-fifth of the total 
expenditure was spent on the subvention of social services. Besides, there was a 
trend of growing proportion of subvention since the mid-1980s. The average 
percentage of social service subvention was 18.4% in 1973-84 and 21.6% in 1984-92. 
The financial year of 1991-92 reached the highest with more than one-fourth of the 
total expenditure being dispersed through subvention. A lion’s share (more than 
three-fourths) of the subvention was taken up by the heading under education which 
included subvention of the Universities and Polytechnic, and the Vocational Training 
Council. This picture was not completed because housing had not been included in 
the above-mentioned figures. Due to the lack of comparable data, the capital 
expenditure of public housing by the Government and the Housing Authority were 
used as an estimation of its share of subvention of the total actual expenditure. As 
shown in Table 4.18, the share was almost 10% in average in 1977-92. As a result, 
it was estimated that no less than one-third of the total expenditure was delivered 
through the statutory bodies or other social organisations.
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Although claiming not to be a welfare state, the Hong Kong Government, in 
fact, provided some basic social services which were indispensable to the stability and 
the economic development of Hong Kong, as well as to the betterment of the material 
life of the Hong Kong people. In other words, the Government had intervened in the 
private consumption process so as to provide a sector of population with some 
protection against the usual logic of market forces. In so doing, a favourable 
environment for investment and economic production would be maintained and 
enhanced. Having this strategic thinking in mind, the Hong Kong Government set 
the priority for intervention. Different from the Western experience of the welfare 
state, the prior target of intervention was the social services but not social security 
programmes.287
The Government intervention in the private consumption processes of medical 
care, housing and education had the effect of turning the original private goods and 
services into a public or collective ones. The direct effects of these measures were 
the stabilisation of wages and price systems, and the suppression of the inflation rate. 
In so doing, the pressure to ask for a salary increase from the workers would 
effectively lessen, and thus, part of their consumption could be insulated from the 
influence of the market. That means their living would be hit only slightly compared 
with others by the rising living standard and inflation rate, which usually prove to be 
the normal phenomenon of a rapid developing economy. As long as the Government 
could manage stable supply funding, the above-mentioned effects would be 
maintained. But the ups and downs of the economic growth rate or the financial 
stringency provoked by the competing programmes of spending, worked to erode the 
Government’s fiscal power. Consequently, budget-cutting or privatisation might be 
logical solutions.
287Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., The Development o f Welfare 
States in Europe and America (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Books, 1981).
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In explaining the trend of privatisation in Hong Kong, Anthony B.L. Cheung 
put forward the "government off-loading" thesis.288 This thesis regarded 
privatisation as a move the Hong Kong Government adopted in reaction to its growing 
incapabilities in the face of increasing Chinese intervention in the transitional period. 
Besides this political explanation, we would argue that the fiscal crisis resulting from 
the high reliance of government revenue on land sale and the constraint of use on 
such revenue by the Sino-British Joint Declaration, would be responsible for the 
privatisation drive.
The trend of privatisation is well reflected in the publication of a discussion 
paper entitled Public Sector Reform released by the Financial Branch of the Hong 
Kong Government in February 1989. The Government sought "a change in the 
attitude and approach to the spending of public money in order to improve efficiency 
and give a better service to the public . . .  by adapting and developing the structures 
and procedures that already exist".289 The paper proposed a pricing system on 
government services. As a result, some government services were classified as 
"support" or "commercial" services and subject to partial or full cost recovery.290
As mentioned before, the Hong Kong Government experienced the expected 
financial stringency caused by the designated use of the revenue from land sale and 
the slowing down of the growth of the GDP since the mid-1980s. The situation grew
288Anthony B.L. Cheung, "Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: Trends and 
Limitations," paper presented at the conference Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: 
Progress-To-Date and Future Directions, Hong Kong, 26 March 1991, pp. 12-14.
289Hong Kong Government Financial Branch, Public Sector Reform (1989), 
Preface; quoted in Anthony B.L. Cheung, "Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: 
Trends and Limitations," paper presented at the conference Public Sector Reform in 
Hong Kong: Progress-To-Date and Future Directions, Hong Kong, 26 March 1991,
p. 1.
290For a discussion on the pricing system, see Anthony B.L. Cheung, "Public 
Sector Reform in Hong Kong: Trends and Limitations," paper presented at the 
conference Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: Progress-To-Date and Future 
Directions, Hong Kong, 26 March 1991, pp. 8-10.
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worse when the Government committed itself to the expensive port and airport plan, 
the massive expansion of the education programme, and others in 1989.
As a result, one can easily distinguish a trend of privatisation of some 
collective consumption programmes. Housing, medical and health services, and 
education have, in one way or another, embarked on the road of privatisation since 
the mid-1980s. Among the list, housing appeared to be the most controversial one 
as housing might be regarded as more basic in the sense of its recurrent nature and 
the sums of money involved. It was reported that the household expenditure on 
housing ranged from 19% for the lowest income groups to 36.5% for the highest 
income groups in 1989-90 of their respective monthly income, and the average was 
25.6%.291 Furthermore, it was estimated that nearly half of the population were 
living in public housing estates. Given the scale and its importance in urban politics, 
we now turn to discuss the privatisation process of public housing.
The Housing Authority has been responsible solely for the provision of low- 
rented public housing since the launching of the Ten-Year Housing Programme in the 
early 1970s by the then Governor Murray MacLehose. Since then, more and more 
public housing estates have been constructed to house the low income families. 
Through the Public Works Department, public housing estates were constructed and 
then handed to the Housing Authority when finished. The cost of construction was 
largely shouldered by the Government through its general revenue account, but the 
Housing Authority had to pay the interest and amortisation of the capital expenditure 
to the Government as well as to take up all the management and maintenance cost. 
In fact, the Government had often absorbed the deficits when they were presented at 
the end of each financial year. Because of such special financial arrangements, the 
Housing Authority could manage to maintain the low rent policy. According to one 
study, it was estimated that the amounts of government subsidy which the public 
housing residents received was HK$840 million in 1976 and HK$6,528 million (in
291Census and Statistics Department (1992b), p. 141, Table 10.5.
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real terms) in 1981.292 The impact on the household’s consumption patterns was 
said to be "substantial" and estimated to increase; "on the average, housing 
consumption by 120 percent and non-housing consumption by 17 percent" with the 
welfare cost of about 25 percent in 1979.293 Rents in public housing had been very 
stable up to 1981. The respective rent per square metre for the former resettlement 
estates, the Housing Authority Blocks, and a tenement floor in the private market was 
HK$3.31, HK$6.14 and HK$18.84 in 1976; but the corresponding figures were 
HK$4.36, HK$6.6 and HK$55.9 in 1981.
The growing government expenditure and subsidy in social services would 
only be continued provided that the necessary revenue was in place. But the high 
economic growth rate in the 1970s slowed down in the 1980s and the future of Hong 
Kong was put into doubt as the 1997 question emerged in 1979. Thus, the fiscal 
condition of the Hong Kong Government also encountered the same problem of 
uncertainty. As mentioned before, the uncertainty about the political future in the 
early 1980s had plagued both the property market and land sales. A decrease in 
revenue from the land-related sources followed. Under such circumstances, the 
continuation of massive social services programmes was not possible. Furthermore, 
as mentioned before, the Hong Kong Government was restrained by the land 
arrangements stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration which came into effect 
in 1985.
Even before the reorganization of the Housing Authority in 1988 which made 
her a self-financed statutory body with Government capital investment, some 
measures of privatisation were already planned and put into practice.294 First of all,
292Li Si-ming and Yu Fu-lai, "The Redistributive Effects of Hong Kong’s Public 
Housing Programme, 1976-86," Urban Studies 13 (1990):249-60.
293Fu-lai Yu and Si-ming Li, "The Welfare Cost of Hong Kong’s Public Housing 
Programme," Urban Studies 22 (1985): 138-9.
294Hong Kong Government, A Review o f Public Housing Allocation Policies (Hong 
Kong: Government Printer, 1984); Hong Kong Government, Green Paper on Housing 
Subsidy to Tenants of Public Housing (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1985); Hong
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the rent policy underwent significant changes after the centralisation of housing 
management into the hands of the Housing Authority in 1973. Before that date, rents 
for Government Low-Cost Housing estates and resettlement estates were based on 
"historic costs".295 That means "rents were fixed by Government to cover land and 
building costs amortized over 40 years as well as management and maintenance 
costs."296 In 1973, rents for all public housing had to be reviewed biennially and 
no more than 10% increase could be allowed. In the early 1980s, rents were 
charged, on average, at 5-7% of the household income of the tenants. But in 1987, 
rents were fixed at no more than 15% of the median household income of the tenants, 
and the percentage soared to 18.5% for new buildings after 1992. In addition, the 
tenants in the redeveloped resettlement estates were liable to pay the new rents which 
were several times higher than before.
Second, the adoption of double-rent policy in 1987 for the tenants whose 
income exceeded twice the Waiting List Income Limit (the maximum income limit 
for applicants for public housing flats) and had already been living there for more 
than 10 years; they were subject to double rent. In its first year of application, 22% 
of the target tenants (N=41,000) were required to pay double rent. It is expected 
that more and more tenants will be required to pay double rent, because the revision 
of the Waiting List Income Limit does not match up with the inflation rate of that 
year. For example, the average growth rates of the Waiting List Income Limit were 
22.6% in 1982-84 and 7.3% in 1984-91 at current market price, but the respective 
inflation rate, in terms of the Consumer Price Index (A), is 7.8% and 8.8%.297
Kong Government, Report of the Committee on Housing Subsidy to Tenants o f Public 
Housing (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1986); Hong Kong Government, Report 
of the Working Party to Review Public Housing Rental Policy (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1986).
295J.C. Morris, "Administration and Finance of Public Housing," in Luke S.K. 
Wong, ed., Housing in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Heinemann, 1978), p. 69.
296Housing Authority Annual Report 1973-74:10.
297Census and Statistics Department (1992b), op. cit., p. 140, Table 10.3.
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Third, tenants and potential tenants of public housing have been offered 
favourable terms in purchasing flats from the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) and 
the Private Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS). These included the low interest rate, 
high mortgage limit (90% of the purchase price, and later up to 95%), long 
repayment period (15 years at first and later 20 years), no income limit and restriction 
of property ownership. Later on in 1988, an interest-free loan (the Home Purchase 
Loan Scheme) was introduced to help the tenants to purchase flats in the private 
sector with the condition that they have to evacuate from their public housing flats. 
Meanwhile, the prices for the HOS’s and PSPS’s flats have been pegged with the 
private market prices and usually at a discount of 30-40% of the latter. As the prices 
of private property skyrocketed, so did the HOS’s and PSPS’s flats.
The decision to undertake privatisation sparked off waves of tenants’ protests 
and thus, to a certain extent, helped to politicise the grassroots. According to one 
study, 169 cases of social conflicts (19.2% of the total, N=882) were of a housing 
nature during the period 1975-86, of which 36 cases were related to public housing 
rent.298 Regarding the modes of action, housing conflict stood out as the most 
"violent" one because it took the form of protest and mass rally more often than other 
social conflicts.299 This is very important to urban politics as the universal 
franchise had only just been introduced to the Hong Kong political system. The 
newly-born politicians have taken advantage of the privatisation issue (not only 
housing) and rallied considerable constituency support in the course of election 
campaigns. The details of the election appeals by the various political groups will be 
discussed in Chapter 6.
298Cheung and Louie (1991), op. cit., pp. 13-4, Tables 3 & 5.
299Ibid., p. 29, Table 19.
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Table 4.1
The Authorized Population of Cottage Resettlement Areas and 
Multi-storey Resettlement Estates, 1954-73
Year Cottage Multi-Storey
Resettlement Resettlement
Areas . Estates
1954 45906 8653
1955 58224 66598
1956 70393 105404
1957 73704 139797
1958 77546 158662
1959 81640 196958
1960 82482 246821
1961 87519 292371
1962 79656 373274
1963 73377 462582
1964 82899 544156
1965 74729 681134
1966 74702 770869
1967 72484 861213
1968 72986 967184
1969 68058 1030022
1970 57585 1077094
1971 55825 1100277
1972 50293 1154792
1973 49907 1183677
Source: Commissioner for Resettlement, A n n u a l D e p a r tm e n t
R e p o r t  1 9 7 2 - 7 3 , appendix 5.
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Table 4 .2
The Number of Central Government Secretaries and 
Departments 1969-90
Year Secretaries Departments
1969 10 39
1974 15 39
1980 16 42
1985 19 47
1990 21 55
♦Figures are including those which have the equivalent 
status in both the Government Secretariat and other 
Departments.
Sources:
1. For 1969, see G.C. Hamilton, G o vern m en t D e p a r tm e n t s  i n  
Hong Kong: 1 8 4 1 - 1 9 6 9 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 
1969);
2. For 1974 and after, see Government Secretariat, C i v i l  
a n d  M i s c e l l a n e o u s  L i s t ,  various years.
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Table 4.3
Changes in Composition of the Executive Council and the 
Legislative Council, 1947-91
ExCo LegCo
Year A B C D E F G
1947 6 6 8 7 _ _ -
1952 6 6 9 8 - - -
1964 6 6 12 13 - - -
1966 6 8 12 13 - - -
1972 6 8 14 15 - - -
1976 6 8 19 22 - - -
1977 6 8 20 24 - - -
1978 6 9 20 24 - - -
1980 6 9 22 26 - - -
1981 6 9 22 27 - - -
1983 6 11 18 29 - - -
1984 6 10 16 30 - - -
1985 6 8 10 22 12 12 -
1986 6 10 10 22 12 12 -
1987 5 9 10 22 12 12 -
1988 5 9 10 20 14 12 -
1989 5 10 10 20 14 12 -
1990 5 10 10 20 14 12 -
1991 5 9 3 18 21 - 18
A = ExCo Official Members (inclusive of ex-officio 
members)
B = ExCo Non-official (Appointed) Members 
C = LegCo Official Members (inclusive of ex-officio 
members)
D = LegCo Non-official (Appointed) Members 
E = LegCo Elected Members through Functional Constituency 
F = LegCo Elected Members through Electoral College 
G = LegCo Elected Members through Geographical 
Constituency
Source: Hong K ong A n n u a l R e p o r t , various years.
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Table 4 .4
The Composition of the Urban Council and the Regional 
Council, 1947-91
Year UrbCo RegCo
A B C D E F G H
1947 5 6 - - - - - -
1952 5 6 2 - - - - -
1953 5 6 4 - - - - -
1955 6 6 4 - - - - -
1956 6 8 8 - - - - -
1965 6 10 10 - - - - -
1973 - 12 12 - - - - -
1983 - 15 15 - - - - -
1985 - 15 15 - 12 - 9 3
1986 - 15 15 - 12 12 9 3
1989 - 15 15 10 12 12 9 3
1991 - 15 15 10 12 12 9 3
A = UrbCo Ex-officio Members 
B = UrbCo Appointed Members
C = UrbCo Elected Members through Geographical 
Const ituency 
D = UrbCo Representatives from District Boards 
E = RegCo Appointed Members
F = RegCo Elected Members through Geographical 
Constituency 
G = RegCo Representatives from District Boards 
H = RegCo Ex-officio Members (the Heung Yee Kuk)
Note: The number of UrbCo's ex-officio members are
inclusive of the Chairman before 1973. Since 1973, 
Chairman and Vice-chairman are elected among members.
Sources:
1. For 1956 and before, Colonial Secretariat, C i v i l  
S e r v i c e  L i s t ,  various years;
2. For 1965 and after, Hong Kong A nnu al R e p o r t , various 
years.
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Table 4 .5
The Composition of the District Boards, 1982-91
Year A B C D E F
1982 167 134 132 27 30 490
1985 - 132 237 27 30 426
1988 - 141 264 27 _ *
(30) *
432* 
(462)*
1991 - 140 274 27 - 441
* From 1 April 1989 to 31 March 1991, 30 Urban Council
members are no longer the District Boards' members.
A = Appointed Official Members 
B = Appointed Unofficial Members 
C = Elected Members 
D = Rural Committee Chairmen 
E = Urban Council Members 
F = Total
Source: supplied by the City and New Territories
Administration, Hong Kong Government on 22 July 1993.
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Table 4.6
The Number of Government Advisory Bodies, Selected Years
Year A B C D
1947 - - - 31
1948 - - - 43
1954 - - - 50
1957 - - - 60
1958 - - - 62
1970 71 34 17 122
1975 79 46 17 142
1977 89 49 16 154
1978 98 51 18 167
1980 103 62 19 184
1984 118 67 22 207
1985 120 68 22 210
1986 123 69 22 214
1987 128 72 27 227
1988 131 76 29 236
1989 136 76 28 240
1990 148 90 29 267
1991 158 91 28 277
A = Statutory Bodies
B = Permanent Non-Statutory Bodies with Official and 
Non-official Members 
C = Permanent Non-Statutory Bodies with Official 
Members Only 
D = Total Number of A, B and C
Sources:
1. For 1958 or before, Colonial Secretariat, C i v i l  
S e r v i c e  L i s t ,  various years;
2. For 1970 or after, Government Secretariat, C i v i l  
a n d  M i s c e l l a n e o u s  L i s t ,  various years.
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Table 4 .7
The Growth Rate of the Civil Servants (Actual Strength) by 
Selected Function Areas, Selected Years
Year A B C D
1963 6770 4636 2504 491
1964 7527 5006 3099 581
1965 8266 5217 3609 608
1967 9033 5478 4329 748
1968 9523 5447 4781 833
1969 9711 5586 4769 952
1971 10661 5596 5072 1254
1972 11103 5789 5269 1424
1973 11981 5784 5279 1573
1974 12605 5763 6180 1833
1975 13407 5829 6536 2087
1976 13956 5736 5789 2063
1977 14712 5548 5621 2159
1978 15314 5630 6046 2271
1979 15857 5715 6560 2560
1980 16421 5484 7200 2532
1981 17595 5661 8101 2676
1982 18977 6148 10373 2817
1983 20398 6760 11198 3073
1984 21884 6976 11364 3073
1985 23604 7062 11049 3139
1986 24500 7048 11065 3070
1987 25642 7193 11564 3247
1988 26587 7292 11943 3512
1989 26852 7354 12176 3751
1990 27888 7432 12554 3856
1991 28744 7396 12580 3883
Annual Growth 
Rate for: 
63-73 7.7 2.5 11.1 22.0
73-84 7.5 1.9 10.5 8.7
84-91 4.5 0.9 1.5 3.8
84-88 5.4 1.1 1.3 3.6
88-91 2.7 0.5 1.8 3.5
A = Health
B = Education
C = Housing
D = Social Welfare
E = Government Secretariat
F = Police, Fire, Custom and Excise, Immigration, and 
Correctional Service
G = Inland Revenue and Treasury
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Table 4.7 (Continued)
Year E F G TOTAL
1963 352 12000 686 52955
1964 375 13194 720 57809
1965 455 13805 775 60181
1967 768 16660 936 69150
1968 778 17225 1039 72936
1969 645 17990 1157 75444
1971 967 19240 1541 81438
1972 1146 19229 1708 84495
1973 1024 20106 1761 89941
1974 1254 21283 1890 95284
1975 1035 25039 1980 104291
1976 1245 25758 2152 104157
1977 1386 28109 2294 108385
1978 1532 31007 2401 115674
1979 1689 32887 2748 122838
1980 1875 35374 2956 129217
1981 1808 37299 3429 139252
1982 2462 40157 3875 154034
1983 2605 47154 3995 166569
1984 2429 49282 4003 170051
1985 2818 50536 4039 172641
1986 2847 51696 4087 174946
1987 3057 53033 4201 179053
1988 3275 54293 4371 182843
1989 3507 55710 4272 186054
1990 3255 56323 4184 188393
1991 3318 56041 4325 190448
Annual Growth 
Rate For:
63-73 19.1 6.8 15.7 7.0
73-84 12.5 13 .2 11.6 8.1
84-91 5.2 2.0 1.1 1.7
84-88 8.7 2.5 2.3 1.9
88-91 0.4 1.1 -0.4 1.4
Notes:
1. Redistributive agencies = A, B, C, D
2. Policy planning = E
3. Law enforcement agencies = F
4. Extractive agencies = G
Sources: compiled from Government Secretariat, Civil
Service Branch, C i v i l  S e r v i c e  P e r s o n n e l  S t a t i s t i c s , and 
Colonial Secretariat, Establishment Branch, P e r s o n n e l  
S t a t i s t i c s , various years; figures are as April for 1975- 
91; as January for 1963-74.
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Table 4.8
The Actual Revenue and Expenditure of Hong Kong, 1947-92
Year Revenue Expenditure Balance
(HK$M) (%) (HK$M) (%) (HK$M)
1947 82.1 _ 85.6 - -3.5
1948 164.3 100.1 127.7 49.2 36.6
1949 194.9 18.6 160.0 25.3 34.9
1950 264.3 35.6 182.1 13 .8 82 .2
1951 291.7 10 .4 251.7 38.2 40.0
1952 308.6 5.8 275.9 9.6 32.7
1953 484.6 57.0 411.8 49.3 72.8
1954 396.9 -18.1 355.4 -13 .7 41.5
1955 434.5 9.5 373 .3 5.0 61.2
1956 454.7 4.6 402.5 7.8 52 .2
1957 509.7 12.1 469.5 16.6 40.2
1958 584.2 14.6 532.7 13 .5 51.5
1959 629.3 7.7 590.0 10.8 39.3
1960 664.6 5.6 710.0 20.3 -45 .4
1961 859.2 29.3 845.3 19.1 13.9
1962 1030.5 19.9 953 .2 12.8 77.3
1963 1253.1 21.6 1113.3 16.8 139.8
1964 1393.9 11.2 1295 .4 16 .4 98 .5
1965 1518.3 8.9 1440 .5 11.2 77. 8
1966 1631.7 7.5 1769.1 22.8 -137.4
1967 1817.8 11.4 1806.1 2.1 11.7
1968 1899.5 4.5 1766.0 -2.2 133.5
1969 2081.1 9.6 1873.0 6.1 208.1
1970 2480.7 19.2 2032 .2 8.5 448.5
1971 3070.9 23 .8 2452 .2 20.7 618.7
1972 3541.3 15.3 2901.4 18.3 639.9
1973 4936.3 39.4 4299.6 48.2 636.7
1974 5240.8 6.2 5169.2 20.2 71.6
1975 5875.3 12.1 6255.2 21.0 -379.9
1976 6519.3 11.0 6032.2 -3.6 487.1
1977 6898.5 5.8 6590.9 9.3 307.6
1978 9534.5 38.2 8996.9 36.5 537.6
1979 11766.0 23 .4 11090.1 23 .3 675.9
1980 15905.6 35.2 13872 .3 25.1 2033 .3
1981 29124 .3 83 .1 23593 .5 70.1 5530.8
1982 32916.2 13.0 27778.2 17.7 5138.0
1983 31097.6 -5.5 34597.8 24.6 -3500.2
1984 30399.7 -2.2 33393 .1 -3.5 -2993.4
1985 36342.5 19.5 36901.8 10.5 -559.3
1986 41241.0 13 .5 39798.2 7.8 1442 . 8
1987 43869.6 6.4 39927.7 0.3 3941.9
1988 55641.4 26.8 44022.0 10.3 11619.4
1989 65780.6 18.2 48952.6 11.2 16828.0
1990 74365.2 13 .1 69661.6 42 .3 4703.6
1991 82674.5 11.2 82837.2 18.9 -162.7
1992 101456.4 22.7 93401.1 12.8 8055.3
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TOTAL NET BALANCE 57280.6
Annual Growth
Rate For:
1947-92 18.6 17.8
1947-67 18 . 7 17.3
1967-73 17.6 14.5
1973-84 21.6 24 .1
1984-92 14 .4 12.3
Note: The actual revenue and expenditure may be a bit
different from those of the Reports due to the rounding of 
each item of revenue and expenditure.
Sources:
1. For 1975-1992, A n n u a l R e p o r t  o f  t h e  D i r e c t o r  o f  
A c c o u n t i n g  S e r v i c e s , various years;
2. For 1947-1974, A n n u a l R e p o r t  o f  t h e  A c c o u n t i n g  
G e n e r a l, various years.
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Table 4.9
Total Actual Revenue and the GDP, 1966-92
Year Revenue
(HK$
GDP
million)
REV/GDP
(%)
1966 1631.7 13718 11.9
1967 1817.8 14817 12.3
1968 1899.5 15758 12.1
1969 2081.1 18520 11.2
1970 2480.7 22040 11.3
1971 3070.9 25384 12.1
1972 3541.3 30638 11.6
1973 4936.3 38483 12 .8
1974 5240.8 45066 11.6
1975 5875.3 47086 12 .5
1976 6519.3 60173 10.8
1977 6898.5 69683 9.9
1978 9534.5 81623 11.7
1979 11766 . 0 107545 10.9
1980 15905.6 136775 11.6
1981 29124 .3 164762 17.7
1982 32916.2 185728 17.7
1983 31097.6 206217 15.1
1984 30399.7 247933 12 .3
1985 36342.5 261070 13 .9
1986 41241.0 298515 13.8
1987 43869.6 367603 11.9
1988 55641.4 433657 12.8
1989 65780.6 499157 13 .2
1990 74365.2 558859 13 .3
1991 82674.5 641136 12.9
1992 101456.4 742582* 13 .7
Annual Growth
Rate For:
1966- 92 12 .7
1967- 73 11.9
1973- 84 12.9
1984- 92 13 .1
* Provisional figure.
Sources:
1. For the revenue, A nnu al R e p o r t  o f  t h e  D i r e c t o r  o f  
A c c o u n t i n g  S e r v i c e s  (1975-1992), and A n n u a l  
R e p o r t  o f  t h e  A c c o u n t a n t  G e n e r a l (1947-74) , 
various years;
2. For the GDP, Census and Statistics Department, 
E s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  G r o s s  D o m e s t i c  P r o d u c t  1 9 6 6 - 9 2  
(Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1993).
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Table 4.10
The Main Components of Actual Revenue, 1947-92 
(in percentage)
Year A B C D E
1947 0.2 3.0 8.3 11.5 14 . 8
1948 5.5 2.2 6.1 13.8 23.6
1949 3.0 2.7 7.7 13 .4 36.2
1950 1.8 2.9 7.3 12.0 27.5
1951 2.0 4.5 9.3 15.8 29.3
1952 1.5 5.5 9.7 16.7 32.4
1953 1.1 3.9 7.0 12.0 33.3
1954 1.5 5.7 9.5 16.7 40.4
1955 2.7 5.8 9.1 17.7 38.7
1956 3.0 6.9 10.9 20.9 33.9
1957 2.9 7.3 11.1 21.4 32 .3
1958 4.5 7.3 11.2 22.9 31.6
1959 4.9 7.9 11.9 24.7 31.0
1960 3.4 7.7 12.8 23.9 29.1
1961 7.3 7.2 11.7 26 .2 27.6
1962 8.8 6.9 11.3 27.0 31.0
1963 16.6 7.0 10.3 33 .8 27.8
1964 14 . 0 7.7 10.4 32.1 30.0
1965 8.8 8.3 11.0 28.1 32 .4
1966 4.5 9.8 13 .7 28.0 32 .3
1967 2.7 8.7 13 .6 25.0 33.3
1968 2.2 9.0 14 .8 26.0 33 .1
1969 1.9 9.3 14.3 25.5 33 .8
1970 4.9 9.5 12 .7 27.1 33 . 7
1971 8.8 9.4 10 . 9 29.2 34.1
1972 7.6 10.1 10 .4 28.0 36.9
1973 13.6 8.5 7.9 29.9 ' 39.2
1974 6.1 7.7 7.0 20.8 43 .3
1975 4 . 9 8.2 6.9 20.1 44 .3
1976 5.3 6.3 8.2 19.8 44 .4
1977 8.1 4.7 9.0 21.7 51.4
1978 19.2 3.9 7.6 30.7 45 . 9
1979 17.1 5.3 6.9 29.2 47.6
1980 17.9 8.4 5.6 31.9 . 48 . 0
1981 37.0 8.0 3.4 48.4 38 .6
1982 29.4 11.1 3.2 43.6 43 .2
1983 16.2 9.5 2.2 28.0 47.6
1984 7.5 8.7 3.8 19.9 49.0
1985 11.7 6.6 3.4 21.7 49.2
1986 9.4 4.0 4.3 17.7 53 .8
1987 1.7 4.1 2.7 8.5 59.6
1988 0.8 3.8 2.5 7.1 62.9
1989 0.6 8.3 2.3 11.2 61.6
1990 0.3 9.8 2.2 12.3 61.3
1991 0.3 7.1 3.7 11.0 60.6
1992 0.4 4.5 3.4 8.3 63.0
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Annual Growth 
Rate For:
1950-91 7.7 7.2 8.3 23 .2 40.4
1950-73 5.5 7.4 11.0 23 .8 32.7
1973-84 15 .2 7.5 6.0 28.7 45 .2
1984-91 4.0 6.5 3.1 13 .7 57.3
1984-88 6.2 5.4 3.3 15.0 54 . 9
1988-91 0.5 7.3 2.7 10 .4 61.6
A = % of Land Sale
B = % of Land, Rents, Property and Investment
C = % of Rates.
D = % of Total Land Revenue (exclusive of property
tax and estate duty).
E = % of Internal (Inland) Revenue.
Sources: A n n u a l R e p o r t  o f  t h e  A c c o u n t a n t  G e n e r a l , and
A n n u a l R e p o r t  o f  t h e  D i r e c t o r  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  S e r v i c e s ,  
various years.
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Table 4.11
Capital Works Reserve Fund (Works Account) and the Actual 
Revenue, 1985-92 (HK$ million)
Year
Capital Works 
Reserve Fund 
(Works Account)
Actual
Revenue %
1986 586 .4 41241.0 1.4
1987 2330.9 43869.6 5.3
1988 3513 .4 55641.4 6.3
1989 6393.0 65780.6 9.7
1990 7457.8 74365.2 10 . 0
1991 4002.5 82674.5 4.8
1992 9074 .4 101456.4 8 . 9
TOTAL 33358 .4 465028.7
AVERAGE 6.7
Sources: Census and Statistics Department, Hong K ong A nnu al  
D i g e s t  o f  S t a t i s t i c s , 1992 Edition, p. 119; and A nnu al
R e p o r t  o f  t h e  D i r e c t o r  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  S e r v i c e s , various 
years.
176
Table 4.12
Selected Components of the Inland Revenue, 1958-91 
(in percentage)
Year A B C D
1958 8.1 14 .1 19.1 39.3
1959 7.0 12.2 14.3 44 .4
1960 7.5 14 .5 13.8 43.6
1961 8.1 16.7 12 .2 45.1
1962 7.4 17.7 17.2 40.4
1963 7.9 15.8 17.1 40.9
1964 8.1 15.5 15.1 43.6
1965 7.8 15.8 13.8 45.8
1966 8.8 12 .1 14 . 7 46.9
1967 9.6 10.7 14 .3 47.2
1968 12.3 8.2 13.9 47.2
1969 12.8 10.0 11.5 47.5
1970 12.4 11.8 9.9 48.9
1971 12.2 12 . 6 9.3 50.1
1972 12.7 16.9 8.2 48.6
1973 9.5 36.9 6.5 38.1
1974 12 .5 20 .4 8.4 50 . 9
1975 15.9 11.6 7.3 54 .2
1976 16.1 13 .2 7.3 51.5
1977 16.8 12.1 9.5 48.3
1978 17.1 11.2 8.1 50.3
1979 18.1 13.6 6.5 47.3
1980 16.7 12.2 6.5 50.2
1981 13 .3 18.3 5.2 48.9
1982 11.9 15.2 7.6 48.5
1983 15.9 9.4 7.4 52.9
1984 23 .0 7.4 6.2 47.0
1985 23 .7 6.6 6.6 47.5
1986 24 . 8 7.8 5.0 46.8
1987 25.5 11.9 5.5 42 .2
1988 22.8 15.2 4.0 44.7
1989 21.4 12.8 3.3 48.6
1990 23 .2 12.1 3.2 47.1
1991 26.4 12.0 3.6 42.8
Annual Growth 
Rate For:
1958-91 14.6 13 .7 9.5 46.7
1958-73 9.5 15.1 13.2 44 . 9
1973-84 15.6 15.1 7.2 49.0
1984-91 23 .8 10.7 4.7 45.8
1984-88 24.0 9.8 5.5 45.6
1988-91 23 .4 13.0 3.5 45.8
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A = Salaries Tax 
B = Stamp Duty
C = Property Tax and Estate Duty 
D = Profits Tax (Corporations and
Businesses)
Unincorporated
Source: Commissioner of Inland Revenue, A n n u al D e p a r tm e n t a l  
R e p o r t , various years.
Table 4.13
Some Statistics of Salaries Tax, Selected Years
Year Standard 
Rate Taxpayers
Number
Share of 
Final Tax
1982 18606 (54.2%)
1987 33771 (45.5%)
1991 100170 (55.0%)
Single
Taxpayers
Total Number 
of Taxpayers
Number
Share of 
Final Tax
147730 (12.7%)
447360 (19.5%)
517524 (18.1%)
255579
686928
1070022
Annual Growth 
For:
1982-91 9062.7
1982-87 3033.0
1987-91 16599.8
41088.2
59926.0
17541.0
90493 .7 
86269.8 
95773 .5
Source: Commissioner of Inland Revenue, A n n u a l D e p a r t m e n t a l  
R e p o r t , various years.
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Table 4.14
Personal Allowances and Inflations, 1973/74-1991/2
Year A B C D
1973/4 10 000 - - 10 000 18.2
1974/5 10 000 - - 10 000 14 .4
1975/6 10 000 - - 10 000 1.2
1976/7 10 000 - - 10 000 3.4
1977/8 10 000 (2,500) 15 10 000 5.8
1978/9 10 000 (2,500) 15 10 000 5.9
1979/80 10 000 (2,500) 10 10 000 11.6
1980/1 12 500 (2,500) 0 15 000 15.5
1981/2 15 000 (7,500) 0 22 500 15 .4
1982/3 20 500 (7,500) 0 28 000 10.5
1983/4 20 500 (7,500) 0 28 000 9.9
1984/5 20 500 (7,500) 0 28 000 8.1
1985/6 20 500 (7,500) 0 28 000 3.2
1986/7 20 500 (8,500) 0 29 000 2.8
1987/8 29 000 (5,000) 10 29 000 5.5
1988/9 29 000 (7,000) 10 29 000 7.5
1989/90 32 000 (7,000) 10 32 000 10.1
1990/1 32 000 (7,000) 0 39 000 9.8
1991/2 34 000 (7,000) 0 41 000 12 . 0
1992/3 39 000 (7,000) 0 46 000
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Table 4.14 (continued)
Year E F G
1973/4 - - -
1974/5 11,820 1, 820 1 820
1975/6 13,522 3,522 3 522
1976/7 13,684 3,684 3 684
1977/8 14,149 1, 649 4 149
1978/9 14,970 2,470 4 970
1979/80 15,853 3,353 5 853
1980/1 17,692 2, 692 2 692
1981/2 20,435 -2,065 -2 065
1982/3 23,582 -4,418 -4 418
1983/4 26,058 -1,942 -1 942
1984/5 28,637 637 637
1985/6 30,957 2,957 2 957
1986/7 31,947 2, 947 2 947
1987/8 32,842 -1,158 3 842
1988/9 34,648 -1,352 5 648
1989/90 37,247 -1,753 5 247
1990/1 41,009 2, 009 2 009
1991/2 45,028 4, 028 4 028
1992/3 50,431 4,431 4 431
A = Personal Allowances with Additional Allowance 
Bracket
in
B = Percentage that Additional Allowance Subject 
Clawback
to
C = Personal Allowances
D = Inflation Rates
E = Amounts of the Sum of Personal Allowances X (1 
Annual Inflation Rate)
+
F = E minus A
G = E minus C
Source: Tang Shu-hung, The P u b l i c  F in a n c e  o f  Hong Kong i n  
t h e  L a t e - T r a n s i t i o n a l  P e r i o d  (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 
1992), pp. 58-59. (in Chinese)
181
Table 4.15
The Actual Expenditure and the GDP, 1966-92
Year Expenditure GDP 
(HK$ million)
Exp/GDP
(%)
1966 1769.1 13718 12.9
1967 1806.1 14817 12 .2
1968 1766.0 15758 11.2
1969 1873.0 18520 10.1
1970 2032.2 22040 9.2
1971 2452.2 25384 9.7
1972 2901.4 30638 9.5
1973 4299.6 38483 11.2
1974 5169.2 45066 11.5
1975 6255.2 47086 13 .3
1976 6032 .2 60173 10.0
1977 6590.9 69683 9.5
1978 8996.9 81623 11.0
1979 11090.1 107545 10.3
1980 13872.3 136775 10.1
1981 23593.5 164762 14 .3
1982 27778.2 185728 15.0
1983 34597.8 206217 16.8
1984 33393.1 247933 13.5
1985 36901.8 261070 14 .1
1986 39798.2 298515 13 .3
1987 39927.7 367603 10.9
1988 44022.0 433657 10.2
1989 48952.6 499157 9.8
1990 69661.6 558859 12.5
1991 82837.2 641136 12.9
1992 93401.1 742582 12 .6
Annual Growth Rate For:
1966- 92 11.8
1967- 73 10 .4
1973- 84 12 .2
1984- 92 12 .2
Note: for GDP only, 1991's estimates are subject to
revision; 1992 are preliminary estimates.
Sources:
1. For GDP, Census and Statistics Department, 
E s t i m a t e s  o f  G r o s s  D o m e s t i c  P r o d u c t  1 9 6 6  t o  1992',
2. For expenditure, A n n u a l R e p o r t  o f  t h e  A c c o u n t i n g  
G e n e r a l , and A n n u a l R e p o r t  o f  t h e  D i r e c t o r  o f  
A c c o u n t i n g  S e r v i c e s , various years.
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Table 4.16
Consolidated Account Expenditure by Selected Functions, 
1971-92 (in percentage)
Year
Social
Welfare Health
Educa­
tion Housing Labour
Total
Social
Services
1971 1.6 10.1 20.4 8.4 0.3 40.8
1972 2.0 10.3 20.2 7.4 0.3 40.2
1973 2.3 9.8 18.3 6.4 0.3 37.1
1974 3.0 9.0 20.0 6.7 0.3 39.0
1975 4.1 8.4 17.4 10.1 0.2 40.2
1976 5.5 8.5 19.6 10.1 0.3 44.0
1977 5.0 8.8 19.5 8.4 0.3 42.0
1978 4.4 8.2 18.0 11.2 0.3 42.1
1979 4.5 7.9 16.2 14 .2 0.3 43.1
1980 4.6 7.9 15.9 15.6 0.2 44 .2
1981 4.0 7.6 15.3 16 . 8 0.4 44.1
1982 4.2 7.3 14 .2 13 .3 0.3 39.3
1983 4.8 7.4 14.3 13 . 8 0.3 40.6
1984 5.0 7.7 14.9 14.5 0.3 42.4
1985 5.6 8.3 17.4 13 .3 0.3 44 . 9
1986 5.7 8.7 17.4 12 .7 0.3 44 . 8
1987 5.8 9.1 17.5 12.1 0.3 44.8,
1988 5.9 9.3 17.1 13 .1 - 45.4
1989 5.9 8.8 17.5 15.1 - 47.3
1990 5.8 8.9 15 . 9 14.1 - 44 . 7
1991 6.1 9.8 16.9 13 . 0 - 45.8
1992 6.4 10 . 0 17.4 11.6 - 45.4
Annual Growth 
Rate For: 
1973-92 4.9 8.6 17.0 12 .3 0.2 43.1
1973-84 4.3 8.2 17.0 11.8 0.3 41.5
1984-92 5.8 9.0 16.9 13 .3 - 45.1
1984-88 5.6 8.6 16.9 13 .1 - 44.5
1988-92 6.0 9.4 17.0 13 .4 “ 45.7
Source: The B u d g e t :  S p e e c h  b y  t h e  F i n a n c i a l  S e c r e t a r y ,
various years; figures for the period 1971-80 are adjusted 
by the Government.
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Table 4.17
Subventions of Selected Social Service Programmes 
(Recurrent and Capital Expenditure)
Year A B 
(HK$ million)
C
1973 719 4299.6 16.7
1974 1001 5169.2 19.4
1975 1173 6255.2 18.8
1976 1303 6032 .2 21.6
1977 1449 6590.9 22.0
1978 1711 8996.9 19.0
1979 2044 11090.1 18 .4
1980 2584 13872.3 18.6
1981 3596 23593.5 15.2
1982 4361 27778.2 15.7
1983 5627 33060.2 17.0
1984 6382 35346.3 18.1
1985 7679 36086.9 21.3
1986 8556 40845.1 20.9
1987 9858 42703.7 23.1
1988 10957 48375.1 22.6
1989 12113 56592.1 21.4
1990 14432 71366.5 20.2
1991 18116 85556.7 21.2
1992 23598 92191.4 25.6
Annual Growth 
Rate For: 
1973-92 19.8
1973- 84 18 .4
1984- 92 21.6
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Table 4.17 (continued)
Year D
(HK$
E
million)
F G
1973 550.3 110.1 12.8 2.6
1974 795.9 134.1 15.4 2.6
1975 909.4 168.9 14.5 2.7
1976 1030.7 167.0 17.1 2.8
1977 1138.7 187.2 17.3 2.8
1978 1313.7 239.8 14.6 2.7
1979 1575.2 283 .7 14 .2 2.6
1980 2007.9 341.4 14 .5 2.5
1981 2780.4 476.3 11.8 2.0
1982 3275.1 629.3 11.8 2.3
1983 4255.2 793.0 12 . 9 2.4
1984 4796.2 912.3 13.6 2.6
1985 5845.3 1004.1 16 .2 2.8
1986 6492.5 1103.8 15.9 2.7
1987 7544.9 1268.1 17.7 3.0
1988 8294 .8 1425.3 17.1 2.9
1989 8997.2 1521.7 15.9 2.7
1990 10534.9 1812.7 14.8 2.5
1991 13013 . 0 2296.5 15.2 2.7
1992 15041.4 5593.8 16.3 6.1
Annual Growth 
Rate For: 
1973-92 15.0 2.8
1973- 84 14 .2 2.5
1984- 92 15.9 3.1
A = Total Subvention
B = Total (Gross) Expenditure & Equity Investment 
C = % of A/B;
D = Total Education Subvention 
E = Medical Subvention 
F = % of D/B
G = % of E/B
Notes: Total Education Subvention = the total amounts under 
the headings of Education, University and Polytechnic, and 
Vocational Training Council.
Sources: Census and Statistics Department, Hong K ong A n n u al  
D i g e s t  o f  S t a t i s t i c s ,  1983 Edition, p. Ill, Table 8.3 and 
1992 Edition, p. 120, Table 8.3.
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Table 4.18
Capital Expenditure of Public Housing and Total Actual 
Expenditure, 1977-92 (HK$ million)
Year A B %
1977 240.0 6590.9 3.6
1978 483 . 0 8996.9 5.4
1979 1175.5 11090.1 10.6
1980 1797.2 13872 .3 13.0
1981 2982.8 23593.5 12 .6
1982 3460.3 27778.2 12.5
1983 3602.6 34597.8 10 .4
1984 3459.6 33393 .1 10.4
1985 3117.0 36901.8 8.4
1986 3187.4 39798 .2 8.0
1987 3514.9 39927.7 8.8
1988 4598.2 44022 . 0 10.4
1989 5839.3 48952.6 11.9
1990 7223 .4 69661.6 10.4
1991 7642 .4 82837.2 9.2
1992 7411.5 93401.1 7.9
Annual Growth
Rate For:
1977- 92 9.6
1977- 84 9.8
1984- 88 9.2
1989- 92 9.9
A = Government's and Housing Authority's Capital 
Expenditure on Public Housing 
B = the Total Actual Expenditure
Sources: calculated from t h e  H o u s in g  A u t h o r i t y  A n n u al
R e p o r t , various years; and A nnu al R e p o r t  o f  t h e  A c c o u n t a n t  
G e n e r a l , and A n n u a l R e p o r t  o f  D i r e c t o r  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  
S e r v i c e s , various years.
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CHAPTER V
THE DEVELOPMENT AND ALIGNMENT OF 
POLITICAL FORCES
This chapter examines the development and nature of various political forces 
and their alignment and realignment since the 1970s so as to understand the 
orientation of political groups emerging in the early 1990s and their respective 
positioning in the budding party market in the 1991 LegCo direct elections. First of 
all, the background prior to the period under study will be examined so as to put the 
subsequent development of political groups into context. Second, the emergence of 
pressure groups in the 1970s will be analyzed against the rapidly changing socio­
economic developments. Third, the alignment of political forces and the rise of 
electoral parties by stages resulting from the political reforms in the 1980s will be 
studied. Fourth, the budding party system just before the 1991 elections will be 
charted.
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Political Groups Before the 1970s
Two kinds of political groups could be differentiated during the period from 
the end of the Second World War to the early 1970s. One was the exogenous, 
ideological political parties of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). The other was the endogenous, electoral-oriented political groups of 
the Reform Club of Hong Kong (RCHK) established in 1949 and the Hong Kong 
Civic Association (HKCA) formed in 1954. Basically, these two kinds of political 
groups differed in their priority political concerns. The first two were mostly 
concerned with Chinese national politics, while the last two mostly concentrated on 
Hong Kong local politics. Needless to say, their influence on Hong Kong would not 
be the same as the KMT and the CCP, which have, at one time or another, been the 
ruling parties of China; while the RCHK and the HKCA had only managed to have 
several of their members sitting in the local Councils.
The Kuomintang and The Chinese Communist Party
The presence of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in Hong Kong has long been considered a sensitive issue. If both of these two 
parties adopted a high profile attitude toward Hong Kong affairs, the British-Hong 
Kong Government would find it very hard to govern. Thus, the Hong Kong 
Government wanted to avoid the presence of two power centres at one time within 
Hong Kong. Because of such considerations, the KMT and the CCP were not 
allowed to have open and legal existences in the territory, except for the former in 
the brief period of 1945-1949.
On the contrary, the KMT and the CCP have used Hong Kong as a stepping 
stone to support their respective activities on mainland China or on Taiwan and they 
seldom showed keen interest in local politics. Thus, the presence of these two parties
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may not be regarded as a "direct challenge" to the British-Hong Kong Government, 
but rather a "potential threat". Given the overwhelming population of Chinese, the 
British-Hong Kong Government would feel a great security pressure as these two 
parties could easily mobilize the Hong Kong Chinese to drive away the alien British- 
Hong Kong Government. In addition, the rivalry between these two parties within 
the territory would give rise to serious internal security problems.300 This was 
especially the case in the early 1950s when the retreated Nationalist Army organized 
subversive activities against the newly established CCP’s regime from within Hong 
Kong, and when conflict between the core supporters of these two parties broke out 
in 1956. Furthermore, the rivalry of these two parties had indeed entailed diplomatic 
embarrassment for the British and Hong Kong Governments. For example, the 
handling of an aeroplane explosion by the British-Hong Kong Government in 1955 
had been criticised fiercely by the Communists; in this case a bomb was planted by 
KMT agents on a plane which Mr Zhou Enlai, the then Chinese Prime Minister, was 
supposed to be using.301
The victory over Japan in the Second World War was accompanied by the 
rising influence and prestige of the KMT in the territory. Many of the mass media, 
labour unions, local schools and Chinese community organizations came under the 
influence of the KMT. But the KMT’s membership did not match with her rising 
status. In 1947, a drive to recruit 50,000 members was kicked off but subsequently 
only attracted 8,000 to 10,000 to join.302 By the late 1940s the influence of the 
KMT was declining rapidly as the CCP marched to win the Chinese civil war.
300Steve Tsang Yui-sang, Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts 
at Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1945-1952 (Hong Kong: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), pp. 136-138.
301For the CCP’s view on the issue, see Huang Wenfang, "My Forty-Two Years
of Life and Works in the New China News Agency’s Hong Kong Branch" Eastweek 
91 (20 July 1994): 161-164. (series and in Chinese)
302Tsang (1988), op. cit., p. 52.
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Nevertheless, the KMT maintained a certain level of support up to the early 
1970s, because the population at that period comprised mostly refugees and the first 
generation in Hong Kong, who tended to have negative feelings toward the 
Communist Chinese Government and a more accommodative attitude toward the 
Nationalist Government in Taiwan. Against this background, many schools, 
"kaifong" associations and local community organisations were dominated by these 
people. During the 1967 riots, the KMT’s supporters (the rightists303) helped the 
British-Hong Kong Government to counteract the advance of the leftists by providing 
protection to those workers who opted not to take part in the local CCP’s inspired 
strikes. However, the influence of the rightists declined thereafter. The aging of the 
leadership, the emergence of the local-born Hong Kong Chinese, and the diplomatic 
breakthrough by Communist China (which joined the United Nations in 197 / and 
established full diplomatic ties with the United States in 1979) contributed to the 
decline of KMT influence.
Before 1949, the chief task of the CCP in Hong Kong was, more or less, the 
same as that of the KMT after 1949, which was "to support their struggle for power 
in China without overtly breaking the laws of the colony."304 Like the KMT, the 
CCP did not involve herself deeply in local politics and has been described as 
adopting an appeasement policy toward the Hong Kong Government before 1949. 
After becoming the governing party in China in 1949, the CCP’s activities in Hong 
Kong were still very low-key, though there was a propaganda campaign against the 
British-Hong Kong Government in early 1952.305 Although there were still other 
conflicts between Britain and Mainland China in this period, no significant 
mobilization of national feeling against the Colonial Government by the CCP was 
recorded. This can be attributed to the pragmatic CCP’s policy which allowed the
303The term "rightists" is used, throughout this thesis, to denote those people or
organisations that are affiliated with the Kuomintang (KMT) or its related 
organisations, and also those who are the supporters of the KMT.
m Ibid., p. 85.
305bid., pp. 175-182.
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status of Hong Kong to remain as it was. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the basic 
policy toward Hong Kong has been "Make long-term plan, utilise to the full." 
Besides, the CCP also appeared to adopt a low profile in recruiting members in Hong 
Kong and was estimated to have only 5,000 members in Hong Kong in the early 
1990s.306
Nevertheless, this policy had come under challenge in the mid-1960s when the 
Cultural Revolution in China spilled over into Hong Kong leading to a series of riots 
and bomb attacks. After the 1967 riots, the CCP suffered from the loss of support 
from her "compatriots" in Hong Kong and the uncovering of the underground 
network there.307 The drastic drop in the readership of the CCP- and PRC- 
sponsored "patriotic" newspapers could be used to illustrate their unpopularity in 
Hong Kong after the 1967 riots. According to Mr Kam Yiu-yu, the former NCNA’s 
party secretary for the press front and editor-in-chief of the communist Wei Wen Pao, 
the total sales of the six "patriotic" newspapers amounted to about 500,000 and 
occupied half of the market before the 1967 riots, but declined significantly 
afterwards. He indicated that the total sales of three of these "patriotic" newspapers 
had dropped from around 120,000 to 10-20,000 after the 1967 riots.308 It would 
take several decades to remedy the wounds the 1967 riots had done to the Hong Kong 
people.
306Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1993-94 (Washington: 
Brassey’s, [1993]), p. 150.
307Xu Jiatun, Xu Jiatun’s Hong Kong Memoirs (Hong Kong: Hong Kong United 
Daily News, 1993), pp. 144-145.
308Kam Yiu-yu, "The Memoirs of Kam Yiu-yu: The History of the Ebb and Flow 
of the Chinese-side Newspapers in Hong Kong," Contemporary Monthly 19 
(1992):88. (in Chinese)
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The Reform Club and the Civic Association
During the period from 1950 until 1982, there were two prominent political 
groups participating in the electoral contest for the UrbCo elected seats: the RCHK 
and the HKCA. A lion’s share of the candidates in the pre-1982 UrbCo election was 
fielded by these two traditional political groups. According to one study, the two 
political groups had put up 33 of the 37 successful candidates between 1955 and 
1967.309
Regarding the membership of these two groups, the Reform Club claimed to 
have over 40,000 in 1974 and the Civic Association was quoted to have about 10,000 
in 1973.310 These groups had managed to attract citizens to join, especially the 
RCHK. Mr Brook Bemacchi, the RCHK’s chairman, had revealed that his club had 
35,000 members in 1969, of which 11,000 were workers, 7,700 hawkers, 7,400 
businessmen, 3,200 fishermen, 3,100 farmers and 1,200 drivers.311 Unfortunately, 
not all their members were entitled to vote because of the restricted franchise. Thus, 
it is interesting to note that the numbers of voters in each of the UrbCo elections in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s only amounted to around 10,000.
In response to the plea made by the then Governor, Sir Mark Young, to carry 
out political reforms in the late 1940s, the RCHK was formed mainly by a group of 
British and Chinese professionals aiming at pushing for a quicker pace of 
democratisation. The RCHK had regarded itself as "an unofficial opposition 
incessantly putting up constructive criticisms on the side of the Hong Kong citizens 
thereby prodding Government into action or quicker action for social and political
309J. Stephen Hoadley, "Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese: Patterns 
and Trends," Asian Survey 13 (1973):607.
310Reform Club of Hong Kong, Silver Jubilee Anniversary Souvenir Publication, 
1949-1974 (Hong Kong: Reform Club of Hong Kong, 1974); Hoadley (1973), op. 
cit., p. 607.
311Brook Bemacchi, Reform Club 40-Year History: A Brief History, [1989], p. 3. 
Supplied by the Reform Club of Hong Kong.
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reforms".312 The RCHK had repeatedly proposed not only to reform the UrbCo by 
expanding its scope and power, and introducing a wholly elected Municipal Council, 
but also to institute a certain number of elected seats in the LegCo. In March 1953, 
the RCHK had gathered 12,000 signatures demanding the introduction of two elected 
seats to the LegCo.313
Unlike the RCHK, the HKCA took a rather moderate approach to Hong Kong 
politics. Formed mainly by Chinese professionals and school teachers, it stressed 
social and economic reforms that brought about "Stability and Progress", and placed 
political stability higher than that of "radical progress".314 The HKCA confessed 
that:
. . .  we advocate that Government should be more open to the 
suggestions of the people, that the Urban Council should be given 
greater responsibility . . . and that there should be elected membership 
in the higher Government councils. . . . This does not mean in any 
sense that we in the Civic Association advocate self-government or 
independence. We do not wish to interrupt the tranquility and peace 
that we at present enjoy in Hong Kong, and we do not dream of taking 
over the central power in government.315
The HKCA further regarded the Hong Kong Government as a "Benevolent 
Dictatorship", who "always made laws and regulations to suit its own immediate 
purpose without carefully examining its later possible consequences."316
312Reform Club of Hong Kong (1974), op. cit.
313Reform Club of Hong Kong, Election Chronicle 1953 (Hong Kong: Reform 
Club of Hong Kong, 1953); Reform Club of Hong Kong, 10th Anniversary, 1949- 
1959 (Hong Kong: Reform Club of Hong Kong, [I960]).
3UThe Hongkong Civic Association 20th Anniversary (1954-1974) Commemoration 
Issue, p. 4.
315P.F. Woo, "My Eight Years in the Chair of the Civic Association," in the 
Hong Kong Civic Association 10th Anniversary (1954-1964) Commemoration Issue, 
pp. 2-3; quoted in Aline K. Wong, Political Apathy and the Political System in Hong 
Kong," United College Journal 8 (1970-71):9.
3l6The Hongkong Civic Association 20th Anniversary (1954-1974) Commemoration 
Issue, p. 2.
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Accompanying the failed attempt to secure political reforms at the central level 
and the new challenge of the HKCA’s moderate appeal was the RCHK’s failure to 
enlist substantial social support for its own reform plan. The RCHK, thus, reacted 
by deflating its demands and by developing a political coalition with the HKCA. In 
1960, the RCHK and the HKCA jointly dispatched a delegation to London to discuss 
the constitutional reform of Hong Kong. According to Mr Hilton Cheong-leen, the 
HKCA’s chairman and a member of the delegation, the joint delegation had asked for 
an increased number of UrbCo elected seats, the institution of elected representation 
to the LegCo, the establishment of a convention which would require the Governor 
to appoint a certain proportion of the LegCo elected members to the ExCo, and the 
gradual relaxation of the highly restricted franchise.317
The unfavourable response from London was anticipated. There were several 
reasons for this. First of all, the domestic order in Hong Kong in the 1950s was still 
not so secure, as the KMT and the CCP were still engaged with each other and 
periodic confrontations between their supporters exploded. The riots, as stirred up 
by the rightists, in Tsuen Wan and Kowloon areas in 1956 were a typical example. 
The deterioration of domestic order would invite Beijing intervention and the 
subsequent possible Chinese take-over. Second, as demonstrated in the abortion of 
the Young Plan in early 1950s, the established elites, including the unofficial 
members of the LegCo, were not in favour of any reform. For them, any reform 
would mean an influx of keen competitors to the political game and thus erode away 
their exclusive access to political power. Third, the lack of widespread demands and 
supports from the mass public led the Hong Kong Government to see no urgency to 
introduce such reforms. Most of the population were still struggling to make both 
ends meet and their immediate concerns were thus mostly of an economic nature. 
Demands for political reforms were still limited to the small circle of professionals.
317Hilton Cheong-leen, Hong Kong Tomorrow: A Collection o f Speeches and 
Articles (Hong Kong: n.p., 1962), pp. 19 & 25.
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Later in January 1961, in response to London’s refusal to carry out reforms, 
the RCHK and the HKCA signed a coalition agreement for four years to press for the 
realisation of the said reforms. Though having a consensus on constitutional reforms, 
the cooperation between the two was not a smooth one and later in 1965 the coalition 
formally broke down. According to the RCHK’s allegation, it was partly the 
insincere HKCA’s move to support their opponents in the 1964 UrbCo election that 
contributed to the dissolution of the coalition.318
The resistance of the British-Hongkong Government to reform of the UrbCo 
and to the introduction of elected members to the LegCo had not only worked to 
discredit the UrbCo as an effective mechanism to redress social grievances but also 
to discourage the social elites from participation. Although the Government had 
recommended the relaxation of the franchise restriction in 1965 and finally reformed 
the UrbCo in 1973, the powers of the reformed UrbCo were still limited, only taking 
care of public recreation and amenities, cultural affairs, and some minor regulating 
power, such as the licensing of hawkers.319
Before 1965, the franchise was largely confined to those who knew enough 
English and who were teachers, taxpayers, jurors, and members of the defence force 
or the auxiliary services. But, there were altogether 23 categories of persons, mostly 
professionals, recommended to be added to the franchise lists in 1965.320 It was
318Reform Club of Hong Kong (1974), op. cit.
319Colonial Secretariat, White Paper: The Urban Council (Hong Kong: 
Government Printer, 1971).
320The 23 categories defined in the 1965 Working Report were:
1. Persons on the Jury List;
2. Persons who would be qualified for Jury Service but for being over 
60, deaf, blind or similarly infirm;
3. Teachers;
4. Taxpayers;
5. Members of the Defence Force and Auxiliary Services;
6. Pensionable Officers of the Hong Kong Government and Civil Service 
Pensioners;
7. Barristers-at-Law and Solicitors in actual practice and their Clerks;
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reported that in deciding which category of persons would be eligible for the
franchise, the following criteria had been used:
(a) that the category should be one which makes a valuable 
contribution to Hong Kong through
(i) service to the community; or
(ii) professional knowledge and skill; or
(iii) educational standard;
(b) that a person’s claim to belong to that category should 
be relatively easy to establish and check.321
After the expansion of the franchise, it was estimated to have a 200,000 
potential electorate. Only 13% (N=26,275) and 17% (N =34,392) of the potential 
electorate went to register in 1967 and 1969, respectively. Furthermore, as indicated 
in Table 5.1a, the electorate in the 1952 only amounted to 9,000 and increased very 
slowly to about 34,000 in 1981.
8. Medical Practitioners, Dentists;
9. Editors, Reporters, Photographers, Commentators;
10. Chemists and Druggists;
11. Clergymen, Priests, Monks;
12. Professors, Lecturers, Full-Time Students, Graduates of the University 
of Hong Kong and the Chinese University of Hong Kong;
13. Pilots, Navigators;
14. Engineer;
15. Postmaster General;
16. Nurses;
17. Official and Unofficial Justices of the Peace;
18. Persons on the Current Rating List;
19. Architects;
20. Auditors;
21. Persons who are Members of some Professional Bodies;
22. Holders of School Certificates, Matriculation Certificates, General 
Certificate of Education ”0 ” Level Certificates, and technical college 
certificates; and
23. Persons on the existing Electoral Register.
For details, see The Report of the Working Party on the Urban Council Franchise and 
Electoral Registration Procedure (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 7-16.
m The Report of the Working Party on the Urban Council Franchise and Electoral 
Registration Procedure (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1965), p. 3.
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After studying electoral participation in the UrbCo elections, one observer 
suggested that the low rate of participation was, in some senses, quasi-rational and 
concluded that:
With politics separated from economics, the pay-off schedule of the 
political "game" is such that it remains a pastime, a hobby for those 
who have the time, energy, and inclination to engage in it. Its rewards 
may be gratifying to some, but they are modest and non-material. It 
is politics without power, a sanitized and safety-inspected simulacrum 
of the real thing, completely divorced from the dynamism of Hong 
Kong’s economy.322
Another scholar attributed the political indifference of the Hong Kong people not to
the cultural factor, but to the electoral system adopted:
. . .  the political indifference of the local Chinese cannot be 
understood as some residue of a traditional preference for a 
paternalistic form of government. Instead I have argued that the 
political apathy of the local population must be explained within the 
context of the present [1970] electoral system, i.e. the part the local 
people are allowed to play in the political scene.323
322Hoadley (1973), op. cit., p. 616.
323Aline K. Wong, "Political Apathy and the Political System in Hong Kong," 
United College Journal 8 (1970-71):20.
197
The Period of Pressure Group Politics
Since the late 1960s, a handful of pressure groups have come into play in 
Hong Kong and they have largely championed the cause of the under-privileged. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the Government adopted a more active attitude 
toward the society from the 1960s. Thus, the conflict between the Government and 
society over the distribution of social resources grew significantly as the latter was 
becoming more and more affected by government decisions and policies. Given the 
closed nature of the political structure and the predominant business influence in it, 
a communication gap existed between the government policy-makers and the affected 
citizens.
According to one study, the number of urban social conflicts had risen from 
6 in 1950-59 and 31 in 1960-69, to 188 in 1970-79.324 These conflicts were at first 
largely concerned about the clearance of slum areas and its compensation, and the 
inadequacy of community facilities, but later had also kept an eye on some high-level 
policy issues, such as the overall distribution of housing resources, the issue of rent- 
fixing for public housing flats, the monitoring mechanism of public utilities, and so 
on. Although the pressure groups’ activities were usually small in scope and weak 
in intensity, the social activists had gradually built-up their images as well as secured 
a certain amount of social support. This kind of asset later proved to be 
indispensable when electoral politics came into play.
The rise of pressure group politics has not only transformed the political 
landscape of Hong Kong but also prompted the government to set up a "new and 
secret body" called the Standing Committee on Pressure Groups (SCOPG), which 
reportedly aims to coordinate "government surveillance of any protest or campaigning 
group and of mounting counter-attacks" and to "undermine, co-opt or coerce" such
324Lui T.L. and Kung K.S., Urban Movements and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong: Wide Angle, 1985), p. 63. (in Chinese)
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groups.325 The Hong Kong Government seemed to care most about the infiltration
of the Chinese Government and the CCP. In addition, the social climate of the 1970s
had mobilised people to identify with communist China because the latter had made
a breakthrough on the international stage. The of -the. China’s
? Re
s Q-a-'t in the United Nations^and her rapprochement with the United States 
in the early 1970s had boosted up her acceptability in Hong Kong. The growing 
identification with China in the society and the rise of an anti-colonial mood had 
made it more difficult for the colonial Hong Kong Government to govern. 
Understandably, the security issue gained prominence on the agenda of the Hong 
Kong Government. Under the circumstances, it was logical for the Hong Kong 
Government to adopt measures to cope with the problem. Unfortunately, the growing 
pro-China sentiments had coincided with expanding conflicts between the Government 
and the society as the result of the expansion of government activities since the late 
1960s. Any challenge from the political activists would, more or less, be interpreted 
as an advancement by the communists. This was reflected in the rather harsh 
comments made in the SCOPG’s reports. This unfortunate coincidence had proved 
to be detrimental for the development of a n "independent" political force within Hong 
Kong.
Among the 11 pressure or community groups mentioned in the SCOPG’s 
confidential reports, the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee (CIC), the Hong 
Kong Professional Teachers’ Union (PTU), the Society for Community Organisation 
(SoCO) and the Hong Kong Observers (HKO) have enjoyed popularity in the media 
and in their respective community.
The CIC was formed in 1967 to "enhance the workers’ movements" in Hong 
Kong and represented the emergence of an independent force in the labour
325Duncan Campbell, "A Secret Plan for Dictatorship," New Statesman 2598 
(1980):8; Campbell’s article was widely reported in Hong Kong’s media, such as 
SCMP, HKS, and Ming Pao Daily News, on 13 December 1980.
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movement.326 By organising seminars, demonstrations, press conferences and 
petitions, the CIC has been deeply engaged in the fight to protect workers’ interests 
and has earned the reputation of the "Robin Hood of labour". Moreover, the CIC 
regarded its role as "to set ways and means to make distributive justice a permanent 
feature of our (Hong Kong) society".327 Thus, its engagement in other sorts of 
campaigns was just a logical development, such as the Coalition Against Bus Fare 
Increase and the Committee fighting for raising personal tax allowances in 1981. The 
SCOPG’s report said the CIC’s activities were "biased and counter-productive" and 
commented that:
The CIC’s intervention in trade disputes not only usurps the role of the 
Labour Department but complicates issues, feed erroneous ideas into 
workers’ minds, and render them less amenable to conciliation. Their 
criticism has always been destructive.328
The PTU is one of the most active trade unions in Hong Kong. Its former 
chairman, Mr Szeto Wah, had succeeded in fighting with the government for a 
reasonable salary scheme for the Certificate Masters in early 1970s and in supporting 
the sacked teachers who protested against the alleged corruption of the Golden Jubilee 
School’s Principal in 1977. These events had earned him and the PTU a reputation 
in the teaching profession. In the 1970s, the PTU had been regarded as a "radical" 
trade union for it tended to use the "uncommon" methods of strike, petition and sit-in 
as its campaign instruments. Mr Szeto has also been considered as a leftist because 
of his uncompromising attitude in challenging the government authority and his 
alleged link with the NCNA’s Hong Kong Branch.329 Moreover, Mr Xu Jiatun
326In 1991, the CIC was under the leadership of Mr Lau Chin-shek, a directly 
elected LegCo member since 1991, who had joined the CIC in 1972.
327HKS, 21 March 1981; Benjamin Leung and Stephen Chiu, A Social History of 
Industrial Strikes and the Labour Movement in Hong Kong, 1946-1989 (Hong Kong: 
Social Sciences Research Centre, University of Hong Kong, 1991), pp. 55-8.
328Campbell (1980), op. cit., p. 9; HKS, 28 January 1981.
329Mr Szeto Wah has a younger brother working in the NCNA’s Hong Kong 
Branch.
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revealed in his memoirs in 1993 that Mr Szeto had asked to join the Chinese 
Communist Party, but without Xu supplying details.330 In reacting to this 
allegation, Mr Szeto has denied it squarely.331 Because of such uncompromising 
attitudes and the alleged close relations with the NCNA, the SCOPG’s report had 
labelled the PTU as "a Chinese communist united front target and several of its 
official [sic] . . . have had contact with leading communist educationalists [sic] " and 
had seen "long-term danger of communist infiltration".332 We could not comment 
on whether the PTU or Mr Szeto has any connection with the CCP or the Chinese 
Government because of the lack of information. But one thing sure is that in a highly 
de-politicized society like Hong Kong, any move to challenge the existing political 
order will be labelled as a "radical" and "leftist" whatever the cause one is fighting 
for. Nevertheless, when the LegCo functional elections were first introduced in 
1985, Mr Szeto was supported by the PTU and finally was elected with an 
overwhelming majority.
Besides, the SoCO was well-known for its skills in organising residents and 
its confrontational attitude, at least according to the Government, in protesting against 
the inadequacy of government policies. The SoCO gave help to the under-privileged 
and marginal communities by organising them to fight for their own cause. As Mr 
Fung Ho-lap, then director of the SoCO, claimed: "[the] SoCO seldom speaks on 
behalf of the people. In fact, we help them to speak on their own with dignity and 
confidence. Pressure comes from the people, not from the pressure groups."333 Mr 
Fung also attributed the formation of the SoCO in 1971 to the inspiration of the three 
main world-wide movements at the time, which were welfare rights movement, 
secularisation of religion, and community development movement; it aimed to 
enhance the sense of community of the Hong Kong people and to consolidate
330Xu (1993), op. cit., pp. 149-150.
m Hong Kong United Daily News, 14 June 1993:2.
^H KS, 28 January 1981.
m HKS, 9 June 1982.
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residents’ forces through organisation and action to fight for their own rights.334 
The SCOPG’s report had made it known that the SoCO had "no subversive motive", 
but that there was a real danger "that [the] SoCO may be able to start organising 
people to achieve certain objectives, but it may turn out that the group so organised 
may eventually do something completely beyond the control of [the] SoCO".335
The HKO was formed in 1975 by a handful of Chinese professionals and its 
stated objectives included: to press for more government response to the needs of 
Hongkong residents and to organise research on issues of public interest.336 By 
publishing articles in both English and Chinese newspapers, they made their views 
known to the general public and the concerned government departments. Though 
they were vocal in criticising government policies and maltreatments, they are not an 
action-oriented group. In fact, to quote a term from the Home Affairs Department 
report, the HKO is "an intelligentsia representative group".337 In the SCOPG’s 
report, the HKO was being assessed as having great potential for "infiltration among 
the educated young" and thus "can be dangerous if the HKO should assume a biased 
attitude one-tracked mind in their interpretation of social issues".338 But the 
political situation has changed since the arrival of Mr Christopher Patten in 1992 as 
the new Governor of Hong Kong. Two former active members of this group have 
been appointed as LegCo members in late 1992.339
Other active pressure groups at the time also included: the Hong Kong 
People’s Council on Public Housing Policy (HKPCPHP) and the Social Workers’
334Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly 52 (July 1981):29-30.
335HKS, 28 January 1981.
336Hong Kong Observers, Pressure Points: A Social Critique, 2nd ed., (Hong 
Kong: Summerson, 1983), p. 211.
331Ibid., p. 214.
m HKS, 28 January 1981.
339They are Miss Anna Wu and Miss Christine Loh. See Eastern Express 17 June 
1994:1.
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General Union (SWGU). The HKPCPHP was formed in 1978 with the help of the 
SoCO and other social organisations which aimed to reflect the will of the public 
housing residents and to monitor the works of the governmental Housing 
Authority.340 The SWGU was formed in 1980 with a membership of over 700, 
one-fourth of the total social workers in Hong Kong. Many of the SWGU’s leaders 
were active participants of the social and residents’ movements in the 1970s.
The mushrooming of the community groups indicated that the conflicts 
between the Government and society had grown to a point where some sort of 
coordination would be desirable because of the adverse impact Government policies 
would have. As shown in Chapter 4, as the Government administered more aspects 
of society and the economy in the 1970s, any dissatisfaction with the policies and 
their implications would necessarily take a political form, especially as the 
Government had established new institutions to reflect its new interventionism. The 
urban redevelopment programmes, the land resumption plan, and related 
compensation schemes had had, in a sense, a destabilising effect on the then rather 
harmonious political order. Because of such developments, the mass public were 
more prone to political mobilisation when their interests were at stake. Although 
small in size and weak in mobilisation power, these community groups had been 
providing a training ground for the social activists who were then equipped with the 
necessary skills in organising the masses and the psychological readiness to confront 
the authority during their fights with the Government in the 1970s.
340Hong Kong People’s Council on Public Housing Policy (HKPCPHP), 
HKPCPHP: 10th Anniversary souvenir Publication, 1978-88 (Hong Kong: 
HKPCPHP, 1988), p. 7. (in Chinese).
Political Alignment in the 1980s
The emergence of the 1997 issue and the subsequent Sino-British negotiations 
over the future of Hong Kong served to provide a new direction to the political 
development of Hong Kong. The commitment to providing a "high degree of 
autonomy" and the promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" by Beijing 
after 1997, and London’s decision to open up partially the colonial political system 
by instituting a representative government there, created a wave of political group 
formation in Hong Kong. As explained in Chapter 4, the society in the 1980s had 
also transformed itself as Hong Kong advanced into being an international financial 
and business centre. Coupled with this were the improvements in living standard and 
education opportunity, the growing proportion of the local-born population, and the 
emergence of the new middle-class of professionals.
The "induced" expectation and aspiration of the "Hong Kong people governing 
Hong Kong through democratic means" at first ran high, but later diminished as 
Beijing’s subsequent negative response to the political reform initiated by Britain, 
aiming at the institution of an independent and open legislature in the transitional 
period, became clear. Nevertheless, once the competitive elections have been put in 
place, whatever the proportion of seats returned by universal suffrage, the rules of 
the political game would be forced to change in the long run. Based upon the 
"supply" of institutional change in various political reform packages, there would be 
"demand" on the existing political forces to adjust. The more power was released 
through competitive elections, the easier the barrier of entry would be removed and 
the lower the threshold of representation would be possible, and thus, the stronger the 
pressure on the political forces to develop mass-oriented parties, or vice versa. 
Although the opportunity was there for the development of political groups or parties, 
the sudden introduction of the universal franchise and related political reforms had 
given no time for the pressure groups to penetrate deeply into society and to build-up 
their organisational strength. The condition was even worse because more and more 
middle-class professionals decided to emigrate, especially after the Tiananmen 
Incident in 1989. The middle-class professionals played the leadership role in the
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democratic movement elsewhere, but, in the case of Hong Kong, their participation 
was minimal. Even for those who participated actively, some of them were lacking 
the will to fight in the face of tremendous Chinese pressure. Added to this was the 
inexperience of the political activists that led to internal divisions and the adoption of 
a flawed strategy.341
The development of political parties in Hong Kong was prone to China’s and 
Britain’s influence and pressure. As mentioned before, the sceptical attitude of 
Beijing leaders towards political reforms since the mid-1980s imposed hurdles on the 
road of democratisation; they, also, intervened in local politics by siding with the 
conservatives in Hong Kong. The strategic move to side with the conservatives was 
dictated by their promise of "one country, two systems" and "Hong Kong people 
governing Hong Kong". Under these circumstances, any move to mobilise the local 
communists or the leftists openly would be interpreted as a move to shatter the 
promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong"; and any move that would put 
the privileges of the established elites at risk would drive away the business tycoons 
whose contributions were very vital to the economic prosperity of Hong Kong. It 
was logical for the Beijing leaders to seek a trustworthy alliance that would be under 
her reach and prone to her pressure in the transitional period. As illustrated in 
Chapter 3, the Chinese Government at first adopted a more positive attitude towards 
democratisation before the conclusion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in late 
1984 so as to soften the resistance of Hong Kong people, but changed gradually to 
a tougher one and later even sided with the conservatives. Being supported by the 
Chinese Government, the conservatives mobilised themselves to form political groups 
in order to counter the emergence of the grass-roots democrats. Nevertheless, the 
conservatives were not a homogenous force in terms of status and location in the 
political establishment, let alone their conflicting economic interests. Thus, the 
conservatives failed to produce a unified political group in the period under study, as 
demonstrated later in this section.
341 Alvin Y. So and Ludmilla Kwitko, "The New Middle Class and the Democratic 
Movement in Hong Kong," Journal of Contemporary Asia 20 (1990):388-94.
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On the British side, her traditional co-opted partners in Hong Kong were those 
who came from the big business firms and the wealthy families. This state of affairs 
was challenged by the rise of the new middle-class in the 1970s and the 1997 issue 
in the 1980s. The established elites were firstly on good terms with the British-Hong 
Kong Government before 1985, but later distanced themselves gradually from it 
because China would become the boss after the reversion of sovereignty in 1997. 
This was especially the case when Britain was at odds with China. In order to boost 
up her legitimacy in the transitional period, Britain has to co-opt those who could 
represent the mass public through the introduction of direct elections. The pace of 
such reforms would not be so bold so as to alienate the established elites and not to 
overload the government when the demands from society grew significantly once the 
direct elections were in place. To strike the delicate balance was not an easy job, 
especially in the turbulent environment of the late transitional period. So, the British 
and Hong Kong Governments were tom by the conflicting demands from the 
established elites and the democrats, as seen in the 1987 review, let alone the pressure 
from China. Thus, the prime concern of the British and Hong Kong Governments 
was to ensure the smooth transfer of power.
In the context of the 1980s, three stages of development could be 
differentiated. First, the political groups formed between 1982-85 appeared to 
respond to the upsurge of the 1997 issue as well as the introduction of universal 
suffrage at the lower tier of the legislature—the District Boards. Given the uncertainty 
of Hong Kong’s political future and the limited power enjoyed by the District Boards’ 
members, the incentives to form political groups were, thus, not large enough. As 
recorded in the following section, the political groups formed in this period were 
largely organized by social activists, who played an active role in the pressure group 
politics of the 1970s. Little effort from the established elites to organize was 
recorded. Election coalitions also appeared, but they only enjoyed a very short life 
span.
Second, in anticipation of the reform of the central government as the result 
of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the subsequent political row over the pace
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and direction of democratization in the 1987 Review and the drafting of the Basic 
Law, the established elites had begun to mobilize. Furthermore, the revision of the 
Beijing’s negative attitude towards party politics to a more positive one, as examined 
in Chapter 3, had given a push to group formation and mobilisation. As mentioned 
before, some groups formed in this period appeared to have blessings from Britain 
and China, like the Progressive Hong Kong Society (PHKS). Besides, the political 
groups formed by social campaigners in the previous stage had consolidated by 
merging with each other.
Third, from 1989 onwards, political events outside Hong Kong, had given a 
further push to party formation. The Tiananmen Incident in 1989 had served as a 
mobilizer, with the Hong Kong public reacting to seek a faster pace of 
democratization. Before the incident, most of the mobilisation efforts by the 
concerned political groups relied heavily on personal networks and thus their 
penetration into the society was very limited. The outburst of emotional feeling 
during the Tiananmen Incident had provided an opportunity for the concerned political 
forces, especially the democrats, to extend their networks of mobilisation on a bigger 
scale. In addition, the political structure of the future HKSAR was finalized as the 
Basic Law was promulgated in early 1990 and the increase in directly-elected seats 
from 10 to 18 in the 1991 LegCo elections. All these developments had, in one way 
or another, provided the social and political impetus for consolidating the existing 
political groups.
The Pre-Mobilisation Stage, 1982-85
During the period 1982-85, numerous political groups declared their 
formation. Shortly after the visit of the then British Prime Minister Mrs Margaret
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Thatcher to Beijing in late 1982, two "political discussion groups"342 had come into 
being—the New Hong Kong Society (NHKS) and the Meeting Point (MP). Probably, 
these two groups were the first to accept the return of Hong Kong to China and the 
idea of Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong through democratic means after 
1997. The NHKS, comprising mainly young graduates who had recently graduated 
in the early 1980s, offered a detailed plan to implement the idea of Hong Kong 
people governing Hong Kong in early 1983 and had discussed it with the officials of 
the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. The NHKS’s stance 
toward the future of Hong Kong might be summarised as: "reunion, self-rule, 
democracy, and reform".343
Although declaring "the identification with the Chinese nation not equivalent 
to the identification with any existing regime or political party", the MP had still 
failed to escape the "pro-Beijing" label as it strongly supported Beijing’s cause in 
restoring Hong Kong sovereignty after 1997. Their stance was not in line with the 
political mood of the time when the Sino-British negotiation had just started in late 
1982. Not only championing the value of reunion with China, the MP had also 
demanded a reform of the colonial political system so as to pave the way for 
subsequent democratic self-rule after 1997. In addition, the MP also advocated social 
reform. According to Mr (now Dr) Yeung Sum,344 then vice-chairman of the MP, 
"The present [social] situation in Hongkong is unequal and unreasonable. That’s why 
we cannot accept that the status quo should remain".345 And he later also argued 
that: "the aspirations of this generation is not going to be met by the existing system
342The term "political discussion groups" is used to denote those political groups 
whose activities are highly confined to die discussion of government policies and 
social issues, and thus their mode of participation is not action-oriented.
343New Hong Kong Society, New Hong Kong Society: 1st Anniversary Souvenir 
Publication (Hong Kong: New Hong Kong Society, 1983), p. 2. (in Chinese)
344Dr Yeung Sum is a LegCo member and Vice-Chairman of the Democratic
Party, which was formed by the merger of the UDHK and the MP in 1994.
345SCMP, 19 October 1982.
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which has been accepted in the past".346 The group’s faith and principles rested on 
the New Three Principles of the People, that is nationalism, democracy, and people’s 
livelihood.347 This group comprised mainly of young academics and social workers 
who graduated from local universities in the 1970s; many of them had been student 
activists during their university years.
The Hong Kong Affairs Society (HKAS) was formed in February 1984 and 
mainly comprised of professionals and academics who graduated in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. The HKAS had highlighted its role of "think tank" by focusing its 
activities on research and study of government and social policies which, in return, 
could enhance citizens’ political awareness and provide an analytical framework for 
policy judgement. In addition, the HKAS had also organised public seminars and 
invited speakers of different viewpoints to exchange ideas and to share their views. 
Though it had facilitated the flow of ideas and narrowed the misunderstanding among 
different walks of life, this kind of approach had been criticised as too academic.348
Quite contrary to the research-oriented HKAS, the Hong Kong People’s 
Association (HKPA), formed in November 1984, had openly declared that "we shall 
encourage Hongkong people to participate in public affairs and exercise their right to 
vote" and "we shall support able men and women to stand for election". The group 
felt that discussion in an age of rapid political transformation was not enough and 
they, therefore, stressed the importance of participation. Although stressing active 
participation, the HKPA did not regard itself as a political party. The initial 
proposers of the group had included many respected people, like Mr Lo King-man,
346HKS, 10 February 1983.
341 Wide Angle Monthly, 160 (January 1986):74-5. The term "Three Principles of 
the People" was used by Dr Sun Yat-sen, a respected Chinese revolutionary leader 
and Provisional President of the Republic of China in 1911, to describe his own 
political philosophy.
348Yip Tze-chin, "The Political Wake-up of Hong Kong’s New Generation of 
Intelligentsia," Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly 92 (1984):42; Pai Shing, 84 
(16 November 1984):7.
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vice-president of the Hong Kong Polytechnic; Mr Anthony Neoh, a barrister; Dr Luk 
Yan-lung, an historian; Dr (now Professor) Wong Siu-lun and Mr Lee Ming-kwan, 
sociologists; Mr Vincent Ko, District Board’s member; and so on.349
The social composition of the above-mentioned political groups was quite 
homogenous in the sense that they were mainly came from the middle-class strata and 
had received university education elsewhere. The NHKS and the MP were more 
inclined to uphold the principle of nationalism and regarded the reunion with China 
as compatible with the development of democratic government in Hong Kong. Their 
romantic nationalist feeling led them to minimise incompatibility of an authoritarian 
communist state and democratic government. As for the HKAS and the HKPA, they 
tended to be concerned more with practical social problems and emphasised the 
importance of participation. Comparatively speaking, the members of the HKAS and 
the HKPA were more "establishment" than those of the MP and the NHKS.
In this period, there was no effort made by the established or business elites 
to organise. One possible explanation for this condition could be the uncertainty of 
how much political power would be devolved and its pace of devolution, and their 
privileged access anyway to the government structure. The opportunity cost of 
forming political groups was, thus, very high. Understandably, they would adopt a 
wait-and-see attitude until the dust settled, i.e. the political settlement of Hong Kong 
by the then on-going Sino-British negotiations.
This low profile attitude also applied to the leftists, for different reasons.350 
Their cautious approach reflected the sensitive situation of Hong Kong. On the one 
hand, Hong Kong people had still not accepted the ways the leftists employed in the 
struggle with the British-Hong Kong Government during the 1967 riots. Any active 
mobilisation of the leftists had, in one way or another, stirred up the fear of the local
M9SCMP, 4 December 1984; Yip (1984), op. cit., pp. 40-1.
350Ng Yin, "The Outlook of the Hong Kong Multi-Parties Politics," Cheng Ming 
Monthly 92 (June 1985):46-8. (in Chinese)
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community and impaired their confidence. On the other hand, the promise of Hong 
Kong people governing Hong Kong seemed to inhibit the leftists from engaging 
actively and openly in forming political groups. Otherwise, the offer of self- 
government by the Hong Kong people after 1997 would be self-defeating.
Nevertheless, the leftist Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) had encouraged 
its members to register and vote in the 1985 District Boards’ elections.351 Later, 
the member unions of the FTU had publicly supported 10 candidates to run in the 
1985 District Boards’ elections.352 Five were elected; but, according to Mr Albert 
C.C. Lam, then Deputy Regional Secretary (Hong Kong and Kowloon), there were 
another 45 elected candidates (out of total 237) with a pro-Beijing background or 
stance.353
Moreover, an umbrella organisation called the New Territories Association of 
Societies (NTAS) had been formed in April 1985. The group was headed by a local 
China National People’s Congress member, Mr Lee Lin-sang, and its member 
organisations were comprised primarily of rural community groups. Influential 
Heung Yee Kuk members and prominent rural leaders, such as Mr Lau Wong-fat, Mr 
Chan Yat-sun and Mr Wong Yuen-cheung, were invited to serve as honorary 
presidents. The group declared that it would not nominate candidates in future 
elections, but would rather give support to individual members.354
As indicated before, the rightists had in the past been a significant player in 
Hong Kong politics, but then declined significantly. Nevertheless, the Nationalist
351SCMP, 24 May 1984.
3S2Sing Tao Jih Pao, 14 February 1985.
353Leung Chun-man, "The Criteria of Appointing District Boards Members and 
the Training of Leaders Capable for Governing Hong Kong: An Interview with Mr
Albert C.C. Lam, ” Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly 97 (1985):4, (in Chinese); 
also, Cheung Tak-shing, "An Overall Review on the District Boards Elections," Wide 
Angle Monthly 151 (1985):21. (in Chinese)
354SCMP, 19 April 1985.
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Government has maintained a certain level of political involvement in local politics. 
In the 1985 District Board elections, the Taipei authority had claimed that 53 "liberal 
anti-communist" persons had been elected; but according to Hong Kong government 
sources, only 5 elected DB members had a pro-Taipei background.355 Nevertheless, 
the rightists have managed to return one LegCo member in the functional constituency 
of labour since 1985.
Election coalitions had appeared just shortly before the 1985 District Board 
elections. The "Group of 12" in the Central and Western District had aimed to take 
all the elected seats in the relevant constituency. This group had involved members 
from the Hong Kong Observers, the Hong Kong Affairs Society, the Hong Kong 
People’s Association and the Meeting Point; but they claimed that their involvement 
was in an individual capacity. This might be interpreted as the lack of consensus 
within each of these political groups over their respective role and positioning in the 
ever-changing political system. Also in the list of members was Mr Carl Tong, then 
appointed Legislative Councillor.356
Another ad hoc election coalition was formed in the Eastern District with 12 
serving DB members and an appointed Legislative Councillor, Mr Chan Ying-lun. 
This group seemed to gain support from the North Point Kaifong Association, mutual 
aid committees and owners’ corporations.357 Quite contrary to the above coalitions 
that were based on a single district, a group of 17 young people had grouped together 
to seek election in different districts. This coalition had drawn its members from 
political groups, like the New Hong Kong Society and the Public Policy Research 
Centre, and local concerned groups on people’s livelihood. And they pledged to play 
a role in the democratisation process during the transitional period.358
355Cheung (1985), op. cit., p. 20; Leung (1985), op. cit., p. 4.
356SCMP, 29 December 1984 and 15 February 1985.
357HKS, 3 January 1985.
m SCMP, 2 January 1985.
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By the time of the 1985 District Boards elections, most of the above- 
mentioned political groups and coalitions had, in one way or another, supported or 
nominated their members to run in the elections. As shown in Table 5.2, the success 
rate of candidates with group backing was quite high. Except those of the RCHK and 
the HKCA, the rate ranged from 80% to 100%. The rather good performance of 
group-backed candidates seemed to have a demonstration effect on other political 
activists. But the uncertainty of the political structure of the future Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), which was still waiting to be framed at the 
time, had made it difficult for political activists to chart their path of advancement in 
the power structure. The limited powers of the District Boards and the Urban 
Council had provided not enough incentive for those who had already occupied the 
key position in the political structure, like the appointed unofficial members in the 
ExCo and the LegCo, or for those who had already acquired prominent status in their 
own career, to participate. Whether to join the electoral competition or to wait for 
government appointment would be up to individual’s choice, but indeed it is a hard 
choice.
The Mobilisation Stage, 1985-1989
This stage of development differed from the previous one in several aspects. 
First of all, the political future of Hong Kong was fixed after Britain and China 
reached an agreement in late 1984. The Sino-British Joint Declaration signified not 
only the reversion of sovereignty from Britain to China, but also the eventual power 
devolution as implied in the Joint Declaration, i.e. the introduction of elections to the 
LegCo and possibly the ExCo, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. Second, the established 
elites began their mobilisation drive to form political groups because the then existing 
political recruitment method had to change from the exclusive appointment to the 
elections. Third, the resistant attitude of the Chinese Government towards party 
politics had started to be revised to a more accommodating one in late 1988. This
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helped to remove the major hurdle to forming political groups. Fourth, as mentioned 
before, the Daya Bay anti-nuclear movements in 1986, the 1987 political review, and 
the drafting of the Basic Law from late 1985 onwards had, in one way or another, 
stimulated the alignment of political forces and exposed the whole society to the 
immense mobilisation efforts of the concerned political forces.
Shortly after the initialling of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in December 
1984, four more political groups declared their formation in this period: the 
Progressive Hong Kong Society (PHKS, February 1985), the Association of 
Democracy and Justice (ADJ, April 1985), the Association for Democracy and 
People’s Livelihood (ADPL, October 1987), and the New Hong Kong Alliance 
(NHKA, May 1989). As examined in the following paragraphs, the PHKS and the 
NHKA were formed by the prominent figures from the political and economic 
establishments whose political outlook was quite conservative, while the ADJ and the 
ADPL were led by the active social activists who had championed social justice since 
the 1970s. Besides, the PHKS and the NHKA stood for the interests of the business 
sector and wanted to maintain the status quo. The ADJ and the ADPL represented 
the grass-roots’ interests and worked towards the coming of representative 
government.
After planning for six months in the dark and reportedly having London’s and 
Beijing’s understanding, Miss Maria Tam, a heavy weight political figure who had 
maintained good ties with local community leaders and was then concurrently ExCo, 
LegCo, UrbCo and DB member, and later also Basic Law drafter, had declared the 
formation of the Progressive Hong Kong Society (PHKS) in March 1985 with Dr 
Philip Kwok of the Wing On Group as vice-chairman.359 The PHKS was different 
from the above-mentioned groups because it aimed to build-up a cross-sector political 
group and attempted to integrate the loosely knit political forces of the establishment. 
Probably, this was the first time in Hong Kong history that the established elites had
359For the rise of Miss Tam, see Au Yung Bun, "The Emergence and 
Breakthrough of Miss Maria Tam," (in Chinese) Hong Kong Economic Journal 
Monthly 100 (1985): 14-16, 88.
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engaged overtly to form political group. The formation of the PHKS also represented 
their awareness of the inevitable reform of the then rather closed political structure. 
It enlisted supports from a variety of social sectors as well reflected in the its 
promoters’ list. Among them were (title was as of March 1985): Mr Cheung Yan- 
lung, LegCo member and prominent rural leaders; Mr Gerry Forsgate, vice-chairman 
of the UrbCo; Dr Raymond Wu, president of the Medical Association; Mr Kan Fook- 
yee, chairman of the Hong Kong Institute of Land Surveyors; Mr Leung Chun-ying, 
a chartered estate surveyor; Mr Vincent Lo, Mr Kenneth Fung, Mr Victor Fung, 
Miss Veronica Wu and Dr J.K. Lee, entrepreneurs and offsprings of renowned 
families; Mr Lam Chak-piu and Mr Tong Kam-biu, UrbCo members and social 
activists; Mr Chan Pun, Miss Lee Fung-ying and Mr Lee Kai-ming, leaders of the 
Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions; Mr Wong Wai-hung, 
chairman of the Federation of the Civil Service Unions; Dr Edward Chen, director 
of Hong Kong University’s Centre of Asian Studies; and others.360 Mr Denis Bray, 
former Secretary for Home Affairs, reportedly joined the group.361
Although not regarding itself as a political party because of the sensitivity of 
the term in Hong Kong society and the resistant attitude of the Beijing Government 
towards party development in Hong Kong in mid-1980s, the PHKS was de facto the 
most influential and powerful combination of individuals with an eye on the power 
vacuum left behind in the devolution process. Echoing the PHKS’s stated aims "To 
encourage and support its members to take part in the administration of public affairs 
in Hongkong", Miss Tam had personally supported 30 candidates in the 1985 DB 
elections, of which 27 were elected.362 It was also reported that the PHKS had over 
80 members serving in major Government advisory bodies, including 5 LegCo 
members, 8 municipal council members and 49 DB members in late 1988. In 
addition, 5 members had served in the Basic Law Consultative Committee and
m HKS, 27 March 1985. 
m SCMP, 15 May 1985.
362SCMP, 10 and 16 March 1985.
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another 2 in Basic Law Drafting Committee.363 Attempts to enlist support from 
other political groups, like the Meeting Point, the Hong Kong Affairs Society and the 
Civic Association, were also tried.364
Some leaders of the rival democratic camp, such as Rev. Lo Lung-kwong, Dr 
Ding Lik-kiu, and Mr Lau Chin-shek, had given birth to the Association of 
Democracy and Justice (ADJ) in mid-1985. This was the first step for the various 
pressure groups to maximise their resources and effectiveness for political 
participation. As Dr Ding, veteran democratic reformer who had led an ad hoc 
delegation to London to ask for the reform of the colonial political structure in 1984, 
made clear, "There will be fewer pressure groups in their conventional form. Future 
pressure group leaders are bound to work within the system itself instead of as outside 
critics of Government policies" and "It’s time to go into politics and exert direct 
influence on Government policies". The ADJ, therefore, was an election-oriented 
association aimed "at promoting the spirit of democracy and social justice while 
upholding the prosperity and stability in Hongkong".365
The democrats had further organised and merged to form a bigger coalition 
after the forming of the ADJ. Several pressure groups, such as the ADJ, the New 
Hong Kong Society, the Hong Kong People’s Council on Public Housing Policy, the 
Society for Social Research, the Septenrio Academy, and the Sham Shui Po 
Concerned Group on People’s Livelihood, had met together to discuss possible 
merger with each other. After several months of discussion and preparation, the 
Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (HKADPL) was 
formally established in October 1986 with Dr Ding Lik-kiu as chairman, Mr Fung 
Kim-kei and Mr Lee Wing-tat as deputy chairmen. The significance of its formation 
was the integration of the grass-roots activists into a more organised and politically-
363SCMP, 3 December 1988; HKS, 28 January 1989.
36*SCMP, 30 March and 10 May 1985.
365SCMP, 6 April 1985.
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oriented group. It also laid the foundation for subsequent development of the 
democrats.
The HKADPL had about 100 members including an UrbCo member, two 
RegCo members and 9 DB members at the time of founding. Among others, the 
HKADPL aimed "to advocate a rational distribution of social resources and to 
improve the quality of life of the lower and middle social strata".366 The group 
believed that "People’s livelihood will not be improved without democratic and equal 
participation in political life".367 Thus, they actively worked with other democrats 
in demanding the introduction of direct elections to the LegCo in 1988 and the 
adoption of the "190 Proposal" in the still-drafting Basic Law. Furthermore, the 
democratic groups of the HKAS, the MP, and the HKADPL had altogether supported 
75 candidates, over 30% of the total (N=264), in the 1988 DB elections.368 The 
first two democratic groups had only supported 7 candidates in 1985 DB elections 
(see Table 5.2).
In contrast, some younger business and social figures, like LegCo members 
Mr Allen Lee, Mr Stephen Cheong and Mrs Selina Chow, had adopted a cautious 
approach. They represented the "liberal" wing within the established elites whose 
judgement on political group formation differed from those of the PHKS. They were 
more inclined to form a political party and were the more "liberal" in their outlook 
among the established elites in early 1980s. Their idea of forming a political party 
was said to have developed in May 1983 when Mr Lee had led a delegation of young 
professionals to Beijing. The leaders of the delegation formed the backbone of the 
planned party. Also involved in the plan were three LegCo members: Mr Chan 
Ying-lun, Mrs Rita Fan and Mr Martin Lee. Their plan did not materialise at this
366SCMP, 30 April 1986; Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed., The Road to Political 
Participation: Collected Essays of the Hong Kong Association of Democracy and 
People's Livelihood (Hong Kong: Wide Angle, 1989), p. 13, (in Chinese).
361HKS, 27 October 1986.
368Kwan Siu-wah, "Hong Kong Walks Quietly into the Era of Party Politics," 
Ming Pao Monthly 267 (March 1988): 6-7. (in Chinese)
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period. This was partly due to their lack of first hand information on the current 
political development and this coloured their judgement. The information flow was 
blocked because none of them were either ExCo members or Basic Law drafters in 
this period, except Mr Martin Lee who actually had broken away from this clique at 
the very beginning of the Basic Law drafting process and joined hands with the 
democrats because of the clique’s non-action orientation to party-building. As a 
result, they decided to adopt a wait-and-see attitude and stressed the importance of 
timing and political climate in forming a party. As a result, Mr Cheong said that 
they wanted "to wait for the decision on the basic law drafting committee and joint 
liaison group" because "We don’t want to be groping in the dark".369
Given that Mr Xu Jiatun, then Director of the Hong Kong Branch of the 
NCNA, had overtly aired its disapproval of constitutional reforms in the transitional 
period in late 1985, their plan to form a political party was therefore given up. When 
announcing the decision to shelve the plan temporarily until the 1987 political review, 
Mr Allen Lee was quoted as saying: "There was Chinese resistance on any local party 
formation and going opposite to China is not very wise". And he further added that 
"It’s still too early to form a party because we don’t know the outcome of the 1987 
review" and " It won’t be too late to organise one then when direct elections are to 
be introduced".370
Regarding the trend of forming political groups in early 1985, the Hong Kong 
Government seemed to hold an encouraging attitude and welcomed the move. Sir 
Edward Youde, the then Hong Kong Governor, had reportedly regarded the trend of 
party formation as a natural development and said "Don’t get stuck with the labels 
(of party), look at the objectives". He further added that those groups formed at the 
time had the objective of assisting in maintaining the stability and prosperity of Hong 
Kong. Sir Sze-yuen Chung, then senior member of the ExCo, also recorded his 
acceptance of political parties and said: "When we talk about democracy, we cannot
369SCMP, 31 March 1985.
310HKS, 29 December 1985; SCMP, 30 December 1985.
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avoid that people have different views and therefore we cannot avoid that people will 
form parties."371
But Beijing seemed not to favour the introduction of party politics in Hong 
Kong. Chinese officials voiced their opposition to party politics on several occasions. 
Following the warning of Mr Xu Jiatun in late 1985, Mr Lu Ping, then Secretary- 
General of HKMAO, had reportedly told a group of LegCo members that Hong Kong 
could not and should not have its own political party.372 When touching on the 
issue of Chinese Communist Party activities in Hong Kong, Mr Li Hou, then deputy- 
director of the HKMAO, had said: "If other political parties have already been set up, 
then I can’t say whether the Chinese Communist Party members would act openly or 
not. "373
The signal was clear, as expounded in the SCMP’s editorial that "Hong Kong
could be playing with fire if party politics were allowed to develop in the future
Special Administrative Region". The editorial went on:
This is the first time that China has set down a clear line on party 
politics. Hongkong must realise that politics could never develop here 
on traditional Western party line by excluding the communist party. .
. . The course towards Westminster-style politics would mean an open 
invitation for politicking of a potentially destructive kind, in the sense 
that struggles for the seat of government with the certain (and only) 
winner being the Communist Party could extinguish the spirit of the 
Joint Declaration, which calls for Hongkong people ruling Hongkong.
. . . Those who espouse the cause of party government should be 
admired for their direct and broad-minded approach to representative 
politics. But they would be wise to consider whether such politicking 
would serve exclusively Hongkong interests.374
m SCMP, 11 April 1985.
312HKS, 1 February 1986
m SCMP, 3 June 1986.
3745CMP, 4 June 1986.
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But Beijing’s negative attitude toward party politics seemed to soften in late 
1988. It seemed that China had came to see the inevitability of having organisational 
support once the direct elections were put in place. In response to whether the 
political party would have a bad influence on the future political structure, Mr Li Hou 
said the forming of political organisations was inevitable and would be further 
developed as Hong Kong would have elections, especially direct elections. He also 
employed intentionally the term political organisation instead of political party as he 
had objected to the term in June 1986.375 By using the term "political 
organisation", China seemed to convey the message that political organisations in 
Hong Kong would not be allowed to become the ruling party of the HKSAR, and 
thus, avoided the usage of the term "political party" which may have the meaning of 
ruling in the Western democratic polities. In January 1989, Mr Xu Jiatun had 
conveyed his view to political activists in Hong Kong, including then drafter Mr 
Martin Lee, that they were free to form political organisations. This move seemed 
to give tacit approval for the formation of political parties.376 Later, Mr Xu had 
reportedly qualified his message by stating that political parties formed in Hong Kong 
would be prohibited from advocating the independence of Hong Kong or engaging in 
anti-communist activities.377 This might be interpreted as the no-go areas that the 
Chinese Government would not tolerate. That means the development and presence 
of political parties in Hong Kong would not threaten the socialist system and 
communist rule in China. But the developments after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 
had invaded these no-go areas and had, thus, strained the Sino-Hong Kong relations.
Being relieved from the pains of party-phobia, various political forces once 
again embarked on the road of party-building. At least four groups of political 
activists were on their way in late December 1988 and early 1989. Their major 
proposers were: Mr Stephen Cheong Kam-chuen, Mr Martin Lee, Mr Lo Tak-shing, 
and Mr Lau Chin-shek and Mr Cheung Man-kwong. First of all, Mr Cheong,
™Ta Kung Pao, 23 November 1988. 
316HKS, 27 January 1989.
311HKS, 16 February 1989.
"Group of 89" member, had revived Mr Allen Lee’s abortive party plan in December 
1988. The core members were, more or less, the same as those of 1985, except Mr 
Allen Lee and Mr Martin Lee.378 It was believed that the political status of Mr 
Allen Lee, then senior member of the LegCo, had prevented him from overtly 
participating in the plan. Mr Allen Lee had been the key contender against Miss 
Maria Tam within the political establishment and this prevented him from merging 
with the PHKS or coordinating to form a new group.
Second, as mentioned earlier, because of contrasting attitudes towards direct 
elections and political reforms with Mr Allen Lee’s group since 1985, Mr Martin 
Lee, then LegCo member and Basic Law drafter, had come out with his own party 
plan announced in late December 1988.379 Mr Martin Lee had been a vocal 
democracy reformer and a campaigner against undue Chinese interference in the Basic 
Law drafting process. He revealed that he would opt either to start a new party or 
merge with some or all of the following political groups to form a new one: the Joint 
Committee for Promotion of Democratic Government, the MP, the HKAS, and the 
HKADPL. At the same time, the "Big Three" democratic groups of the MP, the 
HKAS and the HKADPL had also tried to hammer out a merger plan.380
Third, Mr Lo Tak-shing381, a vice-chairman of the Consultative Committee 
for the Basic Law and former ExCo and LegCo member, was said to have discussed 
with some of the "Group of 89" members, like Dr Philip Kwok, Dr Raymond Wu, 
and Mr Kan Fook-yee, the possibility of forming a party in early March 1989. Miss
™SCMP, 3 December 1988.
319SCMP, 31 December 1988.
3S0HKS, 7 January 1989.
381Mr Lo Tak-shing is a grandson of Sir Robert Hotung whose family has close 
ties with the Establishment of Hong Kong. In 1985, he suddenly resigned from the 
posts of ExCo and LegCo member in protest at London’s failure to accept its 
responsibility toward the Hong Kong people by giving them the full British passports. 
The resignation was the first of its kind in the one and a half centuries of British rule.
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Maria Tam, chairwoman of the Progressive Hong Kong Society, was also reportedly 
involved.
Fourth, Mr Lau Chin-shek of the CIC and Mr Cheung Man-kwong of the PTU 
had engaged in forming a bigger "democratic league" in March 1989. Being 
frustrated by the slow progress of the "Big Three" merger plan and the reach of such 
party if it succeeded, the two proposed to develop "a political party with strong 
grassroots support" with membership between 100,000 and half-a-million.382
Among the above political forces, only Mr Lo’s group had transformed its 
plan into action before Tiananmen Square events in June 1989. The New Hong Kong 
Alliance (NHKA) was formally established in May aiming "to work for the resolution 
or compromise of conflicting interests". The move had signified the first big step in 
formal party-building by the conservative clique amongst the established elites. But 
the leaders of the PHKS, like Miss Maria Tam, did not join the NHKA. One of the 
reasons advanced by Miss Tam for not joining was the incompatibility of the NHKA’s 
aim at influencing government policies and her own role as ExCo member.383 It 
was believed that Miss Tam was still involved in it informally. The division of 
labour between Mr Lo and Miss Tam had been described as: " T.S. [Mr Lo] has got 
the brains and Maria [Miss Tam] is the worker ant—it’s a perfect match".384 
Nevertheless, the NHKA’s general committee had 32 members, of whom 21 were 
from the "Group of 89" and 10 from the PHKS, and at least 6 belonged to both 
"Group of 89" and the PHKS. In order to clear away the impression of being led by 
a single leader, the Alliance decided to elect a honorary secretary instead of a 
chairman. Mr Lo Tak-shing, was elected honorary secretary, LegCo member Mr
382SCMP, 21 March 1989.
383Oriental Daily News 9 March 1989, p. 3.
384Quoted in SCMP 4 March 1989, p. 15.
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Peter Wong Hong-yuen as treasurer, Miss Veronica Wu and Dr Raymond Wu as 
press secretaries, and UrbCo member Mr Pao Ping-wing as recruitment officer.385
The Consolidation Stage, 1989-Present
The suppression of the democratic movement in June 1989 and the subsequent 
labelling of Hong Kong as a "subversive" base by the Chinese Government had 
created a confidence crisis and intense concern about China’s and Hong Kong’s 
future. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the whole society of Hong Kong was shocked by 
the Tiananmen Incident and the democrats had become deeply engaged in supporting 
the democratic movement in Beijing. The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the 
Patriotic Democratic Movement in China (HKASPDMC) was formed under the 
leadership of prominent democratic figures, Mr Szeto Wah and Mr Martin Lee, right 
after the military crackdown in Beijing. By organising rallies and a donation 
campaign, and participating in smuggling the key leaders of the Chinese democratic 
movement out of mainland China, the democrats became the prime target of Chinese 
verbal attacks because the no-go areas of party development, as mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, set by the Beijing Government had been invaded by the democrats. 
Reinforced by the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the liberalisation of Eastern 
Europe in late 1989, the then Beijing leadership was desperately worried about its 
regime security, the possible peaceful evolution from within, and the "subversive" 
role of Hong Kong.
As a result, the party-building efforts cooled down because some political 
activists began to adopt a low-profile attitude at the time. As one democrat recorded 
there was difficulty in having incumbent municipal councils and district boards
m HKS and SCMP, 2 May 1989.
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members to seek re-election in 1991 elections.386 The party-building efforts also 
suffered from the exodus of the middle-class, like the professionals, intellectuals,• 
social workers, and so on. An estimated 62,000 Hong Kong people emigrated to 
overseas in 1990. Nevertheless, the June 1989 events had stimulated the passive Hong 
Kong people to think afresh about their destiny which had long been controlled by 
others and about the closeness of their relationship with China.
The Tiananmen Incident, ironically, initially delayed the emergence of a 
budding territory-wide party system which had gone through nearly ten years of 
alignment, dealignment and realignment of the various political forces and groupings. 
But, once the situation had become stable in late 1989, the trend to form political 
groups was restored. On the democrat side, the prominent role played in supporting 
the democratic movement in China had further reinforced their image and popularity 
among the Hong Kong people. But, on the other hand, their relationship with the 
Chinese Government had totally deteriorated as the democrats had condemned the 
way the Chinese Government suppressed the democratic movement.
The official People’s Daily carried a commentary entitled "No Sabotage of the 
One Country, Two Systems Policy Tolerable" on 21 July 1989, issuing a strongly 
worded warning to those democrats who played a significant role in supporting the 
democratic movement in China, accusing them of engaging in subversive activities, 
and condemning them for planning to form a political party in Hong Kong. Because 
of such developments, the idea of forming a united democratic party seemed to be 
blocked by the Chinese hostility towards it and the very survival of that party after 
1997. The China factor coincided with the unresolved conflicts over ideological 
orientation, and the nature and timing of the new party among key participants had 
contributed to the slow progress of forming a new democratic party.387 In addition,
3865CMP, 3 September 1989.
381SCMP, 6 August 1989; Wong Fu-wing, "The Background and Problems of 
Forming Political Party Among ’Democratic Groups’," Contemporary 11 (10 
February 1990):23-4, 12 (17 February 1990):28-9, 13 (24 February 1990):28-9, (in 
Chinese); Lo Wai, "Mr Fung Kin-kee Forms Another Democratic Group,"
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self-centred calculation also played a role. To quote Dr Ding Lik-kiu’s words, "Some 
of the liberals [democrats] say the time is not ripe for political parties. Others are 
reluctant to give up their hard won identities for the sake of a bigger group".388 
Because of such differences, the MP and the HKADPL later opted not to join the new 
democratic party—the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK), and retained their 
separate group labels and identities. Nevertheless, some members of these two 
groups, like Dr Yeung Sum, did join the new democratic group.
Although the pressure from China was felt, the democrats did manage to form
a new political organisation, though still not calling itself a political party, with their
decision not to dissolve other democratic groups. The UDHK seemed to be taking
shape in late 1989 and was formally established in April 1990 with about 210
founding members.389 The UDHK was chaired by Mr Martin Lee with Mr Yeung
Sum of the Meeting Point and Mr Albert Ho of the Hong Kong Affairs Society as
Vice-Chairmen at the time of founding. Members mainly comprised professionals,
lawyers, social workers, educationalists, and so on. Both Hong Kong Government
and NCNA’s officials were invited to attend the founding ceremony but they were not
present. It was because China had regarded some leaders of the UDHK as
"subversive" and thus, the Hong Kong Government officials wanted to distance
themselves from the conflict. Because of the overlapping leadership with the
HKASPDMC, the UDHK stressed in its founding declaration that:
The UDHK, being a local political organisation, will focus its attention 
on local affairs. It will not seek to participate or be involved in the 
politics of the Central People’s government or of other regions in the 
People’s Republic of China.
The intentional separation of the HKASPDMC and the UDHK did not bear fruit 
because the Chinese Government treated these two groups as if there was no 
difference between them.
Contemporary 21 (21 April 1990):38-9, (in Chinese).
m HKS, 15 May 1989.
389Contemporary, 6 (30 December 1989):29-30.
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While the negotiation among "core" democratic groups and individuals was 
in progress, the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation (HKDF), first initiated by LegCo 
member Mr Jimmy McGregor and subsequently chaired by LegCo member Dr Leong 
Che-hung, declared its formation in October 1989 with support from leading foreign 
businessmen, like Hari Hariela, Ian Tomlin, Matthew Oram and Kewlram Sital.390 
Mr Martin Lee was reportedly involved in the plan but later opted not to play an 
active role in the HKDF because he had deeply involved himself in a party bid with 
the "Big Three" and other leading democrats. The HKDF could be viewed as the 
conservative clique of the democratic forces. Their business interests seemed to 
prevent their merger with the grass-roots oriented democrats, and the adoption of 
confrontational attitude towards China. In its manifesto, the HKDF regarded itself 
as "an independent, multi-racial, multi-cultural political organisation . . . committed 
to developing a pluralistic democracy in Hong Kong" and it aimed "to shape 
government policy in order to make Hong Kong a more open, progressive society in 
which all people can share the fruits of its success".391
On the conservative side, a split emerged as the New Hong Kong Alliance 
(NHKA) proposed to adopt the "Bicameral Model" in the future HKSAR’s legislature 
in late August 1989.392 This move, as mentioned in Chapter 3, had caused a head- 
on confrontation with the supporters of the "4-4-2 Model", which was supported by 
such members of the "Group of 89", like Mr Vincent Lo. Five pro-Beijing members 
of the NHKA, including Mr Lo Tak-shing, had even tried to block the adoption of 
the "4-4-2 Model" by the "Group of 89" as a compromise with the democrats and the 
moderates. One of them reportedly concluded that the compromise "is aimed at using 
democracy to resist China" through the early introduction of universal suffrage.393 
Subsequently, some key members of the NHKA, such as Mr Peter Wong Hong-yuen,
390SCMP, 21 October 1989.
391HKDF, Manifesto: Hong Kong Democratic Foundation Towards a Democratic,
Stable, Prosperous, Just and free Society. Supplied by the HKDF.
m SCMP, 28 August 1989.
m SCMP, 19 and 20 September 1989.
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Dr Raymond Wu, Miss Veronica Wu, and Dr Philip Kwok, quit the alliance in early 
1990.394
Because of this split, the conservative camp needed to develop another political 
group to prepare for the 1991 elections. The backbone of the planned group mainly 
comprised members from the Progressive Hong Kong Society and the "Group of 89", 
like Miss Maria Tam, Mr Hu Fa-kuang (former appointed LegCo member), Dr 
Raymond Wu and Dr Philip Kwok. Miss Maria Tam was believed to be acting as 
a locomotive of the planned group. The group appeared to have difficulty in 
attracting prominent businessmen to join. Her rivals, Mr Allen Lee, Mr Stephen 
Cheong and Mr Vincent Lo had, in one way or another, showed that they would not 
join the group.395 The planned group further suffered from the charge of Miss 
Tam’s alleged conflict of interest and her reportedly censoring of a reporter tracing 
her case in mid-1990.396 The accusation not only damaged her public image but 
also hampered her coalition-building efforts for the planned group.397
Miss Tam had been regarded as "a political penny stock broker" who appeared 
to enjoy trust and acceptance from both the Beijing and the Hong Kong 
Governments.398 She had engaged in bridging the "territorial conservatives" of the 
big businessmen and the "local conservatives" of community leaders and attempted 
to consolidate an influential conservative party so as to counter the surge of the
m SCMP, 6 January 1990.
395Pai Shing, 228 (16 November 1990):34.
396Miss Maria Tam was accused of owning a certain amount of shares of a taxi 
company and the holding company of a bus company while chairing the Transport 
Advisory Committee.
397Stephen Lung-wai Tang, "Political Markets, Competition, and the Return to 
Monopoly: Evolution Amidst a Historical Tragedy," in Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-
sheun, eds., Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, 1993), pp. 283-4.
mIbid., p. 269.
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democrats after the mid-1980s.3"  Because of her important role in the party- 
building drive, the outbreak of the scandal had contributed to the low acceptance of 
the planned group by the mass public. Nevertheless, the planned group had gone 
through the crisis and formally declared the formation of the Liberal Democratic 
Federation (LDF) in November 1990 with Mr Hu Fa-kuang as chairman, Miss Maria 
Tam and Dr Philip Kwok as vice-chairpersons. The LDF’s members were recruited 
mainly from the business community, professionals and local community leaders.
The group led by Mr Allen Lee and Mr Stephen Cheong Kam-chuen did not 
manage to form a mass party before the 1991 LegCo elections. One of the reasons 
was the transformation of this group into a close government coalition after the 
downfall of Miss Maria Tam in 1990. The Government had, thus, relied on this 
group to guard against the expected surge of the democrats in the LegCo after 1991 
direct elections. Under the leadership of Mr Allen Lee, the Cooperative Resources 
Centre (CRC) was formed after the 1991 LegCo elections and comprised mainly the 
appointed members of the ExCo and the LegCo. In fact, the CRC became the pro- 
Govemment force in the LegCo. Because of the arrival of the new Governor Mr 
Christopher Patten and the subsequent "resignation" of the CRC’s members from the 
ExCo in 1992, and the definite abolishment of the LegCo’s appointed seats in 1995, 
the CRC was forced to develop a mass-oriented political party. As a result, the CRC 
was transformed into the Liberal Party in early 1993.
Up to the moment of the 1991 elections, the election-created political groups 
were still small in scale in terms of membership (see Table 5.3). The membership 
of those formed before the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 had 
ranged from 20 to 50 (except the MP), and those formed after that event usually had 
about or over 150 members (except the NHKA). It seemed that political forces had 
undergone realignment in the late 1980s and had merged into a comparatively bigger 
coalition for fighting the 1991 electoral battles.
mIbid., pp. 280-1.
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The Budding Party Market in the Early 1990s
After more than a decade of development, various political forces had, in one 
way or another, consolidated and gradually undergone an institutionalisation process 
sparked off by the political reforms in the mid-1980. Two rival camps of political 
forces had been consolidated: the conservatives and the democrats. As shown in 
previous section, the conservatives comprised mainly the established elites and its 
allies in the local community. They were of the opinion that the unreformed political 
system before the 1980s had served Hong Kong well and why bother to change it. 
By siding with the Chinese Government from the mid-1980s, the conservatives tried 
hard to scale down the pace and scope of democratisation and thus, contained the 
growth of the democrats. Their reasons to adopt a resistant attitude towards political 
reforms were the possible loss of their privileges and exclusive access to political 
power and influence, and the uneasiness of the projected growth of the tax burden as 
a result of the welfare approach of the democrats. They often hold a cooperative 
attitude towards Beijing for business reasons, and thus are labelled as "pro-Beijing”. 
Their approach to change largely relied on the building of a patron-client network, 
in which the patrons (the established elites) and the clients (the local community 
leaders) were threaded together by power brokers or go-betweens. This had the 
advantage of forming a political group within a short period of time, but the lack of 
direct communication between the patrons and the clients, and the limited reach of 
the clients’ personal network proved to be not an effective way to mobilise support 
and to develop the cohesiveness of the group. Furthermore, the group would suffer 
if the power brokers lost his/her credibility in the public eye.
On the democratic side, they acted as an anti-establishment force and urged 
the Government to carry out social reforms in the 1970s and the political reforms in 
the 1980s. They were inspired by the promise of "Hong Kong people governing 
Hong Kong" and the eventual devolution of power resulted from the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration and embarked on the road of political group-building. They were pro- 
China in the sense that some of the leading democrats, like Dr Yeung Sum and Mr 
Szeto Wah, were the first batch of social activists to advocate the return of Hong
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Kong to China when the 1997 issue was first appeared in the early 1980s. But their 
differences over the pace and scope of democratic reforms emerged gradually from 
the mid-1980s. The Beijing leaders and the democrats had confronted each other in 
the Daya Bay anti-nuclear movement and the drafting of the Basic Law, and their 
relationship totally deteriorated after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. Comparatively 
speaking, they were more organised than the conservatives, but their mobilisation 
strength and organisational development were hampered by the lack of institutional 
support and favourable political conditions conducive to the growth of party politics. 
Although their demands for democratic reforms only received support from the small 
attentive middle-class professionals, their role of fighting for the grass-roots’ interests 
had a wider acceptance in the mass public.
The conflict between the conservatives and the democrats of the day was 
mainly over the composition of the legislature, and the timing and pace of introducing 
direct elections. The release of two sets of Green and White Papers in 1984, and 
1987 and 1988 had provided the occasions for various advocate groups to mobilise 
their respective supporters. Through wide media coverage and the mobilisation 
efforts of concerned groups, the attentive public was no longer confined to a small 
group of people.
In the mid-1980s, the conflict between the conservatives and the British-Hong 
Kong Government, on the one hand, and the democrats, on the other, had added a 
new dimension. China had intervened in the internal conflict of Hong Kong over the 
pace and direction of democratization. In the 1987 political review, the Hong Kong 
government had been accused by the democrats of instituting a political structure that 
would not be controlled by the public but instead by the already privileged well-to-do 
people through the introduction of functional constituency elections and the not-so- 
significant portion of directly elected seats in the legislature.
But this contradiction has been transformed to one between the Chinese 
Government and the democrats, as Beijing adopted a cautious but more restrictive 
attitude towards the political reforms. Beijing’s stance was well reflected on the
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occasion of the 1987 political review and in the drafting process of the Basic Law. 
By adopting a conservative stance, Beijing seemed to put all the political forces under 
her reach and manoeuvre. By siding with the business tycoons and turning down the 
democrats’ demands, the Chinese Government engaged itself in a head-on 
confrontation with the democrats. The intervention of China had provided an 
opportunity for the conservatives to exploit its strategic economic role in the 
transitional period to counter the emergence of the democrats. The Tiananmen 
Square events blew away any remaining possibility of cooperation between the 
Chinese Government and the democrats.
The orientation of various political forces in the budding party market in the 
early 1990s can be summarised by using the two dimensions of differences in 
redistribution and democratisation. First, the redistribution issue had long been a 
bone of contention in the territory. From the outset, the democrats and the leftist 
trade unionists had fought for a reasonable distribution of social resources and asked 
for the Government to adopt policies with redistribution effects. By contrast, the 
conservatives from the establishment, such as the bureaucrats, the business tycoons 
and the appointed unofficial ExCo and LegCo members, have tended to uphold the 
capitalist mode of market distribution. Second, the democratisation issue has also 
divided the political community since the mid-1980s. The democrats asked for faster 
pace of democratisation, but the conservatives and the leftists wanted it slower. The 
respective positioning of the various political groups can be roughly sketched in the 
following Figure 5.1.
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Table 5.la
The Electorate of the UrbCo and the RegCo, and Population 
of Hong Kong, 1952-91
Year UrbCo
(A)
RegCo
(B)
Population
(C)
A+B/C
(%)
1952 9 000 - - _
1953 8 000 - - -
1954 13 700 - - -
1955 14 583 - - -
1956 15 638 - - -
1957 19 305 - - -
1959 23 584 - - -
1961 26 039 - 3,129,648 0.83%
1963 25 932 - - -
1965 29 529 - - -
1967 26 275 - 3,708,920* 0.71%
1969 34 392 - - -
1971 37 788 - 3,936,630 0.96%
1973 31 284 - - -
1975 34 078 - - -
1977 37 174 - 4,402,990** 0 . 84%
1979 31 481 - - -
1981 34 381 - 5,109,812 0.67%
1983 707 489 - - -
1986 998 177 443,363 5,495,488 26.23%
1989 1, 045 073 558,975 - -
1991 1,124 292 731,151 5,674,114 32.70%
* 1966 By-Census's figure. 
** 1976 By-Census's figure.
Sources:
1. For electorate's figure: compiled from the data
supplied by the Registration and Electoral Office, 
Constitutional Affairs Branch, Government Secretariat, 
Hong Kong Government.
2. For the population of Hong Kong, see Hong Kong Annual 
Digest of Statistics, 1992 ed., p. 11, Table 2.1.
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Table 5.lb
The Electorate of the District Boards, 1982-91
Year Electorate
1982 893,493
1985 1,412,877
1988 1,610,998
1991 1,855,443
Source: compiled from the data supplied by the Registration 
and Electoral Office, Constitutional Affairs Branch, 
Government Secretariat, Hong Kong Government.
Table 5.lc
The Electorate of Various Composition of the LegCo, 
1985-91
Year Electoral
College
Functional
Constituency
Direct
Election
1985 433 46,645 -
1988 466 61,052 -
1991 - 69,825 1,916,925
Source: compiled from the data supplied by the Registration 
and Electoral Office, Constitutional Affairs Branch, 
Government Secretariat, Hong Kong Government.
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Table 5.2
Performance of Political 
Elections
Groups in 1985 District Boards
Group Name Nominations Elected %
Hong Kong People's 
Association 8 8 100.0
Meeting Point 4 4 100.0
Hong Kong Affairs 
Society 3 3 100 .0
Eastern Coalition 11 11 100.0
Group of 12 12 10 91.7
Hong Kong People's 
Council on Public 
Housing Policy 11 9 81.8
Professional Teachers' 
Union 30 24 80.0
Reform Club 33 17 56 .7
Civic Association 54 21 36 .4
Note: The above figure does not reflect the fact that some 
candidates had received support from more than one group.
Source: Leung Chun-man, "The Criteria of Appointing
District Boards Members and the Training of Leaders Capable 
for Governing Hong Kong: An Interview with Mr Albert C.C. 
Lam, " (in Chinese) Hong K ong E co n o m ic  J o u r n a l  M o n th ly 97 
(1985):4-6.
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Table 5.3
The Membership of Selected Political Groups
Name
(1)
Membership
(2) (3)
Hong Kong Observers 50 30 -
New Hong Kong Society 20 20 -
Meeting Point 190 190 127
Hong Kong Affairs 
Society 50 100 -
Hong Kong People's 
Association 30 20 -
Progressive Hong Kong 
Society - 150 -
Hong Kong Association 
of Democracy and 
People's Livelihood _ 160 140
New Hong Kong Alliance - 36 -
Hong Kong Democratic 
Foundation - 340 -
United Democrats of 
Hong Kong - 520 600
Liberal Democratic 
Federation - 150 208
Sources:
(1) Yip Tze-chin, "The Political Wake-up of Hong Kong's 
New Generation of Intelligentsia," (in Chinese) Hong 
K ong E co n o m ic  J o u r n a l  M o n th ly 92 (1984): 40-43;
(2) Fong Wah, "Hong Kong Political Organizations: Easy to 
Form But Difficult to Grow, " (in Chinese) M in g Pao  
M o n th ly  26 (April 1991):8-9;
(3) Open M a g a z in e 75 (March 1993):50-l, (in Chinese).
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CHAPTER VI
POLITICAL MOBILISATION AND ELECTORAL CHOICES
This chapter examines the immediate electoral context within which the formal 
and informal political participants tried to shape the electoral choice of the voters in 
the 1991 LegCo direct elections, and the concerns and considerations of the electors 
as reported in various opinion polls. The participants had tried hard to convince the 
electorate to support them. Their values and opinions would be transmitted through 
their respective media and personal networks. Given the amplification effect of the 
media and personal networks, the society would be, in one way or another, mobilized 
and politicized. On the one hand, the electorate was then exposed to an immense 
bombardment of electoral information and their vote choices would then be shaped. 
On the other, the electors’ concerns and issue orientation would more or less shape 
the candidates’ policy stance and political attitudes. First of all, the constraints of the 
1991 LegCo direct elections will be highlighted. Second, the attitude of the British- 
Hong Kong and Chinese Governments towards the elections will be discussed. Third, 
the value and policy stance the candidates wanted to convey during the campaign 
period from early August to mid-September 1991 will be examined. Campaign 
materials and debates on the television will be used as the basis of observation. 
Fourth, the concerns and considerations of the electorate will be discussed so as to 
see whether there was a match of views and priorities of issues between the 
candidates and the electors.
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The Constraints of the 1991 LegCo Direct Elections
The first-ever direct elections to the LegCo signified a milestone in the 
political history of Hong Kong not only because of the establishment of an 
institutional linkage which provided a more direct representation for the mass public, 
but also because it was a transitional step leading to a fully-fledged legislature with 
an independent base and role that will remove it from the executive’s direct influence 
and will enable it to wield decisive power within its own jurisdictions, i.e. the 
passage of the Government’s bills and the annual scrutiny of the Government’s 
budgets. These powers would be effective weapons to pressure the Government to 
make compromises if there were a clear majority of opinion within the legislature.
Needless to say, the LegCo direct elections in 1991 did not serve to change 
the Government and to transfer the executive power from one party to another. That 
means no executive power was to be transferred to the winner of the LegCo direct 
elections. The executive-dominated political structure, which is formally not subject 
to any electoral pressure, would still be in place whatever the result of the elections. 
There was no hope of winning the LegCo elections and becoming the ruling party of 
Hong Kong. So the 1991 LegCo direct elections could not be regarded as having the 
same degree of significance and importance as those in former British colonies 
elsewhere when Britain decided to grant them independence through the institution 
of a Westminster-type of government.
But, in fact, the 1991 LegCo direct elections would strengthen the 
representativeness of the legislature and the input from the mass society. If viewed 
from a structural perspective, the introduction of direct elections to the LegCo would, 
in one way or another, challenge the legitimacy of the non-elected executive and may 
transform the relationship between the legislature and the executive in the long run. 
But the rather long-term nature of such a change, coupled with the negative Chinese 
attitude towards a stronger legislature, did contribute to the low key evaluation of the 
1991 LegCo direct elections by the mass public. For the mass public, the 1991 
LegCo direct elections only had a symbolic meaning of exercising civic rights rather
238
than an electoral game devised to empower those among the attentive public to shape 
the political landscape of the transitional Hong Kong. "Votes without power", as the 
title of a book on 1991 LegCo direct elections suggested, seemed to represent their 
perception towards the said elections.400
Furthermore, the formal design and composition of the LegCo has prevented 
the emergence of a majority party in the legislature. There are four kinds of 
membership in the LegCo: 3 ex-officio members, 18 appointed members, 21 elected 
members from functional constituency elections, and 18 elected members from 
geographical direct elections. This composition had contributed to not only a 
fragmented legislature but also a lack of keen participants in the direct elections. 
Most of the prominent politicians, like Mr Allen Lee and Miss Maria Tam, saw no 
urgency about joining the 1991 direct elections. In answering the question why he 
decided not to stand in the 1991 LegCo direct elections, Mr Allen Lee, then an ExCo 
and senior LegCo member, revealed in 1993 that the then Governor Sir David Wilson 
had advised him not to join the said election, as he would reappoint him so as to 
maintain the continuity of the LegCo. Mr Allen Lee later stated that his decision to 
accept Sir David’s offer was a wrong one.401
This contributed to quite an unbalanced picture in which the potential 
candidates from the Establishment and the conservatives relied on government re­
appointment or functional constituency elections. On the other hand, the democrats 
concentrated their efforts on the geographical constituency direct elections. As a 
result, the electoral market had been further distorted as if the democrats had 
dominated the direct elections game. This distorted picture further gained ground 
from the fact that the democrats had altogether nominated over 20 candidates for the 
LegCo direct elections (see Tables 6.1 and 6.3).
400Rowena Kwok, Joan Leung, and Ian Scott, eds., Votes Without Power: The 
Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections 1991, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 1992).
^Interview with Mr Allen Lee, 1 July 1993, Hong Kong.
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Although the party market has been growing and evolving in the decade of the 
1980s, the organisational strength and mobilization power of the political groups still 
remained elementary. This was reflected in the difficulties the political groups faced 
in recruiting candidates to stand in the 1991 LegCo direct elections. No single 
political group managed to nominate enough candidates in all 9 LegCo constituencies. 
The UDHK was no exception. Although nominating a total of 14 candidates and 
contesting in full in 5 constituencies, the UDHK needed to form a coalition with the 
MP in three constituencies and had only one nominated candidate in the Kowloon 
West constituency. The LDF had nominated only 5 candidates in 4 constituencies, 
the HKADPL nominated 3 candidates in 2 constituencies, the MP nominated 3 
candidates in 3 constituencies, the NHKA nominated 2 in 1 constituency, the HKDF 
nominated 1 candidate in 1 constituency. Three candidates in 3 constituencies had 
the apparent support of the leftist backing, (see Table 6.2)
The democrats had failed to arrive at a nomination list acceptable to all sides 
and a grand election coalition because of their different attitudes towards the Beijing 
Government after the Tiananmen Incident, their ideological differences and 
personality conflicts. The HKADPL held a relatively soft attitude towards Beijing 
and a more welfare-oriented ideology, while the UDHK adopted a rather 
confrontational attitude and a more middle-class political orientation. The MP’s 
attitude towards Beijing was closer to that of the HKADPL, while its political 
ideology was nearer to that of the UDHK. Even more, the HKADPL’s candidates 
had engaged in a head-on competition in 2 constituencies with other democrats’ 
candidates, in which one competed with a UDHK’s candidate and the other competed 
with candidates from the UDHK-MP coalition. On the conservative side, any 
coalition effort was hampered by Miss Maria Tam’s scandal (discussed in Chapter 5) 
and the lack of urgency and incentive, created by the nature of the political system, 
to join the direct election game. They were further impeded by their "freshness" in 
wooing and pinning down grass-roots organisation networks. Therefore, it seemed 
that a territory-wide conservative election coalition had failed to emerge in the 1991 
LegCo direct elections. The leftists seemed to be constrained by the unfavourable 
political climate at the time and adopted a low-profile attitude in nominating
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candidates. Mr Tsang Tak-shing, the chief-editor of the communist paper, Ta Kung
Pao, claimed that:
There was no organized fielding of candidates. For the eighteen seats 
contested in the direct elections, there were only three candidates from 
established pro-Beijing [leftist] circles, and they had all decided to run 
on their own initiatives. There was no Chinese official attempt to 
contact more would-be candidates with enticement to run.402 (italic 
mine)
This above assertion was only half true. It was true that only three candidates 
were came from the "established pro-Beijing circles" and there was "no official 
Chinese attempt" to field more candidates, but the Beijing Government had 
strategically supported, through the NCNA’s Hong Kong Branch, those who 
competed against the UDHK’s candidates, as will be demonstrated in the next section. 
Furthermore, the electoral campaigns of the leftists and its supported candidates were 
fought with vigorous support from the Chinese and the leftist establishments in terms 
of both funding and manpower (for details, see the following section). The leftist 
FTU mobilised one thousand "voluntary workers" to help promote voter registration 
in three possible running LegCo constituencies in June 1991. The FTU also planned 
to make a home visit to every voter in the Kowloon Central constituency, which 
political activists had long regarded as a "liberated area" because of the alleged 
popular support and influence the FTU enjoyed there.403
^Tsang Tak-shing, "On Chinese Official Attitudes towards Legislative Council 
Elections 1991," in Jane C.Y. Lee, W.N. Ho, and Jermain T.M. Lam, eds., A 
Report o f the Conference Proceedings on Politics and 1991 Elections in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong: City Polytechnic of Hong Kong, Department of Public & Social 
Administration, 1992), p. 44.
mMing Pao Daily News, 24 June 1991.
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Political Mobilisation:
Chinese and British-Hong Kong Governments
The Hong Kong Government had put enormous efforts into the 1991 direct 
elections so as to ensure its success. The significance of success would not only help 
to prove the wisdom of introducing direct elections but also provide a chip for 
London to bargain with Beijing that more direct elected seats should be introduced 
before 1997. London’s calculation had been embedded in the secret diplomatic 
exchange in February 1990 when China and Britain came to an understanding that 
there should be no less than 20 directly elected seats in the LegCo in 1995. The 
words "no less than" had hinted that London might raise the issue afterwards if she 
saw fit. The British Foreign Minister with special responsibility for Hong Kong 
stated in September 1990 that the Basic Law could be amended so as to accommodate 
the current developments in Hong Kong.404 Even as late as early September 1991, 
Prof. Wang Gungwu, then an ExCo member, urged Hong Kong people to demand 
more LegCo directly-elected seats from the Chinese Government if the turn-out rate 
reached as high as 60% in the LegCo direct elections.405 What mattered here was 
the linkage between the voting turn-out in the 1991 LegCo direct elections and the 
possible increase of directly-elected seats in 1995.
The slogan that the Hong Kong Government employed in urging people to 
vote was: "vote: it’s power in your hands!"406. On the surface, this catchword is 
quite attractive and it implies that significant change could be possible if one did go 
to vote. But this claim did not match up with the then political reality as less than 
one-third (18 seats) of the total LegCo had been set aside for direct elections. 
Numerically speaking, a political force could manage to command a majority of the 
directly elected seats but still remained as a minority in the whole legislature. This
m Bauhinia Magazine, 2 (November 1990): 11.
^H K S, 14 September 1991.
406This phrase was found in the Government’s election advertisements in the 
major printed media.
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short-term calculation and the negative Chinese attitude towards a stronger legislature 
had made the mass public feel that there existed a credibility gap.
On the Chinese side, the stance was very clear. No such link existed and the
Basic Law could not be amended before it was put into practice in 1997. Two days
before the designated polling day, an official statement from the State Council’s
HKMAO, put through by the semi-official China News Service, remarked:
Over a period of time recently, [some people in] Hongkong have time 
and again given such view -- If the Legislative Council direct elections 
succeeded and there is a high turnout, [we should] demand China 
quicken the pace of democracy and give more directly elected seats in 
1995. . . .  It is absolutely impossible and an unrealistic fantasy that the 
composition of the legislative assembly can be amended before
199? 407
It warned that the LegCo constituted in 1995 would have to be dissolved in 1997 if 
the composition was not in accord with the stipulations of the Basic Law.
Beijing had, in one way or another, expressed openly her view that she would 
like to see the election of those who love China and Hong Kong, support Hong 
Kong’s reunion with China and the Basic Law in the LegCo direct elections. Beijing 
had also made it clear that the election of democrats’ candidates would do no good 
to the already strained Sino-Hong Kong relationship and reminded Hong Kong voters 
to be careful in choosing which candidates to vote for. In commenting on whether 
to vote for the pro-China candidates, a signed article in the NCNA affiliated Bauhinia 
Magazine, which was widely cited by other media, stated that:
^Quoted in SCMP, 14 September 1991.
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In the present stage of Hong Kong, if the so-called "pro-China" means 
accepting the Chinese government, supporting "one country, two 
systems", the Basic Law and the unification of China, and advocating 
the strengthening of communication and cooperation between Hong 
Kong and mainland, then what is the problem? . . . Taking into 
consideration of the political reality [of reunion with China], voters 
should demand them to love their country, to accept or at least not to 
confront and even not to subvert the Chinese government when 
choosing political representatives to participate the governing of Hong 
Kong. . . . Some politicians in Hong Kong have regarded themselves 
orally as "not anti-China", and have only criticised some Chinese 
Communist Party’s measures towards Hong Kong. But as a matter of 
fact, their behaviours are not so simple. . . . they have lobbied western 
countries to apply economic sanctions towards China, . . . they have 
set-up political organisation that aimed at subverting Chinese 
government. . .  if people like this become Legislative Councillors, do 
they promote accord cooperation between Hong Kong and mainland? 
Do they contribute to the smooth development of Hong Kong? . . . 
Based upon the intimate and in-dividable relationships between Hong 
Kong and mainland, and the future of Hong Kong, it is worthy to 
consider from the angle of the above questions what kinds of people 
have to be chosen to institute the Hong Kong legislature.408
In order to minimize the democrats’ chance of being elected, Beijing seemed 
to adopt a united-front strategy of supporting the local leftists and non-democrat 
candidates. An internal document drafted in September 1990 highlighted the 
following strategies:
1. to mobilise all possible forces, including those of the pro-Beijing, and 
apparently moderate but pro-Beijing groups, to participate in the 1991 LegCo 
elections;
2. to encourage and support business and professional organisations, like the 
LDF and the NT AS, to participate so as to minimise the democrats’ chances 
of being elected or at least to prevent them from being elected uncontested;
3. owing to the fact that there are various factions within the democrats’ camp 
and the lack of consensus toward China, we can adopt differential treatment 
toward the democrats’ camp; in the hope of isolating and challenging the anti­
m Bauhinia Magazine, 12 (September 1991): 13; my own translation.
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communist figures, like Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, to the maximum degree, 
we could conditionally support the Meeting Point’s and the HKADPL’s 
candidates in those constituencies where the strength of the democrats has 
prevailed and we do not have suitable candidates to nominate;
4. given that they are not anti-communist, we could also conditionally support 
candidates from the British-Hong Kong establishment, whether they are pro- 
British or not.409
These strategies seemed to match the repeated urging of Chinese officials, i.e. 
Mr Li Hou and Mr Zhou Nan, during 1990 that businessmen should get organised 
and participate in the 1991 three-tier legislature elections.410 Mr Lu Ping had also 
publicly supported the left-wing Federation of Trade Unions’ participation in the 1991 
elections.411 In addition, the Beijing Government had reportedly been involved in 
the electoral campaign by giving money to the left-wing LegCo candidates. The 
maximum amount the Beijing-supported candidates could receive was HK$100,000 
and the "money would be channelled by Chinese companies in Hongkong through the 
Federation of Trade Unions". It was also reported that staff of China-run enterprises, 
i.e. the Bank of China and China Travel Service, had also been drafted in to 
campaign for the left-wing candidates.412
Beijing’s fear of the growth of the democrats was further fuelled as the 
UDHK, the flagship of the democrats’ camp, urged the Governor to appoint ExCo 
members in proportion to the seat-share that the relevant political groups and 
individual candidates received in the LegCo direct elections.413 Though article 55
409Yip Chi-chao, "The Chinese Deployment Towards the 1991 Direct Elections," 
Hong Kong Economic Times, 12 September 1991. (in Chinese, my own translation)
410Sing Tao Jih Pao, 18 February 1990; Bauhinia Magazine, 2 (November
1990): 11.
AnMing Pao Daily News, 11 March 1991.
m Ming Pao Daily News, 12 September 1991; SCMP, 15 September 1991.
413Ming Pao Daily News, 24 June 1991.
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of the Basic Law has stipulated that the HKSAR chief executive should appoint ExCo 
members from "among the principal officials of the executive authorities, members 
of the Legislative Council and public figures", Beijing showed its dislike of the 
democrats’ move. The negative response could be seen as a move to prevent the 
UDHK, especially those who had a close relationship with the HKASPDM, 
presumably Mr Szeto Wah and Mr Martin Lee, from acquiring more influence or 
popularity in the transitional period.
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Political Mobilisation:
Candidates and Its Affiliated Groups
Given the embryonic form of party competition in Hong Kong, one cannot 
rely only on the electoral platforms of the participating groups to understand their 
respective value orientation and policy stance. Thus, in addition to the electoral 
platforms of various groups, campaign materials distributed by the candidates 
themselves should also be employed. But there were problems in locating a 
comprehensive set of campaign materials as there were several waves of releases with 
various timings and scope of distribution. It has proved impossible to record and 
examine all the candidates’ messages and communications targeted at their respective 
voters. Therefore, some kind of judgement is required to select representative items 
for analysis.
The platform or campaign leaflets may provide the necessary background 
information for the voters to have an understanding of the candidates. But it is rather 
a static form. Therefore, their debates on the television were also included. Three 
sets of direct election debate programmes were prepared and broadcast. These 
included Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), the Television Broadcasting Limited 
(TVB), and the Asia Television Limited (ATV). This could supplement the rather 
dry campaign leaflets and provide an arena in which candidates could challenge one 
another as well as highlight what they wanted to sell to their potential supporters. 
Furthermore, according to an opinion survey, an overwhelming member of 
respondents (71.6%) had learned about their own candidates through the following 
three channels: campaign material (28.6%), television (27.2%), and newspaper or 
magazine (15.8%).414
414SCMP, 10 September 1991, p. 7.
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Electoral Themes from the Campaign Materials
The campaign materials served to differentiate one (group of) candidate(s) 
from others and had the effect of helping the voters to choose. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, candidates do not need to challenge their competitors in a direct manner; 
rather, they need only stress different issues to enlist support. For example, the 
leftists’ and the conservative candidates did not challenge the democrat candidates’ 
stance towards the Chinese democratic movement, but highlighted the importance of 
the need to maintain communication with China. That meant they played up the value 
of communication with China to counter the democrats’ "position" issue of supporting 
the Chinese democratic movement. According to one study based upon candidates’ 
campaign materials, the issue popularity among the candidates were as follows: social 
services and public utilities (94.4%, N=51); distribution415 (90.7%, N=49); 
political system and political change, and environmental issues (72.2%, N =39); class 
issues, and law and order (70.4%, N=38); gender issues (68.5%, N=37); urban 
issues (66.7%, N=36); Sino-Hong Kong relations (57.4%, N=31); growth and 
stability (53.7%, N=29); Vietnamese boat people (48.1%, N=26); human rights 
(42.6%, N=23); civil service (7.4%, N=4); others (11.1%, N=6). The top three 
of the most articulated issues were similar to those of the popular issues mentioned 
above. They were: social services and public utilities (N=359), political system and 
political change (N=128), and distribution (N = 110).416
The candidates would position themselves as close as possible to the issues that 
attracted the median voters. As a result, it was believed that the popularity of issues 
articulated by the candidates would be a reflection of the electors’ concerns. Popular
415"Distribution" refers, here, to the issues of taxation, the distribution of social 
resources, and so on.
416The figure and percentage in the bracket denoted the number of candidates 
holding a position on that issue. See Lee Ming-kwan, "Issue-Position in the 1991 
Legislative Council Election," in Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds., Hong Kong 
Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong), p. 243.
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as it was, their respective policy stance might be different from each other. Thus, 
a survey on their policy stance could help to clarify this.
Although Hong Kong was famous for her low tax policy, the distribution and 
sources of tax had become one of the sensitive issues since the mid-1980s. As 
indicated in Chapter 4, the Hong Kong Government experienced a fiscal crisis 
because of the significant loss of land revenue resulted from the uncertain political 
features of the early 1980s and the designated use of the land fund by the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration after 1985. Under these circumstances, the Hong Kong Government 
had relied on other tax sources to extract the necessary resources. The widening of 
the salary tax net resulting from the minor, inflation-proof adjustment in personal tax 
allowances had made more and more people feel directly the tax burden and the 
impacts of government tax policy. Because of this, the electors wanted to see a 
lessening of their own tax burden and, therefore, supported some kinds of tax 
reforms.
As far as taxation reform was concerned, the candidates were quite different 
in their approaches. Those who have a strong identity with the interest of the 
grassroots tended to support the taxation reform by demanding the introduction of 
progressive tax-rate which has a redistributive effect. For example, Miss Chan Yuen- 
han, a leftist FTU-supported candidate in the Kowloon Central constituency, pledged 
in her platform "to build-up fair taxation system and to shorten the distance between 
the wealthy and the poor: oppose the introduction of sales tax, . . . progressive tax 
rate should be applied to profit tax".417 Moreover, Mr Lau Chin-shek and Mr 
Conrad Lam Kui-shing, UDHK-supported candidates, also adopted a similar view in 
their joint platform that "in order to enhance the redistribution function of the taxation 
system, we oppose any measures that might put more tax burden onto the low-income 
citizens" and demanded to increase the profit tax rate, to introduce the capital gains 
tax, and so on.418
417Miss Chan’s campaign leaflet of 20 August 1991.
418Mr Lau’s and Mr Lam’s joint campaign leaflet of 1 August 1991.
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On the other hand, candidates who themselves were businessmen or who 
received support from pro-business groups, chose to remain silent or pledged to 
support the existing simple taxation system with a low tax-rate. No taxation reform 
was mentioned in the joint platform of Mr Ronnie Wong and Miss Winnie Cheung, 
NHKA-supported candidates with close ties with the business community and the 
reported support of the NCNA’s Hong Kong Branch.419 Mr Johnny Wong Chi- 
keung, LDF-supported candidate and a young solicitor, stated in his platform that he 
would work hard "to maintain a simple and low tax-rate taxation system, and to 
create a good investment environment".420 The same expression also appeared in 
the LDF’s elections platform.421
Issues of collective consumption seemed to be the major focus of most of the 
candidates. As examined in Chapter 4, the Hong Kong Government had intervened 
in the private consumption process since the early 1970s and had undertaken a series 
of privatisation drives because of the expected fiscal crisis from the early 1980s. The 
privatisation of collective consumption—housing, hospital services, education—had the 
effect of transferring the financial burden back to the recipients of the government 
services. Because of this, any privatisation move would mean the respective 
recipients have to pay for the services by themselves. Given the collective nature of 
the government services, the affected population would be enormous. For example, 
the change of Government’s rent policy, as indicated in Chapter 4, had affected 
nearly 3 million people who lived in public housing estates. This represented half of 
the whole Hong Kong population. Because of such large numbers of people involved, 
the candidates could not afford to ignore them.
Nearly all of the candidates had, in one way or the other, touched on the 
issues, though their approaches to them might have been different. The spending 
under the heading of collective consumption, such as housing, education, hospital
419Mr Wong’s and Miss Cheung’s joint campaign leaflet of 10 August 1991.
420Mr Wong’s campaign leaflet of 10 August 1991.
421LDF’s campaign leaflet of 24 July 1991.
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service, social welfare, and so on, had been criticised by the business community and 
the free market advocates as a "free lunch" delivered to those whose appetite would 
never be satisfied. The "free lunch" thesis was adopted by the conservatives to 
counter the democrats’ advances in enlisting grassroots’ support on several occasions 
of public debate. But it was very interesting to note that the conservatives adopted 
a quite positive attitude towards the collective consumption issues. For example, Mr 
Ronnie Wong Man-chiu and Miss Winnie Cheung Wai-sun mentioned in their joint 
electoral platform that: "Against the pegging of the pricing of public housing and 
home-ownership flats with those of private housing flats; support the criteria of price 
fixing that matched with the eligible purchasers’ ability to pay".422 Mr Tang Shiu- 
tong, a rural conservative candidate of the New Territories West constituency, 
opposed the planned government policy of requiring patients to pay the cost of their 
medical treatments in government clinics and hospitals.423 Like most of the 
democrats’ candidates, Mr Tai Chin-wah and Mr Tso Shiu-wai, rural conservatives 
in the New Territories West constituency, vowed in their joint platform, "to review 
the monitoring system and policy of the public utilities so as to avoid creating 
pressure for inflation".424
The candidates from the democrats, the conservatives and the leftists also 
asked for the government to take care of the living standards of the middle- and low- 
income groups. Their positions were quite alike, such as in demanding the opening- 
up of the Housing Authority, the supply of more public housing flats, the abolition 
of "double rent" policy and the price-pegging of the selling units in public housing 
estates and home-ownership scheme flats with that of the private market. They also 
asked for more consumer’s rights and a better mechanism for checking various public 
utilities’ service and fare policy.
422Mr Wong’s and Miss Cheung’s joint campaign leaflet of 10 August 1991.
423Mr Tang’s campaign leaflet of 27 August 1991.
424Mr Tai’s and Mr Tso’s joint campaign leaflet of 28 August 1991.
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Labour issues, like the opposition to the policy of importing foreign labour, 
the appeal to improve working conditions and industrial safety, the urge to grant trade 
unions collective bargaining power, the setting up of a central provident fund and so 
on, also received considerable concern, especially from those candidates who had 
strong ties with trade unions (for example, UDHK’s platform summary; platforms of 
Miss Chan Yuen-han, Mr Leung Yiu-chung). As well, Mr Lee Wah-ming, MP- 
supported candidate in the Kowloon East constituency, also stated in his campaign 
leaflet that "medical and health services are the basic needs of people’s livelihood, 
government then has the responsibility to provide citizens with an extensive, popular 
and affordable service".425
Issues of democratisation also attracted many candidates’ attention. Although 
the mass public did not realise that there is a close relationship between the 
democratic reforms and their interests, the candidates tried to alert the electors to the 
existence of such linkage. The more open the political structure, the lower the 
threshold of representation and the fewer the institutional barriers of entry will be, 
and the more the chance to actualise one’s electoral promise. In addition, in the 
context of Hong Kong, the establishment of a democratic government had been 
viewed as a mechanism to ward off the improper intervention from China after 1997. 
If a full-fledged democracy is indispensable for the above-mentioned goals, efforts 
should be made to revise the relevant stipulations in the Basic Law so as to 
accommodate a faster pace of democratic reforms.
Issues of democratisation articulated in the candidates’ campaign materials 
included the pace of introducing direct election to the LegCo, the relationship between 
the executive and the legislature, and the revision of the Basic Law. As expected, 
candidates tended to value democracy and advocate a faster pace of democratisation, 
though some favoured a gradual and cautious approach. For example, Mr Tang Siu- 
tong stated that while attempts should be made "to fight for the realisation of 
democratic political structure", "direct election should be introduced gradually to the
425Mr Lee’s campaign leaflet of August 1991.
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Legislative Council" and "all LegCo seats should be speedily returned by one-person- 
one-vote elections after Hong Kong people have sorted out their differences and 
arrived at the consensus".426 The LDF also pledged to "work for the development 
of a democratic system".427
Some other candidates advocated a faster pace for introducing direct elections 
and the expansion of elected representatives’ power and jurisdiction. For example, 
Mr David Chan Yuk-cheung of the Hong Kong Island West constituency, an 
independent candidate with good ties with China, pledged "To quicken the pace of 
introduction of direct election into the three-tier legislature" and "to strengthen the 
actual monitoring power of the elected LegCo members towards the government; all 
major consultative committees and government-run institutions . . . should be chaired 
by or have representative from the LegCo elected members".428 Mr Cheng Kai- 
nam of the Hong Kong Island East constituency, leftist-supported HKCF’s candidate, 
agreed that "all members of the three-tier legislature should ultimately be returned by 
universal suffrage" and advocated "to strengthen the monitoring function of the three- 
tier legislature towards government".429
In addition to the demand to quicken the pace of introducing direct elections 
and more power for the elected LegCo members, the democrats’ candidates had 
explicitly demanded that the chief executive should be directly elected, and the ExCo 
or other independent statutory bodies should be accountable to the LegCo. For 
example, Mr Leung Yiu-chung of the New Territories South constituency, NWSC- 
supported candidate, vowed "to fight for: 1. all LegCo seats should be returned by 
direct elections; 2. LegCo should be the highest decision-making body, ExCo and 
representatives of other government institutions should be responsible and accountable
426Mr Tang’s campaign leaflet of 27 August 1991.
427LDF elections platform, 24 July 1991.
428Mr David Chan’s campaign leaflet of 23 July 1991.
429Mr Cheng’s campaign leaflet of 10 August 1991.
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to the LegCo; 3. Hong Kong chief executive should be returned by direct election;
4. citizens have the right to recall their representatives; 5. Hong Kong citizens have 
the right to participate in the revision of the Basic Law".430 Mr Fung Kin-kee and 
Dr Law Cheung-kwok of the Kowloon West constituency, HKADPL-supported 
candidates, demanded that "Hong Kong chief executive and members of the 
legislature should all be returned through the just, open, universal and direct 
elections; open more channels for citizen participation so as to monitor government 
effectively".431 In addition, the UDHK demanded that "the independent non­
government authorities and other statutory bodies outside the Executive Branch are 
fully accountable to the Legislative Council", the proportion of directly elected LegCo 
seats should increase to 50% in 1995, and "all seats on the Urban Council, Regional 
Council and District Boards be democratically elected by 1995".432
The Sino-Hong Kong relationship was perhaps the most controversial single 
issue in the 1991 LegCo direct elections. The electoral importance of this issue 
seemed to relate proportionally to the weight the voters had put on the autonomy of 
Hong Kong. The phraseology used in the manifestos of the candidates on this issue 
was more or less being interpreted by voters as the degree of determination of the 
candidates to stand up for the interests of Hong Kong if they conflicted with those of 
China. But what would be considered as the best method to achieve the goal— 
cooperation or confrontation with China. The answer to that question would be 
subject to interpretation. Therefore, many candidates took up the issue in their 
platform but with somewhat different attitudes. At the radical extreme, one candidate 
demanded China reform her political system and vowed to support the pro-democracy 
movement in China. In Mr Chan Cheong’s own words, "to strengthen the unity of 
people from China and Hong Kong, and to support Chinese people in their struggle 
to demand democracy; to end the one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party,
430Mr Leung’s campaign leaflet of 8 August 1991.
431Mr Fung’s and Dr Law’s campaign leaflet of 1 August 1991.
432UDHK, 1991 Legislative Council Election: Platform Summary. Supplied by the 
UDHK.
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power should be re-directed to people, and to draft democratically a new 
constitution" .433
The UDHK seemed to play down the Tiananmen Square events in their 
election platform so as to make clear that the UDHK was a Hong Kong-based 
political group. Besides, it was also believed that this was the UDHK’s strategy 
aiming to improve its relationship with China by not directly confronting China on 
the sensitive subject. Instead, they chose to emphasize the need for communication 
and cooperation between China and Hong Kong. But they appealed to China to treat 
Hong Kong people as promised, and pledged to stand firm to protect Hong Kong’s 
interests, and urged revision to the Basic Law so as to accommodate a faster pace of 
democratisation. In their joint platform, Mr Martin Lee Chu-ming and Mr Man Sai- 
cheong not only pledged support to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the basic 
principle of "one country, two systems", but also demanded that: "Chinese 
Government should trust Hong Kong people, respect their opinions, and avoid 
interfering with Hong Kong’s internal affairs"; "to communicate progressively with 
the Chinese Government but to raise active criticism and protest against all those 
policies and interferences that worked to the disadvantage of the public interests of 
Hong Kong", and "to demand that the Chinese Government amend the Basic Law so 
as to implement full democratisation of the political structure".434
Some candidates or groups, including the leftists, were of the opinion that 
confrontation would not work to the benefit of Hong Kong and they advocated the 
resolution of Sino-Hong Kong contradictions through consultation and communication. 
In regard to Sino-Hong Kong relations, Miss Chan Yuen-han, the leftist FTU- 
supported candidate, stated that: "both sides should have an open attitude and analyze 
things from different angles so as to decrease the differences. China should respect 
and understand the feeling and aspiration of Hong Kong people, and Hong Kong
433Mr Chan Cheong’s campaign leaflet of 29 August 1991. Mr Chan is a 
Trotskyite.
434Mr Martin Lee’s and Mr Man’s joint campaign leaflet of 15 August 1991.
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would also know more about China so as to increase mutual understanding".435 Mr 
Tony Kan Chung-nin, an independent, proposed in his campaign leaflet the adoption 
of the means of consultation and dialogue to solve the contradictions between China 
and Hong Kong.436
Others just stressed the importance of mutual communication; for example, the 
LDF pledged to "promote closer communication between China, Britain and Hong 
Kong people to preserve the free economy and capitalism of Hong Kong".437 Mr 
Poon Chi-fai of the Kowloon East constituency, an independent, committed himself 
to "support the strengthening of communication between China and Hong Kong, and 
uphold the full implementation of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration so as to 
make sure Hong Kong had a high degree of autonomy".438
Different constituencies had different population compositions, thus the 
candidates treated issues differently. Quite contrary to other UDHK candidates, Mr 
Lau Chin-shek and Mr Lam Kui-shing of the Kowloon Central constituency, adopted 
a quite high-profile attitude in publicising their role in supporting the pro-democracy 
movement in China in 1989, publishing pledges of support from exiled prominent 
Chinese pro-democracy figures, like Prof. Fang Li-zhi.439 Given that the Kowloon 
Central constituency used to be the leftist and the local conservative "sphere of 
interests" and that many new immigrants from mainland China were living there, it 
seemed that they tried to take advantage of the dismay and frustration among those 
who were supporters of the leftists in the past but objected to the way the Beijing 
Government handled the pro-democracy movement in 1989.
435Miss Chan’s campaign leaflet of 20 August 1991.
436Mr Kan’s campaign leaflet of 15 August 1991.
437LDF, Legislative Council Elections Platform of the Liberal Democratic 
Federation, 24 July 1991. Supplied by the LDF.
438Mr Poon’s campaign leaflet of August 1991.
439Mr Lau’s and Mr Lam’s joint campaign leaflet of 1 August 1991.
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Electoral Issues in the Television Debates
The direct election forum on television provided another but more effective 
channel for the voters to acquire more information on the political background and 
policy stances of the candidates. The questions and responses of/from the candidates 
and the moderator had helped to define and redefine the electoral universe through 
which the electorate received the essential information for judging the differences of 
stance among the candidates and on which their voting decisions were then based.
The two commercial television stations, i.e. the TVB and the ATV, and the 
government-run RTHK all produced direct election forums in which all the candidates 
were invited to join to discuss their platforms with each other on a constituency basis. 
The series of forums bombarded the electorate nearly every night from late August 
onwards. In addition, the series of RTHK’s direct election forums appeared to have 
a larger audience because it was simulcast with its own radio channels and on the two 
commercial Chinese TV channels in the prime time.
From the series of forums, the attentive public and the Hong Kong electorate 
were highly exposed to different political arguments and policy debates, during which 
the candidates tried to make clear their stance and attitude towards various issues. 
Although the issues raised in the forum and the subsequent political discourse had 
covered a wide range of social and political issues, the most hotly debated and 
divisive issues appeared to relate to those "position issues" concerning Sino-Hong 
Kong relations, the revision of the Basic Law’s political structure section, the pace 
of democratisation of Hong Kong, and the death penalty. These issues cut across the 
candidates and more or less divided them into two opinion groups. On the one hand, 
the democrats’ candidates tended to show a non-compromising attitude to the Chinese 
Government, to demand the amendment of the Basic Law so as to accommodate the 
speedy democratisation of Hong Kong, and to support the abolition of the death 
penalty. On the other hand, the leftist and the conservative candidates appeared to 
adopt a conciliatory attitude towards Beijing and the Tiananmen Square events, to 
oppose the amendment of the Basic Law before 1997, and to support the
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implementation of the death penalty so as to suppress the rapid growth in the crime 
rate.
Judging from the debates on television, the issues that related to Sino-Hong 
Kong relations appeared to be more divisive in the constituencies with leftist 
candidates.440 The democrats’ candidates tended to adopt a vocal attitude towards 
the issue by stressing that though the need of communication and cooperation with the 
Chinese Government was highly plausible, they would not sacrifice the interest of 
Hong Kong just for the sake of communication. They seemed to place the autonomy 
and interest of Hong Kong higher than communication with China, and they were 
even prepared to confront Beijing if necessary. That means they would not 
compromise the interests of Hong Kong just for the sake of maintaining good 
relationships with the Chinese Government. Mr Szeto Wah441 of the Kowloon East 
constituency asserted that "good relationship" did not mean either "superior and 
subordinate relationship" or "human and dog relationship".442
Mr Lau Chin-shek of the Kowloon Central constituency stated that only after 
the rightful verdict on the Tiananmen Square tragedy was pronounced would there be 
a real improvement in Sino-Hong Kong relations. He further questioned the Chinese 
Government as to why Beijing should be liberated again by the use of tanks and guns 
in 1989 since the People Liberation Army had peacefully liberated Beijing in 
1949?443 In response to whether the efforts to smuggle the pro-democracy leaders
^Constituencies with leftist candidates included: Hong Kong Island East (Mr 
Cheng Kai-nam), Kowloon East (Mr Hau Shui-pui), and Kowloon Central (Miss Chan 
Yuen-han).
441Mr Szeto Wah is the chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance of Supporting 
Patriotic Democratic Movement of China. He has also been a veteran and active 
social activist since the 1970s.
^A T V ’s KE forum.
^TV B ’s KC forum.
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out of China after the military suppression in 1989 should be regarded as a patriotic 
or an unlawful act, Mr Lau replied that it was a patriotic act.444
Mr Szeto Wah also appealed to the Hong Kong electorate to differentiate
between "party" and "country", and encouraged the electorate to vote by conscience;
summing up in a RTHK’s forum, he said:
Hide one’s political stance, urged to forget about the June Fourth [pro­
democracy movement], being afraid of talking about China’s human 
right issue and the dictatorship of the one-party-rule [in China]; this is 
only love the [CCP] party, not the country; we, as human beings, 
should have the courage and backbone, not to bend to the wind’s 
direction, not to side with the powerful; please vote according to your 
conscience.445
Because of joint-jacket election strategy,446 Mr Martin Lee appealed to the 
electorate to choose two "fresh fish" instead of one "fresh fish" and one "dead fish" 
in the ATV’s HKIE forum. The notion of "fresh fish" implied those who could stand 
up for the interest of Hong Kong; the "dead fish" implied those who could not. In 
refuting Mr Martin Lee’s appeal, the communist newspaper Wen Wei Pao published 
a "letter to the editor" on 13 September that warned electorate not to choose the 
"fresh fish" because it was a "poisonous fish". The letter stated:
^RTH K’s KC forum.
^RTH K’s KE forum (original in Chinese, my own translation).
^ In  the 1991 LegCo direct elections, a double-seat-double-vote system was 
adopted. That meant each voters could vote for up to two candidates in his/her two- 
seat geographical constituency. As a result, the concerned political groups tried to 
maximise their electoral supports by urging their supporters to cast votes only to the 
group’s supported candidates.
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To this gentleman [Mr Martin Lee], what he meant by "fresh" might 
be about the ability. But because one is able does not necessarily 
mean he will do a good job and be suitable for a councillor. . . .  If we 
allow those who always seek confrontation to the LegCo, it will 
definitely be disadvantageous to the legislature’s smooth operation, the 
co-operative relations between Hongkong and the mainland, the 
atmosphere of prosperity and stability and the interest of voters. These 
people have been selling that they are fresh fish. But if we look 
carefully at their words and deeds, it’s not difficult to find that "fresh 
fish are not necessarily good fish". One should never purchase the 
poisonous fish.447
Furthermore, the democrats’ candidates also played up the political 
background of the leftist candidates and exploited the Hong Kong people’s feeling of 
"communist-phobia". A typical example was the dialogue between campaign 
assistants of Mr Man Sai-cheong and Mr Cheng Kai-nam in the ATV’s HKIE forum:
Assistant: Are you a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)?
Mr Cheng: No.
Assistant: Are you a member of the CCP’s Youth Group?
Mr Cheng: No.
Assistant: Is the CCP an exclusive one-party-rule party or a democratic political
party?
Mr Cheng: The CCP is an exclusive one-party-rule party.
Assistant: How do you feel about the human rights in China?
Mr Cheng: It depends on the actual situation of a country . . .
(Interrupted by the Assistant)
Assistant: You have said human rights are transnational on one occasion, but you
now say it depends on a country’s situation. Do you advocate the 
CCP’s socialist concept of human rights?
u lWen Wei Pao, 13 September 1991; quoted in SCMP, 14 September 1991.
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When the time came for Mr Cheng to sum up at the end of the forum, he thanked Mr 
Man’s assistant for letting the audience know of his left-leaning stance.
By contrast, the leftist candidates often found themselves on the defensive side 
of the argument. They appeared to avoid toeing the Chinese Government’s line of 
labelling the 1989 pro-democracy movement as a subversive movement aimed at 
toppling the existing regime. Although expressing support for the Beijing students 
who urged the government to take action against the wide-spread corruption, they 
stopped short of overtly scolding the Chinese Government for using excessive force 
to suppress the pro-democracy movement. For example, Mr Hau Shui-pui of the 
Kowloon East constituency recorded his reservations about the military crackdown 
of the 1989 pro-democracy movement.448 Miss Chan Yuen-han of the Kowloon 
Central constituency appealed to the Hong Kong people to adopt plural views in 
handling Sino-Hong Kong relations and implied that the Tiananmen Square tragedy 
would not become a hurdle to improving Sino-Hong Kong relations.449
Nevertheless, the leftist and the conservative candidates did remain passively 
defensive. They questioned the uncompromising attitude of the democrats’ candidates 
and their credibility in maintaining a positive relationship with the Chinese 
Government. For example, Miss Chan Yuen-han challenged Mr Lau Chin-shek as 
to whether it would be advantageous to have communication with the Chinese 
Government only after the acquisition of the rightful verdict on the Tiananmen Square 
tragedy.450 The democrats’ candidates also faced trials from their overlapping 
leadership and the conflicting roles between the UDHK and the HKAPDM. For 
example, Dr Yeung Sum was asked how to sort out the incompatibility of the 
UDHK’s and the HKAPDM’s attitude towards the Chinese Government.451
^A T V ’s KE forum.
^ V B ’s KC forum.
450TVB’s KC forum.
451ATV’s HKIW forum.
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On the other hand, in constituencies with no leftist candidates, the divisive 
issues appeared to be focusing on the issues concerning the pace of democratisation, 
candidates’ track record of protecting grassroots’ interest, and questions related to the 
amendment of the Basic Law. Most of the candidates’ positions on issues concerning 
the quality of life seemed to be the same. But their claims had to be backed up by 
their past record as well as electors’ faith in their credibility to deliver. Therefore, 
candidates would tend to sell their past community services and their role in fighting 
for the interest of the constituency and Hong Kong as a whole.
The democrats’ candidates played up their uncompromising role of challenging 
the injustice of the colonial political structure and the domination of capitalists in the 
Government Establishments. Mr Fung Chi-wood of the New Territories North 
constituency alleged that the repeated LegCo objection to setting up the central 
provident fund was the result of the disproportionate representation of businessmen 
in the LegCo.452 Mr Lee Wing-tat and Mr Leung Yiu-chung of the New Territories 
South constituency both pointed to the monopoly of the LegCo by big financial 
corporations and businessmen and appealed to the grassroots to fight to have their 
own representatives in it. And Mr Lee also talked about his role as campaigner in 
the past decade for the above-mentioned sake.453 The late Mr Ng Ming-yum and 
Dr Huang Chen-ya also launched similar criticism of the LegCo in their own 
constituency’s election forum.454 Mr Fung Kin-kee also criticised the closed nature 
of the Hong Kong Government.455
Following the question of the lack of popular control of the government, the 
logical move was to proceed to the question of establishing a full-fledged legislature 
and an accountable executive system. The democrats’ candidates showed their
452TVB’s NTN forum.
453ATV’s NTS forum.
454ATV’s NTW and HKIW forums, respectively.
455ATV’s KW forum.
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enthusiasm and demand for a faster pace of democratization, even though it needed 
amendments to the relevant clauses in the Basic Law. In the TVB’s KC forum, Mr 
Lau Chin-shek (UDHK) asked Dr Dragon John Young (pro-democrats independent) 
why the campaign for direct elections to the LegCo in 1988 had failed? Dr Young 
responded that it was China’s fault because China feared that the development of 
democracy in Hong Kong would have an impact on China’s democratic movement. 
Mr Lau also asked Miss Chan Yuen-han (FTU) whether she agreed with the FTU’s 
objection to introducing direct election in 1988? Miss Chan responded that she 
personally supported its introduction in 1988, and explained that the FTU did agree 
to introduce direct elections but only differed from the democrats in timing. Mr Lau 
then reminded the electorate by raising tactically the question of whether those who 
objected to the 1988 direct elections should bear the responsibility for the decline in 
living standards in recent years.
In addition, the democrats’ candidates were in favour of the amendment of the 
Basic Law’s section on political structure; for example, Mr Martin Lee and Mr Man 
Sai-cheong of the Hong Kong Island East constituency.456 In contrast, some 
candidates expressed reservations or objections to the said amendment, like Mr 
Ronnie Wong Man-chiu (NHKA) of the Hong Kong Island West constituency.457
The following were some of the issues that received support from most of the 
candidates: the establishment of central provident fund, the strengthening of the 
mechanism for monitoring public utilities, the determination to fight inflation and the 
sky-rocketing price of private housing flats, the pledge to improve public 
transportation, the urge to provide more public housing flats and to abolish "double 
rent" policy, the demand for abolishing the import of foreign labour and so on. 
Although the candidates held similar positions on these issues, their past records and 
exposure helped to differentiate whose pledges and promises should carry more 
weight. Probably, a guest moderator’s question in one direct election forum reflected
456RTHK’s HKIE forum.
457ATV’s HKIW forum.
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this line of thinking. The guest moderator asked Miss Winnie Cheung Wai-sun of the 
Hong Kong Island West constituency whether she had ever got on a bus and if so, 
when? Miss Cheung hesitated for a few seconds and replied: two months ago. The 
guest moderator then pursued her to ask how she could get to know the public 
transportation problems of the Southern District.458
458ATV’s HKIW forum.
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Electors’ Concerns and Considerations
From the published opinion poll’s findings, the voters seemed concerned about 
the candidates’ political stance and their track record of community service. 
According to an opinion survey completed by the Hong Kong University’s Social 
Sciences Research Centre, 46.4% of the respondents regarded the candidates’ past 
performance or track record as the most important criteria in selecting who they 
would support. But the poll had also revealed that the popularity459 of the 
candidates was not considered as a major criterion in deciding for whom they were 
going to cast their support. Only 9.6% of the respondents had said that their vote 
choice rested on the candidates’ popularity.460 The stress on the candidates’ track 
record but not the popularity of the candidates reflected the maturity of the voters in 
their vote deliberation process. It also refuted a belief that popular singers would be 
elected once the direct elections were introduced.
In addition, the voters also appeared to assess the candidates’ attitude towards 
the Beijing Government, especially the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident. In an 
opinion survey, more than half of the respondents (50.7%, N=791) said they would 
consider whether candidates supported the 1989 pro-democracy movement in China 
before deciding whom they vote for. Respondents in the three leftist contested 
constituencies seemed to place more emphasis on the issue. The respective figures 
in the constituencies of the KE, the HKIE, and the KC were 59%, 54% and 
51 %.461 It seemed that the voters had passed moral judgement on the candidates’ 
courage in resisting Chinese pressure to label the Tiananmen democratic movement 
as "subversive". This was especially clear for the leftist candidates because of the 
vulnerability of their dependence on Beijing’s or the CCP’s support.
459The term "popularity" denoted the candidates or political figures being
recognised by the general public based on the reasons other than their past political 
performances.
m SCMP, 10 September 1991.
461 Sing Tao Jih Pao, 14 September 1991.
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The people’s earnest hope for the directly-elected LegCo members, according 
to one opinion poll, was to safeguard the Hong Kong people’s interests first; a 
considerable percentage had even shown their acceptance of confronting the Hong 
Kong Government if necessary. In response to the question of what should the new 
councillors do, 45% of the respondents wanted them to represent Hong Kong people 
and place the interests of Hong Kong first, even if that entailed confronting the Hong 
Kong government. Another 45 % of respondents had stressed co-operation with the 
Hong Kong Government in balancing Hong Kong people’s interests. Besides, the 
voters tended to trust (in term of protecting one’s interests) the directly-elected LegCo 
members more. In the same opinion poll, 46% of the respondents trusted the 
directly-elected LegCo members to look after their interest, while another 12% and 
10% trusted the government and LegCo members from the functional constituencies, 
respectively.462 Judging from the above data and the limited proportion of directly- 
elected seats in the LegCo, the voters seemed to have unrealistic expectations of the 
directly-elected LegCo members. Unrealistic as it was, the voters’ subjective 
projection to have alternative voices in the LegCo could reflect their distrust of the 
pre-reformed LegCo members and their suspicion over the latter’s ability to protect 
and fight for the interests of the mass public. Their frustration seems to have 
accumulated to the point where they even accepted a confrontational approach as a 
means in their conflicts with the Government.
Understandably, the voters had a positive attitude towards the introduction of 
directly elected members to the LegCo. The respondents in an opinion poll were 
asked to express their judgement on the possible impact of the directly-elected 
members on the LegCo. Five choices were offered: more effective in reflecting 
public opinion and protecting citizen’s rights; decelerate the efficiency of law-making 
process; enhance the transparency of the LegCo; increase the chance of political 
conflict; and an open-ended option. Over sixty percent (62.8%) of the respondents 
had chosen the option of "more effective in reflecting public opinion and protecting
462SCMP, 15 September 1991.
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citizen’s rights".463 Moreover, one-third of the respondents would also have liked 
to see more directly-elected seats in the future LegCo. When asked whether it is 
appropriate for the LegCo to have one-third (20 seats) directly elected seats in 1997, 
38.8% of the respondents thought it was the right proportion but 33.4% did not.464 
It was believed that the respondents wanted to have more directly-elected LegCo 
members so as to better protect and fight for their interests.
In response to a survey question "what is the most pressing problem that you 
would like the Hong Kong Government to pay more attention to?", the respondents 
listed the following ten problems that concerned them most: inflation (16.5%), 
Vietnamese boat people issues (11.9%), housing policy (11.2%), Sino-Hong Kong 
relations (9.8%), crime (8.1%), standard of living (7.3%), economic issues (5.1%), 
social welfare (4.5%), infrastructural construction (3.6%), and labour and 
employment (3.4%). This list of concerns shows that most of the voters’ concerns 
were of an economic nature, such as inflation and housing policy, but the Sino-Hong 
Kong relationship had also attracted much attention from the voters and was among 
the top five in two previous opinion surveys.465
In a nutshell, judging from the candidates’ campaign materials and TV 
debates, as well as from the concerns and consideration of the electors, as reported 
in various opinion polls, the issues represented by the candidates were quite similar 
to those exercising the electors. Therefore, issues related to collective consumption, 
like housing, as well as to the Sino-Hong Kong (centre-periphery) relations, like 
democratisation and autonomy, were the focal point of contention in the 1991 LegCo 
direct elections.
4637m Tin Daily News, 27 August 1991.
m Ibid.
465Ming Pao Daily News 10 September 1991, p. 5.
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Table 6.1
Candidates and Affiliations in the 1991 LegCo Direct
Elections
Constituency Name Affiliation
Hong Kong LEE Chu-ming, Martin UDHK
Island East MAN Sai-cheong UDHK
CHENG Kai-nam HKCF
CHAN Ying-lun HKDF
LEUNG Wai-tung, Diana (HKDF)
CHOW Kit-bing, Jennifer
Hong Kong YEUNG Sum UDHK
Island West HUANG Chen-ya UDHK
CHAN Yuk-cheung, David 
CHANG Yau-hung, Alexander LDF 
WONG Man-chiu, Ronnie NHKA
CHEUNG Wai-sun, Winnie NHKA
Kowloon East SZETO Wah UDHK
LI Wah-ming MP
HAU Shui-pui KTMCA
POON Chi-fai
CHAN Cheong OR
LI Ting-kit TUC
LI Koi-hop, Philip (LDF)
Kowloon LAU Chin-shek UDHK
Central LAM Kui-shing, Conrad UDHK
CHAN Yuen-han FTU
CHAN Chi-kwan, Peter (HKCA)
YEUNG Lai-yin, Cecilia (RCHK)
YOUNG, Dragon John (HKAS, UDHK)
CHEUNG Chung-ming, Justin
Kowloon West FUNG Kin-kee, Frederick HKADPL
TO Kun-sun, James UDHK
LEE Yu-tai, Desmond (HKCA, UDHK)
SIT Ho-yin, Kingsley
LAW Cheung-kwok HKADPL
NG Kin-sun LDF
New Territories LAU Wai-hing, Emily
East WONG Wang-fat, Andrew
KAN Chung-nin, Tony
LAU Kong-wah UDHK
WONG Hong-chung, Johnston UDHK
CHOI Man-hing
LEUNG Ka-ching, Eric
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New Territories LEE Wing-tat UDHK
South CHAN Wai-yip, Albert UDHK
LEUNG Yiu-chung NWSC
YEUNG Fuk-kwong (PHKS)
New Territories NG Ming-yum UDHK
West TAI Chin-wah
WONG Wai-yin, Zachary MP
TANG Siu-tong
TSO Shiu-wai LDF
New Territories FUNG Chi-wood UDHK
North TIK Chi-yuen MP
CHEUNG Hon-chung (LDF)
WONG Chi-keung, Johnny LDF
CHOW Mei-tak, Ronald HKADPL
TONG Wai-man
Abbreviations:
FTU = Federation of Trade Unions
HKADPL = Hong Kong Association of Democracy and
People's Livelihood
HKAS = Hong Kong Affair Society
HKCA = Hong Kong Civic Association
HKCF = Hong Kong Citizen Forum
HKDF = Hong Kong Democratic Foundation
KTMCA = Kwun Tong Man Chung Association
LDF = Liberal Democratic Foundation
MP = Meeting Point
NHKA = New Hong Kong Alliance
NWSC = Neighbourhood and Workers Service Centre
OR = October Review
PHKS = Progressive Hong Kong Society (dissolved in
1990’)
RCHK = Reform Club of Hong Kong
TUC = Trades Union Council
UDHK = United Democrats of Hong Kong
Note: Organisations in bracket represented those candidates 
who had pervious affiliated with or who has still belonging 
to the group but did not ran under the group's banner.
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Table 6.2
Contest of Political Groups by Constituencies in the 1991
LegCo Direct Elections
HKIE HKIW KE KC KW NT
E
NT
S
NT
W
NT
N
FTU 1
HKADPL 2 1
HKAS (1)
HKCA (1) (1)
HKCF 1
HKDF 1(1)
KTMCA 1
LDF 1 (1) 1 1 1(1)
MP 1 1 1
NHKA 2
NWSC 1
OR 1
RCHK (1)
TUC 1
UDHK 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1
Abbreviations:
1) for groups' name, see those of Table 6.1;
2) for constituency:
HKIE = Hong Kong Island East
HKIW = Hong Kong Island West
KE = Kowloon East
KC = Kowloon Central
KW = Kowloon West
NTE = New Territories East
NTS = New Territories South
NTW = New Territories West
NTN = New Territories North
Notes:
1) the figure in the table means the exact number of 
candidates being nominated by that political group in 
the constituency;
2) the figure in bracket means those candidates who had 
been previously affiliated with or who were still 
belonging to the group but did not ran under the 
group's banner.
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Table 6.3
Candidates by Political Affiliation in the 1991 LegCo
Direct Elections
Name Number of Candidate
Democrats:
UDHK 14
MP 3
HKADPL 3
HKDF 1
NWSC 1
Pro-Democrat 
Independents 5
Conservatives:
LDF 5*
Rural 3
NHKA 2
Leftists:
FTU 1
HKCF 1
KTMCA 1
Rightist:
TUC 1
*Mr Cheung Hon-cheung of the NTN constituency regarded 
himself as an independent candidate. Nevertheless, the 
nomination list supplied to me by the LDF included his 
name.
271
CHAPTER VII
ANALYSIS OF THE 1991 LEGCO DIRECT ELECTIONS
RESULTS
This chapter examines the election results of the 1991 LegCo direct elections 
under the theoretical framework introduced above, that is, the emergence of the 
centre-periphery and collective consumption cleavages. First, a constituency-wide 
profile of this election results will be discussed. Second, with the help of the 1991 
Census data and the TVB’s exit poll data, an ecological analysis of the election results 
at the level of Census’ District Board (DB) districts will be presented. Third, with 
the help of survey data, the effects of various socio-economic factors as well as the 
individual elector’s position towards the issues of centre-periphery relations and 
collective consumption on vote choices will be examined.
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The Profile of the LegCo Direct Elections Result
The first-ever LegCo direct elections held on 15 September 1991 recorded the 
highest turnout, in terms of both rates and figures, in the electoral history of Hong 
Kong, although it was quite low in comparison with those of Western democratic 
polities and newly independent states. Except those of the United States and 
Switzerland, the turnout rates for the industrialised countries ranged from 69.1% 
(Spain) to 89.2% (Australia where voting is compulsory) in the period 1985-89. The 
respective figures for the US and the Switzerland were 52.8% and 46.1%.466 
Regarding the Asian developing countries in the early 1990s, the turnout rates, in 
general, were lower than those of the OECD countries. The respective turnout rates 
of Bangladesh, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, and Thailand were 52%, 70%, 71.9% 
and 59.27%.467 As shown in Table 7.3, nearly forty percent (39.15%, 
N = 750,467) of the registered electorate went to the polling stations and cast their 
votes. But in the calculation and interpretation of the turnout rate in Hong Kong it 
is necessary to take into consideration the following factors: the de-politicized context 
and its socialization effect, the obsolete electoral roll which has not been updated 
since the early 1980s, and the high rate of internal movement due to the rapid 
urbanization of the New Territories. Thus, according to a post-election study, the 
real turnout was estimated to lie in the range of 47.5% to 51.8%.468
Whatever the turnout rate may be, it was certainly the single political event 
in Hong Kong that attracted the greatest involvement of the local Hong Kong people
466Jan-Erik Lane, David McKay and Kenneth Newton, Political Data Handbook: 
OECD Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 123.
467Inter-Parliamentary Union, Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections and 
Developments, Vol. 25 (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1991), pp. 39 & 101; 
and Vol. 26 (1992), pp. 139 & 159.
468For the estimation based upon a territory-wide survey, see Louie Kin-sheun et 
al., "Who Voted in the 1991 Elections? A Socio-Demographic Profile of the Hong 
Kong Electorate," in Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds., Hong Kong Tried 
Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Chinese University of 
Hong Kong, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1993), pp. 32-34.
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up to date. In fact, the absolute numbers of voters had increased from about 390,000 
in the UrbCo elections in May 1991 to 750,000, but the Hong Kong and Chinese 
officials, mass media and commentators still focused their discussion on the relatively 
"low" turnout rate. This agenda of discussion seemed to be set well before the 
election day by the British-Hong Kong Government’s plan to request Beijing to 
increase the proportion of the LegCo directly elected seats if the 1991 LegCo 
elections proved to have a high turnout rate (see Chapter 3 for details).
Before examining the results, we should first investigate who did vote in the 
1991 LegCo direct elections at the micro (individual) level. Because of the lack of 
information on the composition of the Hong Kong electorate, the electoral universe 
of Hong Kong is still not very clear. The Final Register of Electors only contained 
the electors’ sex and age, as well as the address and constituency. As shown in Table 
7.1, 52.9% of the electorate were male, and 47.1% were female. With regard to 
age, the registration rate was not spread in proportion to the 1991 Population Census. 
The younger generation seemed to have less interest in registering, with only 16.9% 
of the electorate belonging to 21-30 age group (27.2% Census). Persons in the age 
groups of 31-40 and 41-50 appeared to have greater enthusiasm to become electors 
(31.8% and 19.1%, respectively), with around 4% more than their respective figures 
(27.2% and 15.4%) in the 1991 Population Census. For the age groups of 51-60 and 
61 & above, the percentage (14.7% and 17.5%) was much closer to that of the 1991 
Population Census (13.2% and 17.1%; see Table 7.2).469
Once again, because of secret ballots, we did not have the detailed breakdown 
of the actual voters in the 1991 LegCo direct elections. Thus, we need to rely on
469A complete enumeration of the population by age, sex, type of household and 
type of living quarters, and an one-in-seven sample survey of their socio-economic 
characteristics were adopted in the Hong Kong 1991 Population Census. Therefore, 
the Census data were significance at any practical level. For details, see Census and 
Statistics Department, Hong Kong 1991 Population Census: Main Report (Hong 
Kong: Government Printer, 1993), chaps. 9-11.
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survey data to fill the gap. As reported in one post-election study,470 those who 
possessed a higher socio-economic status tended to be more willing to vote. That is, 
the relationship between turnout and education, occupation, and income were found 
to be highly significant in the LegCo direct elections.471 Regarding the relationship 
between turnout and age, it was reported that the turnout rate rose steadily from 
56.6% for 21-30 age group and 56.7% for 31-40 age group, to the peak of 57.2% 
for 41-50 age group, but then declined to 51.8% and 51.5% for age groups of 51-60 
and 61 & above, respectively.472 One thing worth noting here was the rather high 
turnout rate of the 21-30 age group, despite the group’s low registration rate. 
Besides, those who lived in the government-subsidised home ownership estates 
(58.5%) tended to turn up more than those who lived in the private housing (55.5%), 
and public housing estates (53.7%).473
Among the 18 elected LegCo members, 16 either came from the democrats 
or were pro-democrat independents. As shown in Table 7.5, the UDHK succeeded 
in returning 12 out of 14 LegCo candidates; the MP returned 2 out of 3; the 
HKADPL 1 out of 3; and one out of the pro-democrat independents. On the other 
hand, the rural conservatives managed to return only 1 LegCo member.474 The 
leftists and the rightists had failed to grasp any seats. With regard to vote share by 
political inclination, the democrats and the pro-democrat independents had received
470The following discussion on the voters’ profile of 1991 LegCo direct elections 
is mainly based upon Louie Kin-sheun et al., "Who Voted in the 1991 Elections? A 
Socio-Demographic Profile of the Hong Kong Electorate," in Lau and Louie, eds. 
(1993), op. cit., pp. 14-31.
m Ibid. , pp. 20-24.
m Ibid., p. 19, Table 12.
™Ibid., p. 27, Table 22.
474Mr Tai Chin-wah resigned from the post before the formal swearing-in 
ceremony. He was then under investigation by the police concerning his alleged 
fraudulent qualifications to practise as a solicitor.
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66 % of the total actual vote, the conservatives and the pro-conservative independents 
19.5%, and the leftists 7% (see Table 1.5).415
As predicted by many pre-election polls, the prominent leaders of the 
HKASPDM and the UDHK were all returned by a very large margin of voters’ 
support. Mr Martin Lee Chu-ming of the HKIE had obtained the territory-wide 
highest votes of 76,831, three-quarters (74.6%) of the voters in his constituency 
voting for him. The next three highest candidates in terms of vote share were: Mr 
Szeto Wah of the KE (70%, 57,921 votes); Dr Yeung Sum of the HKIW (65.4%, 
45,108 votes); and Mr Lau Chin-shek of the KC (62.2%, 68,489 votes), (see Table 
7.4, Vote Share A)
Furthermore, the UDHK and its coalition partner MP won the top two highest 
votes in each of the following six constituencies: HKIE, HKIW, KE, KC, NTS, and 
NTN. Where their combined vote share of these winning candidates in the said 
constituencies ranged from 70.2% (KE) to 52.8% (NTN) of the total votes cast (see 
Table 7.4, Vote Share B). Nevertheless, the UDHK’s candidates were defeated in 
the NTE constituency where they had only managed a combined 29.9% of vote and 
lagged far behind the top three candidates in that constituency.
In fact, who did vote for the democrat candidates? It was reported that the 
"definite supporters" of the democrats were probably those who "are public housing 
residents, relatively well educated, non-manual labourers or above, higher income 
groups and young employees".476
475The electoral qualifications for the 1991 LegCo direct elections were: any 
person who is a registered elector and who has been ordinarily resident in Hong Kong 
for the 10 years immediately preceding the nomination date is eligible to be 
nominated as a candidate; and any Hong Kong permanent resident who is 21 years 
old or over, or any person who is ordinarily resident in Hong Kong for 7 years 
immediately preceding the date of his/her application is eligible to register as an 
elector. See the Electoral Provisions Ordinance (Cap. 367), sections 8, 9, and 18.
476Tsang Wing-kwong, "Who Voted for the Democrats? An Analysis of the 
Electoral Choice of the 1991 Legislative Council Election," in Lau and Louie, eds. 
(1993), op. cit., p. 128.
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The landslide victory of the democrat candidates brought home a clear 
message that the voters wanted to have the possibility of an alternative voice in the 
LegCo. The result had contributed to the birth of a relatively solid, though still 
minority, opposition group in the government official- and business-dominated 
legislature.
The leftist candidates had contested in the following three constituencies: the 
HKIE, the KE, and the KC, and they all finished in third place. Miss Chan Yuen- 
han (KC) had secured 44,894 votes (22.4% of the total valid vote in that 
constituency); Mr Cheng Kai-nam, 29,902 votes (15.6%); and Mr Hau Shui-pui, 
21,225 (13.9%). The relative wide margin of votes between the democrat and the 
leftist candidates seemed to remove the "sure win" thesis that the leftists would have 
an overwhelming advantage in direct elections. The narrowest margin was that 
between Dr Lam Kui-shing and Miss Chan Yuen-han. Dr Lam led Miss Chan by 
nearly 12,000 votes, approximately 5.6% of the total actual vote in the KC 
constituency. However, relatively speaking, the leftist candidates, in general, showed 
up better than the conservatives and the independents in terms of number of votes a 
single candidate received.
The LDF had shown up badly with none of their candidates being elected. 
Despite being strongly supported by Miss Maria Tam, then an ExCo and LegCo 
member, Mr Alexander Chang Yau-hung had received less than 10% of the vote in 
the HKIW constituency. Mr Cheung Hon-chung and Mr Johnny Wong Chi-keung 
appeared to be closer challengers to the democrat candidates in the NTN constituency, 
but they still lagged behind by a margin of over 6% of the vote.
The rural conservatives seemed to have maintained certain support in the 
NTW constituency where Mr Tai Chin-wah had obtained 21.5% of vote and finished 
in the second place. At the LegCo constituency level, the rural forces seemed to fail
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to strike back against the surge of the democrats in their influential New Territories’ 
constituency.477
477For an analysis at the District Boards level, see Li Pang-kwong, "An 
Exploratory Study of the Rural-Urban Cleavage in the 1991 Elections," in Lau and 
Louie, eds. (1993), op. cit., pp. 317-29.
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Ecological Analysis bv Electoral Districts
By regulation, the votes cast in each LegCo constituency should be counted 
and its result announced at that level, and information below that level should not be 
disclosed. Because of that reason, the returning officers did not declare the details 
of voting at the polling station level. In order to have a deeper understanding of the 
effects of local context and its interplay with the availability of candidates with 
different political background, a district-wide analysis could better serve the purpose. 
Lacking official poll data at the district level, we are forced to rely on the TVB’s exit 
poll data and demographic data from the 1991 Census to explore possible voting 
patterns of the Hong Kong voters.
In regard to the 1991 Census data on the CD-ROM, there were basically two 
kinds of data: one was tabulated along the census tracks and the other was along the 
DB districts which were the lowest electoral division where the tabulation of census 
data have been reported. The DB districts were the basic building blocks of the 
larger LegCo constituency, and some DB districts had one polling station and others 
had more than one. That meant the LegCo’s polling stations might be one level 
lower than the Census’ DB districts. Due to the homogenous demographic 
composition of most of the DB districts, an estimation on the correlation between the 
demographic data from the Census and the vote share data from the TVB’s exit poll 
will help explore the missing contextual dimension of voting analysis. On the other 
hand, 100 polling stations (nearly one-third of the total, N=354) had been chosen as 
the sample in the TVB’s exit poll exercise and nearly one-third of the actual voters 
were interviewed. In the following pages all the 1991 LegCo constituencies are 
analyzed.
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Hong Kong Island East
Among the candidates, four of them could be regarded as democrats or pro­
democrat candidates. They were Mr Martin Lee Chu-ming and Mr Man Sai-cheong 
(UDHK), Mr Chan Ying-lung (HKDF), and Miss Diana Leung Wei-tung 
(independent and former member of the HKDF). Mr Cheng Kai-nam (HKCF) was 
the only leftist candidate in this constituency. Miss Jennifer Chow Kit-bing was the 
only candidate that had no political affiliation at the time.478 There were altogether 
13 sample polling stations in this constituency, of which 9 districts (N01, N02, N03, 
P05, P06, P08, P09, P l l ,  and P13) did not have public housing estate in them; and 
only two (P10 and P12) had got a majority of 61.8% and 83.9% of public housing 
population, respectively. P10 and P12 also had a relative large blue collar population 
(54.1% and 56.4, respectively) and a rather low percentage of residents receiving 
tertiary education (4.5 % and 4.8 %). In contrast, the respective maximum blue-collar 
population and the minimum tertiary education percentages of the remaining districts 
were 37.2 (P07) and 12.9 (P12).
As shown in Figure 7.1, Mr Lee had received considerable support in all 
sample polling stations, ranging from 35.5% (P10) to 45.6% (P08). Mr Man had 
received an average of 23.9% vote and was in a neck-and-neck competition with Mr 
Cheng in three polling stations (P07, P10, and P12). The vote share of Mr Cheng 
fluctuated between 9.8% and 21.3%. Mr Lee and Mr Man had secured far more 
votes in the middle class districts than Mr Cheng, especially in N02, P06, P08 and 
P09. But the latter did not outweigh the first two in the working class districts, with 
only one exception of P10 where Mr Cheng had 4% lead over Mr Man. On the other 
hand, Mr Chan, Miss Leung and Miss Chow received an average of 9.9%, 7.6% and 
2.7%, respectively.
478Miss Chow joined the Liberal Party, which is under the leadership of Mr Allen 
Lee, appointed LegCo member, and former ExCo member and senior LegCo 
member, in 1993.
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Figure 7.1 Hong Kong Island East: Exit Poll’s Vote Share
Percentage of Vote
N01 N02 N03 P04 P05 P06 P07 P08 P09 P10 P l l  P12 P13
Polling Stations
—  C H E N G  Kai-nam +  C H A N  Ying-lun *  Martin LEE  
D iana L E U N G  -*  M A N  Sai-cheong +  Jennifer CHOW
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Hong Kong Island West
Among the ten sample polling stations, three of the corresponding districts had 
over three-fourths of the population in public housing. They were Q08 (97.2%), Q09 
(74%), and Q10 (78.3%). The remaining were all private housing flats or estates. 
Over half of the working population of Q09 and Q10 were engaged in blue-collar 
work and the respective figures were 51% and 57.3%. In addition, these two 
districts also had the lowest percentage of residents receiving tertiary education and 
the respective percentages were 5.8 and 3. M01, M05 and Q07 had at least doubled 
the figure of that of the rest in terms of working population engaged in professional 
and managerial works (57.3%, 62.1 %, and 54.4%, respectively). Some districts had 
even displayed over five times the difference, such as between M05 (62.1 %) and Q10 
(11.1%). The same three districts (M01, M05 and Q07) had also had the largest 
percentage of residents receiving tertiary education and the respective figures were 
36.4%, 34.9% and 24.8%.
As shown in Figure 7.2, Dr Yeung Sum (UDHK) showed up as a high flier 
and obtained one-third of the vote in all polling stations, except Q09 where he secured 
25.7% of vote. His campaign partner, Dr Huang Chen-ya, had won an average of 
25.1% of vote and led over his vigorous competitor, Mr David Chan (independent), 
in seven polling stations, all of them middle class districts. But Mr Chan had beaten 
Dr Huang in the remaining three working class polling stations (Q06, Q09 and Q10) 
by a narrow margin. Being a keen challenger of Dr Huang, Mr Chan finished the 
race in third place and obtained an average of 22.1 % vote. The electoral support for 
Mr Alexander Chang (LDF), Mr Ronnie Wong (NHKA) and Miss Winnie Cheung 
(NHKA) was spread evenly throughout the sample polling stations and they obtained 
an average of 8.4%, 3.8% and 3.5% vote, respectively.
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Figure 7.2 Hong Kong Island West: Exit Poll’s Vote Share
Percentage of Vote
50 i-----------------------
Polling Stations
—  D avid  C H A N  +  W innie C H EU N G  *  Alexander C H A N G
^  Y U E N G  Sum ■* H U A N G  Chen-ya R onnie W O N G
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Kowloon East
The difference in demographic characteristics among the respective districts 
of the sample polling stations in this constituency was not as large as that in HKIE 
and HKIW. In regard to occupation, only one district (S03) had a relative large 
proportion (30.5%) of working population engaging in professional and managerial 
work. The percentage of population receiving tertiary education ranged from 3.8% 
(S10) to 10.8% (S03). Among the ten sample polling stations, six of them had well 
over three-quarters of public housing population: S04 (96.4%), S05 (99.9%), S07 
(74.7%), S08 (98.3%), S09 (85.4%), and S10 (99.4%). These six districts also 
tended to have more than half of its population as blue-collar workers.
The data in the sample polling stations in this constituency had showed a 
crystal clear support for the democrat candidates regardless of the demographic 
characters. As shown in Figure 7.3, Mr Szeto Wah (UDHK) and Mr Lee Wah-ming 
(MP) had led by a relatively large margin in all the sample polling stations with the 
biggest difference in S03, the only sample of a middle class district in this 
constituency. Mr Hau Shui-pui (KTMCA), a leftist candidate who has knitted 
together his local network over the past twenty years, nonetheless failed badly in his 
challenge to the democrat candidates. The maximum and minimum difference of vote 
share between Mr Lee and Mr Hau were 27.5% (S03) and 10.2% (S04), respectively. 
Mr Poon Chi-fai (pro-conservative independent), then current LegCo member who 
had close ties with the KTMCA, obtained about 10% of vote in all the sample polling 
stations. Mr Chan Cheong (OR), Mr Li Ting-kit (TUC), and Mr Philip Li Koi-hop 
(independent, former LDF member) all lagged far behind.
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Figure 7.3 Kowloon East: Exit Poll’s Vote Share
Percentage of Vote
SOI S02 S03 S04 S05 S06 S07 S08 S09 S10
Polling Stations
—  H A U  Shui-pui +  SZETO Wah *  LI Ting-kit PO O N  Chi-fai
*  C H A N  Cheong +  LI Wah-ming *  Philip LI '
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Kowloon Central
Among the 13 sample districts, 7 of them were largely filled up by public 
housing population ranging from 74.9% to 99.9%. They were: R04 (99.9%), V07 
(89.1%), V08 (99.6%), V09 (97.5%), V10 (74.9%), V12 (99.9%), and V13 
(92.6%).479 Moreover, these seven districts had tended to have a higher percentage 
of blue-collar workers (ranging from 44.6% to 59.4%) and a lower percentage of 
tertiary education population (ranging from 3.1 % to 9%). By contrast, the respective 
percentage of R01 and R05 were 30 and 23, and 18.9 and 16.5. Furthermore, R01 
and R05 had the highest percentage of professional and managerial population (46.2% 
and 45.8%, respectively).
Like the KE constituency, the democrat candidates had defeated the leftist 
candidate in all the sample polling stations with one exception (in V10). As shown 
in Figure 7.4, Mr Lau Chin-shek (UDHK) did not face much challenge from the 
leftists and gained around one-third of the total vote in each of the sample polling 
stations. His campaign partner, Dr Conrad Lam Kui-shing (UDHK), also returned 
with an average of about 30% vote. Miss Chan Yuen Han (FTU), a leftist candidate, 
had engaged in a close contest with Dr Lam in two polling stations (R03 and V10), 
and she had even won one of them (V10). But she lost all the remaining to her target 
competitor, Dr Lam, with a margin of over 8% on average. Mr Peter Chan Chi- 
kwan (pro-conservative independent), Miss Cecilia Yeung Lai-yin (pro-conservative 
independent), Dr Dragon John Young (pro-democrat independent), and Mr Justin 
Cheung Chung-ming (independent) acquired an average of 6.2%, 3.6%, 2.6%, and 
0.9% vote, respectively.
479R03 would be another polling station with an overwhelming public housing 
population. But because of the lumping of R02 and R03 into a single census DB 
district, the details of their demographic character could not be traced. Nevertheless, 
based on my own judgement and the location of the said polling station, the electorate 
of R03 would be most likely comprise the residents of a public housing estate 
(Homantin Estates).
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Figure 7.4 Kowloon Central: Exit Poll’s Vote Share
Percentage of Vote
R01 R02 R03 R04 R05 R06 V07 V08 V09 V10 V I 1 V12 V13
Polling Stations
—  L A U  Chin-shek +  Conrad LAM
Peter C H A N  ** Cecilia Y E U N G
D ragon John Y O U N G
C H A N  Yuen-han 
+  Justin C H E U N G
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Kowloon West
Kowloon West constituency comprises the three administrative districts of Yau 
Tsim, Mong Kok and Sham Shui Po, and has been regarded as an elderly community 
with an established record for the lowest turnout rate in previous DB and UrbCo 
elections. In the eleven sample polling stations, 9 of them had around or above 50% 
blue-collar working population. Of these 9 districts, 4 had a pre-dominantly public 
housing population ranging from 73.9% to 94.2% (U06, 78.7%; U08, 94.2%; U09, 
73.9%; and U ll, 91.4%) and the remaining five were (W02, T03, T04, T05, and 
U07) all occupied by private flats or estates. Regardless of housing types in these 9 
districts, the percentage of population receiving tertiary education tended to be lower, 
ranging from 3.4% (U08) to 8.2% (T03 and U09). The two outstanding districts in 
the sample were W01 and U10. These two districts had the highest percentage of 
population engaging in professional and managerial work (47.7% and 55.9%) and 
receiving tertiary education (20.2% and 19.7%), and the lowest percentage of blue- 
collar workers (20.8% and 19.9%).
Mr Frederick Fung Kin-kee (HKADPL) won by a large margin of votes 
(32.9% on average) in his sphere-of-influence Sham Shui Po districts (U06 to U09 
and U ll)  but engaged in a keen competition with the other three candidates, Mr 
James To Kun-sun (UDHK), Mr Desmond Lee Yu-tai (independent and former 
LegCo member) and Mr Kingsley Sit Ho-yin (then current LegCo and Heung Yee 
Kuk member), in Yau Tsim and Mong Kok areas (see Figure 7.5). Mr To and Mr 
Lee had competed neck-and-neck in all of Yau Tsim and Mong Kok, and some of 
Sham Shui Po’s polling stations, such as U06, U07 and U08. But Mr To had 
managed to beat Mr Lee in U09 to U ll and finally won one of the seats in this 
constituency. Mr To’s victory seemed to owe much to his UDHK’s affiliation as he 
had just entered politics in March of that year. Mr Sit had gained support from the 
Yau Tsim and Mong Kok districts but declined significantly in the Sham Shui Po 
area. Dr Law Cheung-kwok, Mr Fung’s campaign partner, had only acquired a 
relative high percentage of support in U06 and U08 and done badly in the remaining
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polling stations. Only securing considerable support in W01, Mr Ng Kin-sun (LDF) 
had slid to the bottom in the rest of the polling stations.
Figure 7.5 Kowloon West: Exit Poll’s Vote Share
Percentage of Vote
W01 W02 T03 T04 T05 U06 U07 U08 U09 U10 U l l
Polling Stations
LAW Cheung-kwok +  Frederick FUNG ^  Desmond LEE
NG Kin-sun ^  Kingsley SIT James TO
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New Territories East
There were four types of district included in the 12 sample polling stations of 
this constituency: one rural district (C01), two districts of exclusive private flats or 
estates (D04 and D07), three districts with about 50% public housing residents (C03, 
D08 and DIO), and six districts of over 67% public housing residents (C02, D05, 
D06, D09, D ll and D12). The private housing districts (D04 and D07) had the 
higher percentage of population engaging in professional and managerial works 
(45.2% and 41.8%), and receiving tertiary education (26.2% and 16.8%). By 
contrast, the remaining ten districts had more blue-collar workers (ranging from 
47.8% to 63.7%) and low percentage of population receiving tertiary education 
(ranging from 3.3% to 8%).
Miss Emily Lau Wai-hing (pro-democrat independent) had led in 7 polling 
stations with electoral support spreading evenly in both private and public housing 
estates and securing her highest vote share in the two private housing districts. Like 
Miss Lau, Mr Andrew Wong Wang-fat (independent with rural support) had drawn 
considerable support from both the private and public estates, but with a lesser vote 
share than that of Miss Lau except in two polling stations (C01 and D12). Mr Tony 
Kan (independent with close ties with rural forces and a Heung Yee Kuk member) 
had polled well in the only rural district (C01) and in the newly developed districts 
(C02, C03, D05 and D06) but drew lesser support from the established public 
housing estates (D09 to D12). By contrast, Mr Lau Kong-wah (UDHK) had secured 
a considerable support in the established public housing estates (D09, D ll and D12), 
but polled relatively low in the remaining polling stations. The same also went for 
Mr Johnston Wong Hong-chung (UDHK) who had only led in one sample polling 
station (D09). The remaining two independent candidates, Mr Choi Man-hing and 
Mr Eric Leung Kai-ching, had obtained a vote share of only 0.4% and 0.2%, 
respectively.
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Figure 7.6 New Territories East: Exit Poll’s Vote Share
Percentage of Vote
C01 C02 C03 D04 D05 D06 D 07 D 08 D09 DIO D l l  D 12
Polling Stations
—  Andrew W ONG +  Johnston W O N G  ^  Eric L E U N G  
Tony K AN CHOI M an-hing +  Em ily L A U
^  LAU Kong-wah
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New Territories South
This constituency comprises the three administrative districts of Islands, Tsuen 
Wan, and Kwai Tsing. Tsuen Wan was first developed in the early 1960s, when it 
was still a pre-dominantly rural area with some small-scale light industrial factories. 
After three decades of development, Tsuen Wan had become the first rural-converted 
urban community with a significant but declining rural influence. Because of the 
rapid growth of population and industry there, the nearby Kwai Tsing areas were also 
developed to accommodate this expansion. Therefore, these two districts had a 
predominantly working class and public housing population. By contrast, Islands area 
has remained a rural community with a small and ageing population.
In the 13 sample polling stations, two were drawn from Islands area (A01 and 
A02), five from Tsuen Wan (F03 to F07), and six from Kwai Tsing (J08 to J13). In 
regard to demographic composition, F04 and F07 had a higher percentage of 
population engaging in professional and managerial work (25.5% and 32%, 
respectively) and receiving tertiary education (9.4% and 11.4%).480 Six districts 
had an overwhelming public housing population.481 They were: F05 (94.8%), F06 
(87.6%), J10 (99.9%), J l l  (68.2%), J12 (91%), and J13 (91.6%). In addition, there 
was a correspondingly high percentage of blue-collar workers living in these 6 
districts, ranging from 53.7% (F06) to 68.2% (J12) and a lower percentage receiving 
tertiary education, ranging from 3.3% (J10 and J12) to 7% (F06).
480Relatively speaking, these percentage were at the lower end of the scale when 
comparing with that of HKIE, HKIW, and KC.
481R08 might be added to the list, but we are prevented from doing so due to the 
lumping of R08 and R09 into a single census district. Thus, the details of its 
demographic composition could not be traced back on the CD-ROM. Based on my 
judgement and the location of the said polling station, the electorate of R08 would 
mainly include the residents of the Kwai Fong (public housing) Estate. The lumping 
of two polling stations within one census district was also found in A01 and A02, but 
seemed not to cause much problem because of their rural nature.
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As shown in Figure 7.7, the three democrat candidates dominated the 
competition with the exception of the rural A01 and A02, and urban F05. Mr Lee 
Wing-tat and Mr Albert Chan Wai-yip, both nominated by the UDHK, had led Mr 
Leung Yiu-chung (NWSC) in all the sample polling stations in Islands and Tsuen Wan 
areas by a comfortable margin; and the joint-jacket election strategy seemed to be 
effective. But the situation turned to confusion in Kwai Tsing area where Mr Leung 
had worked for the blue-collar workers for years and he received widespread 
grassroots support there. For example, Mr Leung received over half of the total vote 
in J08. The rather strong working-class image and policy stance of Mr Leung 
seemed not to be acceptable to the voters in the two middle class districts of F04 and 
F07. Mr Yeung Fuk-kwong (pro-conservative independent) acquired a significant 
support from the rural districts and in his sphere of influence, F05. But he was 
defeated by the democrat candidates in most of the remaining sample polling stations, 
even in the middle-class districts of F04 and F07.
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Figure 7.7 New Territories South: Exit Poll’s Vote Share
Percentage of Vote
A01 A02 F03 F04 F05 F06 F07 J08 J09 J10 J l l  J12 J13
Polling Stations
—  L E U N G  Y iu-chung +  LEE W ing-tat 
*  Y E U N G  Fuk-kwong Albert C H A N
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New Territories West
This constituency comprised the two administrative districts of Tuen Mun and 
Yuen Long. Tuen Mun is a newly-developed satellite town with an overwhelming 
population of urban migrants who mainly live in high-rise public housing or home- 
ownership estates. On the other hand, Yeun Long has remained, more or less, a 
rural community but with a growing population of urban origin. In the 11 sample 
polling stations, only one sample polling station could really be regarded as a rural 
district. This might probably under-estimate the electoral strength of the rural forces 
and has contributed to the presence of a remarkable gap between the official and the 
exit poll’s vote share of most of the candidates. As a result, the weighted poll shares 
of Mr Ng Ming-yum (UDHK) and Mr Zachary Wong Wai-yin (MP) were both over 
3% more than what they actually had; and Mr Tai Chin-wah (rural conservatives), 
Mr Tso Shui-wai (LDF), and Mr Tang Siu-tong (rural conservatives) were predicted 
lower than what they actually achieved, ranging from about 1.4% to 3.1 %. (see Table 
7.6) On the other hand, seven districts were packed with public housing estates. 
They were (% of public housing population): H04 (98.5%), G05 (90.7%), G06 
(78.8%), G07 (76%), G08 (99.9%), G09 (66.7%), and G10 (93.9%). The 
corresponding percentage of blue-collar workers was probably higher than that of 
other constituencies, ranging from 60.6% (G09) to 78.7% (G08). Besides, these 
seven districts also had a lower percentage of population receiving tertiary education, 
ranging from only 1.2% (G08 and G10) to 3.9% (G09). On the contrary, the 
remaining four districts had a higher percentage of professional and managerial 
workers, especially in G il (24.7%) and H02 (20.5%).
Excluding H03 and H04, Mr Ng appeared to lead in all sample polling 
stations, with a tremendous support in Tuen Mun where he had engaged in pressure 
group politics for years. In the seemingly middle class district (G il), Mr Ng had 
also wielded his third highest electoral support. His campaign partner, Mr Wong, 
had managed to beat his rival, Mr Tso, in four out of seven of Tuen Mun’s sample 
polling stations. By judging the poll finding in H03, Mr Tai seemed to have 
tremendous support in rural districts. But the misleading low electoral support of Mr
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Tai in Tuen Mun might probably be related to his supporters’ non-response attitude 
towards the interviewers of the exit poll.482 The same might also be applied to the 
other two rural-supported candidates, Mr Tang and Mr Tso.
Figure 7.8 New Territories West: Exit Poll’s Vote Share
Percentage of Vote
40 -
HOI H 02 H03 H04 G05 G06 G07 G08 G09 G10 G i l
Polling Stations
—  TANG  Siu-tong +  TSO Shiu-wai **■ TAI Chin-wah 
N G  Ming-yum Zachary W O NG
482I gained this impression from the exit poll’s interviewers in that constituency.
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New Territories North
Like the New Territories West constituency, this constituency was also a rural- 
converted satellite town developed since the 1970s. It comprises the administrative 
districts of the North and Tai Po. With the advantage of being near to Shatin, Tai 
Po had undergone a quicker pace of urbanisation than the North area. Accompanying 
the urbanisation process was the gradual build-up of public housing and home- 
ownership estates, and the influx of urban migrants. As noted in the previous 
chapter, the inadequacy of communal facilities and transportation had given birth to 
the formation of pressure groups at the local level. Tai Po and the North areas were 
no exception. Similar to that of the New Territories West, the election battles have 
usually been fought between the rural conservatives and the urban democrats. There 
was altogether six contenders in this constituency: Mr Fung Chi-wood (UDHK), Mr 
Tik Chi-yuen (MP), Mr Johnny Wong Chi-keung (LDF), Mr Cheung Hon-chung 
(LDF), Mr Ronald Chow Mei-tak (HKADPL and then current LegCo member), and 
Mr Tong Wai-man (independent).
Seven polling stations had been chosen as samples. Two of them (E04 and 
E05) were dominated by private-housing flats or estates. The remaining 5 mainly 
comprised a public housing population, ranging from 60.5% (E06) to 96.7% (B03). 
The usual correlation of housing type with other demographic characteristics also 
applied in this constituency. Higher percentage of professional and managerial 
workers and of tertiary education were found to live in private housing, for example, 
E04 and E05 had about a quarter of their working population engaging in professional 
work and about 7.6% population receiving tertiary education. By contrast, the 
remaining five had tended to have more blue-collar working population, ranging from 
54.1% (B01) to 64.7% (B03); relatively lower percentage of professional workers, 
ranging from 9.4% (B03) to 17.9% (E07) and receiving tertiary education, ranging 
from 2.3% (B03) to 4.8% (E07).
The joint ticket strategy of Mr Fung and Mr Tik appeared to be effective and 
they led in the first two places in five polling stations. As shown in Figure 7.9, Mr
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Tik had drawn his electoral support from the North area while Mr Fung had drawn 
his support from Tai Po. Their electoral support seemed to cut across housing types 
and occupation as reflected in their constant support in private housing districts (like 
E04) and public housing districts (B03). Mr Wong and Mr Chow had acquired 
support in a quite even manner but lacked a sufficient amount of votes to win. Mr 
Cheung tended to draw his support in North area (especially in B03) but slid 
significantly in Tai Po; and this probably reflected the limited reach of his local 
influence. Mr Tong had remained a low-flyer throughout all the sample stations.
Figure 7.9 New Territories North: Exit Poll’s Vote Share 
Percentage of Vote
E06 E07B01 B02 B03 E04 E05
Polling Stations
— Ronald CHOW +  Johnny WONG *** TO NG  Wai-man
F U N G  Chi-wood TIK Chi-yuen +  CH EUN G  Hon-chung
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Given that the non-operationalisation of the centre-periphery cleavage (in terms 
of democratisation and autonomy) by the 1991 Census data variables, the regression 
analysis of the 1991 Census data could therefore only be employed to discover the 
effect of contextual factors on voting.483 As shown in Table 7.7, five independent 
variables of social and economic structures are introduced. They are: HKBORN, 
TERTIARY, PUBLIC HOUSING, PROFESSIONAL, and BLUE COLLAR. The 
dependent variable is the combined votes share of the UDHK and the MP 
(UDHKMP). The decision not to include the dummy variables of "Leftist" and 
"Conservative" candidates is taken because (1) there is no territory-wide competition 
among the democrats, the leftists and the conservatives, and (2) the effects of 
constituency and dummy variables are unidentified given that all of the leftist 
candidates and nearly all of the conservative candidates were defeated. Therefore, 
a choice is made to separate constituencies into those with and those without leftist 
candidates for regression analysis.
In the three constituencies with the participation of the leftist candidates 
(N=36 polling stations), as shown in Table 7.8, no variable is entered into the 
regression line. The possible explanation of this would be the crosscutting effect of 
the centre-periphery cleavage on the collective consumption cleavage. That means 
the voters who supported the democrats tended to put more emphasis on the issues 
of democratisation and autonomy than on the issue of collective consumption in these 
three constituencies. As shown in Figures 7.1, 7.3, and 7.4, the socio-economic 
differences of these polling stations seemed to have little influence on the vote share 
of the UDHK candidates.
For the remaining six constituencies (64 polling stations), the NTE 
constituency is excluded from further analysis because of the presence of a 
charismatic pro-democrat independent, Miss Emily Lau Wai-hing, whose political 
stance is more aggressive and reform-oriented than that of the UDHK and the MP,
4830n  regression analysis of census data on voting, see T .J. Nossiter, Communism 
in Kerala: A Study in Political Adaptation (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1982), chap.
12.
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and who received significant electoral supports and even beat the UDHK candidates 
there.484 The NTE constituency would therefore be considered as an deviant case. 
The regression analysis showed that two variables, HKBORN (R2 = .11, p < .05) 
and TERTIARY (R2 = .12, p < .01) accounted for 23% of variance in UDHKMP 
vote share (as shown in Table 7.8). It hints that candidates nominated by the UDHK 
and the MP appeared to draw more support from the polling stations where higher 
percentages of population are local-born or have received tertiary education.
484If including the NTE constituency, no variable is entered into the regression 
equation.
Analysis of Poll Data
In this section, two sets of opinion poll data are employed to estimate the 
effects of various social and economic variables as well as issue positions on the 
voters’ vote choices.485 These two opinion polls were commissioned by the Sing 
Tao Jih Wan Pao, the Hong Kong Standard and the Tin Tin Daily News (for 
questionnaires, see Appendixes 1 & 2). The first and second polls were conducted, 
by telephone interviews, from 13 to 19 August and from 7 to 11 September 1991 
respectively.486 The sample pools of these surveys were generated by adding the 
telephone prefixes supplied by the Hong Kong Telecom with the suffixes, which were 
selected randomly by computer. The respective successful cases for the first and 
second polls were 1,000 and 1,007 (out of 14,653 and 8,336). In order to analyze 
respondents’ vote choices, we only select those cases in which the respondents 
expressed their vote choices for subsequent statistical analysis. Therefore, the 
respective cases used for analysis in the first and second polls were 569 and 388 
(56.9% and 38.5% of the successful cases respectively).
As shown in Table 7.9, the distribution of the socio-economic characteristics 
of the respondents in the first and second opinion survey data sets do not vary 
significantly. But one thing we must bear in mind is the difference of sex and age 
distribution between the 1991 Final Register of Electors and the two opinion polls. 
In terms of sex distribution, there is about 5 % more males in the two opinion polls
485Given that every respondent (voter) has two votes, three types of vote choices 
are, therefore, being classified: support democrats (two votes casted to democrat 
candidates), no clear preference (only one of the votes casted to democrat candidates), 
and not support democrats (none of the votes casted to democrat candidates). The 
following are being classified as democrat candidates: those nominated by the UDHK, 
the MP, the HKADPL, the HKDF, the NWSC, as well as Emily LAU Wai-hing, 
Diana LEUNG Wai-tung, and Dragon John YOUNG, (for abbreviations, see Table 
6.1)
486The telephone density in Hong Kong was 60 telephones per 100 population by 
the end of 1991, which was regarded as the highest in South-east Asia. See Hong 
Kong Government, Hong Kong 1992: A Review of 1991 (Hong Kong: Government 
Printer, 1992), p. 292.
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than in the 1991 Final Register of Electors. The respective percentages of males in 
the 1991 Final Register of Electors, the first and second opinion polls are 52.9%, 
58.5 % and 57.8%. In terms of age distribution, the samples of the two opinion polls 
are over-represented by the age groups of 21-30, 31-40, and 41-50; and under­
represented by the age groups of 51-60, and 61 or above (for details, see Tables 7.1, 
7.2, and 7.9).
Given that the research designs of all of the 1991 LegCo opinion surveys do 
not intend to test the effects of the cleavages of centre-periphery relations and 
collective consumption on vote choices, the two opinion surveys employed are no 
exception. In these two opinion polls, only the centre-periphery cleavage could be 
operationalized by one’s attitude towards the increase of LegCo directly-elected seats 
in the first poll and by one’s attitude towards Chinese pro-democracy movement in 
the second poll. Therefore, we are forced to create a dummy variable as a proxy to 
measure the effect of collective consumption on vote choices. A dummy variable, 
CREDIBILITY, is constructed by assigning "1" to those candidates who have a track 
record of defending grassroots’ interests, or whose image and social status are 
matched with their pledges in their campaign materials to oppose government 
privatisation programmes, and "0" to the rest of the candidates.487 It is assumed 
that those respondents who vote for any one of the candidates in category " 1" regard 
the issue of collective consumption as their major consideration in vote deliberation.
In the first opinion poll, personal monthly income (INCOME), attitude 
towards LegCo directly-elected seats (SEAT-INCREASE and SEAT-DECREASE), 
and CREDIBILITY are associated with vote choice, as shown in Tables 7 .10a, 7 .10b, 
7.10c and 7.10d. Those respondents who have a higher monthly income, who 
support the increase of LegCo directly-elected seats, and who support those
487Candidates being grouped under category "1” included: Mr Cheng Kai-nam, 
Dr Yeung Sum, Mr Szeto Wah, Mr Li Wah-ming, Mr Hau Shui-pui, Mr Lau Chin- 
shek, Mr Lam Kui-shing, Ms Chan Yuen-han, Mr Fung Kin-kee, Mr To Kun-sun, 
Mr Kan Chung-nin, Mr Lau Kong-wah, Mr Wong Hong-chung, Mr Lee Wing-tat, 
Mr Chan Wai-yip, Mr Leung Yiu-chung, Mr Ng Ming-yum, Mr Wong Wai-yin, Mr 
Fung Chi-wood, Mr Tik Chi-yuen, and Mr Chow Mei-tak.
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candidates that have been judged to have the credibility to defend the grassroots’ 
interest and to oppose the privatisation programmes, tended to vote for two democrat 
candidates, and vice versa. Sex, age, educational attainment, and birth place do not 
have an association with vote choice.
In the second opinion poll, educational attainment (EDUCATION), whether 
candidates support the Chinese democracy movement (SUPPORT), and 
CREDIBILITY are associated with vote choice, as shown in Tables 7.11a, 7.11b and 
7.11c. Those respondents who have a higher educational attainment, who claim to 
consider whether candidates support the Chinese democracy movement, and who 
support those candidates that have been judged to have the credibility to defend the 
grassroots’ interest and to oppose the privatisation programmes, tended to vote for 
two democrat candidates, and vice versa. Sex, age, income and birth place do not 
have an association with one’s vote choices.
In order to estimate the probability of the effect of each of the above- 
mentioned independent and dummy variables on respondents’ vote choices, PROBIT 
analysis is employed. In the first opinion poll, two sets of dummy variables, SEAT- 
INCREASE and SEAT-DECREASE, and CREDIBILITY, have been found to have 
greater probability to have effect on VOTE CHOICE. The respective estimated 
coefficients are 0.1888, -0.7666 and 0.5574, as shown in Table 7.12. Although the 
estimated coefficient of SEAT-DECREASE is the highest among the three, its 
significance level is low (p > 0.1). Adding to this is the very small number of 
respondents (N=6) having this kind of political stance (see Table 7 .10c). Therefore, 
it is not reliable to conclude that SEAT-DECREASE has the greatest probability of 
effecting respondents’ vote choices. As a result, the variable of CREDIBILITY 
becomes the single factor that has the greatest probability of having an effect on vote 
choice (p < 0.001). In other words, other things being equal, the issue of collective 
consumption has more effect than the issue of democratisation on respondents’ vote 
choices.
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On the other hand, two variables, SUPPORT and EDUCATION, have been 
found to have greater probability to have effect on vote choices in the second opinion 
poll. As shown in Table 7.13, the respective estimated coefficients are -0.5411 (p 
< 0.001) and 0.1464 (p < 0.05). Statistically speaking, SUPPORT has a greater 
probability than EDUCATION to have effect on vote choices. It is interesting to note 
here that CREDIBILITY does not have the same effect on vote choices as in the first 
opinion poll (estimated coefficient = -0.0895, p > 0.25). The estimated coefficients 
of SEX and BIRTH PLACE are -0.1476 and -0.1591, and not at an acceptable 
significance level (p > 0.15 and p > 0.11).
The above findings demonstrate that the issues of centre-periphery relations 
and collective consumption have carried more weight than other socio-economic 
factors in determining one’s vote choices. Furthermore, the shifting salience from 
the collective consumption issue in the first opinion poll to the issue of centre- 
periphery relations in the second opinion poll could probably be explained in the light 
of the political climate and electoral campaign in the 1991 LegCo direct elections, 
which had been mentioned in Chapter 6. First of all, the Chinese Government had 
helped to reinforce the salience of centre-periphery relations by criticising relentlessly 
those prominent democrat candidates, Mr Martin Lee and Mr Szeto Wah, who have 
enjoyed widespread support within Hong Kong. Second, during the course of 
electoral campaign, the democrat and the leftist candidates competed most strongly 
with each other over the issue of centre-periphery relations, and seldom over the issue 
of collective consumption because they held the same view and attitude towards the 
latter issue.
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Table 7.1
Electorate and Hong Kong Population Aged 21 and above by 
Sex (%), 1991
Sex 1991 Final Register 1991 Hong Kong
of Electors Population Census
Male 52.9 50.5
Female 47.1 49.5
Total 100.0 100.0
(N) (1,916,925) (3,880,542)
Source: adapted from Louie Kin-sheun et al., "Who Voted in 
the 1991 Elections? A Socio-Demographic Profile of the Hong 
Kong Electorate," in Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds., 
Hong K ong T r i e d  D e m o c ra c y :  The 1991  E l e c t i o n s  i n  Hong Kong  
(Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1993), p. 4, Table 1.
Table 7.2
Electorate and Hong Kong Population Aged 21 and above by 
Age Group (%), 1991
Age 1991 Final Register 1991 Hong Kong
Group of Electors Population Census
21-30 16.9 27.2
31-40 31.8 27.2
41-50 19.1 15.4
51-60 14 .7 13 .2
61 & above 17.5 17.1
Total 100.0 100.0
(N) (1, 899,733) (3,880,542)
Source: adapted from Louie Kin-sheun et al., "Who Voted in 
the 1991 Elections? A Socio-Demographic Profile of the Hong 
Kong Electorate," in Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds., 
Hong K ong T r i e d  D e m o c ra c y :  The 1991 E l e c t i o n s  i n  Hong Kong  
(Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1993), p. 5, Table 2.
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Table 7.3
Summary of the 1991 Legislative Council Elections
Constit- Forecast Registered A / B Turnout
uency Populat- Electorate (%) (%)
ion (A) (B)
(I) DIRECT ELECTIONS
Hong Kong 794,900 261,573 32.9 103,028
Island East (39.39)
Hong Kong 540,700 171,052 31.6 68,979
Island West (40.33)
Kowloon East 570,300 217,117 38.1 82,405
(37.95)
Kowloon 751,300 287,373 38.3 110,043
Central (3 8.29)
Kowloon West 731,500 213,345 29.2 69,483
(32.57)
New Territ- 656,100 197,614 30.1 96,637
ories East (48.90)
New Territ- 742,400 248,045 33.4 91,780
ories South (37.00)
New Territ- 647,600 198,817 30.7 81,468
ories West (40.98)
New Territ- 392,400 121,989 31.1 46,644
ories North (38.24)
TOTAL 5,827,200 1,916,925 32.9 750,467
(39.15)
(II) FUNCTIONAL ELECTIONS
First Commercial 1,609 911
(56.62)
Second Commercial 2,348 Uncontested
First Industrial 460 Uncontested
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Second Industrial 
Finance
Financial Services
Teaching
Labour (2 seats) 
Social Services 
Medical 
Health Care 
Legal
Engineering
Architectural, 
Surveying and 
Planning
Accountancy
Real Estate and 
Construction
Tourism
Urban Council 
Regional Council
Rural
1,366
234
694
38,678
378 
181 
4, 031 
10,636 
1,240
2, 805
1,481
2,276
373
847
40
36
112
390
(28.55)
Uncontested
556
(80.12)
17,034
(44.04)
Uncontested
Uncontested
Uncontested
Uncontested
714
(57.58)
1,511
(53.87)
1, 039
(70.16)
Uncontested
Uncontested
728
(85.95)
Uncontested
36
(1 0 0 .0 0 )
Uncontested
TOTAL 69,825 
(48,756)*
22919
(47.01)
* Excluding the electorate of 12 uncontested seats.
Source: compiled and calculated from the data supplied by 
the Registration and Electoral Office, Constitutional 
Affairs Branch, Government Secretariat, Hong Kong 
Government.
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Table 7.4
Results of the 1991 LegCo Direct Elections
Constituency/Name Vote Given Vote Share
(A) (B)
HONG KONG ISLAND EAST
LEE Chu-ming, Martin* 
MAN Sai-cheong*
CHENG Kai-nam 
CHAN Ying-lun 
LEUNG Wai-tung, Diana 
CHOW Kit-bing, Jennifer
HONG KONG ISLAND WEST 
YEUNG Sum*
HUANG Chen-ya*
CHAN Yuk-cheung, David 
CHANG Yau-hung, Alexander 
WONG Man-chiu, Ronnie 
CHEUNG Wai-sun, Winnie
KOWLOON EAST 
SZETO Wah*
LI Wah-ming*
HAU Shui-pui 
POON Chi-fai 
CHAN Cheong 
LI Ting-kit 
LI Koi-hop, Philip
KOWLOON CENTRAL 
LAU Chin-shek*
LAM Kui-shing, Conrad* 
CHAN Yuen-han 
CHAN Chi-kwan, Peter 
YEUNG Lai-yin, Cecilia 
YOUNG, Dragon John 
CHEUNG Chung-ming, Justin
KOWLOON WEST
FUNG Kin-kee, Frederick*
TO Kun-sun, James*
LEE Yu-tai, Desmond 
SIT Ho-yin, Kingsley 
LAW Cheung-kwok 
NG Kin-sun
76831 74.6 40.2
43615 42.3 22.8
29902 29.0 15.6
19806 19.2 10.4
15230 14.8 8.0
5805 5.6 3.0
45108 65.4 34.8
31052 45.0 24.0
29413 42.6 22.7
12145 17.6 9.4
6113 8.9 4.7
5821 8.4 4.5
57921 70.3 37.8
49643 60.2 32.4
21225 25.8 13.9
16625 20.2 10.9
3431 4.2 2.2
3393 4.1 2.2
865 1.0 0.6
68489 62.2 34.2
56084 51.0 28.0
44894 40.8 22.4
14145 12.9 7.1
8257 7.5 4.1
6273 5.7 3.1
2158 2.0 1.1
36508 52.5 28.9
26352 37.9 20.9
21471 30.9 17.0
18634 26.8 14.8
17145 24.7 13.6
6098 8.8 4.8
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NEW TERRITORIES EAST 
LAU Wai-hing, Emily*
WONG Wang-fat, Andrew*
KAN Chung-nin, Tony 
LAU Kong-wah
WONG Hong-chung, Johnston
CHOI Man-hing
LEUNG Ka-ching, Eric
NEW TERRITORIES SOUTH 
LEE Wing-tat*
CHAN Wai-yip, Albert* 
LEUNG Yiu-chung 
YEUNG Fuk-kwong
NEW TERRITORIES WEST 
NG Ming-yum*
TAI Chin-wah*
WONG Wai-yin, Zachary 
TANG Siu-tong 
TSO Shiu-wai
NEW TERRITORIES NORTH 
FUNG Chi-wood*
TIK Chi-yuen*
CHEUNG Hon-chung 
WONG Chi-keung, Johnny 
CHOW Mei-tak, Ronald 
TONG Wai-man
46515 48.1 26.3
39806 41.2 22.5
37126 38.4 21.0
26659 27.6 15.1
26156 27.1 14.8
348 0.4 0.2
306 0.3 0.2
52192 56.9 32.0
42164 45.9 25.9
38568 42.0 23.7
30095 32.8 18.5
42319 51.9 29.4
30871 37.9 21.5
27243 33.4 18.9
23389 28.7 16.3
20018 24.6 13.9
23267 49.9 27.3
21702 46.5 25.5
16221 34.8 19.1
15350 32.9 18.0
7117 15.3 8.4
1429 3.1 1.7
Notes:
1. Vote Share (A) = % of individual vote given over 
sum of vote cast in that constituency; Vote Share
(B) = % of individual vote given over sum of vote 
cast in that constituency.
2. The symbol "*" denoted the returned candidates.
Source: compiled and calculated from the data bank supplied 
by the Registration and Electoral Office, Constitutional 
Affairs Branch, Government Secretariat, Hong Kong 
Government.
309
Table 7.5
Vote Share by Political Affiliation in 1991 LegCo Direct
Elections
Name Candidates Seats Vote Share (%)
Democrats:
UDHK 14 12 45 .1
MP 3 2 7.2
HKADPL 3 1 4.4
HKDF 1 0 1.4
NWSC
sub-total
1 0 2.8
61.0
Pro-Democrat
Independents
Conservatives
3 1 5.0 5.0
LDF 5* 0 5.1
Rural 3 1 5.3
NHKA
sub-total
Pro-
Conservative
2 0 0.9
11.3
Independents 6 0 8.2 8.2
Leftists:
FTU 1 0 3.3
HKCF 1 0 2.2
KTMCA
sub-total
1 0 1.6
7.0
Rightist:
TUC 1 0 0.2 0.2
Others 9 1 7.2 7.2
TOTAL 54 18 100.0 100.0
*Mr Cheung Hon-cheung of the NTN constituency had regarded 
himself as an independent candidate. Nevertheless, the 
nomination list supplied to me by the LDF had included his 
name.
Source: see Table 7.4.
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Table 7.6
Comparison of Official and Exit Poll's Results of the 1991
LegCo Direct Elections
Constituency/Name Official TVB's Exit Poll
Vote Share (A) (B) (C)
HONG KONG ISLAND EAST
LEE Chu-ming, Martin* 40.2 40.4 40.4 41.1
MAN Sai-cheong* 22 .8 23.9 23.9 23.9
CHENG Kai-nam 15.6 14.9 14.9 14.9
CHAN Ying-lun 10.4 9.9 9.9 9.7
LEUNG Wai-tung, Diana 8.0 7.9 7.9 7.6
CHOW Kit-bing, Jennifer 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9
HONG KONG ISLAND WEST 
YEUNG Sum* 34.8 35.8 35.4 36.1
HUANG Chen-ya* 24.0 25.1 24.8 24 .7
CHAN Yuk-cheung, David 22.7 22.3 22.6 22.6
CHANG Yau-hung, Alexander• 9.4 8.4 8.5 8.5
WONG Man-chiu, Ronnie 4.7 4.4 4.8 4.2
CHEUNG Wai-sun, Winnie 4.5 3.9 4.0 3.9
KOWLOON EAST 
SZETO Wah* 37.8 38.7 38.7 38 . 6
LI Wah-ming* 32 .4 31.5 31.5 32.1
HAU Shui-pui 13 . 9 14 .2 14 .2 14 .3
POON Chi-fai 10.9 11. 0 11.0 10.6
CHAN Cheong 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.3
LI Ting-kit 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.6
LI Koi-hop, Philip 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
KOWLOON CENTRAL
LAU Chin-shek* 34.2 36.0 36.0 36.5
LAM Kui-shing, Conrad* 28.0 29.7 29.6 29.1
CHAN Yuen-han 22.4 21.2 21.0 21.2
CHAN Chi-kwan, Peter 7.1 6.1 6.4 6.2
YEUNG Lai-yin, Cecilia 4.1 3.6 3.5 3.5
YOUNG, Dragon John 3.1 2.6 2.6 2.6
CHEUNG Chung-ming, Justin 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9
KOWLOON WEST
FUNG Kin-kee, Frederick* 28.9 28.8 29.6 30.0
TO Kun-sun, James* 20.9 20.6 20.6 20.7
LEE Yu-tai, Desmond 17. 0 17.1 16.7 16.5
SIT Ho-yin, Kingsley 14.8 15.1 14.7 14 . 9
LAW Cheung-kwok 13.6 13.9 14 .2 14.0
NG Kin-sun 4.8 4.6 4.2 3.9
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NEW TERRITORIES EAST
LAU Wai-hing, Emily* 26 .3 26.0 26.0 26 .4
WONG Wang-fat, Andrew* 22 .5 22.8 22.7 22 .4
KAN Chung-nin, Tony 21.0 19.4 19.5 19.7
LAU Kong-wah 15.1 16.8 16.8 16.6
WONG Hong-chung, Johnstonl4.8 14 .4 14 .4 14.5
CHOI Man-hing 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
LEUNG Ka-ching, Eric 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2
NEW TERRITORIES SOUTH
LEE Wing-tat* 32.0 31.4 31.2 30.9
CHAN Wai-yip, Albert* 25.9 25.3 27.1 27.4
LEUNG Yiu-chung 23 .7 24.6 23.9 23.8
YEUNG Fuk-kwong 18.5 18.8 17.8 17.9
NEW TERRITORIES WEST
NG Ming-yum* 29.4 32.5 33 .6 33.9
TAI Chin-wah* 21.5 20.1 18.6 18.6
WONG Wai-yin, Zachary 18.9 22 .2 22 .3 21.9
TANG Siu-tong 16.3 13 .2 12 .4 12 .5
TSO Shiu-wai 13.9 12.0 13.1 13.1
NEW TERRITORIES NORTH 
FUNG Chi-wood* 27.3 27.9 27.9 28 .4
TIK Chi-yuen* 25.5 27.7 27.7 27.4
CHEUNG Hon-chung 19.1 15.6 15.6 15.8
WONG Chi-keung, Johnny 18.0 18.5 18.5 18.2
CHOW Mei-tak, Ronald 8.4 8.7 8.7 8.7
TONG Wai-man 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5
Notes:
1. The symbol "*" denoted the returned candidates.
2. Vote Share = % of individual vote given over sum 
of vote given in that constituency.
3. TVB's Exit Poll: (A) = revised (weighted) vote
share in the origin data bank; (B) = vote share 
in the origin data bank; (C) = vote share after 
double-checked by me on the raw data sheets.
Sources: see Table 7.4, and TVB's exit poll.
312
Table 7.7
Ecological Analysis: Variables in Multiple Regression
Short
Label
Full
Variable
Form of 
Variable
HKBORN Residents Born in Hong Kong as % 
of Total Population
%
PROFESSIONAL Professional Workers as % of Total 
Workforce (excluding armed forces)
%
BLUE COLLAR Blue Collar as % of Total Work­
force (excluding armed forces)
%
PUBLIC HOUSING Residents Living in Public Housing 
Estates as % of Total Population
%
TERTIARY Residents Received Tertiary 
Education as % of Total Population
%
UDHKMP Combined Vote Share of the UDHK 
and the MP as % of Total Vote Cast
%
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Table 7.8
Ecological Analysis: Multiple Regression
Dependent
Variable
No. of 
Cases
Stepwise Order 
Independent 
Variables & 
Sign
F-value &
Significance
Level
R2
UDHKMP 36 No Variable Entered
UDHKMP 64 No Variable Entered
UDHKMP 52 +HKBORN 6.18* .11
+TERTIARY 7 .48** .23
* denoted p < .05 
** denoted p < .01
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Table 7.9
Socio-Economic Characteristics of Respondents in the First 
(13-19 August 1991) and Second (7-11 September 1991) 
Opinion Polls
VARIABLES OPINION
FIRST
SURVEYS
SECOND
SEX
Male 585 (58.5%) 582 (57.8%)
Female 415 (41.5%) 425 (42.2%)
AGE
21-25 73 (7.3%) 77 (7.6%)
26-30 172 (17.2%) 151 (15.0%)
31-35 189 (18.9%) 209 (20.8%)
36-40 189 (18.9%) 180 (17.9%)
41-45 106 (10.6%) 132 (13.1%)
46-50 77 (7.7%) 73 (7.2%)
51-55 55 (5.5%) 44 (4.4%)
56-60 42 (4.2%) 41 (4.1%)
61 or above 97 (9.7%) 100 (9.9%)
EDUCATION
No schooling 44 (4.4%) 43 (4.3%)
Primary 242 (24.2%) 242 (24.0%)
Lower secondary 215 (21.5%) 203 (20.2%)
Upper secondary 293 (29.3%) 294 (29.2%)
Matriculation 42 (4.2%) 46 (4.6%)
College & university 164 (16.4%) 178 (17.7%)
No answer 0 (0%) 1 (0.1%)
INCOME
No income 245 (24.5%) 254 (25.2%)
HK$3/000 or below 29 (2.9%) 28 (2.8%)
HK$3,001-HK$5/000 118 (11.8%) 103 (10.2%)
HK$5,001-HK$8/000 219 (21.9%) 224 (22.2%)
HK$ 8,0 01-HK$10,000 129 (12.9%) 126 (12.5%)
HK$10,001-HK$15/000 147 (14.7%) 145 (14.4%)
HK$15,001-HK$20,000 34 (3.4%) 43 (4.3%)
HK$20,001 or above 68 (6.8%) 72 (7.1%)
No answer 11 (1.1%) 12 (1.2%)
BIRTH PLACE
Hong Kong 624 (62.4%) 634 (63.0%)
China 335 (33.5%) 332 (33.0%)
Others 40 (4.0%) 39 (3.9%)
No answer 1 (0.1%) 2 (0.2%)
TOTAL (N) 1,000 (100%) 1, 007 (100%)
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Table 7.10a
Vote Choices by Personal Monthly Income: First Opinion Poll
VOTE
CHOICES
A
INCOME
B
i
C D
Support 89 111 61 16
democrats 42 .4% 53 .1% 52.6% 47.1%
No clear 55 55 38 9
preference 26.2% 26.3% 32.8% 26.5%
Not support 66 43 17 9
democrats 31.4% 20.6% 14.7% 26.5%
TOTAL 210 209 116 34
100% 100% 100.1%* 100.1%*
N=569/ p < 0.05 
* due to rounding. 
Notes:
A = No income and HK$5,000 or below.
B = HK$5,001 - HK$10, 000 .
C = HK$10,001 - HK$20, 000 .
D = HK$20,001 or above.
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Table 7.10b
Vote Choices by the Increase of LegCo Directly-elected 
Seats (SEAT-INCREASE): First Opinion Poll
VOTE
CHOICES
INCREASE LEGCO 
Yes
DIRECTLY-ELECTED SEATS 
No
Support 119 158
democrats 55.9% 44 .4%
No clear 59 98
preference 27.7% 27.5%
Not support 35 100
democrats 16 .4% 28.1%
TOTAL 213 356
100% 100%
N=569, p < 0.005
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Table 7.10c
Vote Choices by the Decrease of LegCo Directly-elected
Seats (SEAT-DECREASE): First Opinion Poll
VOTE DECREASE LEGCO DIRECTLY-ELECTED SEATS
CHOICES
Yes No
Support 1 276
democrats 16.7% 49.0
No clear 5 152
preference 83 .3% 27.0
Not support 0 135
democrats 0% 24 . 0
TOTAL 6 563
100% 100%
N=569, p < 0.01
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Table 7.10d
Vote Choices by Credibility: First Opinion Poll
VOTE
CHOICES
CREDIBILITY 
Yes No
Support 206 71
democrats 56.4% 34.8%
No clear 143 14
preference 39.2% 6.9%
Not support 16 119
democrats 4.4% 58.3%
TOTAL 365 204
100% 100%
N=569, p < 0.0001
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Table 7.11a
Vote Choices by Education: Second Opinion Poll
VOTE
CHOICES
A
EDUCATION
B C D
Support 33 38 63 56
democrats 37.5% 44 .2% 50.0% 63.6%
No clear 44 33 49 29
preference 50.0% 38.4% 38.9% 33.0%
Not support 11 15 14 3
democrats 12.5% 17.4% 11.1% 3.4%
TOTAL 88 86 126 88
100% 100% 100% 100%
N=388/ p < 0.01
Notes:
A = No schooling and primary level.
B = Lower secondary level.
C = Upper secondary and matriculation level.
D = College and university level.
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Table 7.11b
Vote Choices by Consideration of Whether the Candidates 
Support the Chinese Democracy Movement (SUPPORT): Second
Opinion Poll
VOTE
CHOICES
WHETHER SUPPORT 
Consider
CHINESE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT 
Not Consider
Support 120 70
democrats 58.8% 38.0%
No clear 70 85
preference 34.3% 46.2%
Not support 14 29
democrats 6.9% 15.8%
TOTAL 204 184
100% 100%
N=388/ p < 0.001
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Table 7.11c
Vote Choices by Credibility: Second Opinion Poll
VOTE
CHOICES
Yes
CREDIBILITY
No
Support 139 51
democrats 48.4% 50.5%
No clear 138 17
preference 48 .1% 16.8%
Not support 10 33
democrats 3.5% 32.7%
TOTAL 287 101
100% 100%
N=388, p < 0.0001
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Table 7.12
Estimation of Effects on Vote Choices: PROBIT Analysis of 
First Opinion Poll Data
VARIABLE ESTIMATED
COEFFICIENTS
STANDARD
ERROR
SEX -.0310 .1223
AGE .0525 .0891
EDUCATION .0855 .0658
INCOME .0348 . 0787
BIRTH PLACE .0488 . 1108
SEAT-IN .1888 .1148
SEAT-DE -.7666 .6104
CREDIBILITY .5574 .1139
CONSTANT 4.1330 .3951
N=569
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Table 7.13
Estimation of Effects on Vote Choices: PROBIT Analysis of 
Second Opinion Poll Data
VARIABLE ESTIMATED
COEFFICIENTS
STANDARD
ERROR
SEX - . 1476 .1495
AGE -.0771 .1119
EDUCATION .1464 . 0784
INCOME .0336 .0950
BIRTH PLACE -.1591 .1348
SUPPORT -.5411 .1347
CREDIBILITY -.0895 . 1514
CONSTANT 5.9690 .5314
N=387
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
The political configurations at the time that universal suffrage is introduced 
have a considerable effect on the development and salience of particular electoral 
cleavages. Once the electoral cleavages have emerged, the electoral market will be 
structured by the mobilisation efforts of the concerned political groups or parties 
along these cleavage lines. In the context of Hong Kong, the removal of the 
institutional barrier of entry by the new political structure stipulated in the Sino- 
British Joint Declaration in 1984 paved the way for the entry of the new middle-class 
professionals into the political arena and this reflected the gradual breakdown of the 
monopolistic power structure, which the established elites had dominated since the 
founding of the Crown Colony of Hong Kong. The ”1997 issue", therefore, not only 
signified the reversion of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China, but also the 
transformation of Hong Kong’s political order as a result of the Chinese promise of 
"Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong". At this juncture of transformation, the 
privatisation of collective consumption programmes and the expanding salary tax net 
resulting from the drastic decline of land revenues as a result of political uncertainty 
in the early 1980s and the designated use of the land fund from 1985 alienated the 
low-income group and the middle-class professionals.
The 1991 LegCo direct elections were, thus, the result of the interaction 
among various historic and structural factors, such as the widespread distrust of the 
communist Chinese Government by the Hong Kong people, the rise of new middle- 
class professionals, the tough Chinese policy towards Hong Kong’s democratisation, 
the privatisation of government services resulted from the fiscal crisis of the British-
325
Hong Kong Government, and the Tiananmen Incident of 1989. All these events had, 
in one way or another, structured the political and electoral universe of Hong Kong, 
from which the enfranchised Hong Kong electors had being nurtured since 1945, and 
contributed to the salience of the centre-periphery and the collective consumption 
electoral cleavages in the 1991 LegCo direct elections.
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The Centre-Peripherv Cleavage
The centre-periphery cleavage denoted, here, the clash of the "centre" 
dominant Chinese Government with the "periphery" constituted unit(s) of Hong Kong 
over the pace of democratisation and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the latter 
after 1997. Electorally speaking, Hong Kong’s political groups and voters could be 
divided into the pro-centre and the pro-periphery groupings, in which the former 
stands for a slower pace of democratisation and accepts the degree of autonomy as 
allowed by China, while the latter supports a quicker pace of democratisation and 
fights for the maximum degree of autonomy.
The centre-periphery cleavage also reflected the mistrust between the Chinese 
Government, and the British-Hong Kong Government and the Hong Kong people. 
On the one hand, the Chinese Government appeared to have the perception that 
Britain did not wholeheartedly wish to see the reversion of Hong Kong’s sovereignty 
to China and would adopt any measure to prolong the informal British presence in 
Hong Kong. This conspiratorial perception by Beijing coloured its judgements on the 
developments in Hong Kong and paved the way for the adoption of a cautious and 
conservative policy. For example, the political reforms initiated by the British-Hong 
Kong Government since the mid-1980s have been viewed as a plan to take advantage 
of the distrustful feelings among the Hong Kong people by planting "pro-British" 
politicians into the political structure through elections after 1997, and the Hong Kong 
Government’s decision to build a new airport after the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 
has been interpreted as a move to transfer Hong Kong’s fiscal reserves back to 
Britain. Because of such an attitude, China tended to assert its authority by claiming, 
in the name of a smooth transition of power and convergence, to have a "veto" power 
in the transitional period. The Chinese suspicion and distrust further intensified after 
the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 when the Hong Kong people came out collectively 
to protest against the way the Beijing leaders had handled the democratic movement.
On the other hand, the Hong Kong Chinese have held negative feelings 
towards the communist Chinese Government because most of them are either refugees
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or their children, who either had experienced or have been told of the misgoverning 
of the communist Chinese Government. The historic distrust of the communist 
Chinese Government had been moderated by the rise of China on the international 
stage in the early 1970s. China’s entry into the United Nations and the Sino- 
American rapprochement had softened the negative attitude of the Hong Kong people, 
especially the local-born young intellectuals and university students, towards the 
Chinese Government.
The emergence of the 1997 issue in the late 1970s, however, had, more or 
less, challenged their national identification and their related emotional feelings. The 
possible loss of freedom and existing living style resulting from the reversion of Hong 
Kong sovereignty to China had placed the Hong Kong Chinese in a very embarrassing 
position. Their national romance gave way to practical considerations of their way 
of life. Although China promised to keep Hong Kong unchanged for 50 years and 
to let Hong Kong people govern Hong Kong after 1997, the trust of the Hong Kong 
people was not high enough to make their own hearts really at ease. Their suspicion 
and distrust might have been alleviated if China had made the best use of the symbol 
of nationalism and handled skilfully its contradictions with Hong Kong society by 
acting with self-restraint as a referee, rather than as an arbiter, in the local political 
conflicts between the conservatives and the democrats.
The bone of contention between the Chinese Government and the 
conservatives, on the one hand, and the democrats, on the other, lies in the pace of 
democratisation and the degree of autonomy allowed after 1997. As the colonial 
political structure was given notice with the signing of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration in 1984, political reforms were inevitable, but the pace and scope of 
political reforms in the transitional period was subject to differing interpretation. The 
mistrust between Britain and China had come into play at this critical juncture in the 
smooth transfer of power. The reforms aimed at having a full-fledged legislature and 
a more accountable executive system met with a suspicious reception from the 
Chinese. In order to control these developments, the Chinese Government asserted 
that any "major" changes in the transitional period had better converged with the
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Basic Law then being drafted. The Sinologists within the British Foreign Office 
stressed the importance of cooperation with the Chinese Government so as to secure 
a viable plan, which could extend beyond 1997, for the maximum actualization of the 
pledges contained in the Joint Declaration. For them, any unilateral move without 
China’s blessing would prove to be short-lived and thus, the confrontational approach 
would do no good for the continued stability and prosperity of Hong Kong.
The continued prevalence of this cooperative approach had been challenged 
by the subsequent developments after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The upsurge 
of emotional feeling within Hong Kong at the time brought pressure on the British- 
Hong Kong Government to do something to stabilise both the social order and the 
inner psychological uncertainty of most Hong Kong people. The pressure to do more 
was once again viewed by the Chinese Government as a plot to prevent the smooth 
transfer of power. Even worse, China seemed to conceive that the joint effort of 
Britain and other Western countries in sanctioning China and in supporting the pro- 
democratic Chinese activists was an offensive move to challenge the communist 
regime in Beijing. Thus, the mistrust and misunderstanding between Britain and 
China had reached the point of no return.
As for the local democrat activists, they had high hopes of reforming the 
colonial political system and smoothing the way for subsequent "Hong Kong people 
governing Hong Kong" in the early 1980s. This stance had been taken up by various 
political groups formed during or after the Sino-British negotiations, such as the MP 
and the NHKS. The demands for democratic government from such groups and 
political activists had become the prime source of conflict with the Hong Kong 
Government and the conservatives in the mid-1980s, when the power devolution 
resulting from the Sino-British Joint Declaration had taken place. Later on, however, 
the contradiction shifted to one between the Chinese Government and the democrats 
as a result of the Chinese intervention in Hong Kong domestic politics. This was 
well demonstrated in the 1987 political review which, under China’s pressure, 
deferred the introduction of direct elections from 1988 to 1991, and the drafting of 
the Basic Law which adopted a conservative political model after 1997. The
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conservative approach to political reforms and the alliance with the conservatives had 
put the Chinese Government at odds with the democrats. The growing Chinese 
intervention in local Hong Kong politics had also brought up the question of how high 
the "high degree" of autonomy for Hong Kong promised by the Chinese leaders and 
stipulated in the Joint Declaration, would be after 1997. Later in 1989, the 
Tiananmen Incident had not only politicised the Hong Kong society but also had 
driven the Hong Kong people to support the democrats’ demands for a quicker pace 
of democratisation so as to minimise the intervention from Beijing after 1997.
The salience of the centre-periphery electoral cleavage in terms of 
democratisation and autonomy in the 1991 LegCo direct elections is reflected in both 
the salience of the issue during the electoral campaign process and the defeat of the 
leftist and the conservative candidates by a significant margin of votes by the leading 
democrats. The leftists had knitted together their local working class network for 
decades and believed themselves to have considerable support in the low-income 
groups.488 But the ecological data at the LegCo election district level, as shown in 
Chapter 7, reveals that they actually showed up worse than the democrats in the 
working class districts. The pro-centre candidates, who strongly stressed a 
cooperative attitude towards China, obtained even less support than the leftists. By 
contrast, the democrats’ leaders who played both an active role in Chinese and local 
democratic movements enjoyed the highest electoral support.
488The leftists formed their own political organisation (party)--the Democratic 
Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong—in 1992.
The Collective Consumption Cleavage
The growing intervention of the Hong Kong Government in the private 
consumption process in the 1970s, resulting from the pressure of further capitalist 
economic development had two different consequences. First of all, most of the 
Hong Kong people improved their living standards as a result of massive government 
provisions of public housing, medical services and education. There was no doubt 
that most of the Hong Kong people had benefited from it, especially those direct 
recipients, and appreciated the government’s benevolent effort. Second, the affected 
population under the Government’s urban redevelopment scheme, slum clearance and 
land resumption drive, complained of their poor or unfair treatment and poor 
compensation from the Government. Although their grievances did not accumulate 
to the point of explosion, their negative feelings toward the Government would be 
reinforced and, thus, the Government’s efficiency of governing would suffer.
On top of these were the growing costs of living resulting partly from the high 
land price policy of the Hong Kong Government and the related chain effects of price 
rises on other daily necessities. In order to keep the tax low enough to attract foreign 
investment, the Hong Kong Government had to rely on land revenues to support its 
massive expenditure on infrastructural construction and collective consumption 
programmes. The disproportionate reliance on land revenues exposed the 
vulnerability of the Government’s fiscal capability. The real challenge had come 
when the 1997 issues surfaced in the late 1970s. The confidence crisis resulting from 
the uncertainty over the political future of Hong Kong in the early 1980s had plagued 
the land and property markets. Because of the sudden decline in land revenues, the 
Government was forced into either contracting out its activities by cutting back 
government expenditure and adopting a privatisation policy, or into finding new tax 
sources to replace the declining land revenues.
The results of the government contraction and the decline of land revenues 
were the shifting of the financial burden to the low-income group and the middle- 
class. The effect of privatisation would be tremendous because of the extensive scope
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of government provisions in public housing, medical services and education. Even 
worse, the low-income group further suffered by the transfer of the manufacturing 
industries to nearby Chinese special economic zones, the import of foreign labour, 
and the high inflation rates in the mid- or late 1980s. The middle-class also suffered 
from the expanding salary tax net resulting from Government pressure to replace the 
loss of land revenues through the minor, inflation-proof adjustment in tax allowance. 
Understandably, the low-income group and the middle-class would be prone to 
political and electoral mobilisation, and thus, come to extend the reach of the political 
activists. Therefore, a territory-wide political market gradually emerged, in which 
the collective consumption issues became one of the principal concerns of the 
electors.
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Dimensions of Electoral Support
Previous studies on the 1991 LegCo direct elections have been largely focused 
on the effect of the Tiananmen Incident on the alignment of political forces and on 
the voters’ choice. This thesis develops these studies further by adding the domestic 
dimension of the social conflicts which have been developed within Hong Kong since 
the 1970s. The twin cleavages of centre-periphery and individual-collective 
consumption have been demonstrated as serving as a base of electoral division and 
political mobilisation.489 Based upon these twin cleavages, a classification scheme 
has been constructed to frame the positioning of various political forces, which would 
contribute to the understanding of the electoral and political dynamics in the 
transitional period and after 1997. In short, it is possible to construct the following 
figure, based upon the centre-peripheral (in terms of democratisation and autonomy) 
and the individual-collective consumption (in terms of privatisation) cleavages, to 
demonstrate the possible electoral support for various political forces, presuming that 
the voters are expressing their own free will.
489For stylistic consideration, the term "individual-collective consumption" is used 
hereafter instead of the similar term "collective consumption" which is used 
conventionally in the literature and elsewhere in this thesis.
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Figure 8.1 Possible Dimensions of Electoral Support
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As shown in Figure 8.1, there are four possible situations:
(1) the voters are positive towards democratisation and autonomy, and hold a negative 
attitude towards privatisation;
(2) the voters are negative towards democratisation and autonomy, and hold a 
negative attitude towards privatisation;
(3) the voters are negative towards democratisation and autonomy, and hold a positive 
attitude towards privatisation; and
(4) the voters are positive towards democratisation and autonomy, and hold a positive 
attitude towards privatisation.
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If situation (1) emerges, the democrats are likely to receive more electoral 
support; if situation (2) arises, the leftists are likely to have more electoral support; 
if situation (3) emerges, the conservatives are likely to get more electoral support; if 
situation (4) arises, there is no political force (group), at this moment, to represent 
this.
The victory of the democrats in the 1991 LegCo direct elections reflected the 
fact that the majority of voters were concerned about the issues of democratisation 
and autonomy, but had held a negative attitude towards privatisation. But the show 
of value or policy preference would not necessarily be accompanied by an infallible 
commitment to see it actualised at all odds. That depends on whether the cost 
involved would be bearable or not. Given that the issues of democratisation and 
autonomy are more sensitive to the Beijing Government, more concerns and pressure 
from China would then be predictable. If voters put or are forced to put less 
emphasis on democratisation and autonomy, but still disapprove of the privatisation 
drive, they may vote strategically for those democrats who are less confrontational 
with the Chinese Government, or even support the leftists. Situation (4) seems not 
to be viable because those voters who oppose the privatisation drive would logically 
have to support more democratisation as only more directly-elected seats could 
effectively bring enough pressure to halt the privatisation move. The conservatives 
are fighting an uphill battle because their negative attitude towards democratisation 
and positive attitude towards privatisation do not match with the interests and 
demands of the grassroots and the middle-class. Therefore, situation (3) is not likely 
to emerge in the near future.
The findings and discussion in this thesis have served to explore the 
development of a cleavage system in Hong Kong and its impact on the alignment of 
political forces and on the voters’ choice in the 1991 LegCo direct elections. Any 
generalisations and projections must be cautious because of the possible disruption of 
the political order resulting from the Sino-British disagreement over Governor 
Patten’s political reforms and over the "through train" arrangement for transferring 
sovereignty in 1997. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Hong Kong would not
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be an independent state, but a special administrative region of the PRC after 1997. 
Therefore, the attitude of the Beijing Government is critical to any further 
liberalisation or democratisation of Hong Kong’s political system. Nevertheless, 
Hong Kong’s emerging electoral cleavage structure, which is embedded in a particular 
pattern of social cleavages and conflicts, has been taking shape since the 1970s and 
will, in my view, probably remain in place after 1997. Other things being equal after 
1997, the twin cleavages would have the same effect on voters’ choice. How far the 
Beijing Government will allow Hong Kong to have a limited democracy after 1997 
is not certain, but the pressure generated by the cleavage structure and released 
during the electoral process sets the agenda for public discussion and policy debate 
both before and after 1997.
Looking into the future 10 or 20 years’ political order of Hong Kong, it is 
very likely that the role played by the Hong Kong people in domestic politics will 
become more important than before. Two reasons can be adduced: (1) the fading 
away of the British Government as one of the formal players in shaping the direction 
and content of political reform in Hong Kong; and (2) free elections have been 
instituted to elect certain numbers of political posts. Therefore, six developments 
may emerge: (1) further mobilisation and politicisation of Hong Kong society along 
the twin cleavages of centre-periphery and^collective consumption will become 
inevitable; (2) the democrats will continue to receive electoral support and will remain 
as a significant player in the Legislature; (3) tensions and conflicts between the 
Executive and the Legislature will come to the forefront because of the built-in 
contradiction of the HKSAR’s representation system; (4) the insulation of the 
Executive from the mass electoral pressure will give rise to a legitimacy crisis for the 
future HKSAR Government; (5) pressure to reform the "executive-led" government 
will surface; and (6) the Beijing Government will tolerate demands for political 
reform so long as these demands do not prevent her from exercising sovereign power 
over Hong Kong and so long as there is no significant spill-over effect into China.
Things happening outside Hong Kong will also have effect on the liberalisation 
or democratisation of Hong Kong. First of all, the absorption of the Chinese
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economy into the international capitalist system has made China more prone to the 
influence of the outside world. Given that the success of economic reforms in China 
is so important for the survival of the Communist regime and the contribution of 
Hong Kong to that effect is significant, the Chinese leaders would be more cautious 
and self-restrained in handling the governing of and political demands from Hong 
Kong after 1997. Second, the succession issue after the death of Mr Deng Xiaoping. 
Whoever will emerge, Deng’s successor seems likely to be a more open-minded and 
pragmatic leader, who will try to balance conflicting demands in the economic 
liberalisation process and will also subscribe to the capitalist logic of thinking. 
Therefore, a more relaxed atmosphere will emerge within China as well as between 
China and Hong Kong. If the above judgements are right, there will be no drastic 
change or profound difference before and after 1997. The political order of Hong 
Kong will not undergo significant change. Although China will be tempted to restrain 
the pace of democratisation and the depth of political reforms, we do not see 
democracy in Hong Kong as going backwards after 1997. Optimistic it may be, but 
it still depends on the "will and skill" of the political leaders of China and Hong Kong 
to make compromises that would allow a non-zero sum political game to play, which, 
I think, can bring benefits to both sides as well as to their people.
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APPENDIX 1
1991 Legislative Council (LegCo) Direct Election Poll: 
First Round (August)
Will you go to vote in the coming LegCo direct election?
Have you voted in the last Urban or Regional Council elections in May this 
year?
( ) yes
2A. Could you explain reason(s) why you went to vote?
urged by neighbours, relatives or campaigners
urged by social groups
urged by political groups or party
support my favourite candidate
others (please specify)
don’t know
Questionnaire
( )
( )
( )
( )
yes
no
not decided 
don’t know
( ) no
2B. Could you explain the reason(s) why you did not go to 
vote?
( ) no time
( ) it can change nothing
( ) the candidates not known
( ) voting will only lead to conflict
( ) all candidates are power-seekers
( ) candidates returned unopposed
( ) others (please specify)
( ) don’t know
( ) don’t know
3. What sort of considerations do you have in deciding which candidate(s) you 
would like to vote for?
( ) candidates’ capability and record serving the public
( ) candidates’ academic qualification
( ) recommended by neighbour or relatives
( ) recommended by social groups
( ) recommended by political groups or parties
( ) don’t know
4. If today is an election day, which candidates you would like to vote for? 
(maximum two candidates)
5. How do you know your favourite candidate?
( ) from friends or relatives
( ) from the company or social groups you are working for
( ) from candidate’s campaign activities
( ) from mass media
( ) from the campaign activities launched by political groups
( ) don’t know
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6. What sort of social problems do you expect your favourite candidate would 
tackle or be concern with after winning the election?
. law and order 
inflation
Vietnamese boat people 
social welfare and services 
pollution 
home profiteering 
human rights 
imported labour
development of representative government 
others (please specify) 
don’t know
7. What impact does the introduction of direct election to the LegCo have on the 
operation of Legco?
( ) more easy to monitor government
( ) will affect the efficiency
( ) enhance the weighting of public opinion
( ) increase the chance of political conflict
( ) others (please specify)
( ) don’t know
8. There will be twenty directly-elected members in the first legislature of the 
HKSAR in 1997. Do you think this proportion is appropriate?
( ) yes
( ) no
( ) don’t know
8A. If answer "no", do you suggest increasing or decreasing 
the number of directly-elected seats?
( ) increase
( ) decrease
seats
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9. Would you please express your opinion concerning the lowering of voting age 
to 18?
( ) absolutely oppose
( ) oppose
( ) no ideas
( ) absolutely support
( ) support
( ) don’t know
10. Would you mind indicating your sex?
( ) male
( ) female
11. How old are you?
( ) 21 -25  ( ) 46 - 50
( ) 26 - 30 ( ) 51 - 55
( ) 31 - 35 ( ) 56 - 60
( ) 36 -40  ( ) 61 or above
( ) 41 -45
12. How about your educational attainment?
( ) unable to read or write (no schooling)
( ) primary school or below
( ) F.3 level
( ) F.5 level
( ) matriculation
( ) college/university or above
13. Would you mind indicating your personal monthly salary range?
( ) HK$ 3,000 or below
( ) HK$ 3,001 - HK$ 5,000
( ) HK$ 5,001 - HK$ 8,000
( ) HK$ 8,001 - HK$10,000
( ) HK$10,001 - HK$15,000
( ) HK$15,001 - HK$20,000
( ) HK$20,001 or above
( ) no income (retired)
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14. Where were you bom?
( ) Hong Kong
( ) China
( ) others (please specify)
( ) don’t know
14A. How long have you lived in Hong Kong?
( ) 7 - 1 0  years
( ) 11-20 years
( ) 21-30  years
( ) 31-40  years
( ) 41 years or above
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APPENDIX 2
1991 LegCo Direct Election Poll: 
Second Round (September)
Questionnaire
1. How many registered voters in your household?
2. Will you go to vote in the coming Legco direct election?
( ) yes
2a. Could you explain why you go to vote?
( ) urged by neighbours, relatives or
campaigners 
( ) urged by social groups
( ) urged by political groups or parties
( ) support favourite candidate
( ) civic responsibility
( ) expected to influence government policy
( ) other (please specify)
( ) don’t know
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( ) no
2b. Could you explain why you do not go to vote? 
( ) no time
( ) it can change nothing
( ) the candidate not known
( ) voting will only lead to conflict
( ) all candidates are power-seekers
( ) not willing to be involved in politics
( ) out of town
( ) other (please specify)
( ) don’t know
( ) not yet decided
( ) not willing to answer
3. If today is an election day, which candidate(s) you would like to vote for in 
your constituency? (maximum two candidates)
( ) not willing to disclose
( ) not yet decided
4. How many hours did you spend to know the candidates and read campaign 
materials?
hrs
5. Please name the source(s) from which you get to know the candidates? 
(maximum three, by order of importance)
( ) election forum hold by government
( ) election forum hold by private body
( ) canvassing
( ) candidates’ campaign materials
( ) election materials sent by government
( ) mass media
( ) other (please specify)
( ) not willing to answer
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Please name any political group (party) that you have heard of?
Please evaluate the political group (party) that you mentioned above. Highest 
score is 100 and the lowest is 0.
Do you believe that the directly-elected Legco councillors have enough power 
to monitor government or influence government policy-making?
( ) yes
( ) no
( ) not willing to answer
Do you consider whether the candidates support the Chinese democracy 
movement?
( ) yes
( ) no
( ) not willing to answer
Have you voted in the last Urban or Regional Council elections in May this 
year?
( ) yes
( ) no
( ) can’t remember
Would you mind indicating your sex?
( ) male
( ) female
How old are you?
( ) 21 -25 ( ) 46 - 50
( ) 26 - 30 ( ) 51 - 55
( ) 31 - 35 ( ) 56 -60
( ) 36 -40 ( ) 61 or above
( ) 41 -45
13. What is your educational attainment?
unable to read or write (no schooling)
primary school or below
F.3 level
F.5 level
matriculation
college/university or above
14. Would you mind indicating your personal monthly income range?
( ) HK$ 3,000 or below
( ) HK$ 3,001 - HK$ 5,000
( ) HK$ 5,001 - HK$ 8,000
( ) HK$ 8,001 - HK$10,000
( ) HK$10,001 - HK$15,000
( ) HK$15,001 - HK$20,000
( ) HK$20,001 or above
( ) no income (retired)
15. Where were you bom?
( ) Hong Kong
( ) China
( ) others (please specify)
( ) don’t know
15a. How long have you lived in Hong Kong?
( ) 7 - 1 0  years
( ) 11-20  years
( ) 21 -3 0  years
( ) 31 -4 0  years
( ) 41 years or above
16. How many telephone lines do you have?
346
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Interviews bv Author
Dr Philip C.K. Kwok, J.P., 13 July 1993, Hong Kong. 
Mr Allen Lee, C.B.E., J.P., 1 July 1993, Hong Kong. 
Dr Patrick Shiu Kin-ying, 7 July 1993, Hong Kong.
Mr Tsang Yok-sing, 22 June 1993, Hong Kong.
B. Government Publications
Abercrombie, Patrick. [1948]. Hong Kong: Preliminary Planning Report, n.p.
Assessment Office. 1984. Arrangements for Testing the Acceptability in Hong Kong 
o f the Draft Agreement on the Future of the Territory. Report o f the Assessment 
Office. Report o f the Independent Monitoring Team. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
Blackie, W.J. 1955. Report on Agriculture in Hong Kong with Policy 
Recommendation. Hong kong: Government Printer.
Braga, J.M. 1965. A Hong Kong Bibliography. Hong Kong: Government Press.
Census and Statistics Department. 1969. Hong Kong Statistics 1947-1967. Hong 
Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1975. Hong Kong Social & Economic Trend 1964-1974. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
347
________. 1987. Hong Kong 1986 By-Census, Main Report Vol. 1. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. 1988. Hong Kong 1986 By-Census, Graphic Guide. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. 1992a. Hong Kong 1991 Population Census: Basic Table for District
Board Districts. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1992b. Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics. 1992 Edition. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. 1994. Estimates o f Gross Domestic Product 1966 to 1993. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
Colonial Secretariat. 1971. White Paper: The Urban Council. Hong Kong: 
Government Printer.
Commerce and Industry Department. 1958. Report o f the Hong Kong Commercial 
Mission to Caribbean Countries, Nov.-Dee. 1958. Hong Kong: n.p.
________. 1960. Report of the Hong Kong Commercial Mission to West Africa, Jan.-
Feb. 1960. Hong Kong: n.p.
Commissioner for Resettlement. 1973. Annual Departmental Report 1972-73. Hong 
Kong: Government Printer.
Council of Social Service. 1958. Working Together: A Survey of the Work of 
Voluntary and Government Social Organizations in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: 
Government Printer.
Environment Branch. 1979. Keeping Hong Kong Moving: The White Paper on 
Internal Transport Policy. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
Fisher, N.G. 1951. A Report on Government Expenditure on Education in Hong Kong 
1950. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
Freeman, R.A. 1964. Report on an Export Credits Insurance Scheme for Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong: Government Printer.
Gill, K.L. 1966. 'Recreation for Young People’: A Survey. Hong Kong: Government 
Printer.
Hamilton, G.C. 1969. Government Departments in Hong Kong: 1841-1969. Hong 
Kong: Government Printer.
Hong Kong Annual Report. Yearly.
348
Hong Kong Government. 1949. Report of the Hong Kong Salaries Commission. 
Singapore: Government Printer.
________. 1952. High Education in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1953a. Report on Technical Education and Vocational Training. Hong
Kong: n.p.
________. 1953b. Rent Control. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1954. Papers on Development of Kai Tak Airport. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. 1956a. Report o f the Inter-Departmental Working Party on the Proposed
Cross-Harbour Tunnel. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1956b. Report o f the Working Committee on Tourism. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. 1956c. Report on the Riots in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan, October 10th to
12th, 1956. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1958a. Report of the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Federation of
Industries. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1958b. Final Report of the Special Committee on Housing 1956-1958.
Hong Kong: n.p.
________. 1959. The Problem of Narcotic Drugs in Hong Kong. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. 1961a. Report of the Hong Kong Trade Mission to Australia. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. [1961]b. Reports o f the Standing Committee and the Advisory Committee
on Corruption, 1960-61. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1963a. Statement on Government’s Policy on the Re-organization o f the
Structure of Primary and Secondary Education. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1963b. Report of the Fulton Commission 1963. Hong Kong: Government
Printer.
________. 1963c. Report of Working Party on Export Credit Insurance. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
349
________. 1963d. Report of Working Party on the European Common Market. Hong
Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1963e. Report of the Hong Kong Trade Mission to the Middle East, 27th
Dec. 1962—22nd Jan. 1963. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1963f. Report of the Working Paper on Government Policies and Practices
with Regard to Squatters, Resettlement and Government Low Cost Housing. Hong 
Kong: Government Printer.
________. [1963]g. Development o f Medical Services in Hong Kong. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. 1963h. Shek Pik Water Scheme. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1964a. Aims and Policy for Social Welfare in Hong Kong. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. 1964b. Report o f the Finance of Home Ownership Committee. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. 1964c. Final Report o f the Seamen’s Recruitment Committee. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. 1964d. Review of Policies for Squatter Control, Resettlement and
Government Low-Cost Housing. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1964e. Report o f the Working Committee on Productivity. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. 1964f. Report o f the Hong Kong Government Trade Mission to the
Common Market Countries, October 1963. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1965a. Report o f the Working Committee on Export Promotion
Organization. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1965b. The Report o f the Advisory Committee on Gambling Policy. Hong
Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1965c. Education Policy. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1965d. Report of the Governor in Council o f the Working Party set up to
Advise on the Adequacy of the Law in Relation to Crimes of Violence Committed by 
Young Persons. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1965e. Development o f Medical Services in Hong Kong. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
350
________. 1965f. Report o f the Hong Kong Trade Mission to the East Africa. Hong
Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1965g. The Report o f the Working Party on the Urban Council Franchise
and Electoral Registration Procedure. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1966a. Report o f Advisory Committee on Clinics. Hong Kong: Government
Printer.
________. [1966]b. Hong Kong Trade Mission to Cyprus. Hong Kong: Government
Printer.
________. 1966c. Report o f the Ad Hoc Committee on the Future Scope and
Operation o f the Urban Council. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
 . 1967a. Kowloon Disturbances 1966: Report o f Commission o f Inquiry.
Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1967b. A Report by the Inter-Departmental Working Party to Consider
Aspects o f Social Security. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
 . 1967c. Report of the Working Party on Local Administration. Hong Kong:
Government Press.
________. 1968. Report on the Operation of the Rice Control Scheme in 1967. Hong
Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1971. Chinese Language Committee Report: The First to the Fourth
Report. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1973a. Social Welfare in Hong Kong: The Way Ahead. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________ . 1973b. The Five Year Plan for Social Welfare Development in Hong Kong,
1973-78. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1973c. The Machinery of Government: A New Framework for Expanding
Services. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1974a. The Further Development o f Medical and Health Services in Hong
Kong. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1974b. Transport in Hong Kong: A Paper for Public Information and
Discussion. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1974c. Secondary Education in Hong Kong over the Next Decade. Hong
Kong: Government Printer.
351
________ . 1977a. Integrating the Disabled into the Community: A United Effort.
Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1977b. A Programme of Social Security Development in Hong Kong. Hong
Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1977c. Services for the Elderly. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1977d. Development of Personal Social Work among Young People in
Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1978. The Development of Senior Secondary and Tertiary Education. Hong
Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1979a. Advisory Committee on Diversification Report. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________ . 1979b. Social Welfare into the 1980’s. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1980. Green Paper: A Pattern of District Administration in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1981a. White Paper: District Administration in Hong Kong. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________ . 1981b. Primary Education and Pre-Primary Services: White Paper. Hong
Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1984a. Green Paper: The Further Development o f Representative
Government in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1984b. White Paper: The Further Development of Representative
Government in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1984c. A Review of Public Housing Allocation Policies. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________ . 1985. Green Paper on Housing Subsidy to Tenants o f Public Housing.
Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1986a. Report o f the Committee on Housing Subsidy to Tenants o f Public
Housing. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________ . 1986b. Report o f the Working Party to Review Public Housing Rental
Policy. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
352
________. 1986c. Consultative Document: Redress o f Grievances. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
________. 1987. Green Paper: The 1987 Review o f Developments in Representative
Government. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1988. White Paper: The Development o f Representative Government: The
Way Forward. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
________. 1994. Representative Government in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Government
Printing Department.
Office of Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (OMELCO). 1989. 
Comments on the Basic Law (Draft). Hong Kong: OMELCO.
OMELCO Standing Panel on Constitutional Development. 1988. Report on Draft 
Basic Law. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
Secretariat for Chinese Affairs. 1969. The City District Officer Scheme. Hong Kong: 
Government Printer.
Survey Office. 1987. Public Response to Green Paper: The 1987 Review of 
Developments in Representative Government.Report of the Survey Office: Part 1— 
Report. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
Tomkins, H. J. 1962. Report on the Hong Kong Banking System and Recommendations 
for the Replacement o f the Banking Ordinance 1948. Hong Kong: Government 
Printer.
Urban Council. 1957. Hawkers: A Report with Policy Recommendations. Hong Kong: 
Government Printer.
________. 1969. Report o f the Reform of Local Government. Hong Kong:
Government Printer.
Williams, Gertrude. 1966. Report on the Feasibility of a Survey into Social Welfare 
Provision and Allied Topics in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
Younghusband, Eileen L. 1960. Training for Social Work in Hong Kong: A Report 
Prepared for the Government o f Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
353
C. Books and Articles
Alavi, Hamza. 1972. "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and 
Bangladesh." New Left Review 74:59-82.
________. 1990. "Authoritarianism and Legitimation of State power in Pakistan." In
Subrata Kumar Mitra, ed. The Post-Colonial State: Dialectics o f Politics and Culture, 
pp. 19-71. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
________ and Teodor Shanin, eds. 1982. Introduction to the Sociology of
"Developing Societies". Hampshire: MacMillan.
Alford, Robert. 1963. Party and Society. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Apter, David E. 1971. Choice and the Politics o f Allocation: A Developmental 
Theory. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Au-yung, Bun. 1985. "The Emergence and Breakthrough of Miss Maria Tam." Hong 
Kong Economic Journal Monthly 100:14-6, 88. (in Chinese)
Austin, D.G. 1980. "The Transfer of Power: Why and How." InW. H. Morris-Jones 
and Georges Fischer, eds. Decolonisation and After: The British and French 
Experience, pp. 3-34. London: Frank Cass.
Bacher, B., O. Lorz, & L. Schuknecht. 1992. "Chinese Investment -- ’Hostages’ for 
Hong Kong?" Journal o f Institutional and Theoretical Economics 148:645-54.
Baker, Hugh D.R. 1983. "Life in the Cities: the Emergence of Hong Kong Man." 
China Quarterly 95:469-79.
Bartolini, Stefano and Peter Mair. 1990. Identity, Competition, and Electoral 
Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Berglund, Sten and Soren Risbjerg Thomsen, eds. 1990. Modem Political Ecological 
Analysis. Abo: Abo Akademis Forlag.
Bermeo, Nancy. 1987. "Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison 
of Spain and Portugal." Comparative Politics 19:213-231.
Bemacchi, B[rook] A., et al. 1979. The Hong Kong Urban Council: The Case of the 
Elected Members, n.p.
________. [1989?]. Reform Club 40-Year History: A Brief History. Memo. (Xerox
copy supplied to me by the Reform Club of Hong Kong.)
354
Bemdtson, Erkki. 1985. "The Party System and the Future of the State in Advanced 
Capitalist Countries." International Political Science Review 6:65-80.
von Beyme, Klaus. 1985. "The Role of the State and the Growth of Government." 
International Political Science Review 6:11-34.
Bogdanor, Vernon. 1990. "Founding Elections and Regime Change." Electoral 
Studies 9:288-294.
Brown, Courtney. 1982. "The Nazi Vote: A National Ecological Study." American 
Political Science Review 76:285-302.
Budge, Ian. 1982. "Electoral Volatility: Issue Effects and Basic Change in 23 Post- 
War Democracies." Electoral Studies 1:147-168.
________  and Dennis Farlie. 1983a. Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue
Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies. London: George Allen & 
Unwin.
________. 1983b. "Party Competition: Selective Emphasis or Direct Confrontation?
An Alternative View with Data." In Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds. Western 
European Party Systems: Continuity and Change, pp. 267-305. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Budge, Ian; David Robertson; and Derek Hearl, eds. 1987. Ideology, Strategy and 
Party Change: Spatial Analysis o f Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bums, John P. 1987. "Immigration From China and the Future of Hong Kong." 
Asian Survey 27:661-82.
________. 1988. "Succession Planning and Localization." In Ian Scott and John P.
Bums, eds. The Hong Kong Civil Service and Its Future. Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press.
Butler, David and Donald Strokes. 1974. Political Change in Britain: the Evolution 
of Electoral Choice. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.
Cameron, David R. 1978. "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative 
Analysis." American Political Science Review 72:1243-61.
Campbell, Duncan. 1980. "A Secret Plan for Dictatorship." New Statesman 2598:8-9, 
12 .
Castells, Manuel. 1978. City, Class and Power. Hampshire: MacMillan.
355
________; L. Goh; and R. Y-W. Kwok. 1990. The Shek Kip Mei Syndrome:
Economic Development and Public Housing in Hong Kong and Singapore. London: 
Pion.
Chan Lau, Kit-ching. 1973. "The Hong Kong Question During the Pacific War." 
Journal o f Imperial and Commonwealth History 2:56-77.
________. 1990. China, Britain and Hong Kong 1895-1945. Hong Kong: Chinese
University Press.
Chan, Ming K. 1991. "Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong 
Kong Basic Law, 1985-90." In Ming K. Chan and David J. Clark, eds. The Hong 
Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for "Stability and Prosperity" under Chinese Sovereignty?, 
pp. 3-35. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
________and David J. Clark, eds. 1991. The Hong Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for
”Stability and Prosperity" under Chinese Sovereignty? New York: M.E. Sharpe.
Chan, Thomas M.H. 1988. "The Political Organization of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region." Journal o f Chinese Law 2:115-22.
Chan, Wai Kwan. 1991. The Making of Hong Kong Society: Three Studies o f Class 
Formation in Early Hong Kong. Oxford: Clarendon.
Chao, Chien-min. 1987. "’One Country, Two Systems’: A Theoretical Analysis." 
Asian Affairs 14:107-24.
Cheek-Milby, Kathleen. 1989a. "The Changing Political Role of the Hong Kong Civil 
Servant." Pacific Affairs 62:219-34.
________. 1989b. "The Civil Servant as Politician: The Role of the Official Member
of the Legislative Council." In Kathleen Cheek-Milby and M. Mushkat, ed., Hong 
Kong: The Challenge of Transformation, pp. 256-291. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian 
Studies, University of Hong Kong.
Cheng, Joseph Y.S. 1982a. "The Future of Hong Kong: A Hong Kong Belonger’s 
View." International Affairs 58:476-88.
________, ed. 1982b. Hong Kong in the 1980s. Hong Kong: Summerson.
________, ed. 1984. Hong Kong In Search of a Future. Hong Kong: Oxford
University Press.
________, ed. 1986a. Hong Kong in Transition. Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press.
356
________ . 1986b. "The 1985 District Board Elections in Hong Kong." In Joseph
Y.S. Cheng, ed. Hong Kong in Transition, pp. 67-87. Hong Kong: Oxford University 
Press.
________. 1987. "Hong Kong: the Pressure to Converge." International Affairs
63:271-83.
________. 1989a. "The Democracy Movement in Hong Kong." International Affairs
65:443-62.
________. 1989b. "The Post-1997 Government in Hong Kong: Toward a Stronger
Legislature." Asian Survey 24:731-48.
________. 1989c. "Political Modernization in Hong Kong." Journal of
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 27:294-320.
________ , ed. 1989d. The Road to Political Participation: Collected Essays o f the
Hong Kong Association of Democracy and People’s Livelihood. Hong Kong: Wide 
Angle, (in Chinese)
________. 1989e. "The 1988 District Board Elections: A Study of Political
Participation in the Transitional Period." In Kathleen Cheek-Milby and Miron 
Mushkat, ed. Hong Kong: The Challenge o f Transformation, pp. 116-49. Hong Kong: 
Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong.
Cheng, T.C. 1969. "Chinese Unofficial Members of the Legislative and Executive 
Councils in Hong Kong Up to 1941." Journal of the Hong Kong Branch o f the Royal 
Asiatic Society 9:7-30.
Cheong-leen, Hilton. 1962. Hong Kong Tomorrow: A Collection o f Speeches and 
Articles. Hong Kong: n.p.
Cheung, Anthony B[ing]. L[eung]. 1991. "Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: 
Trends and Limitations." Paper presented at the conference Public Sector Reform in 
Hong Kong: Progress-To-Date and Future Directions, Hong Kong, 26 March 1991.
________and Louie Kin-sheun. 1991. Social Conflicts in Hong Kong, 1975-1986:
Trends and Implications. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Cheung, Kit-fung; Yeung Kin-hing; Lo Wing-hung; and Chan Lu-tze. 1991. No 
Change for Fifty Years? The Tug of War among China, Britain and Hong Kong over 
the Basic Law. Hong Kong: Long-chiu. (in Chinese)
Cheung, Tak-shing. 1985. "An Overall Review on the District Boards Elections." 
Wide Angle Monthly 151:20-2. (in Chinese)
357
Chiu, Hungdah; Y.C. Jao; and Yuan-li Wu, eds. 1987. The Future o f Hong Kong: 
Toward 1997 and Beyond. New York: Quorum.
Clubb, HeromeM.; W.H. Flanigan; and N.H. Zingale. 1990. Partisan Realignment: 
Voters, Parties, and Government in American History. Westview Encore ed. Boulder: 
Westview.
Committee of Hongkong-Kowloon Chinese Compatriots of All Circles for the 
Struggle Against Persecution by the British Authorities in Hong Kong. 1967. The 
May Upheaval in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Committee of Hongkong-Kowloon 
Chinese Compatriots of All Circles for the Struggle Against Persecution by the British 
Authorities in Hong Kong.
Conway, M. Margaret. 1989. "The Political Context of Political Behavior." Journal 
of Politics 51:3-10.
Cooper, John. 1970. Colony in Conflict: The Hong Kong Disturbances Mpy 1967— 
January 1968. Hong Kong: Swindon.
Cottrell, Robert. 1993. The End o f Hong Kong: The Secret Diplomacy o f Imperial 
Retreat. London: John Murray.
Cradock, Percy. 1994a. Experiences of China. London: John Murray.
________. 1994b. "China, Britain and Hong Kong: Policy in a Cul-de-sac." World
Today 50:92-96.
Crewe, Ivor and D. Denver, eds. 1985. Electoral Change in Western Democracies. 
Beckenham: Croom Helm.
Crook, Richard C. 1987. "Legitimacy, Authority and the Transfer of Power in 
Ghana." Political Studies 35:552-572.
Cuthbert, Alexander R. 1991. "A Fistful of Dollars: Legitimation, Production and 
Debate in Hong Kong." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
15:234-49.
Dahl, Robert A. 1967. Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and 
Consent. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Dalton, Russell J.; Scott C. Flanagan; and Paul Allen Beck, eds. 1984. Electoral 
Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Darwin, John. 1988. Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the 
Post-War World. Hampshire: MacMillan.
358
Davies, S.N.G. 1977. "One Brand of Politics Rekindled." Hong Kong Law Journal 
7:44-80.
Davis, S.G. 1949. Hong Kong In Its Geographical Setting. London: Collins.
Deutsch, Karl W. 1986. "State Functions and the Future of the State." International 
Political Science Review 7:209-222.
Devine, Joel A. 1985. "State and State Expenditure: Determinants of Social 
Investment and Social Consumption Spending in the Postwar United States." 
American Sociology Review 50:150-65.
Dicks, Anthony. 1983. "Treaty, Grant, Usage or Sufferance? Some Legal Aspects of 
the Status of Hong Kong." China Quarterly 95:427-455.
Dittmer, Lowell. 1986. "Hong Kong and China’s Modernization." Orbis 30:525-42.
Domes, Jurgen. 1990. "Elections in the People’s Republic of China." In Robert K. 
Furtak, ed. Elections in Socialist States, pp. 143-160. New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf.
________and Yu-Ming Shaw, eds. 1988. Hong Kong: A Chinese and International
Concern. Boulder: Westview.
Doron, Gideon and Moshe Maor. 1991. "Barriers to Entry into a Political System." 
Journal o f Theoretical Politics 3:175-88.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory o f Democracy. New York: Harper.
Drower, George. 1992. Britain's Dependent Territories: A Fistful o f Islands. 
Aldershot: Dartmouth.
Duke, Vic and Stephen Edgell. 1984. "Public Expenditure Cuts in Britain and 
Consumption Sectoral Cleavages." International Journal o f Urban and Regional 
Research 8:177-201.
Duncanson, Dennis. 1988. "The Anglo-Chinese Negotiations." In Jurgen Domes and 
Yu-Ming Shaw, eds. Hong Kong: A Chinese and International Concern, pp. 26-41. 
Boulder: Westview.
Dunleavy, Patrick. 1979. "The Urban Basis of Political Alignment: Social Class, 
Domestic Property Ownership, and State Intervention in Consumption Processes." 
British Journal o f Political Science 9:409-443.
________. 1980a. "The Political Implications of Sectoral Cleavages and the Growth
of State Employment: Part 1, The Analysis of Production Cleavages." Political 
Studies 28:364-383.
359
________. 1980b. "The Political Implications of Sectoral Cleavages and the Growth
of State Employment: Part 2, Cleavage Structures and Political Alignment." Political 
Studies 28:527-549.
Dunn, Lydia Dunn. 1985. "Hong Kong after the Sino-british Declaration." 
International Affairs 61:197-204.
Duvall, Raymond D. and John R. Freeman. 1981. "The State and Dependent 
Capitalism." International Studies Quarterly 25:99-118.
Duverger, Maurice. 1984. "Which is the Best Electoral System?" In Arend Lijphart 
and Bernard Grofman, eds. Choosing An Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives, 
pp. 31-39. New York: Praeger.
Eichenberg, Richard C. 1983. "Problems in Using Public Employment Data." In 
Charles Lewis Taylor, ed. Why Government Grow, pp. 136-53. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Endacott, G.B. 1962. A Biographical Sketch-Book o f Early Hong Kong. Singapore: 
Eastern Universities Press.
________. 1964. Government and People in Hong Kong 1841-1962: A Constitutional
History. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
England, Joe and John Rear. 1975. Chinese Labour Under British Rule: A Critical 
Study o f Labour and Law in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
Evans, Peter B. 1985. "Transnational Linkages and the Economic Role of the State: 
An Analysis of Developing and industrialized Nations in the Post-World War II 
Period." In Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 
Bringing the State Back In, pp. 192-226. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
________; Dietrich Rueschemeyer; and Theda Skocpol, eds. 1985. Bringing the State
Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fifoot, Paul. 1991. "China’s Basic Law for Hong Kong." International Relations 
10:301-327.
Flora, Peter and Jens Alber. 1981. "Modernization, Democratization, and the 
Development of Welfare States in Western Europe." In Peter Flora and Arnold J. 
Heidenheimer, eds. The Development o f Welfare States in Europe and America, pp. 
37-80. New Brunswick & London: Transaction Books.
Flora, Peter and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds. 1981. The Development o f Welfare 
States in Europe and America. New Brunswick & London: Transaction Books.
Foley, Duncan K. 1978. "State Expenditure from a Marxist Perspective." Journal of 
Public Economics 9:221-38.
360
Fong, Peter F.W. 1986. "Citizen Participation and Administrative Decentralisation 
in Hong Kong." Habitat International 10:207-217.
Fong, Wah. 1991. "Hong Kong Political Organisations: Easy to Form but Difficult 
to Grow." Ming Pao Monthly 26 (April):8-9. (in Chinese)
Fung, Yee-wang. 1973. "Some Contributory Factors to Student Movements in Hong 
Kong." Asia Quarterly 4:287-311.
Fung, Yuk-lin. 1990. Embarking on the Road to 1997: Interviews with the Political 
Elites. Hong Kong: Comos Books Ltd. (in Chinese)
Furtak, Robert K, ed. 1990a. Elections in Socialist States. New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf.
________ . 1990b. "The Fundamentals, Characteristics and Trends of Elections in
Socialist States." In Robert K. Furtak, ed. Elections in Socialist States, pp. 4-19. 
New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Ghai, Yash. 1991. "The Past and the Future of Hong Kong’s Constitution." China 
Quarterly 128:794-813.
Ginsberg, Benjamin. 1976. "Elections and Public Policy." American Political Science 
Review 70:41-49.
Goodstadt, L.F. 1969. "Urban Housing in Hong Kong, 1945-63." In I.C. Jarvie and 
J. Agassi, ed., Hong Kong: A Society in Transition. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.
Gould, Frank. 1983. "The Growth of Public Expenditures: Theory and Evidence from 
Six Advanced Democracies." In Charles Lewis Taylor, ed. Why Government Grow, 
pp. 217-39. Beverly Hills: Sage.
________ and Barbara Roweth. 1978. "Politics and Public Spending." Political
Quarterly 49:222-7.
Grinberg, Lev Luis. 1993. "The Crisis of Statehood: A Weak State and Strong 
Political Institutions in Israel." Journal o f Theoretical Politics 5:89-107.
H.K. Lamb. [1985]. A Date with Fate. Hong Kong: Lincoln Green.
Hall, John A. 1986. "State and Economic Development: Reflections on Adam Smith." 
In John A. Hall, ed. States in History, pp. 154-76. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
________, ed. 1986. States in History. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
361
Hambro, Edvard. 1955. The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong. Leyden: 
A.W. Sijthoff.
Hanneman, Robert and J. Rogers Hollingsworth. 1992. "Refocusing the debate on the 
Role of the State in Capitalist Societies." In Rolf Torstendahl, ed. State Theory and 
State History, pp. 38-61. London: Sage.
Harris, Peter. 1975. "Representative Politics in a British Dependency: Some 
Reflections on Problems of Representation in Hong Kong." Parliamentary Affairs 
28:180-98.
________. 1978. Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics. Hong Kong:
Heinemann Asia.
________. 1986. "Hong Kong Confronts 1997: An Assessment of the Sino-British
Agreement." Pacific Affairs 59:45-68.
________. 1988. Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucracy and Politics. Hong Kong:
Macmillan.
Harrop, Martin and William L. Miller. 1987. Elections and Voters. Hampshire: 
MacMillan.
Heaton, William. 1970. "Maoist Revolutionary Strategy and Modem Colonialism: 
The Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong" Asian Survey 10:840-857.
Hermel, Robert and John D. Robertson. 1985. "Formation and Success of New 
Parties: A Cross-National Analysis." International Political Science Review 6:501- 
523.
Hermet, Guy. 1978. "State-Controlled Elections: A Framework." In Guy Hermet, 
Richard Rose and Alain Rouquie, eds. Elections Without Choice, pp. 1-18. London: 
MacMillan.
Ho, Shuet Ying. 1986. "Public Housing." In Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed. Hong Kong in 
Transition, pp. 331-53. Hong Kong: Oxford university Press.
Ho, H.C.Y. 1979. The Fiscal System of Hong Kong. London: Croom Helm.
Hoadley, J. Stephen. 1970. "Hong Kong is the Lifeboat: Notes on Political Culture 
and Socialization." Journal of Oriental Studies 8:206-18.
________ . 1973. "Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese: Patterns and
Trends." Asian Survey 13:604-616.
Holcombe, Randall G. 1991. "Barriers to Entry and Political Competition." Journal 
of Theoretical Politics 3:231-40.
362
Hong Kong Civic Association. 1974. Hong Kong Civic Association: 20th Anniversary, 
1954-1974. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Civic Association.
________ . 1979. Hong Kong Civic Association: 25th Anniversary, 1954-1979. Hong
Kong: Hong Kong Civic Association.
Hong Kong Federation of Students, ed. 1983. A Review o f the Student Movements in 
Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Wide Angle, (in Chinese)
Hong Kong Observers. 1981. Pressure Point. Hong Kong: Summerson Eastern.
________. 1983. Pressure Points: A Social Critique. 2nd ed. Hong Kong:
Summerson.
Hong Kong People’s Council on Public Housing Policy (HKPCPHP). 1988. 
HKPCPHP: 10th Anniversary Souvenir Publication, 1978-88. Hong Kong: 
HKPCPHP. (in Chinese)
Hook, Brain. 1983. "The Government of Hong Kong: Change Within Tradition." 
China Quarterly 95:491-511.
Hopkins, Keith, ed. 1971. Hong Kong: The industrial Colony. Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press.
Hsia, Ronald and Laurence Chau. 1978, Industrialisation, Employment and Income 
Distribution: A Case Study o f Hong Kong. London: Croom Helm.
Hughes, Richard. 1976. Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time: Hong Kong and Its Many 
Faces. 2nd rev. ed. London: Andre Deutsch.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press.
________ . 1974. "Postindustrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?" Comparative
Politics 6:163-191.
________ . 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman & London: University of Oklahoma Press.
________and Joan M. Nelson. 1976. No Easy Choice: Political Participation in
Developing Countries. Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press.
Hurley, R.C. 1925. Picturesque Hong Kong and Dependencies. Hong Kong: 
Commercial Press.
Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles 
Among Western Publics. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press.
363
________. 1984. "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western
Societies." In Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan and Paul Allen Beck, eds. 
Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, pp. 25-69. Princeton N.J.: 
Princeton University Press.
Jao, Y.C.; Leung Chi-keung; Peter Wesley-smith; and Wong Siu-lun, eds. 1985. 
Hong Kong and 1997: Strategies for the Future. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, 
University of Hong Kong.
Jarvie, I.C. 1969. "A Postscript on Riots and the Future of Hong Kong." In I.C. 
Jarvie and Joseph Agassi, eds. Hong Kong: A Society in Transition, pp. 361-369. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
________  and Joseph Agassi, eds. 1969. Hong Kong: A Society in Transition.
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Jeffries, Charles. 1960. Transfer o f Power: Problems o f the Passage to Self- 
Government. London: Pall Mall Press.
Johnson, Graham E. 1986. "1997 and After: Will Hong Kong Survive? A Personal 
View." Pacific Affairs 59:237-54.
Johnston, R.J. 1990. "Lipset and Rokkan Revisited: Electoral Cleavages, Electoral 
Geography, and Electoral Strategy in Great Britain." In R.J. Johnston, F.M. Shelley, 
and P.J. Taylor, eds. Developments in Electoral Geography, pp. 121-42. London: 
Routledge.
Katz, Richard S. 1980. A Theory o f Parties and Electoral Systems. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.
Keung, John. 1985. "Government Intervention and Housing Policy in Hong Kong: 
A structural Analysis" Third World Planning Review 7:23-44.
Key, V.O., Jr. 1955. "A Theory of Critical Elections." Journal o f Politics 17:3-18.
________ . 1959. "Secular Realignment and the Party System." Journal o f Politics
21:198-210.
King, Anthony. 1973. "Ideas, Institutions and the Policies of Governments: A 
Comparative Analysis, Parts I and II, III." British Journal o f Political Science 3:291- 
313, 409-423.
King, Ambrose Y.C. 1975. "The Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong 
Kong: Emphasis on the Grass Roots Level." Asian Survey 15:422-39.
_________and Ranee P.L. Lee, eds. 1981. Social Life and development in Hong
Kong. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
364
Kirkbride, Paul S.; Sara F.Y. Tang; and Robert I. Westwood. 1991. "Chinese 
Conflict Preferences and Negotiating Behaviour: Cultural and Psychological 
influences." Organization Studies 12:365-86.
Knutsen, Oddbjom. 1986. "Plitical Cleavages and Political Realignment in Norway: 
The New Politics Thesis Reexamined.” Scandinavian Political Studies 9:235-263.
Koch, Koen. 1980. "The New Marxist Theory of the State or the Rediscovery of the 
Limitations of a Structure-Functionalist Paradigm. ” Netherlands Journal o f Sociology 
16:1-19.
Kohl, Jurgen. 1981. "Trends and Problems in Postwar Public Expenditure 
Development in Western Europe and North America." In Peter Flora and Arnold J. 
Heidenheimer, eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America, pp. 
307-44. New Brunswick & London: Transaction Books.
________ . 1983. "The Functional Structure of Public Expenditures: Long-Term
Changes." In Charles Lewis Taylor, ed. Why Government Grow, pp. 201-16. 
Beverly Hills: Sage.
Ku, Sing-fai. 1987. Ku Sing-fai’s Discussion on Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Mirror, (in 
Chinese)
Kuan, Hsin-chi. 1979. "Political Stability and Change in Hong Kong." In Lin Tzong- 
biau, Ranee P.L. Lee and Udo-Emst Simonis, eds. Hong Kong: Economic, Social 
and Political Studies in Development, pp. 145-66. New York & Kent: M. E. Sharpe 
& Dawson.
________ . 1991. "Power Dependence and Democratic Transition: The Case of Hong
Kong." China Quarterly 128:774-93.
________and Lau Siu-kai. 1987. "Hong Kong’s Search for a Consensus: Barriers
and Prospects." In Hungdah Chiu, Y.C. Jao, and Yuan-li Wu, eds. The Future of 
Hong Kong: Toward 1997 and Beyond, pp. 95-114. New York: Quorum.
Kurke, Lance B. 1992. "Repression and Restitution: Hong Kong and the PRC." 
Journal o f Contemporary Asia 22:234-48.
Kwan, Siu-wah. 1988. "Hong Kong Walks Quietly into the Era of Party Politics." 
Ming Pao Monthly March: 6-7. (in Chinese)
Kwok, Rowena, Loan Leung and Ian Scott, eds. 1992. Votes Without Power: The 
Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections 1991. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press.
365
Lam, Jermain T.M. and Jane C.Y. Lee. 1992a. The Political Culture o f the Voters 
in Hong Kong: A Study of the Geographical Constituencies o f the Legislative Council 
in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: City Polytechnic of Hong Kong.
________. 1992b. "Allegiance, Apathy, or Alienation? The Political Culture of
Professional Constituency Voters in Hong Kong." Issues & Studies 28,7:76-109.
Lane, Kevin P. 1990. Sovereignty and the Status Quo: The Historical Roots of 
China's Hong Kong Policy. Boulder, Colorado: Westview.
LaPalombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner, eds. 1966. Political Parties and Political 
Development. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Larkey, Patrick D.; Chandler Stolp; and Mark Winer. 1981. "Theorizing About the 
Growth of Government: A Research Assessment." Journal of Public Policy 1:157- 
220.
Lau, Emily. 1988. "The Early History of the Drafting Process." In Peter Wesley- 
Smith and Albert H. Y. Chen, eds. The Basic Law and Hong Kong’s Future, pp. 90- 
104. Hong Kong: Butterworths.
Lau, Siu-kai. 1981. "The Government, Intermediate Organizations, and Grass-Roots 
Politics in Hong Kong." Asian Survey 21:865-84.
________ . 1982. Society and Politics in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Chinese University
Press.
________ . 1983. "Social Change, Bureaucratic Rule, and Emergent Political Issues
in Hong Kong." World Politics 35:544-62.
________ . 1987. Decolonization without Independence: The Unfinished Political
Reforms o f the Hong Kong Government. Hong Kong: Institute of Social Studies, 
Chinese University of Hong Kong.
________ . 1988a. Basic Law and the New Political Order o f Hong Kong. Hong
Kong: Institute of Social Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
________ . 1988b. Hong Kong ’s Political Structure Reform and Political Development.
Hong Kong: Wide Angle, (in Chinese)
________ . 1990. "Institutions Without Leaders: The Hong Kong Chinese View of
Political Leadership." Pacific Affairs 63:191-209.
________ . 1992. Political Attitude toward Political Parties in Hong Kong. Hong
Kong: Hong kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong 
Kong.
366
________and Kuan Hsin-chi. 1983. District Board Elections in Hong Kong. Hong
Kong: Institute of Social Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
________. 1985. The 1985 District Board Election in Hong Kong: The Limits of
Political Mobilization in a Dependent Polity. Hong Kong: Institute of Social Studies, 
Chinese University of Hong Kong.
________. 1986. "Hong Kong After the Sino-British Agreement: The Limits to
Change." Pacific Affairs 59:214-36.
________. 1988. The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese. Hong Kong: Chinese
University Press.
Lau, Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds. 1993. Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 
1991 Elections in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Laver, Michael and W. Ben Hunt. 1992. Policy and Party Competition. New York: 
Routledge.
Lee, J.M. 1967. Colonial Development and Good Government. Oxford: Clarendon.
Lee, Jane C.Y., W.N. Ho, and Jermain T.M. Lam, eds. 1992. A Report o f the 
Conference Proceedings on Politics and 1991 Elections in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: 
City Polytechnic of Hong Kong, Department of Public & Social Administration.
Lee, Martin C.M. 1988. "How Much Autonomy?" In William McGum, ed. Basic 
Law, Basic Questions: The Debate Continues, pp. 37-52. Hong Kong: Review 
Publishing Co. Ltd.
Lee, M[ing].K[wan]. 1982. "Emerging Patterns of Social Conflict in Hong Kong 
Society." In Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed. Hong Kong in the 1980s, pp. 23-31. Hong 
Kong: Summerson.
________. 1993. "Issue-Position in the 1991 Legislative Council Election." In Lau
Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds. Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections 
in Hong Kong, pp. 237-48. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Lee, Su-Hoon. 1988. State-Building in the Contemporary Third World. Boulder: 
Westview.
Lehner, Franz and Ulrich Widmaier. 1983. "Market Failure and Growth of 
Government: A Sociological Explanation." In Charles Lewis Taylor, ed. Why 
Government Grow, pp. 240-60. Beverly Hills: Sage.
367
Lethbridge, H J. 1978. Hong Kong: Stability and Change. Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press.
________ . 1985. Hard Graft in Hong Kong: Scandal, Corruption and the ICAC.
Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
Leung, Benjamin and Stephen Chiu. 1991. A Social History of Industrial Strikes and 
the Labour Movement in Hong Kong, 1946-1989. Hong Kong: Social Sciences 
Research Centre, University of Hong Kong.
Leung, C.B. 1982. "Community Participation: From Kai Fong Association, Mutual 
Aid Committee to District Board." In Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed. Hong Kong in the 
1980s, pp. 152-70. Hong Kong: Summerson.
Leung, Chun-man. 1985. "The Criteria of Appointing District Boards Members and 
the Training of Leaders Capable for Governing Hong Kong: An Interview with Mr 
Albert C.C. Lam." Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly 97:4-6. (in Chinese)
Leung, Joe. 1986. "Community Development in Hong Kong: Contributions Toward 
Democratization." Community Development Journal 21:3-10.
Lewis, D.K. 1982. The Prospects for Hong Kong. London: Institute for the Study of 
Conflict.
Li, Pang-kwong. 1993. "An Exploratory Study of the Rural-Urban Cleavage in the 
1991 Elections." In Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds. Hong Kong Tried 
Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong, pp. 317-29. Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Li, Si-ming and Yu Fu-lai. 1990. "The Redistributive Effects of Hong Kong’s Public 
Housing Programme, 1976-86." Urban Studies 27:105-118.
Liang, Yii-ying. 1990. "Peking’s Hong Kong Policy After Tienanmen." Issues & 
Studies 26(12):71-84.
Lijphart, Arend. 1981. "Political Parties: Ideologies and Programs." In David Butler, 
Howard R. Penniman, and Austin Ranney, eds. Democracy at the Polls: A 
Comparative Study o f Competitive National Elections, pp. 26-51. Washington: 
American Enterprise Institute.
________ . 1990. "The Cleavage Model and Electoral Geography: A Review." In R.J.
Johnston, F.M. Shelley, and P.J. Taylor, eds. Developments in Electoral Geography, 
pp. 143-50. London: Routledge.
________ and Bernard Grofman, eds. 1984. Choosing An Electoral System: Issues
and Alternatives. New York: Praeger.
368
Linz, J. Juan. 1973. "Opposition to and under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case 
of Spain." In Robert A. Dahl, ed. Regimes and Oppositions, pp. 171-259. New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Lipset, Seymour M. 1960. Political Man. New York: Doubleday.
________ and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter
Alignment: An Introduction." In Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds. Party System 
and Voter Alignments, pp. 1-64. New York: Free Press.
Liu, Yiu Chu. 1988. "Interpretation and Review of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region." Journal of Chinese Law 2:49-63.
Lo, Shiu-hing. 1988. "Decolonization and Political Development in Hong Kong: 
Citizen Participation." Asian Survey 28:613-29.
 . 1989. "Colonial Policy-Makers, Capitalist Class and China: Determinants
of Electoral Reform in Hong Kong’s and Macau’s Legislatures." Pacific Affairs 
62:204-18.
 . 1990. "Democratization in Hong Kong: Reasons, Phases, and Limits."
Issues and Studies 26 (May 1990): 100-17.
Lo, Wai. 1990. "Mr Fung Kin-kee Forms another Democratic Group."
Contemporary 21 April:38-9. (in Chinese)
Louie, Kin-sheun and Wan Po-san. 1992. Voting Behaviour o f the Hong Kong 
Electorate: A Review of the Past Studies. Paper submitted to Steering Group on Study 
of Voting Behaviour, Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education, Hong Kong, 
March 1992.
Louie, Kin-sheun et al. 1993. "Who Voted in the 1991 Elections? A Socio- 
Demographic Profile of the Hong Kong Electorate." In Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin- 
sheun, eds. Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong, pp. 1- 
39. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Institute of Asia- 
Pacific Studies, 1993.
Lui, T.L. and K.S. Kung. 1985. Urban Movements and Politics in Hong Kong. Hong 
Kong: Wide Angle, (in Chinese)
MacDonald, Stuart Elaine; Ola Listhaug; and George Rabinowitz. 1991. "Issues and 
Party Support in Multiparty Systems." American Political Science Review 85:1107- 
1131.
Mann, Michael. 1984. "The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms 
and Result." Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 25:185-213.
369
________. 1986. The Sources of Social Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 1967. The Communist Manifesto. Middlesex: 
Penguin.
Mavrogordatos, George Th. 1987. "Downs Revisited: Spatial Models of Party 
Competition and Left-Right Measurements." International Political Science Review 
8:333-342.
McGum, William, ed. 1988. Basic Law, Basic Questions: The Debate Continues. 
Hong Kong: Review Publishing Co. Ltd.
________. 1992. Perfidious Albion: The Abandonment o f Hong Kong 1997.
Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Centre.
Migdal, Joel S. 1988. Strong Societies and Weak State: State-Society Relations and 
State Capabilities in the Third World. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Miners, Norman. 1975. "Hong Kong: A Case Study in Political Stability" Journal o f 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 13:2-39.
________. 1988. "The Normal Pattern of Decolonisation of British Dependent
Territories." In Peter Wesley-Smith & Albert H.Y. Chen, eds., The Basic Law and 
Hong Kong’s Future, pp. 44-54. Hong Kong: Butterworths.
________. 1989. "Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1945-1952 and 1984-1989."
Asian Journal of Public Administration 11:92-103.
________. 1991. The Government and Politics of Hong Kong. 5th ed. Hong Kong:
Oxford University Press.
Mitra, Subrata Kumar, ed. 1990. The Post-Colonial State in Asia: Dialectics of 
Politics and Culture. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Mok, Bong-ho. 1988. "Influence Through Political Power: The Emergence of Social 
Workers as Politicians in the Recent Political Reform in Hong Kong." International 
Social Work 31:249-262.
Morris, J.C. 1978. "Administration and Finance of Public Housing." In Luke S.K. 
Wong, ed. Housing in Hong Kong, pp. 55-71. Hong Kong: Heinemann.
Mushkat, Miron. 1990. "The Political Economy of Constitutional Change in Hong 
Kong." Asian Economies 75:33-53.
Nettl, J.P. 1967. Political Mobilization: A Sociological Analysis o f Methods and 
Concepts. London: Faber and Faber.
370
________. 1968. "The State as a Conceptual Variable." World Politics 20:559-92.
New Hong Kong Society. 1983. New Hong Kong Society: 1st Anniversary Souvenir 
Publication. Hong Kong: New Hong Kong Society, (in Chinese)
Ng, Yin. 1985. "The Outlook of the Hong Kong Multi-parties Politics." Cheng Ming 
Monthly June 1985:46-8. (in Chinese)
Nordlinger, Eric A. 1981. On the Autonomy of the Democratic State. Mass.: Harvard 
University Press.
Nossiter, T.J. 1982. Communism in Kerala: A Study in Political Adaptation. London:
C. Hurst & Co.
Nthenda, Louis. 1979. "Recent Trends in Government and Industry Relationships in 
Hong Kong." In Tzong-biau Lin, Ranee P.L. Lee, and Udo-Emst Simonis, eds. Hong 
Kong: Economic, Social and Political Studies in Development, pp. 167-81. New York 
& Kent: M.E. Sharpe & Dawson.
O’Connor, James. 1973. The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press.
O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore 
& London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Paddock, Joel. 1990. "Beyond the New Deal: Ideological Differences between Eleven 
State Democratic Parties, 1956-1980." Western Political Quarterly 43:181-190.
Peter, B. Guy and Martin O. Heisler. 1983. "Thinking About Public Sector Growth: 
Conceptual, Operational, Theoretical, and Policy Considerations." In Charles Lewis 
Taylor, ed., Why Government Grow, pp. 177-97. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Podmore, David. 1971. "Localisation in the Hong Kong Government Service 1948- 
1968." Journal o f Commonwealth Political Studies 9:36-51.
Przeworski, Adam. 1975. "Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or is Mobilization 
the Source of Decay?" American Political Science Review 69:49-67.
________and John Sprague. 1986. Paper Stones: A History o f Electoral Socialism.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rabushka, Alvin. 1973. The Changing Face of Hong Kong: New Departures in Public 
Policy. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, and Stanford: Hoover 
Institution.
371
________. 1976. Value for Money: The Hong Kong Budgetary Process. Stanford:
Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press.
________ . 1979. Hong Kong: A Study in Economic Freedom. Chicago: University of
Chicago.
Rae, Douglas W. and Michael Taylor. 1970. The Analysis o f Political Cleavages. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Rear, John. 1971. "One Brand of Politics" In Keith Hopkins, ed., Hong Kong: The 
industrial Colony, pp. 55-139. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
Reeve, Andrew and Alan Ware. 1992. Electoral Systems: A Comparative and 
Theoretical Introduction. London and New York: Routledge.
Reform Club of Hong Kong. 1953. Election Chronicle 1953. Hong Kong: Reform 
Club of Hong Kong.
________ . 1959. 10th Anniversary, 1949-1959. Hong Kong: Reform Club of Hong
Kong.
________ . 1974. Silver Jubilee Anniversary Souvenir Publication, 1949-1974. Hong
Kong: Reform Club of Hong Kong.
Remmer, Karen L. 1985. "Redemocratization and the Impact of Authoritarian Rule 
in Latin America." Comparative Politics 17:253-75.
Riley, Mike. 1988. Power, Politics and Voting Behaviour. New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf.
Rokkan, Stein. 1970. Citizens, Elections, Parties, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
________. 1975. "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building." In Charles
Tilly, ed., The Formation o f National State in Western Europe, pp. 562-600. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
________and Derek W. Urwin, eds. 1982. The Politics o f Territorial Identity:
Studies in European Regionalism. London: Sage.
Rose, Richard, ed. 1980. Electoral Participation: A Comparative Analysis. Beverly 
Hills & London: Sage.
________ . 1981. "What If Anything is Wrong with Big Government?" Journal of
Public Policy 1:5-36.
________ . 1983. "Disaggregating the Concept of Government." In Charles Lewis
Taylor, ed., Why Government Grow, pp. 157-76. Beverly Hills: Sage.
372
________ and Ian McAllister. 1990. The Loyalties o f Voters: A Lifetime Learning
Model. London: Sage.
Rose, Richard and Harve Mossawir. 1967. "Voting and Elections: A Functional 
Analysis." Political Studies 15:173-201.
Roy, Denny. 1991. "The Rabbit Awaits the Tiger: Hong Kong’s View of the Peking 
Regime." Issues & Studies 27(7):61-78.
Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber. 1987. "State Formation in Asia--Prolegomenon to a 
Comparative Study." Journal o f Asian Studies 46:731-46.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Peter B. Evans. 1985. "The State and Economic 
Transformation: Toward an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective 
Intervention." In Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. 
Bringing the State Back In , pp. 44-77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Salisbury, Robert H. and Michael MacKuen. 1981. "On the Study of Party 
Realignment." Journal o f Politics 43:523-530.
Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scarbrough, Elinor. 1991. "Micro and Macro Analysis of Elections." European 
Journal o f Political Research 19:361-374.
Schiffer, Jonathan R. 1991. "State Policy and Economic Growth: A Note on the Hong 
Kong Model." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 15:180-96.
Schmidt, Manfred G. 1983. "The Growth of the Tax State: The Industrial 
Democracies, 1950-1978." In Charles Lewis Taylor, ed. Why Government Grow, pp. 
261-85. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Schneider, William. 1974. "Issues, Voting, and Cleavages: A Methodology and Some 
Tests." American Behavioral Scientist 18:111-146.
________ . 1980. "Styles of Electoral Competition." In Richard Rose, ed. Electoral
Participation: A Comparative Analysis, pp. 75-100. Beverly Hills & London: Sage.
Scott, Ian. [1980]. Administrative Adaptation and the New Towns Policy in Hong 
Kong. memo. Hong Kong: Department of Political Science, University of Hong 
Kong.
________ . 1986. "Sino-British Agreement and Political Power in Hong Kong." Asian
Pacific Community 31:1-18.
373
________. 1989. Political Change and the Crisis o f Legitimacy in Hong Kong.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
________ . 1992. "An Overview of the Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections of
1991." In Rowena Kwok, Loan Leung and Ian Scott, eds. Votes Without Power: The 
Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections 1991, pp. 1-28. Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press.
_________and John P. Bums, eds. 1988. The Hong Kong Civil Service and Its
Future. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
Secretariat of the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law (CCBL). 1988. Drafting 
of the Basic Law and the "Mainstream Political Model". Hong Kong: CCBL.
________. 1989a. Reference Papers for the Basic Law o f the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region o f the People’s Republic o f China (Draft). Hong Kong: 
Secretariat of the CCBL of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China.
________. 1989b. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the People’s Republic o f China (Draft): Consultation report, Vol. 2. Hong Kong: 
Secretariat of the CCBL of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China.
Shaffer, Bretigne. 1991. "Beijing, the West, and the Approaching Sack of Hong 
Kong." Orbis 35:327-45.
Shamir, Michal. 1984. "Are Western Party Systems ’Frozen’? A Comparative 
Dynamic Analysis." Comparative Political Studies 17:135-79.
Shawcross, William. 1989. Kowtowl London: Chatto & Windus.
Shively, W. Phillips. 1969. "’Ecological’ Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to 
Study Individuals." American Political Science Review 63:1183-1196.
Silverman, Lawrence. 1991. "Beyond the Micro/Macro Distinction." European 
Journal o f Political Research 19:375-397.
Skeldon, Ronald. 1990. "Emigration and the Future of Hong Kong." Pacific Affairs 
63:500-23.
Skocpol, Theda. 1985. "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current 
Research." In Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., 
Bringing the State Back In, pp. 3-37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Slinn, Peter. 1987. "The Hong Kong Settlement: A Preliminary Assessment." 
International Relations 9:1-22.
374
Smith, Carl T. 1971. "The Emergence of a Chinese Elite in Hong Kong." Journal 
of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 11:74-115.
So, Alvin Y. and Ludmilla Kwitko. 1990. "The New Middle Class and the 
Democratic Movement in Hong Kong." Journal o f Contemporary Asia 20:384-98.
________. 1992. "The Transformation of Urban Movements in Hong Kong, 1970-
90." Bulletin o f Concerned Asian Scholars 24:32-43.
Strath, Bo and Rolf Torstendahl. 1992. "State Theory and State Development: State 
as Network Structure in Change in Modem European History." In Rolf Torstendahl, 
ed. State Theory and State History, pp. 12-37. London: Sage.
Sun Wai-see. 1987. The Collection of Political Essays o f Sun Wai-see. Hong Kong: 
Ming Pao Publishing Co. (in Chinese)
________. 1990. The New Collection of Political Essays of Sun Wai-see. Hong
Kong: Ming Pao Publishing Co. (in Chinese)
Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment 
of Political Parties in the United States, rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution.
Sung, Y.W. 1986. "Fiscal and Economic Policies in Hong Kong." In Joseph Y.S. 
Cheng, ed., Hong Kong in Transition, pp. 120-41. Hong Kong: Oxford university 
Press.
Szczepanik, Edward. 1958. The Economic Growth o f Hong Kong. London: Oxford 
University Press.
Sze Ma, Yee. 1984. "The Negotiation of Hong Kong Future with All Glories Goes 
to Deng Xiaoping." Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly 91:5-48. (in Chinese)
Tang, Shu-hung. 1991. "Fiscal Constitution, Income Distribution and the Basic law 
of Hong Kong." Economy and Society 20:281-305.
________. 1992. The Public Finance o f Hong Kong in the Late-Transitional Period.
Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, (in Chinese)
Tang, Stephen Lung-wai. 1993. "Political Markets, Competition, and the Return to 
Monopoly: Evolution Amidst a Historical Tragedy." In Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin- 
sheun, eds. Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong, pp. 
249-96. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong.
Tarschys, Daniel. 1975. "The Growth of Public Expenditures: Nine Modes of 
Explanation." Scandinavian Political Studies 10:9-31.
375
Taylor, Charles Lewis, ed. 1983. Why Governments Grow: Measuring Public Sector 
Size. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Thatcher, Margaret. 1993. The Downing Street Years. London: Harper Collins.
Therbom, Goran. 1992. "The Right to Vote and the Four World Routes to/through 
Modernity." In Rolf Torstendahl, ed. State Theory and State History, pp. 62-92. 
London: Sage.
Thomas, George M., and John W. Meyer. 1984. "The Expansion of the State." 
Annual Review o f Sociology 10:461-82.
Thomsen, Soren Risbjerg. 1987. Danish Elections 1920-79: A Logit Approach to 
Ecological Analysis and Inference. Aarhus: Politica.
Tilly, Charles, ed. 1975a. The Formation o f National State in Western Europe. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
________. 1975b. "Reflections on the History of European State-Making." In Charles
Tilly, ed. The Formation of National State in Western Europe, pp. 3-83. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press.
________. 1975c. "Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation."
In Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National State in Western Europe, pp. 601- 
38. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Torstendahl, Rolf, ed. 1992. State Theory and State History. London: Sage.
Tsai, Jung-fang. 1993. Hong Kong in Chinese History: Community and Social Unrest 
in the British Colony, 1842-1913. New York: Columbia University Press.
Tsang, Steve Yui-sang. 1988. Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and 
Attempts at Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1945-1952. Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press.
________. 1989. "China and Political Reform in Hong Kong." Pacific Review 2:68-
74.
Tsang, Wing-kwong. 1993. "Who Voted for the Democrats? An Analysis of the 
Electoral Choice of the 1991 Legislative Council Election." In Lau Siu-kai and Louie 
Kin-sheun, eds. Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong, pp. 
115-155. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Institute of 
Asia-Pacific Studies, 1993.
Tsim, T.L. 1984. "1997: Peking’s Strategy for Hong Kong." World Today 40:37-45.
376
________. 1991. "Beijing Hijacks Hong Kong Autonomy." Asian Wall Street Journal
29 January, p. 10.
Walden, John. 1983. Excellency, Your Gap is Showing! Six Critiques on British 
Colonial Government in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Corporate Communication Ltd.
________. 1987. Excellency, Your Gap is Growing! Six Talks on a Chinese
Takeaway. Hong Kong: All Noble Company Ltd.
________. 1988. "Accountability: Past, Present and Future." In William McGum,
ed. Basic Law, Basic Questions: The Debate Continues, pp. 53-68. Hong Kong: 
Review Publishing Co. Ltd.
Ware, Alan, ed. 1987. Political Parties: Electoral Change and Structural Response. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Weatherford, M. Stephen. 1987. "How Does Government Performance Influence 
Political Support?" Political Behavior 9:5-28.
Weiner, Myron. 1987. "Empirical Democratic Theory." In Myron Weiner and Ergun 
Ozbudun, eds. Competitive Elections in Developing Countries, pp. 3-34. N.A.: Duke 
University Press, for American Enterprise Institute.
________and Ergun Ozbudun, eds. 1987. Competitive Elections in Developing
Countries. N.A.: Duke University Press, for American Enterprise Institute.
Weiss, Julian. 1988. "The Negotiation Style of The People’s Republic of China: The 
Future of Hong Kong and Macao." Journal of Social, Political and Econmoic Studies 
13:175-194.
Wellhofer, E. Spencer. 1991. "Confounding Sources of Variance in the Macro- 
Analysis of Electoral Data." European Journal o f Political Research 19:425-439.
Welsh, Frank. 1993. A History o f Hong Kong. London: Harper Collins.
Weng, Byron S.J. 1987. "The Hong Kong Model of ’One Country, Two Systems’: 
Promises and Problems." Asian Affairs 14:193-209.
Wesley-Smith, Peter. 1980. Unequal Treaty 1898-1997. Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press.
________ and Albert H.Y. Chen, eds. 1988. The Basic Law and Hong Kong's
Future. Hong Kong: Butterworths.
Wight, Martin. 1946. The Development of the Legislative Council 1606-1945. 
London: Faber & Faber.
377
Wilkinson, Paul. 1983. "Hong Kong: a One-Way Ticket to an Unknown Destination." 
Government and Opposition 18:442-57.
Wong, Aline K. 1970-71. Political Apathy and the Political System in Hong Kong," 
United College Journal 8:1-20.
________. 1972a. The Kaifong Associations and the Society of Hong Kong. Taipei:
Orient Cultural Service.
________. 1972b. The Study of Higher Non-Expatriate Civil Servants in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong: Social Research Centre, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
________. 1972c. "Chinese Community Leadership in a Colonial Setting." Asian
Survey 12:587-601.
Wong, C.K. 1990. "The Advocacy Role of Social Work in a Changing Political 
Environment: Its Dilemmas and Challenges in Hong Kong." Community Development 
Journal 25:399-404.
Wong, Chack-kie. 1993. Social Work and Social Change: A Profile o f the Activist 
Social Workers in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific 
Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Wong, Fu-wing. 1990. "The Background and Problems of Forming Political Party 
among ’Democratic Groups’." Contemporary 10 February:23-4; 17 February:28-9; 
24 February:28-9. (in Chinese)
Wong, Jeremiah K.H. 1982. "Separatism and Convergence: Pattern of Administrative 
Adaptation in the New Territories." In Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed. Hong Kong in the 
1980s, pp. 13-21. Hong Kong: Summerson.
Wong, Luke S. K., ed. 1978. Housing in Hong Kong: A Multi-Disciplinary Study. 
Hong Kong: Heinemann.
Wong, Richard Y.C. and Joseph Y.S. Cheng, eds. 1990. The Other Hong Kong 
Report 1990. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
Xiao, Weiyun. 1988. "A Study of the Political System of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region Under the Basic Law." Journal of Chinese Law 2:95-113.
Xu, Jiatun. 1993. Xu Jiatun ’s Hong Kong Memoirs. 2 Vols. Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
United Daily News, (in Chinese)
Yahuda, Michael. 1993. "Hong Kong’s Future: Sino-British Negotiations, 
Perceptions, Organization and Political Culture." International Affairs 69:245-266.
378
Yee, Herbert S. and Wong Yiu-chung. 1987. "Hong Kong: The Politics of the Daya 
Bay Nuclear Plant Debate." International Affairs 63:617-630.
Yip, Tze-chin. 1984. "The Political Wake-up of Hong Kong’s New Generation of 
Intelligentsia." Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly 92:40-3. (in Chinese)
Yip, Chi-chao. 1991. "The Chinese Deployment Towards the 1991 Direct Elections." 
Hong Kong Economic Times, 12 September 1991. (in Chinese)
Yu, Fu-lai and Li Si-ming. 1985. "The Welfare Cost of Hong Kong’s Public Housing 
Programme." Urban Studies 22:133-40.
Zhang, Youyu. 1988. "The Reasons for and Basic Principles in Formulating the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region Basic Law, And Its Essential Contents and Mode 
of Expression." Journal o f Chinese Law 2:5-19.
Zuckerman, Alan S. 1982. "New Approaches to Political Cleavage: A Theoretical 
Introduction." Comparative Political Studies 15:131-144.
D. Journals and Newspapers 
Cheng Ming Magazine, monthly.
Contemporary, weekly (before 15 April 1991) and monthly (after 15 April 1991). 
Far Eastern Economic Review, weekly.
Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly.
Hong Kong Standard
The Nineties Magazine, Monthly.
Ming Pao Daily News
Ming Pao Monthly
Pai Shing Bi-monthly Magazine.
South China Morning Post
379
